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Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG-RSP Document 136 Filed 01/30/20 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 5450
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Civil Action No.: 2:18-cv-00551-JRG
`
`v.
`
`PATENT CASE
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Defendant.
`
`UNILOC 2017’S REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`Google v. Uniloc, IPR2020-00757
`Uniloc's Exhibit 2002
`
`

`

`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG-RSP Document 136 Filed 01/30/20 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 5451
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS.............................................................................. 1
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`A. Terms 1-3 – the “recursive filtering step” (claim 1) ...................................................... 1
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`B. Terms 4-5: The “Transformed” Terms ......................................................................... 2
`
`i
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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG-RSP Document 136 Filed 01/30/20 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 5452
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`I. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
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`A. Terms 1-31 – the “recursive filtering step” (claim 1)
`
`Google’s indefiniteness argument against claim 1 rests on its faulty assumption that “a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art would be left to choose among at least … four interpretations”
`
`due to the use of terms “intended to” and “such as” in the claim’s “wherein” clause of the claim’s
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`recursive filtering step. Dkt. 130 at 5-6. But Google has not shown that a person of ordinary skill
`
`would, in fact, find the recursive filtering step of claim 1 indefinite. As noted in Uniloc’s
`
`opening brief, Google proposed an alternative construction of “plain and ordinary meaning” for
`
`the term. And rather than providing evidence of indefiniteness, Google presents only attorney
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`argument.
`
`Google bases its attorney argument on the misleading decision to argue the language of
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`the claim out of order. The claim recites “said filtering step using a recursive filter wherein the
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`recursive filtering step is intended to use a recursive filter such as: [the equation of claim 1].” But
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`Google’s argument switches the “such as” language so that it appears to occur before the
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`“intended to” language. Dkt. 130 at 3 (“[Claim 1] delineates ‘a recursive filter such as: ….’ and
`
`then precedes that phrase with ‘is intended to use.’”) (emphasis in original). Though Google
`
`appears to agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the meaning of a
`
`“recursive filter,” as Google did not allege indefiniteness of this term, it asks the Court to believe
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`that this same person of ordinary skill in the art would be confused to the point of indefiniteness
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`where an exemplary “recursive filter” is then provided in the claim. Id. at 3-4. This is illogical
`
`and wrong.
`
`Also absent from Google’s argument is any authority to support its position that the
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`recitation of an exemplary recursive filter (“such as …”) renders the interpretation of the
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`“recursive filter step” unclear. Rather, absolute precision in claim language is not required. See
`
`
`1 Google has withdrawn its request to have terms 2 and 3 and construed. Cf. Dkt. 121 at 6-8 with
`Dkt. 130 n.1.
`
`1
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`

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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG-RSP Document 136 Filed 01/30/20 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 5453
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`One-E-Way, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 859 F.3d 1059, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Nautilus,
`
`Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 908-910 (2014) and Interval Licensing LLC v.
`
`AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
`
`Nevertheless, Google asserts that the recursive filter step is “a facially ambiguous
`
`limitation containing the phrases ‘intended to’ and ‘such as’” (Dkt. 130 at 1) and points the Court
`
`to a section of the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure concerning exemplary language.
`
`Ironically, Google’s citation completely rebuts Google’s contention that the element is “facially
`
`ambiguous.” M.P.E.P. § 2173.05(d) states directly: “Note that the mere use of the phrase ‘such
`
`as’ or ‘for example’ in a claim does not by itself render the claim indefinite.” M.P.E.P. §
`
`2173.05(d) further advises an examiner “should analyze whether the metes and bounds of the
`
`claim are clearly set forth.” Thus, the fact that the examiner here accepted this “wherein” clause
`
`to overcome a rejection, as Google acknowledges, should be the end of the story. See Dkt. 130 at
`
`4.
`
`Google also ignores the remainder of claim 1’s terms while addressing the “intended to”
`
`language of the “wherein” clause. Google alleges that this phrase’s appearance in the claim
`
`creates ambiguity. Dkt. 130 at 5. But it is hardly remarkable that the claimed “filtering step using
`
`a recursive filter” is “intended to use a recursive filter,” as recited. Google’s indefiniteness theory
`
`should be rejected.
`
`B. Terms 4-5: The “Transformed” Terms
`
`Google’s constructions ask the Court to restrict the plain and ordinary term “transformed”
`
`in claims 1 and 4 to a particular transformation involving the steps of performing a discrete
`
`cosine transform and an inverse quantization. In support, Google cites to multiple pages of an
`
`extrinsic text and portions of the specification of the ’960 patent. Neither item supports a
`
`departure from the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language.
`
`
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`2
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`

