`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_______________
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MAXELL, LTD.,
`Patent Owner
`_______________
`
`Case: IPR2020-00407
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,748,317
`_______________
`
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
`INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 6,748,317
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Mail Stop Patent Board
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S EXHIBIT LIST
`
`Description
`5/31/19 Scheduling Order from District Court Action
`3/10/15 Letter from Apple to Maxell
`5/15/15 Letter from Apple to Maxell
`5/17/18 Letter from Maxell to Apple
`Maxell’s Infringement Contentions from District Court Action
`Apple’s Invalidity Contentions from District Court Action
`Hayashida Chart from Apple’s Invalidity Contentions
`Hayashida Chart from Apple’s Expert Report from District Court
`Action
`Abowd Chart from Apple’s Expert Report from District Court Action
`Apple’s Final Election of Prior Art
`1/8/20 Minute Order
`8/28/19 Minute Order
`9/18/19 Minute Order
`Markman Decision from District Court Action
`4/20/20 Scheduling Order from District Court Action
`Declaration of Tiffany A. Miller
`5/8/20 Notices of Compliance
`Decision denying Apple’s Motion to Stay
`10/9/18 Letter from Maxell to Apple
`’317 IPR Preliminary Response
`’317 IPR Institution Decision
`’498 IPR Preliminary Response
`’498 IPR Petition (ASUS)
`Getting Heading and Course Information
`Getting the Heading and Course of a Device
`Wayback Machine excerpts
`
`Exhibit #
`2001
`2002
`2003
`2004
`2005
`2006
`2007
`2008
`
`2009
`2010
`2011
`2012
`2013
`2014
`2015
`2016
`2017
`2018
`2019
`2020
`2021
`2022
`2023
`2024
`2025
`2026
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
`
`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`THE BOARD SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION AND
`DENY INSTITUTION FOR ALL GROUNDS PURSUANT TO 35
`U.S.C ................................................................................................................ 2
`A. Application of the General Plastic Factors Weighs in Favor of
`Denying Institution ................................................................................ 5
`1.
`General Plastic Factors 6 and 7 Weigh in Favor of Denial ........ 7
`a.
`The District Court Action Will Resolve the Same
`or Substantially the Same Arguments as Those
`Presented Here .................................................................. 7
`The District Court Action Will Be Complete Well
`Before a Final Written Decision in This
`Proceeding ...................................................................... 12
`Apple’s Inexcusable Delay in Filing the Petition ........... 15
`c.
`General Plastic Factors 4 and 5 Weigh in Favor of Denial ...... 19
`General Plastic Factor 3 Weighs in Favor of Denial ................ 21
`General Plastic Factor 2 Weighs in Favor of Denial ................ 22
`General Plastic Factor 1 Has Little Probative Value in
`this Case .................................................................................... 23
`B. Application of the Fintiv Factors Weighs in Favor of Denying
`Institution ............................................................................................. 23
`III. THE PETITION DOES NOT SHOW A REASONABLE
`LIKELIHOOD OF PREVAILING WITH RESPECT TO ANY
`CHALLENGED CLAIM .............................................................................. 24
`A.
`Background ......................................................................................... 24
`1.
`Background Of The Relevant Technology ............................... 24
`2.
`Level of Skill of a POSITA ...................................................... 25
`Claim Construction.............................................................................. 26
`1.
`The Petition Fails To Apply A Proper 35 U.S.C ...................... 26
`ii
`
`b.
`
`2.
`3.
`4.
`5.
`
`B.
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
`
`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
`
`2.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`3.
`
`Page
`The Petition Fails To Apply A Proper 35 U.S.C ...................... 29
`2.
`3. Maxell Did Not Disavow Claim Scope in Prior IPR
`Proceedings ............................................................................... 32
`C. Ground 1: Petitioner Failed To Establish That Claims 1-3, 5,
`15, and 17 Are Obvious Over Hayashida In View Of The
`Knowledge of POSITA ....................................................................... 33
`1.
`Petitioner fails to establish that Hayashida Discloses
`Element 1(b) .............................................................................. 33
`Petitioner fails to establish that Hayashida Discloses
`Element 1(e)(i) .......................................................................... 39
`Petitioner fails to establish that Hayashida Discloses
`Element 1(e)(ii) ......................................................................... 39
`Petitioner fails to establish that Hayashida Discloses
`Element 1(e)(iii) ........................................................................ 40
`Petitioner fails to establish that Hayashida Discloses
`Claims 2-3, 5, 15, and 17 .......................................................... 45
`D. Ground 2: Petitioner Failed To Establish That Claims 1-3, 5,
`10-15, 17, and 18 Are Obvious Over Hayashida In View Of
`Abowd ................................................................................................. 45
`1.
