Case 2:15-cv-00300-JRG-RSP Document 116 Filed 04/20/16 Page 1 of 94 PageID #: 3419
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`OPTIS WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY LLC &
`PANOPTIS PATENT MANAGEMENT,
`LLC,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`ZTE CORPORATION & ZTE (USA) INC.,
`Defendants.
`
`Case No. 2:15-cv-300-JRG-RSP
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
` Before the Court is the opening claim construction brief of Plaintiffs Optis Wireless
`
`Technology, LLC and PanOptis Patent Management, LLC (“Plaintiffs”) (Dkt. No. 66, filed on
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`December 22, 2015),1 the response of ZTE Corporation and ZTE (USA) Inc. (“Defendants”)
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`(Dkt. No. 78, filed on January 19, 2016), the reply of Plaintiffs (Dkt. No. 83, filed on January 27,
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`2016), and the sur-reply of Defendants (Dkt. No. 92, filed on February 9, 2016). The Court held
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`a hearing on claim construction and definiteness on February 17, 2016. Having considered the
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`arguments and evidence presented by the parties at the hearing and in their briefing, the Court
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`issues this Order.
`
`1 Citations to the parties’ filings are to the filing’s number in the docket (Dkt. No.) and pin cites
`are to the page numbers assigned through ECF.
`1
`
`APPLE 1011
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`

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`Table of Contents
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`I.
`
`II.
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`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 4
`
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES ..................................................................................................... 5
`
`A. Claim Construction .......................................................................................................... 5
`
`B. Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term ................................................. 8
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`C. Functional Claiming and 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (pre-AIA) / § 112(f) (AIA) .................... 9
`
`D. Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (pre-AIA) / § 112(b) (AIA)........................... 11
`
`III. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS .................................................................. 12
`
`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................... 13
`
`A. The ’631 Patent .............................................................................................................. 13
`
`A-1. “model specific information” .............................................................................. 15
`
`A-2. “object-oriented interface layer” ......................................................................... 18
`
`A-3. The First Party and Third Party Terms ................................................................ 21
`
`A-4. “performing an executable operation, configured using said model
`specific information, by a telephony software interface”.................................. 27
`
`B. The ’191 Patent .............................................................................................................. 30
`
`B-1. “text message” ..................................................................................................... 31
`
`B-2. “attachment” ........................................................................................................ 33
`
`B-3. The Server Terms: “adding information to the text message that identifies
`a server,” “sending the attachment to a server,” and “transmitting the
`text message to the receiving terminal’s phone number based address” .......... 36
`
`B-4. “means for querying a user of the mobile station regarding whether the
`attachment is to be transmitted with the text message” .................................... 44
`
`C. The ’919 Patent .............................................................................................................. 48
`
`C-1. “determination unit” ............................................................................................ 51
`
`C-2. “[to determine / determining] a resource of downlink, to which a
`response signal transmitted from the base station is mapped, from an
`index of the allocated resource block” .............................................................. 56
`
`2
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`C-3. “response signal” ................................................................................................. 58
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`C-4. “and the response signal is mapped to the subcarrier group” ............................. 60
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`D. The ’792 Patent: “with [an/the] orthogonal sequence” and “which is associated with
`[the/an] orthogonal sequence” ............................................................................. 65
`
`E. The ’557 Patent .............................................................................................................. 73
`
`E-1. “receiving unit” and “control information” ......................................................... 76
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`E-2. “selecting unit” .................................................................................................... 82
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`E-3. “which are respectively associated with different amounts of data or
`reception qualities” ............................................................................................ 87
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`E-4. “different amounts of data or reception qualities” .............................................. 91
`
`V.
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`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 93
`
`3
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`

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`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiffs allege infringement of U.S. Patents No. 6,356,631 (the “’631 Patent”), No.
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`6,865,191 (the “’191 Patent”), No. 8,064,919 (the “’919 Patent”), No. 8,199,792 (the “’792
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`Patent”), and No. 8,411,557 (the “’557 Patent”) (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”). Generally,
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`the Asserted Patents are directed to computer- and radio-implemented telecommunications.
