Case 6:18-cv-00308-ADA Document 90 Filed 10/02/19 Page 1 of 15
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`
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`MV3 PARTNERS LLC,
` Plaintiff
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`-v-
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`ROKU, INC.,
` Defendant
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`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`6:18-CV-00308-ADA
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER
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`Before the Court are the parties’ claim construction briefs: Plaintiff MV3 Partners’
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`(“MV3”) opening, responsive, and reply briefs (ECF No. 64, 73, and 77, respectively) and
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`Defendant Roku’s opening, responsive, and reply briefs (ECF No. 68, 72, and 76, respectively).
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`The Court held the Markman hearing on July 19, 2019. ECF Nos. 82–83. During that hearing,
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`the Court informed the Parties of the constructions it intended to provide. This Order does not
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`alter any of those constructions.
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`I.
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`Background
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`MV3 filed this lawsuit on October 16, 2018 alleging that Roku infringed U.S. Patent No.
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`8,863,223. ECF No. 1. Roku answered on January 22, 2019. ECF No. 39. MV3 asserts claims
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`1–3, 5, 6, 15, 21, 23, 25, 29–35, 37, 38, 47, 53, 55–57, 59, and 61.
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`The ’223 Patent is entitled “Mobile set top box.” According the specification of the ’223
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`Patent, the invention described therein solved at least the two of the problems that were present
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`in the prior art. First, prior art set top boxes could “only be used with the network that provides
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`the box,” e.g., Comcast or Verizon FIOS. ’223 Patent at 1:32–35. Second, prior art mobile
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`computing devices could not “up-convert” the content intended for a mobile computing device,
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`1
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`Parus Exhibit 2009
`Apple Inc. v. Parus Holdings, Inc.
`IPR2020-00686
`Page 1 of 15
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`

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`Case 6:18-cv-00308-ADA Document 90 Filed 10/02/19 Page 2 of 15
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`which may have a three inch screen, so that the content properly fits on a large screen high-
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`definition television. Id. at 2:38-61.
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`The ’223 Patent describes a mobile set top box that “acts as a conduit between disparate
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`data networks and display devices.” Id. at 2:65-67. Figure 4 illustrates the implementation of a
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`disclosed embodiment. Id. at 3:59–61.
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`Label 38 in Figure 4 refers to different types of existing source content, e.g., TV feeds,
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`live broadcasts, and internet/downloadable content, which are stored on disparate data networks.
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`Id. at 5:27–29. Label 42 refers to the new content management, which provides, for example, a
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`program guide, remote control functionality, and content filtering. Id. at 5:45–51. Label 40
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`refers to potential wired and wireless networks that may be used to transfer the content from each
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`data network to the mobile set top box. Id. at 5:48–51. Labels 20 and 22 refer to the mobile
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`2
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`Parus Exhibit 2009, Page 2 of 15
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`computing device and the docking station, respectively. Id. at 5:33–35. The mobile computing
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`device and the docking station may be combined into one device. Id. at 4:49–54 (“As illustrated,
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`the cellular phone 20 merely passes information to the docking station 22 and is controlled by the
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`docking station 22. However, the functionality of the mobile set top box 10 can be in either
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`device. In addition, the mobile phone 20 and docking station 22 can be combined into one
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`device.”); see also id. at Fig. 4. After receiving the content from the mobile computing device,
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`the docking station up-scales the content and displays it on the television. Id. at 5:40–43. The
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`connection between the docking station and television may be wired or wireless. Id. at 5:64–65
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`see also id. at Fig. 4.
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`II.
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`Legal Principles
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`The general rule is that claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning.
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Azure Networks, LLC v.
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`CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“There is a heavy presumption that claim terms
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`carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time.”) (vacated on
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`other grounds). The plain and ordinary meaning of a term is the “meaning that the term would
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`have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Philips, 415
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`F.3d at 1313.
