Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 1 of 58 PageID #: 4865
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`OPTIS WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY,
`LLC ET AL.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00066-JRG
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`Before the Court is the opening claim construction brief of Optis Wireless Technology, LLC,
`
`Optis Cellular Technology, LLC, and PanOptis Patent Management, LLC (collectively,
`
`“Plaintiffs”) (Dkt. No. 82),1 the response of Apple Inc. (“Defendant”) (Dkt. No. 86), and Plaintiffs’
`
`reply (Dkt. No. 92). The Court held a hearing on the issues of claim construction and claim
`
`definiteness on February 25, 2020. Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by
`
`the parties at the hearing and in their briefing, the Court issues this Order.
`
`1 Citations to the parties’ filings are to the filing’s number in the docket (Dkt. No.) and pin cites
`are to the page numbers assigned through ECF.
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 1
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 2 of 58 PageID #: 4866
`
`Table of Contents
`
`I.
`II.
`
`V.
`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 3
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES ..................................................................................................... 3
`A.
`Claim Construction ................................................................................................. 3
`B.
`Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term ........................................ 6
`C.
`Functional Claiming and 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (pre-AIA) / § 112(f) (AIA) ........... 7
`D.
`Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (pre-AIA) / § 112(b) (AIA) ................... 9
`III. AGREED CONSTRUCTIONS...................................................................................... 10
`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................... 11
`A.
`U.S. Patent No. 8,005,154..................................................................................... 11
`A-1.
`“control information extractor for configuring transmission
`information for the downlink control channel via higher layer
`signaling” .................................................................................................. 14
`U.S. Patent No. 8,019,332..................................................................................... 18
`B-1.
`“given by using a variable of Yk for the subframe k and a modulo
`‘C’ operation” ........................................................................................... 20
`“wherein Yk is defined by: Yk=(A*Yk-1)mod D” ...................................... 23
`B-2.
`U.S. Patent No. 8,385,284..................................................................................... 26
`C-1.
`“reserved for indicating” ........................................................................... 28
`C-2.
`“processing unit for … wherein the processing unit is further
`configured for …” ..................................................................................... 34
`U.S. Patent No. 8,411,557..................................................................................... 39
`D-1.
`“selecting unit configured to …” .............................................................. 43
`U.S. Patent No. 9,001,774..................................................................................... 46
`E-1.
`“at least one of a time delay, a phase rotation and a gain” ....................... 47
`U.S. Patent No. 8,102,833..................................................................................... 50
`F-1.
`“the ACK/NACK control signals overwrite some of the
`multiplexed signals mapped to the 2-dimensional resource matrix
`[at step (b)] from the last row of the specific columns” ........................... 51
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 54
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 2
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 3 of 58 PageID #: 4867
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiffs allege infringement of seven U.S. Patents: No. 8,005,154 (the “’154 Patent”), No.
`
`8,019,332 (the “’332 Patent”), No. 8,102,833 (the “’833 Patent”), No. 8,385,284 (the “’284
`
`Patent”), No. 8,411,557 (the “’557 Patent”), No. 8,989,290 (the “’290 Patent”),2 and No. 9,001,774
`
`(the “’774 Patent”) (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”).
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES
`
`A.
`
`Claim Construction
`
`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
`
`which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`
`381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start by
`
`considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d
`
`858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d
`
`1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the
`
`specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at
`
`861. The general rule—subject to certain specific exceptions discussed infra—is that each claim
`
`term is construed according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Azure
`
`Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“There is a heavy presumption
`
`that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time.”)
`
`(vacated on other grounds).
`
`2 The parties did not submit any dispute regarding the scope of the ’290 Patent. Since the hearing,
`the ’290 Patent was dismissed from the case. (Dkt. No. 105.)
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 3
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 4 of 58 PageID #: 4868
`
` “The claim construction inquiry . . . begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the
`
`claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[I]n
`
`all aspects of claim construction, ‘the name of the game is the claim.’” Apple Inc. v. Motorola,
`
`Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1998)). First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can be instructive. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`
`1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim’s meaning, because
`
`claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id. Differences among the claim
`
`terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For example, when a dependent claim
`
`adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that the independent claim does not
`
`include the limitation. Id. at 1314–15.