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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG-RSP Document 136 Filed 01/30/20 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 5454
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`Google starts with the extrinsic text, contending:
`
`In the video encoding context applicable to the ’960 Patent, the
`word “coefficients” reflects data resulting from a discrete cosine
`transform, which transforms picture pixels into coefficients. Ex. B
`at 25–27. The term “transformed coefficients” therefore denotes
`video data that has been discrete cosine transformed.
`
` Dkt. 130 at 8 (emphasis added).2 Google’s argument, based on extrinsic evidence and presented
`
`without evidence of how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted this extrinsic
`
`evidence, is circular. Google’s starting point is text explaining a discrete cosine transform and
`
`Google’s “therefore” conclusion ends with the same discrete cosine transform explanation. But
`
`nothing in Exhibit B provides the definition for “transformed coefficients” and “transformed
`
`signals” sought by Google. Nor does Google’s argument mandate a departure from the plain
`
`language of the claims.
`
`Regarding the specification, as best can be understood, Google’s construction seeks to
`
`add an upstream encoding of a particular format based on the specification’s use of the word
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`“transcoding” interpreted by revisiting the extrinsic text. Dkt. 130 at 8-9 (requiring “motion
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`estimation, discrete cosine transform, quantization, and variable-length coding” based on pages
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`“25-30” of Ex. B) (emphasis in original). Again, Google’s argument is circular and requires
`
`encoding using a discrete cosine transform based on extrinsic evidence.
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`
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`Further, Google effectively admits that its requirement of “inverse quantization” does not
`
`flow from the term “transformed coefficients” or “transformed signals” but instead is based on a
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`different recitation in the claims of “dequantizing” or “dequantization.” Dkt. 130 at 8. As such,
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`there is no reason to saddle the terms “transformed coefficients” or “transformed signals” with
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`such a requirement.
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`Google also cannot avoid other citations in the specification where a transformed signal
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`is present without requiring both a discrete cosine transform and inverse quantization. In
`
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`2 It is unclear which three pages of Ex. B Google is actually relying upon—pages 25-27 (or 25-
`30) of the exhibit or pages 25-27 (or 25-30) as numbered in the text.
`3
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`

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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG-RSP Document 136 Filed 01/30/20 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 5455
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`particular, Google admits that the signal Rmc, the “transformed motion-compensated signal,” is
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`not quantized:
`
`The “transformed motion-compensated signal (Rmc)” in Figure 2
`represents the output of the prediction channel. Id. at Figure 2,
`5:33–34. Just like the “first transformed signal” and “filtered
`transformed signal,” the “transformed motion compensated signal”
`has been discrete cosine transformed (at box 19) but not
`quantized. Id.
`
`Dkt. 130 at 10 (emphasis added). Yet, Google merely asserts that signal Rmc supports Google’s
`
`position (id.) when, in fact, signal Rmc, a “transformed … signal,” is produced without any
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`quantization or any inverse quantization.
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`The disputed claim terms should be construed as proposed by Uniloc.
`
`Dated: January 30, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ James L. Ethridge
`James L. Etheridge, TX Bar No. 24059147
`Ryan S. Loveless, TX Bar No. 24036997
`Brett A. Mangrum, TX Bar No. 24065671
`Travis L. Richins, TX Bar No. 24061296
`Jeff Huang (Admitted E.D. Tex.)
`Etheridge Law Group, PLLC
`2600 E. Southlake Blvd., Suite 120 / 324
`Southlake, TX 76092
`Tel.: (817) 470-7249
`Fax: (817) 887-5950
`Jim@EtheridgeLaw.com
`Ryan@EtheridgeLaw.com
`Brett@EtheridgeLaw.com
`Travis@EtheridgeLaw.com
`Jeff@EtheridgeLaw.com
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`

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`Case 2:18-cv-00551-JRG-RSP Document 136 Filed 01/30/20 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 5456
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic
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`service are being served with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local
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`Rule CV-5(a)(3).
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`
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`DATED: January 30, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ James L. Etheridge
`James L. Etheridge
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
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`

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