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`“‘Although the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed
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`claim language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not
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`generally be read into the claims.’” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182,
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`1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571
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`(Fed. Cir. 1988)). “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in
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`the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in
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`3
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`the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co.
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`v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic
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`record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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`Technical dictionaries may be helpful, but they may also provide definitions that are too broad or
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`not indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Expert testimony also may be
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`helpful, but an expert’s conclusory or unsupported assertions as to the meaning of a term are not.
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`Id.
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`The “only two exceptions to [the] general rule” that claim terms are construed according
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`to their plain and ordinary meaning are when the patentee (1) acts as his/her own lexicographer
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`or (2) disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.
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`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To act as
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`his/her own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim
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`term,” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. at 1365. To disavow the full scope
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`of a claim term, the patentee’s statements in the specification or prosecution history must
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`represent “a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Id. at 1366. Accordingly, when “an applicant’s
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`statements are amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and
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`unmistakable.” 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
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`2013).
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`Courts presume that the preamble does not limit the claims. Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v.
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`Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus.,
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`Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (“Generally,” we have said, “the preamble does not
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`limit the claims.”). But “[i]n general, a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential
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`structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.” Catalina
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`Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pitney
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`Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “Conversely, a
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`preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim
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`body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Catalina,
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`289 F.3d at 808 (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The Federal Circuit
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`has provided some “guideposts” regarding whether the preamble is limiting: (1) preamble
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`provides antecedent basis, (2) preamble is essential to understand limitations or terms in the
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`claim body, (3) preamble recites “additional structure or steps underscored as important by the
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`specification,” and (4) “clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the
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`claimed invention from the prior art.” Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808–09.
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`The order in which steps of a method appear in a claim is not a limitation on that claim
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`unless either (1) “as a matter of logic or grammar, [the steps] must be performed in the order
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`written” or (2) the specification “directly or implicitly requires such a narrow construction.”
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`Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F. 3d 1363, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and
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`citations omitted). The specification and prosecution history can support a construction
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`requiring the steps to be performed in the order written in the claims. See, e.g., Loral Florchild
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`Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Function Media, LLC v. Google,
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`Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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`III. Legal Analysis
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`After reviewing the parties’ briefing, the Court determines that “television signal,”
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`“docking port,”1 “configured to accept,” “accepted in,” “adaptive circuitry,” and “determining,
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`based on the validity of the user, that the received first media content is permitted to be provided
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`to the display device” be given their plain and ordinary meaning that a person of ordinary skill in
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`the art would ascribe to it. Hrg. Tr. at 7:11–17. For all these terms, neither of the exceptions to
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`the general rule that plain and ordinary meaning applies. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365.
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`Furthermore, none of these terms are difficult technical terms for which a construction would
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`help the jury understand the meaning of the term. Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Safeway, Inc., No.
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`2:12-cv-800-WCB, 2014 WL 3735222, at *2 (E.D. Tex., July 28, 2014).
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`A.
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`“Mobile set top box” (All asserted claims)
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`MV3’s Proposed Construction
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`Roku’s Proposed Construction
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`Preamble is not limiting.
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`Even if the Court finds the preamble to be
`limiting, no construction is necessary and the
`term should be given its plain and ordinary
`meaning
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`Alternatively, the following is provided in the
`event the Court determines a construction is
`necessary: “hardware and/or software
`that
`combines the functionality of a set top box and
`a mobile communication system”2
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`Preamble is limiting
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`“a device that converts an input television
`signal to an output signal to a [display device]3
`and also permits content from a mobile
`computing device to be displayed on the same
`display device
`to which
`the device
`is
`connected”
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`The term “mobile set top box” appears in the preamble of two asserted claims, Claims 1
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`and 32. The preamble for both claims is “A mobile set top box comprising.” ’223 Patent, Cls. 1,
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`1 During the Markman hearing, the parties agreed that “docking port” is either (1) hardware or (2) hardware and
`software. Hrg. Tr. at 55:2-58:3.