`
`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id. at 1315
`
`(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
`
`“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
`
`dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`
`1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996));
`
`Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, “‘[a]lthough the
`
`specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular
`
`embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the
`
`claims.’” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting
`
`Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also
`
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment
`
`described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 4
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 5 of 58 PageID #: 4869
`
`indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-
`
`Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction
`
`because, like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the U.S. Patent
`
`and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
`
`However, “because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO
`
`and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the
`
`specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. at 1318; see also Athletic
`
`Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (ambiguous prosecution
`
`history may be “unhelpful as an interpretive resource”).
`
`Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic record
`
`in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317
`
`(quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court
`
`understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use
`
`claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or
`
`may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony
`
`may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the particular
`
`meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a
`
`term’s definition are not helpful to a court. Id. Extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent
`
`and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id. The Supreme Court has
`
`explained the role of extrinsic evidence in claim construction:
`
`In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s
`intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for
`example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during
`the relevant time period. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 546 (1871)
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 5
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 6 of 58 PageID #: 4870
`
`(a patent may be “so interspersed with technical terms and terms of art that the
`testimony of scientific witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of its
`meaning”). In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to
`make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are the
`“evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction that we discussed in Markman,
`and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
`
`B.
`
`Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term
`
`There are “only two exceptions to [the] general rule” that claim terms are construed according
`
`to their plain and ordinary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own
`
`lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the
`
`specification or during prosecution.”3 Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 F.3d 1362, 1365
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012)); see also GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2014) (“[T]he specification and prosecution history only compel departure from the plain meaning
`
`in two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”). The standards for finding lexicography or
`
`disavowal are “exacting.” GE Lighting Solutions, 750 F.3d at 1309.
`
`To act as his own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the
`
`disputed claim term,” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. (quoting Thorner, 669
`
`F.3d at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The patentee’s lexicography must appear
`
`“with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249.
`
`To disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the patentee’s statements in the
`
`specification or prosecution history must amount to a “clear and unmistakable” surrender. Cordis
`
`3 Some cases have characterized other principles of claim construction as “exceptions” to the
`general rule, such as the statutory requirement that a means-plus-function term is construed to
`cover the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification. See, e.g., CCS Fitness, Inc. v.
`Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 6
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 7 of 58 PageID #: 4871
`
`Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner, 669 F.3d at
`
`1366 (“The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning
`
`of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,
`
`representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”). “Where an applicant’s statements are amenable
`
`to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable.” 3M
`
`Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
`
`C.
`
`Functional Claiming and 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (pre-AIA) / § 112(f) (AIA)
`
`A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6;
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347–49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in
`
`relevant portion). Section 112, Paragraph 6, provides that a structure may be claimed as a
`
`“means . . . for performing a specified function” and that an act may be claimed as a “step for
`
`performing a specified function.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2002).
`
`But § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim language. There is a rebuttable
`
`presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies when the claim language includes “means” or “step for” terms,
`
`and that it does not apply in the absence of those terms. Masco, 303 F.3d at 1326; Williamson, 792
`
`F.3d at 1348. The presumption stands or falls according to whether one of ordinary skill in the art
`
`would understand the claim with the functional language, in the context of the entire specification,
`
`to denote sufficiently definite structure or acts for performing the function. See Media Rights
`
`Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not
`
`apply when “the claim language, read in light of the specification, recites sufficiently definite
`
`structure” (quotation marks omitted) (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349; Robert Bosch, LLC v.
`
`Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2014))); Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (§ 112, ¶ 6
`
`does not apply when “the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 7
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 8 of 58 PageID #: 4872
`
`to have sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure”); Masco, 303 F.3d at 1326 (§ 112,
`
`¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes an “act” corresponding to “how the function is
`
`performed”); Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. International Trade Commission,
`
`161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when the claim includes “sufficient
`
`structure, material, or acts within the claim itself to perform entirely the recited function … even
`
`if the claim uses the term ‘means.’” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
`
`When it applies, § 112, ¶ 6 limits the scope of the functional term “to only the structure,
`
`materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and
`
`equivalents thereof.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347. Construing a means-plus-function limitation
`
`involves multiple steps. “The first step … is a determination of the function of the means-plus-
`
`function limitation.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2001). “[T]he next step is to determine the corresponding structure disclosed in the
`
`specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. A “structure disclosed in the specification is
`
`‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates
`
`that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Id. The focus of the “corresponding structure”
`
`inquiry is not merely whether a structure is capable of performing the recited function, but rather
`
`whether the corresponding structure is “clearly linked or associated with the [recited] function.”