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`The ’631 Patent is entitled “Multi-Client Object-Oriented Interface Layer.” The
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`application leading to the ’631 Patent was filed on September 24, 1998 and the patent issued on
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`March 12, 2002.
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`The ’191 Patent is entitled “System and Method for Sending Multimedia Attachments to
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`Text Messages in Radiocommunication Systems.” The application leading to the ’191 Patent
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`claims priority to a provisional application filed on August 12, 1999 and the patent issued on
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`March 8, 2005.
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`The ’919 Patent is entitled “Radio Communication Base Station Device and Control
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`Channel Arrangement Method.” The application leading to the ’919 Patent claims priority to a
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`number of Japanese patent applications through a series of continuation applications. The earliest
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`Japanese application was filed on March 23, 2007 and the ’919 Patent issued on November 22,
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`2011.
`
`The ’792 Patent is entitled “Radio Communication Apparatus and Response Signal
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`Spreading Method.” The application leading to the ’792 Patent claims priority to a number of
`
`Japanese patent applications through a series of continuation applications. The earliest Japanese
`
`application was filed on June 15, 2007 and the ’792 Patent issued on June 12, 2012.
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`The ’557 Patent is entitled “Mobile Station Apparatus and Random Access Method.” The
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`application leading to the ’557 Patent claims priority to a Japanese patent application through a
`
`4
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`series of continuation applications. The Japanese application was filed on March 20, 2006 and
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`the ’557 Patent issued on April 2, 2013.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES
`
`A.
`
`Claim Construction
`
`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
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`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
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`1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
`
`Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start
`
`by considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388
`
`F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc.,
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`262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the
`
`specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at
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`861. The general rule—subject to certain specific exceptions discussed infra—is that each claim
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`term is construed according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Azure
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`Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“There is a heavy
`
`presumption that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the
`
`relevant time.”) (vacated on other grounds).
`
` “The claim construction inquiry . . . begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of
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`the claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`“[I]n all aspects of claim construction, ‘the name of the game is the claim.’” Apple Inc. v.
`
`Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362,
`
`1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can be instructive. Phillips,
`5
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`415 F.3d at 1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim’s
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`meaning, because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id.
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`Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For
`
`example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that
`
`the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
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`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id.
`
`(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
`
`“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
`
`dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics
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`Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.
`
`Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, “‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the
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`court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and
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`examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.’” Comark
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`Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v.
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`Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Phillips, 415
`
`F.3d at 1323. “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the
`
`specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the
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`intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v.
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`Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
`
`construction because, like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the
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`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips, 415
`
`F.3d at 1317. However, “because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation
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`6
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`between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks
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`the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. at
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`1318; see also Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
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`(ambiguous prosecution history may be “unhelpful as an interpretive resource”).
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`Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic
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`record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a
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`court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might
`
`use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too
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`broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly,
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`expert testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining
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`the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported
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`assertions as to a term’s definition are entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic
`
`evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read
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`claim terms.” Id. The Supreme Court recently explained the role of extrinsic evidence in claim
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`construction:
`
`In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s
`intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for
`example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art
`during the relevant time period. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 546
`(1871) (a patent may be “so interspersed with technical terms and terms of art that
`the testimony of scientific witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of
`its meaning”). In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will
`need to make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are
`the “evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction that we discussed in
`Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on
`appeal.
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
`
`7
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`B.
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` Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term
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`There are “only two exceptions to [the] general rule” that claim terms are construed
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`according to their plain and ordinary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts
`
`as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term
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`either in the specification or during prosecution.”2 Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758
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`F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d
`
`1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d
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`1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he specification and prosecution history only compel departure
`
`from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”). The standards for
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`finding lexicography or disavowal are “exacting.” GE Lighting Solutions, 750 F.3d at 1309.
`
`To act as his own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the
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`disputed claim term,” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. (quoting Thorner,
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`669 F.3d at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The patentee’s lexicography must
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`appear “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249.
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`To disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the patentee’s statements in the
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`specification or prosecution history must amount to a “clear and unmistakable” surrender. Cordis
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`Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner, 669 F.3d at
`
`1366 (“The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed
`
`meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or
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`restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”) “Where an applicant’s statements are
`
`amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable.”