`2 During the Markman hearing, MV3 substituted “device” for “hardware and/or software” to remove any the
`ambiguity that its construction could encompass a software-only mobile set top box. Hrg. Tr. at 21:12–25:13.
`3 In its responsive brief, Roku changed its construction to swap in “display device” for “television set.” ECF No. 72
`at 18. Roku’s construction in the parties’ Joint Claim Construction Statement, however, uses “television set.” ECF
`No. 78 at 2. Roku stated that it was “happy” to include “display device” in its construction. ECF No. 83 at 11:2–9.
`Accordingly, the Court considers Roku’s construction to include “display device” in lieu of “television set.”
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`32. The parties dispute both whether the preamble for Claims 1 and 32 is limiting and the proper
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`construction of “mobile set top box.” See, e.g., ECF No. 64 at 21 (MV3); ECF No. 68 at 19
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`(Roku).
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`Roku contends that the preamble is limiting for several reasons. First, Roku contends
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`that because the patentee amended the preamble from “system” to “mobile set top box” during
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`prosecution, that “illustrates” that mobile set top box is a limiting claim element. ECF No. 68 at
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`19; ECF No. 72 at 17; ECF No. 76 at 10. Second, Roku also contends that “mobile set top box”
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`is not limiting because it does not appear in the preamble of all claims and when it does, it also
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`appears in the body of the claim. ECF No. 72 at 16–17. Third, Roku contends that the
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`“specification confirms that the term ‘mobile set top box’ is an important characteristic of the
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`claimed invention.” ECF No. 72 at 17.
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`As a general matter, MV3 contends that Roku has not met its burden to prove that the
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`preamble is limiting. ECF No. 64 at 20–21. MV3 offers several reasons why the preamble is not
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`limiting. First, MV3 contends that the claim language makes it clear that the term “mobile set
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`top box” “merely ‘gives a name’ or describes a set of limitations.” Id. at 21; ECF No. 73 at 15;
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`ECF No. 77 at 9. Second, MV3 contends that “nowhere in the prosecution history is the
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`preamble clearly relied on to support the validity of the ’223 Patent.” ECF No. 64 at 21. Third,
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`MV3 contends that even if the “preamble is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to being merely duplicative
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`of the limitations in the body of the claim,” the preamble is not limiting based on Federal Circuit
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`case law. Id.
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`Based on the Court’s review of the specification and the prosecution history of the ’223
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`Patent, and the parties’ briefing and arguments, the Court finds that the preamble is not limiting
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`for several reasons. First, rather than setting forth an important characteristic of the claimed
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`invention as Roku claims, the Court agrees with MV3 that the term “mobile set top box” in the
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`preamble “merely gives a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the claim that
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`completely set forth the invention.” IMS Tech., Inc. v. Hass Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422,
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`1434 (Fed. Cir. 2000). More specifically, each of the claim limitations in Claims 1 and 32 are
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`depicted in Figure 4 and were briefly explained above. For example, Claim 32, Limitation [a]
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`requires a “docking port” which is depicted by Label 22. Claim 32, Limitation [b] requires a
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`“mobile device input” which is the output arrow from Label 40. Claim 32, Limitations [c]–[e]
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`all pertain to video processing (e.g., to process the media content from unicast to multicast
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`broadcasts), multimedia processing (e.g., to interact with video on demand storage device,
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`electronic programming guide, and a digital rights management server) which can be found
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`within Labels 20 or 22. See also id. at 6:22–24. Claim 32, Limitations [f]–[m] all pertain to up-
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`conversion and user authentication which can be found within Labels 20 or 22. See also id. at
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`6:11–18. Finally, Claim 32, Limitation [n] requires an output from Label 22 which is inputted
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`into Label 14. Therefore, the presence of “mobile set top box” in the preambles of Claims 1 and
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`32 does not provide an important characteristic of the claimed invention.