`
`Id. The corresponding structure “must include all structure that actually performs the recited
`
`function.” Default Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005). However, § 112 does not permit “incorporation of structure from the written
`
`description beyond that necessary to perform the claimed function.” Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great
`
`Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 8
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 9 of 58 PageID #: 4873
`
`For § 112, ¶ 6 limitations implemented by a programmed general purpose computer or
`
`microprocessor, the corresponding structure described in the patent specification must include an
`
`algorithm for performing the function. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339,
`
`1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The corresponding structure is not a general purpose computer but rather
`
`the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat Techs.
`
`Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`D.
`
`Definiteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (pre-AIA) / § 112(b) (AIA)
`
`Patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as
`
`the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. A claim, when viewed in light of the intrinsic evidence, must
`
`“inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus
`
`Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014). If it does not, the claim fails § 112, ¶ 2
`
`and is therefore invalid as indefinite. Id. at 901. Whether a claim is indefinite is determined from
`
`the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the time the application for the patent was
`
`filed. Id. at 911. As it is a challenge to the validity of a patent, the failure of any claim in suit to
`
`comply with § 112 must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. BASF Corp. v. Johnson
`
`Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “[I]ndefiniteness is a question of law and in
`
`effect part of claim construction.” ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012).
`
`When a term of degree is used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent
`
`provides some standard for measuring that degree.” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783
`
`F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Likewise, when a subjective term is
`
`used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent’s specification supplies some
`
`standard for measuring the scope of the [term].” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 9
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 10 of 58 PageID #: 4874
`
`F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The standard “must provide objective boundaries for those of
`
`skill in the art.” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`In the context of a claim governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, the claim is invalid as indefinite
`
`if the claim fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform the claimed function.
`
`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52. The disclosure is inadequate when one of ordinary skill in the
`
`art “would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the
`
`corresponding function in the claim.” Id. at 1352.
`
`III. AGREED CONSTRUCTIONS
`
`The parties have agreed to the following constructions set forth in their P.R. 4-3 Joint Claim
`
`Construction and Prehearing Chart.4 (Dkt. No. 76.)
`
`Term
`“serially multiplexing first control signals and
`data signals, wherein the first control signals
`are placed at a front part of the multiplexed
`signals and the data signals are placed at a
`rear part of the multiplexed signals”
`’833 Patent Claims 1, 8
`•
`“mapping the multiplexed signals to”
`’833 Patent Claim 1, 8
`•
`
`“mapping ACK/NACK control signals to”
`’833 Patent Claim 1, 8
`•
`“transport format”
`’284 Patent Claim 1, 145
`•
`“based on a received uplink signal”
`’774 Patent Claim 6
`•
`
`Agreed Construction
`first control signals and data signals are
`mapped with a sequence in which one is
`directly after the other, wherein the first
`control signals are placed at a front part of the
`multiplexed signals and the data signals are
`placed at a rear part of the multiplexed signals
`
`after placing the first control signals and the
`data signals [in step (a)], mapping the
`multiplexed signals to
`
`after mapping the multiplexed signals [in step
`(b)], mapping ACK/NACK control signals to
`
`transport format, transport block size, payload
`size, or modulation and coding scheme
`
`no construction necessary
`
`4 The parties did not provide these agreements in their P.R. 4-5(d) Joint Claim Construction Chart
`(Dkt. No. 95.)
`5 Only the highest-level claim in each dependency chain is listed.
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 10
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 11 of 58 PageID #: 4875
`
`Having reviewed the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence of record, the Court hereby adopts the
`
`parties’ agreed constructions.
`
`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A.
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,005,154
`
`The ’154 Patent is entitled Method and Apparatus for Transmitting and Receiving Shared
`
`Control Channel Message in a Wireless Communication System Using Orthogonal Frequency
`
`Division Multiple Access. The application leading to the ’154 Patent was filed on December 26,
`
`2007 and the patent states a priority claim to a foreign application filed on December 22, 2006.