`Petitioner fails to show that Abowd is prior art ........................ 46
`a.
`The University of Pittsburgh Exhibits Are
`Insufficient ...................................................................... 47
`(1) Appendix AB01 Does Not Show Public
`Accessibility ........................................................ 47
`(2) Appendix AB02 Does Not Prove Public
`Accessibility ........................................................ 49
`The Carnegie Mellon University Exhibits Are
`Insufficient ...................................................................... 51
`
`b.
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
`
`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`(1) Appendix AB03 Fails to Prove Public
`Accessibility ........................................................ 51
`(2) Appendix AB04 Fails to Prove Public
`Accessibility ........................................................ 51
`Petitioner fails to show that it would be obvious to
`combine Hayashida and Abowd ............................................... 57
`IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 59
`
`
`2.
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
`
`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc.,
`908 F.3d 765 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................ 50
`In re Antor Media Corp.,
`689 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 43
`Apple Inc., v. Immersion Corporation,
`IPR2016-01372, Paper 7 (January 11, 2017) ............................................... 27, 31
`Apple Inc. v. Maxell Ltd.,
`IPR2020-00204, Paper 1 ............................................................................... 20, 21
`Apple v. Fintiv,
`IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB March 20, 2020) ...................................passim
`Apple v. Maxell,
`IPR2020-00201, Paper 1 (PTAB December 19, 2019) (Petition for
`U.S. Patent No. 7,116,438) ................................................................................. 30
`Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB,
`892 F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1989) .......................................................................... 42
`Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc.,
`445 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................... 48
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) .......................................................................................... 5
`Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. ITC,
`899 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......................................................................... 29
`E-One, Inc. v. Oshkosh Corp.,
`IPR2019-00161, Paper 16 (PTAB May 16, 2019) ....................................... 15, 18
`Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. Evalve,
`IPR2019-01546, Paper 7, 12-13 (PTAB Feb. 26, 2020) .................................... 12
`v
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
`
`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Facebook, Inc. v. Sound View Innovations, LLC,
`IPR2017-01004, Paper No. 13 (Aug. 29, 2017) ........................................... 27, 31
`Facebook, Inc. v. Sound View Innovations, LLC,
`IPR2017-01006, Paper No. 14 (Aug. 29, 2017) ........................................... 27, 31
`Gen. Plastic Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha,
`IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) ........................................passim
`Google LLC v. Uniloc 2017 LLC,
`IPR2020-00115, Paper 8 (PTAB March 27, 2020) ............................................ 15
`Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech.,
`815 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 5
`Hormel Foods Corp. v. HIP, Inc.,
`IPR2019-00469, Paper 9 (PTAB July 15, 2019) .......................................... 15, 18
`Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC,
`Case No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) ................. 46, 52, 53
`IPCom GmbH & Co. v. HTC Corp.,
`861 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................... 28
`KAIST IP LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.,
`No. 2:16-cv-01314-JRG (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2020) ........................................... 19
`In re Klopfenstein,
`380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .................................................................... 46, 47
`In re Kumar,
`418 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .......................................................................... 42
`Maxell, Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 5:19-cv-00036-RWS (E.D. Tex.) ............................................................... 1, 3
`
`vi
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
`
`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`NetApp Inc. v. Realtime Data LLC,
`IPR2017-01195, Paper 9 (PTAB Oct. 12, 2017) ................................................ 11
`NHK Spring Co., Ltd. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc.,
`IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) ........................................passim
`Polycom, Inc. v. Directpacket Research, Inc.,
`No. IPR2019-01235, 2020 WL 205974 (PTAB Jan. 13, 2020) ......................... 47
`Pride Solutions LLC v. Not Dead Yet Manufacturing, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00627, Paper No. 14 (March 17, 2014) ......................................... 27, 31
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd.,
`929 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .......................................................................... 50
`Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal Group – Trucking
`LLC,
`IPR2019-01393, Paper 12 (PTAB Feb. 5, 2020) .........................................passim
`SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc.,
`511 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 48, 50
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 28, 29, 30
`ZTE Corp. v. Maxell, Ltd.,
`IPR2018-00241, Paper No. 9 (July 2, 2018) ...................................................... 31
`ZTE,
`IPR2018-00235, Paper 9 ............................................................................... 28, 30
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. 112(f) ....................................................................................................... 29
`35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 6 .............................................................................................. 29, 32
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 ..........................................................................................passim
`
`vii
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
`
`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`35 U.S.C. § 314 ............................................................................................ 2, 4, 5, 24
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ................................................................................... 1, 15, 23, 24
`35 U.S.C § 314(b) ...................................................................................................... 5
`35 U.S.C. §316(a)(11) .............................................................................................. 14
`35 U.S.C. § 316(b) ..................................................................................................... 5
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104 ............................................................................................. 29, 32
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) .............................................................................................. 27
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) ...................................................................................passim
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)… ...................................................................................... 31
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ...................................................................................... 1, 26
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) ................................................................................................. 5
`157 Cong. Rec. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen.