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`Second, contrary to what Roku argues, the patentee did not clearly rely on the preamble
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`to support the validity and/or amend the preamble to traverse a rejection. See ECF No. 68, Exh.
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`2 at MV3_ROKU0000569-70. Rather, the patentee relied on structural components within the
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`body of the claim rather than the preamble to distinguish the Tee and Kung references. See id.
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`Third, the Roku’s apparent contention that patentee’s use of a term in both the preamble
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`and the body of claim automatically render the preamble to be limiting is unsupported by case
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`law. ECF No. 68 at 19 (“Here, ‘mobile set top box’ is included in the body of independent
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`Claims 1 and 32. It also appears throughout the body of independent claim 30, and it does not
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`appear in the preamble of that claim at all. Thus, ‘mobile set top box’ is a limiting phrase since it
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`has been included in the body of all of the independent claims.”) (citations removed). Roku
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`incorrectly relies on Catalina for the proposition that “mobile set top box” is a limiting phrase
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`because it appears in both the preamble and the body of the independent claims. But in fact, in
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`Catalina, the preambles for Claims 1 and 25 were not limiting. More specifically, in Catalina,
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`the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s construction of “located at predesignated sites
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`such as consumer stores,” which appeared in the preamble of Claim 1, and the preamble and
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`body of Claim 25. Catalina, 289 F.3d at 807. The Circuit held that the preamble of Claim 1 was
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`not limiting. Id. at 810 (“Accordingly, this court holds that the district court erroneously treated
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`the preamble as a limitation of Claim 1.”). As for Claim 25, the Circuit found that the term was
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`a limitation, but only because it was in the body of the claim. Id. at 811 (“By virtue of its
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`inclusion in the body of Claim 25, this phrase limits Claim 25.”). The remainder of the Circuit’s
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`discussion regarding Claim 25 was directed to the proper construction of that term. See id. at
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`810–13. Because there is no rule that a that patentee’s use of a term in both the preamble and the
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`body of claim automatically render the preamble to be limiting, for the reasons already provided
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`above, the Court does not change its conclusion that the preamble is not limiting.
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`The Court now turns to the proper construction of “mobile set top box.” MV3 contends
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`that no construction is necessary as the term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning or,
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`in the alternative, that the correct construction is “hardware and/or software that combines the
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`functionality of a set top box and a mobile communication system.” ECF No. 64 at 20; ECF No.
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`73 at 17; ECF No. 77 at 10. Roku contends that the correct construction for this term is “a
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`device that converts an input television signal to an output signal to a display device and also
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`permits content from a mobile computing device to be displayed on the same display device to
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`which the device is connected.” ECF No. 68 at 19–20; ECF No. 72 at 16; ECF No. 76 at 10–11;
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`ECF No. 78 at 2.
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`As a preliminary matter, a plain and ordinary construction for this term is inappropriate
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`because “mobile set top box” was an unknown term at the time of the invention. Id. at 22:22–25
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`(Ms. Mandrusiak: “I would just reiterate that plain and ordinary meaning can’t apply here
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`because [MV3’s expert] and both parties agree that this is an unknown term. So plain and
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`ordinary meaning for an unknown term just doesn’t exist.”).
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`The Court determines that the proper construction for “mobile set top box” is MV3’s
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`construction which recites “a device that combines the functionality of a set top box and a mobile
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`communication system” for the reasons that follow. Hrg. Tr. at 25:14-17. First, the specification
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`describes that a mobile set top box combines the functionality of a mobile communication
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`system and a set top box. ’223 Patent at 2:53–57; see also ’223 Patent at 3:14–20; 3:65–4:1;
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`4:21–27; 6:3–24; 6:25-28; and Figs. 2–5. Second, MV3’s construction does not exclude any
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`embodiments. See Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290
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`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir.
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`1996)) (“A claim construction that excludes the preferred embodiment ‘is rarely, if ever, correct
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`and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.’”).
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`B.