`
`2 Some cases have characterized other principles of claim construction as “exceptions” to the
`general rule, such as the statutory requirement that a means-plus-function term is construed to
`cover the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification. See, e.g., CCS Fitness, Inc. v.
`Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`8
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`3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also
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`Avid Tech., Inc. v. Harmonic, Inc., 812 F.3d 1040, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“When the prosecution
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`history is used solely to support a conclusion of patentee disclaimer, the standard for justifying
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`the conclusion is a high one.”).
`
`C.
`
`Functional Claiming and 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (pre-AIA) / § 112(f) (AIA) 3
`
`A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6;
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347–49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in
`
`relevant portion). Section 112, Paragraph 6, provides that a structure may be claimed as a “means
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`. . . for performing a specified function” and that an act may be claimed as a “step for performing
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`a specified function.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`But § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim language. There is a rebuttable
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`presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies when the claim language includes “means” or “step for”
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`terms, and that it does not apply in the absence of those terms. Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326;
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`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. The presumption stands or falls according to whether one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim with the functional language, in the context
`
`of the entire specification, to denote sufficiently definite structure or acts for performing the
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`function. See Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2015) (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when “the claim language, read in light of the specification,
`
`recites sufficiently definite structure” (quotation marks omitted) (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at
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`1349; Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2014))); Williamson,
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`792 F.3d at 1349 (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when “the words of the claim are understood by
`
`persons of ordinary skill in the art to have sufficiently definite meaning as the name for
`
`3 Because the applications resulting in the Asserted Patents were filed before September 16,
`2012, the effective date of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), the Court refers to the pre-AIA
`version of § 112.
`
`9
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`

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`structure”); Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326 (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes
`
`an “act” corresponding to “how the function is performed”); Personalized Media Commc’ns,
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`L.L.C. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply
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`when the claim includes “sufficient structure, material, or acts within the claim itself to perform
`
`entirely the recited function . . . even if the claim uses the term ‘means.’” (quotation marks and
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`citation omitted)).
`
`When it applies, § 112, ¶ 6 limits the scope of the functional term “to only the structure,
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`materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and
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`equivalents thereof.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347. Construing a means-plus-function limitation
`
`involves multiple steps. “The first step . . . is a determination of the function of the means-plus-
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`function limitation.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311
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`(Fed. Cir. 2001). “[T]he next step is to determine the corresponding structure disclosed in the
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`specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. A “structure disclosed in the specification is
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`‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or
`
`associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Id. The focus of the “corresponding
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`structure” inquiry is not merely whether a structure is capable of performing the recited function,
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`but rather whether the corresponding structure is “clearly linked or associated with the [recited]
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`function.” Id. The corresponding structure “must include all structure that actually performs the
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`recited function.” Default Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291,
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`1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However, § 112 does not permit “incorporation of structure from the
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`written description beyond that necessary to perform the claimed function.” Micro Chem., Inc. v.
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`Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`10
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`For § 112, ¶ 6 limitations implemented by a programmed general purpose computer or
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`microprocessor, the corresponding structure described in the patent specification must include an
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`algorithm for performing the function. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339,
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`1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The corresponding structure is not a general purpose computer but rather
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`the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat Techs.
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`Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`D.
`
`Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (pre-AIA) / § 112(b) (AIA) 4
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`Patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded
`
`as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. A claim, when viewed in light of the intrinsic evidence,
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`must “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”
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`Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). If it does not, the claim
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`fails § 112, ¶ 2 and is therefore invalid as indefinite. Id. at 2124. Whether a claim is indefinite is
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`determined from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the time the application
`
`for the patent was filed. Id. at 2130. As it is a challenge to the validity of a patent, the failure of
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`any claim in suit to comply with § 112 must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
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`2130 n.10. “[I]ndefiniteness is a question of law and in effect part of claim construction.” ePlus,
`
`Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`When a term of degree is used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent
`
`provides some standard for measuring that degree.” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
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`783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Likewise, when a subjective
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`term is used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent’s specification supplies
`
`some standard for measuring the scope of the [term].” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.,
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`4 Because the applications resulting in the Asserted Patents were filed before September 16,
`2012, the effective date of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), the Court refers to the pre-AIA
`version of § 112.