`
`In general, the patent is directed to technology for “configuring and transmitting/receiving a
`
`message of a Forward Shared Control Channel (F-SCCH) to support various antenna technologies
`
`for forward data transmission in a wireless communication system using OFDMA.” ’154 Patent at
`
`7:58–62. A “shared control channel … includes control information necessary for demodulation
`
`of the transmission data” that is transmitted together with the shared control channel. Id. at 5:9–
`
`13. In an embodiment of the invention, the shared control channel includes a TD-FLAM field to
`
`“identify Transmit Diversity (TD) technologies agreed upon between a base station and a terminal
`
`to determine which precoding is used for data transmission in an OFDMA wireless communication
`
`system.” Id. 6:29–33; see also, id. at 8:8–67.
`
`With reference to Figure 6, reproduced and annotated by the Court below, the patent describes
`
`an exemplary “process in which to demodulate data transmitted over the forward link, a terminal
`
`receives a shared control channel, analyzes its message, and demodulates a data channel depending
`
`on the analysis result.” Id. at 11:7–10. “In step 602, the terminal receives a shared control channel
`
`from the base station, and demodulates it to acquire a message. In step 603 [(green)], the terminal
`
`determines whether the base station uses the common pilot or uses the dedicated pilot at the
`
`corresponding time.” Id. at 11:15–20. In step 604 (green), the terminal determines whether
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 11
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 12 of 58 PageID #: 4876
`
`precoding feedback (BFCH) is enabled. Id. at 11:20–23. The patent elsewhere explains that “[t]he
`
`rule for determining which feedback channel the base station will enable and which feedback
`
`channel the base station will disable is commonly agreed upon between the base station and the
`
`terminal by Layer-3 signaling.” Id. at 9:30–33. Based on pilot and feedback type, the message type
`
`is then determined (605, 608, and 611, yellow). Id. at 11:20–27, 11:38–41, 11:52–54. The data
`
`channel is received and demodulated based on the message type and TD-FLAM control
`
`information (606, 607, 609, 610, 612, 613).
`
` The patent also describes an exemplary receiver with reference to Figure 8, reproduced and
`
`annotated by the Court below: “the receiver includes a demodulation and channel decoding unit
`
`802, a control information extractor 803, a controller 804, a reception processor 805, a reception
`
`combiner 806, and a demodulation, channel decoding & interference cancellation unit 807.” Id. at
`
`12:35–39. Operation of the receiver is described as follows:
`
`A control channel reception unit composed of the demodulation and channel
`decoding unit 802 and the control information extractor 803 extracts control
`information through a demodulation and channel decoding process on the signal
`received over a specific control channel. The extracted control information is
`input to the controller 804. The controller 804 controls a data channel reception
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 12
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 13 of 58 PageID #: 4877
`
`unit composed of the reception processor 805, the reception combiner 806 and the
`demodulation, channel decoding & interference cancellation unit 807 using the
`method described in FIG. 6.
`
`Id. at 12:40–49 (emphasis added).
`
`The abstract of the ’154 Patent provides:
`
`A method and apparatus for transmitting/receiving a shared control channel
`message in an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) wireless
`communication system are provided. The message transmission apparatus receives
`feedback information from a terminal; determines whether to transmit data by
`applying preceding; and transmits, in the shared control channel message, control
`information whose message type is differently set according to the application of
`the preceding. The message reception apparatus receives the shared control channel
`message from a base station; determines a message type of the shared control
`channel message; and if the message type is a Transmit Diversity (TD)-Forward
`Link Assignment Message (FLAM), demodulates data by at least one of Single
`Input Single Output (SISO) and Spatial Time Transmit Diversity (STTD) as
`indicated by the TD-FLAM.