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`“determining the native display resolution of the second size format of the
`display device based on a response resulting from the query of the display
`device” (Claims 1 and 30)
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`MV3’s Proposed Construction
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`Roku’s Proposed Construction
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`“using the particular data provided by the
`display device to calculate the number of
`physical horizontal and vertical pixels in the
`screen of the display device”
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`No construction necessary.
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`Alternatively, the following is provided in the
`event the Court determines a construction is
`necessary: “determining the maximal allowed
`display resolution of the second size format of
`the display device based on a response
`resulting from a request for information from
`the display device”
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`The parties have three disputes for this term. First, the parties dispute both how the
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`mobile set top box “determin[es] the native display resolution of the second size format of the
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`display device.” Roku contends that the mobile set top box determines the native display
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`resolution by “calculat[ing] the number of physical horizontal and vertical pixels in the screen of
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`the display device.” ECF No. 68 at 25. MV3 contends there is no support in the specification or
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`prosecution history to support narrowing the construction of “determining” to “calculating,” and
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`proposes “determining the maximal allowed display resolution of the second size format of the
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`display device.” ECF No. 73 at 20–21. Second, Roku contends that the proposed construction
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`for “native display resolution” should be “the number of physical and vertical pixels in the
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`screen of the display device.” ECF No. 68 at 25. MV3 contends that Roku’s construction
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`improperly narrows the meaning of “native display resolution” by excluding information such as
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`whether the display is interlaced or progressive. ECF No. 64 at 12–13. Third, Roku’s proposed
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`construction for “based on a response resulting from the query of the display device” is “using
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`the particular data provided by the display device.” ECF No. 68 at 26–28. MV3 contends that
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`Roku’s proposed construction improperly narrows the claims and is also unhelpful. ECF 77 at
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`13.
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`The Court addresses each of these disputes in turn. First, the Court agrees with MV3’s
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`reasoning and construction for the “determining” step. The plain meaning of “determining” does
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`not necessarily require “calculating.” For example, rather than perform a calculation to
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`determine the native display resolution, the display device may simply provide the native display
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`resolution, thus obviating the need to perform a calculation. In fact, it may not be possible to
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`“calculate” some aspects of the display’s resolution, e.g., whether the display is interlaced or
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`progressive. Furthermore, Roku has not identified any support in the specification or
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`prosecution history which shows “a clear disavowal of claim scope” that justifies construing
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`“determining” with the narrower “calculating.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366. Roku cites aspects
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`of Claim 1 in support of its contention that the specification requires using a “processor” for
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`calculation. ECF No. 72 at 23. But the “processor” described in the claims is for up-
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`conversions, one step of which is “determining the native display resolution.” ’223 Patent at
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`8:26–59. In other words, the claims do not clearly require that the “determining” is limited to
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`“calculating.”
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`Second, the Court agrees with MV3’s reasoning and construction for “native display
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`resolution.” In particular, a POSITA would understand that “native display resolution” is not
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`limited to the number of horizontal and vertical pixels, but also includes whether the display is
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`interlaced or progressive, and the areal density of pixels. Id. at 2:44–49 (describing “1080p” as
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`the “native resolution for a target display”); see also Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2:13-cv-
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`01015-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 6611487, at *10–11 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2016). Roku has not
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`identified any support in the specification or prosecution history which shows “a clear disavowal
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`of claim scope.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366.
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`Third, the Court agrees with MV3’s reasoning and construction for “based on a response
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`resulting from the query of the display device.” Roku’s proposed construction appears to
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`potentially narrow the scope of the claim language by reciting “particular data” and “provided
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`by.” Roku’s use of “particular data” instead of “response” is narrower because the former
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`appears to be a subset of the latter. The use of “particular data” in Roku’s proposed construction,
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`which comes from a dictionary definition, also suffers from the infirmity of being both
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`ambiguous as to what “particular” data will meet the claim limitation and unsupported by the
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`specification. Similarly, Roku’s use of “provided by” instead of “a response resulting from the
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`query” may be narrower because the plain meaning of “resulting” allows for both direct and
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`indirect responses while “provided by” may not allow for indirect responses. Roku has not
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`identified any support in the specification or prosecution history which shows “a clear disavowal
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`of claim scope.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366.