`
`11
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`417 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005); accord Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d
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`1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1351).
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`In the context of a claim governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, the claim is invalid as
`
`indefinite if the claim fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform the claimed
`
`functions. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52. The disclosure is inadequate when one of ordinary
`
`skill in the art “would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it
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`with the corresponding function in the claim.” Id. at 1352.
`
`III.
`
`CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS
`
`The parties have agreed to the following constructions set forth in their Amended Joint
`
`Claim Construction Chart Pursuant to P.R. 4-5(d) (Dkt. No. 104):
`
`“line device”
`
`Term5
`
`’631 Patent Claim 10
`(cid:120)
`“allocation information indicating one or a
`plurality of allocated resource block(s) of
`uplink”
`
`Agreed Construction
`“a hardware device that provides access to a
`communications service”
`
`“allocation information indicating one or a
`plurality of resource block(s) of uplink
`allocated to a mobile station”
`
`’919 Patent Claims 1, 10
`(cid:120)
`“resource of downlink”
`
`’919 Patent Claims 1, 10
`(cid:120)
`“resources”
`
`(cid:120)
`
`’919 Patent Claims 1, 10
`
`downlink channel
`
`downlink channels
`
`5 For all term charts in this order, the claims in which the term is found are listed with the term
`but: (1) only the highest level claim in each dependency chain is listed, and (2) only asserted
`claims identified in the parties’ Amended Joint Claim Construction Chart Pursuant to P.R. 4-5(d)
`(Dkt. No. 104) are listed.
`
`12
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`

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`Term5
`“wherein: the indices of a plurality of the
`consecutive resource blocks are respectively
`associated with a plurality of the resources
`which are different in a frequency domain”
`
`Agreed Construction
`wherein: the indices of a plurality of the
`consecutive resource blocks are associated
`one-to-one with a plurality of the resources
`which are different in a frequency domain
`
`(cid:120)
`
`’919 Patent Claims 1, 10
`
`The Court adopts the parties’ agreed constructions.
`
`IV.
`
`CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
`
`The parties’ positions and the Court’s analysis as to the disputed terms are presented
`
`below.
`
`A.
`
`The ’631 Patent
`
`In general, the ’631 Patent is directed to technology for facilitating software applications’
`
`communications over telephonic systems by improving the telephony software interface through
`
`object-oriented programming. ’631 Patent col.1 ll.5–10, col.2 ll.46–59. The telephony software
`
`interface is the interface between the applications and a telephony system’s line devices. Id. at
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`col.1 ll.41–54, col.1 l.65–col.2 l.11. Line devices are used to access the telephony system’s
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`communication channels and it includes things such as a public switched telephone network
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`(PSTN), integrated services digital network (ISDN), and T1/E1 lines. Id. at col.1 ll.41–54.
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`Object-oriented programming utilizes software “objects” that include data as well as instructions
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`for manipulating the data. Objects include the program components’ attributes, relationships, and
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`methods. Id. at col.2 ll.28–34.
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`With reference to Figure 3, reproduced
`
`’631 Patent, Figure 3
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`and annotated by the Court, the patent describes
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`an exemplary object-oriented interface layer
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`(310, in blue) that acts an intermediary between
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`13
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`Case 2:15-cv-00300-JRG-RSP Document 116 Filed 04/20/16 Page 14 of 94 PageID #: 3432
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`application programs (105, in yellow) and the telephony software interface (305, in green) to the
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`line devices (110, in red). Id. at col.4 ll.42–65. This interface layer performs a number of
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`functions meant to improve the system by removing the need to conform applications to the
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`specification of the telephony software interface and by creating a single point of contact for the
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`telephony software interface so as to reduce the message traffic between the interface and the
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`applications. Id. at col.2 ll.25–28, col.2 ll.43–49, col.4 ll.31–41, col.4 l.56 – col.5 l.35.