`
`Claim 37, an exemplary asserted claim from the ’154 Patent, is reproduced below with the
`
`term in dispute emphasized:
`
`37. An apparatus for receiving downlink shared channel in an Orthogonal
`Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) wireless communication
`system, the apparatus comprising:
`a reception unit for receiving downlink control channel comprising
`transmission scheme information for downlink shared channel data and
`downlink shared channel data from a base station;
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 13
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 14 of 58 PageID #: 4878
`
`a control information extractor for configuring transmission information for
`the downlink control channel via higher layer signaling;
`a demodulator for demodulating the downlink shared channel data; and
`a controller for controlling the reception unit to receive the downlink control
`channel with a format corresponding to the transmission information and the
`demodulator to demodulate the downlink shared channel data according to
`the transmission scheme information included in the format,
`wherein the transmission scheme information indicates that a Transmit
`Diversity or Open-Loop Spatial Multiplexing is used for transmitting the
`downlink shared channel data.
`
`A-1. “control information extractor for configuring transmission
`information for the downlink control channel via higher layer
`signaling”
`
`Disputed Term6
`
`Plaintiffs’ Proposed Construction
`
`“control information
`extractor for
`configuring
`transmission
`information for the
`downlink control
`channel via higher
`layer signaling”
`
`•
`
`’154 Patent
`Claim 37
`
`no construction necessary: not 35 U.S.C. §
`112, ¶ 6, not indefinite
`
`alternatively (if § 112, ¶ 6),
`function: configuring transmission
`•
`information for the downlink control
`channel via higher layer signaling
`• structure: hardware programmed, or
`hardware with software programmed,
`to extract transmission information for
`the downlink control channel; for
`example, as shown and described in
`Figures 5, 6, and 8 and at 9:1-33,
`11:12-65 and 12:33-58, and
`equivalents thereof
`
`The Parties’ Positions
`
`Defendant’s Proposed
`Construction
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6,
`indefinite
`
`•
`
`function: configuring
`transmission
`information for the
`downlink control
`channel via higher
`layer signaling
`• structure: indefinite
`
`Plaintiffs submit: The “control
`
`information extractor”
`
`term
`
`is not governed by
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 for two reasons. First, the term “control information extractor” is a term of
`
`art for specific structure. Second, the claim provides the structure of this term by providing the
`
`6 For all disputed-term charts in this order, the claims in which the term is found are listed with the
`term but: (1) only the highest-level claim in each dependency chain is listed, and (2) only asserted
`claims identified in the parties’ P.R. 4-5(d) Joint Claim Construction Chart (Dkt. No. 95) are listed.
`
`Optis Cellular Ex 2005-p. 14
`Apple v Optis Cellular
`IPR2020-00465
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00066-JRG Document 130 Filed 04/07/20 Page 15 of 58 PageID #: 4879
`
`“objectives and operations” of the extractor. Thus, the presumption against applying § 112, ¶ 6 is
`
`not overcome. Even if § 112, ¶ 6 applies to this term, the ’154 Patent satisfies that statute’s
`
`disclosure requirements (citing ’154 Patent Figs.5, 8; 9:30–33, 9:63–10 :15, 11:30–36, 12:35–45,
`
`12:64–67). (Dkt. No. 82 at 9–13.)
`
`In addition to the claims themselves, Plaintiffs cite the following intrinsic and extrinsic
`
`evidence to support their position: Intrinsic evidence: ’154 Patent Figs.5, 8; 9:30–33, 9:63–10:15,
`
`11:30–36, 12:35–45, 12:64–67. Extrinsic evidence: Mahon Decl.7 ¶¶ 93–113 (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 7,
`
`Dkt. No. 82-7); Akbar Rahbar, Quality of Service in Optical Packet Switched Networks 310–11
`
`(2015) (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 8, Dkt. No. 82-8 at 20–21); Microsoft Computer Dictionary at 203 (5th ed.
`
`2002), “extract” (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 9, Dkt. No. 82-9 at 4).
`
`Defendant responds: The “control information extractor” term is governed by § 112, ¶ 6 and
`
`is indefinite because: (1) the extractor is defined by its function rather than being a name for
`
`definite structure, (2) the claim itself does not provide sufficient structure for performing the
`
`recited function, and (3) the ’154 Patent does not disclose structure for performing the recited
`
`function, which requires “configuring … via higher layer signaling” at the mobile station rather
`
`than extracting control information. First, the Rahbar publication that Plaintiffs’ present as
`
`evidence that “control information extractor” is a term of art denoting defi