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`The Court agrees with MV3’s argument that “Roku’s new restriction requiring the
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`‘querying of the display device’ limitation to be completed before the ‘determining the native
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`display resolution of the second size format of the display device’ limitation should be rejected.”
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`ECF No. 77 at 13. But the Court disagrees with MV3’s argument that there is “no evidence” that
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`the “determining” step refers back to the “querying” step. Id. Rather, the evidence is in the
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`claim itself. More specifically, because the “determining” step is “based on a response resulting
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`from the query of the display device,” “as a matter of logic or grammar,” the “querying” step
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`must begin before the “determining” step begins. Altiris, 318 F. 3d at 1369-70; ’223 Patent at
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`8:43–46. But because there is nothing in the claim language or specification that expressly
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`Case 6:18-cv-00308-ADA Document 90 Filed 10/02/19 Page 14 of 15
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`requires that the “querying” step be completed before the “determining” step begins, the Court
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`does not hold that the “querying” step must be completed before the “determining” step begins.
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`The “determining” step may occur concurrently with the “querying” step if, for example, the
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`response for the querying step is segmented into multiple blocks wherein one of the earlier
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`blocks contains the information required for the “determining” step. See, e.g., Hrg. Tr. 47:15–
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`48:6. Alternatively, the “determining” step may begin after the completion of the “querying”
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`step if, for example, the response for the querying step is sent in a single block.
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`Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the Court construes “determining the native
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`display resolution of the second size format of the display device based on a response resulting
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`from the query of the display device” as “determining the maximal allowed display resolution of
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`the second size format of the display device based on a response resulting from a request for
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`information from the display device.” But, as explained above, the Court finds that the
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`“querying the display device” limitation must begin before the “determining the native display
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`resolution of the second size format of the display device based on a response resulting from the
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`query of the display device” limitation begins.
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`C.
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`“multicast broadcasts” (Claims 1, 30, and 32)
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`MV3’s Proposed Construction
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`Roku’s Proposed Construction
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`No construction necessary.
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`Alternatively, the following is provided in the
`event the Court determines a construction is
`necessary: “communication to more than one
`recipient”
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`
`“transmitting simultaneously from a single
`sender to more than one recipient”
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`The Court determines that “multicast broadcasts” be given its plain and ordinary meaning
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`that a person of ordinary skill in the art would ascribe to it for the reasons that follow. Hrg. Tr. at
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`52:23–24. First, for this term, neither of the exceptions to the general rule that plain and ordinary
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`Case 6:18-cv-00308-ADA Document 90 Filed 10/02/19 Page 15 of 15
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`meaning applies here. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. Second, this term is not a technical term for
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`which a construction would help the jury understand the meaning of the term. Kroy IP Holdings,
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`2014 WL 3735222, at *2. Third, Roku’s proposed construction incorrectly limits the number of
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`senders to a single sender. More specifically, the term “multicast” only describes that there is
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`more than one recipient and not necessarily that there is also only a single sender. Fourth,
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`Roku’s proposed construction introduces some ambiguity by using the word “simultaneously”
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`when that word does not appear in the specification. In this case, using “simultaneously” in
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`Roku’s construction does not clarify the scope of the claim, but rather adds ambiguity into it by
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`forcing the jury to whether sending within five milliseconds, five nanoseconds, etc. is
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`“simultaneous.” Hrg. Tr. 34:8–14. As such, not only is “simultaneous” potentially indefinite, it
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`is unhelpful to a jury. Kroy IP Holdings, 2014 WL 3735222, at *2.
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`SIGNED this 2nd day of October, 2019.
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`
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`
`
`ALAN D ALBRIGHT
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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