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`The abstract of the ’631 Patent provides:
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`The present invention is directed to a system, method, and apparatus for adding
`the benefit of object-oriented programming to conforming application programs
`to the specifications of telephony software interfaces and reducing the traffic load
`from messages generated and sent by line devices to application programs. An
`object-oriented interface layer is inserted between the application program which
`accepts objects from the application programs and causes the telephony software
`interface to perform a standard set of operations. From the standpoint of the
`telephony software interface, the object-oriented interface layer is the application
`program utilizing the line devices, thus causing the line devices to generate a
`single message to the object-oriented interface layer which distributes the
`message to the appropriate application programs. Accordingly, the traffic load
`caused by the generation of messages is reduced.
`
`Claims 1 and 10 are reproduced here as representative claims.
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`14
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`Case 2:15-cv-00300-JRG-RSP Document 116 Filed 04/20/16 Page 15 of 94 PageID #: 3433
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`A-1.
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`“model specific information”
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`Plaintiffs’ Proposed
`Construction
`“information about the
`particular line device”
`
`Defendants’ Proposed
`Construction
`“specifications for the model
`of the line device”
`
`Disputed Term
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`“model specific
`information”
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`(cid:120)
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`’631 Patent Claim 10
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`The Parties’ Positions
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`Plaintiffs submit that “model specific information” is described and claimed as going
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`from the line device to the application. Dkt. No. 66 at 14–15. This, according to Plaintiffs, is in
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`contrast to the “model specific details” which are described and separately claimed as going from
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`the application to the line device. Id. at 15–16 (citing Claim 1). Plaintiffs argue that while the
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`“model specific details” may include specifications of the line-device model, the “model specific
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`information” does not necessarily include such specifications. Id. Instead, Plaintiffs contend, the
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`“model specific information” is information about the particular line device, such as whether it is
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`connected to a network. Id. at 15.
`
`In addition to the claims, Plaintiffs cite the following intrinsic evidence to support their
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`position: ’631 Patent, at [57] Abstract, col.1 l.55 – col.2 l.16, col.2 ll.24–27, col.3 l.34 – col.4
`
`l.32, col.4 ll.34–35, col.4 ll.50–53, col.5 ll.32–34.
`
`Defendants respond that their proposed construction gives effect to the word “model” in
`
`the “model specific information” and that Plaintiffs’ proposed construction would improperly
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`flip the plain meaning of “model” to instead mean a “particular” device. Dkt. No. 78 at 29.
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`Defendants argue that contrary to Plaintiffs’ representation, the ’631 Patent neither teaches nor
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`claims sending model specific details from the application program. Id. at 29–30. Instead,
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`Defendants contend, the patent teaches that the details are abstracted, not sent. Id. at 30.
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`15
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`Case 2:15-cv-00300-JRG-RSP Document 116 Filed 04/20/16 Page 16 of 94 PageID #: 3434
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`In addition to the claims, Defendants cite the following intrinsic evidence to support
`
`their position: ’631 Patent col.1 ll.55–64, col.3 ll.45–46.
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`Plaintiffs reply that the intrinsic record does not support a limitation requiring the model
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`specific information to include the specifications for the model. Dkt. No. 83 at 7–8. Rather,
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`Plaintiffs contend, the patent describes that the line device sends “useful” information. Id.
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`(quoting ’631 Patent col.5 ll.32–34). Plaintiffs reiterate that Defendants’ proposed construction
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`improperly ignores the difference between the “model specific details” of Claim 1, which the
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`patent describes as the “specific technical details of the particular line device,” and the “model
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`specific information” of Claim 10. Id. at 8 (quoting ’631 Patent col.3 ll.34–38, ll.45–46).
`
`Analysis
`
`The dispute turns on two main issues. First, the whether the model specific information is
`
`necessarily about the model or whether it includes information about the particular line device
`
`without reference to the model of that device. Second, whether the model specific information is
`
`necessarily the specifications for the model of the line device. The Court understands this term to
`
`mean information about the model of the line device, but the term is not coextensive with the
`
`specifications of the model.
`
`To give effect to “model specific,” “model specific information” must be construed as
`
`information about the model of the line device. See Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945,
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`950 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“claims are interpreted with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the
`
`claim”). Construing “model specific information” as information about the particular line device
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`fails to give effect to the “model spe