`Kyl) ..................................................................................................................... 17
`83 Fed. Reg. 39,989 at 10 (August 2018) .................................................................. 5
`
`viii
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
`
`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Patent Owner Maxell, Ltd. (“Patent Owner”) respectfully requests that the
`
`Board deny institution because Petitioner Apple Inc. (hereinafter, “Apple” or
`
`“Petitioner”) has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the
`
`grounds submitted in its Petition for challenging the patentability of claims 1-3, 5,
`
`10-15, 17, and 18 (“challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 6,748,317 (“the ’317
`
`patent”).
`
`First, the Board should exercise its discretion pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`
`and deny this petition. Application of the General Plastic and Fintiv factors weighs
`
`heavily in favor of denying institution. One of the purposes of IPRs is to be an
`
`“effective and efficient alternative” to litigation. Gen. Plastic Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
`
`Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 16-17 (PTAB Sept. 6,
`
`2017) (precedential). Here, instituting an IPR would not be an effective or efficient
`
`alternative to litigation, particularly given the advanced stage of the co-pending
`
`District Court case Maxell, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 5:19-cv-00036-RWS (E.D.
`
`Tex.), the finite resources of the Board, and Apple’s delay in filing its Petition.
`
`Second, it is Petitioner’s burden to propose a construction and then explain
`
`how the construed claim is unpatentable under that proposed construction. See 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). The Petition fails, however, to propose a construction and
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
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`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`
`explain how the claims are unpatentable in view of that construction, particularly
`
`with the terms “a device for getting location information denoting a [p]resent place
`
`of said portable terminal;” “a device for getting direction information denoting an
`
`orientation of said portable terminal;” “a device for getting a location information
`
`of another portable terminal from said another terminal via connected network;” “a
`
`device for retrieving a route from said present place to said destination;” and “an
`
`input device for inputting a destination.”
`
`Third, Apple fails to show that Abowd is prior art; this is fatal to Ground 2.
`
`Fourth, even if Abowd is prior art, Apple’s obviousness analysis lacks
`
`sufficient articulated reasons with rational underpinnings on why it would be
`
`obvious to combine the systems of Hayashida in view of the knowledge of
`
`POSITA and Hayashida in view of Abowd.
`
`For at least reasons, more fully explained below, Apple has failed to show a
`
`reasonable likelihood of success on any ground presented.
`
`II. THE BOARD SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION AND DENY
`INSTITUTION FOR ALL GROUNDS PURSUANT TO 35 U.S.C. § 314
`Apple’s Petition for IPR should be denied because the invalidity arguments
`
`Apple raises here will be resolved in a co-pending District Court action long before
`
`this proceeding will conclude. Specifically, the ’317 Patent is asserted in the co-
`
`pending District Court case, Maxell, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 5:19-cv-00036-RWS
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
`
`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`
`(E.D. Tex.) (“District Court Action”). While Apple acknowledged the District
`
`Court Action in its Petition, it failed to inform the Board that the District Court
`
`Action will be complete long before any final decision would issue in this
`
`proceeding. Nor did Apple inform the Board—when attempting to justify its delay
`
`in filing its Petition—that Maxell identified Apple’s infringement of the claims at
`
`issue in the ’317 Patent years prior to Apple filing its Petition, and that the trial
`
`date of October 2020 for the District Court Action was scheduled back in May
`
`2019. Ex. 2001.1 The jury trial is scheduled in the District Court Action only two
`
`months after the Board’s anticipated Institution Decision, and will adjudicate the
`
`validity of the ’317 Patent ten months before any Final Written Decision issues in
`
`this proceeding.
`
`Not only will the District Court Action conclude long before this
`
`proceeding, but it will also resolve the invalidity arguments that Apple raises in the
`
`instant Petition. The prior art references relied on in this proceeding are the same,
`
`or substantially the same, as those at issue in the District Court Action.
`
`1 See March 10, 2015 and May 15, 2015 Letters from Apple to Maxell (Exs. 2002
`and 2003); see also Letter from Maxell to Apple dated May 17, 2018 (Ex. 2004) at
`2. As explained further herein, over the next year Maxell consistently and
`periodically identified asserted claims of the ’317 Patent to Apple. See, e.g., Ex.
`1010 at ¶ 23.
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
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`Patent No. 6,748,317
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`
`Additionally, the challenged claims are substantially the same as those asserted in
`
`the District Court Action. The claim construction disputes between the parties with
`
`respect to the ’317 Patent are also the same across the two proceedings and the
`
`Court has already issued a Markman Order. The claim constructions Apple applies
`
`in this proceeding are identical to those it is putting forward in the District Court
`
`Action. Thus, any questions of whether the grounds of invalidity raised in Apple’s
`
`Petition invalidate the asserted claims of the ’317 Patent will be decided in the
`
`District Court action at least ten months prior to when the Board would issue a
`
`Final Written Decision in this proceeding.
`
`Simply put, instituting an IPR in this circumstance would needlessly
`
`duplicate the District Court Action, and unnecessarily waste the Board’s
`
`resources.2 See NHK Spring Co., Ltd. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752,
`
`Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential) (denying institution under
`
`similar facts). For at least these reasons and those further set forth below, the
`
`
`2 Apple has filed nine other Petitions challenging the patentability of the other
`patents-in-suit in the District Court Action. As set forth individually in Maxell’s
`preliminary responses to those Petitions, the Board should exercise its discretion to
`deny institution in those proceedings for similar reasons pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
`§ 314. See IPR2020-00199, -00200, -00201, -00202, -00203, -00204, -00408, -
`00409, -00597.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
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`Patent No. 6,748,317
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`Board should exercise its discretion not to institute this proceeding pursuant to 35
`
`U.S.C. § 314.
`
`A. Application of the General Plastic Factors Weighs in Favor of
`Denying Institution
`There is no requirement that the Board institute IPR. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid
`
`Tech., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, the decision to institute is
`
`delegated to the Board and is purely discretionary. As 35 U.S.C § 314(b) explains,
`
`“[t]he Director shall determine whether to institute an inter partes review.” See also
`
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016); 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.108(a). The Director’s discretion is informed by many things, including the
`
`consideration of “the integrity of the patent system, [and] the efficient
`
`administration of the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(b).
`
`The USPTO recognized that these factors, and the Board’s discretionary
`
`denial, apply where “other proceedings relating to the same patent, either at the
`
`Office, in district courts, or the ITC” are at advanced stages and will resolve the
`
`same or similar issues presented in the Petition before the Board can. See Trial
`
`Practice Update, 83 Fed. Reg. 39,989 at 10 (August 2018). That is because one of
`
`the purposes of IPRs is to be an “effective and efficient alternative” to litigation.
`
`Gen. Plastic, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 16-17. Here, instituting an IPR would
`
`not be an effective or efficient alternative to litigation because the co-pending
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
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`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`
`District Court Action (1) involves the same, or substantially the same prior art that
`
`Apple relies on here, and (2) will be complete well before a final decision in this
`
`proceeding.
`
`The majority of the General Plastic factors weigh heavily in favor of the
`
`Board using its discretion to deny institution. Indeed, even if other factors weighed
`
`in favor of institution, Board precedent demands denial of institution due to
`
`Apple’s delay in filing its Petition and the advanced stage of the District Court
`
`Action. Apple v. Fintiv, IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5-6 (PTAB March 20, 2020)
`
`(precedential); NHK Spring, IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (“Institution of an inter
`
`partes review under these circumstances would not be consistent with an objective
`
`of the AIA . . . to provide an effective and efficient alternative to district court
`
`litigation. . . . Accordingly, we find that the advanced state of the district court
`
`proceeding is an additional factor that weighs in favor of denying the Petition
`
`under § 314(a).”) (internal quotes omitted); see also Sand Revolution II, LLC v.
`
`Continental Intermodal Group – Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 12 at 15-18
`
`(PTAB Feb. 5, 2020) (noting the advanced stages of the related district court
`
`litigation, the substantial similarity of the issues, and the precedential effect of the
`
`NHK decision as reasons for denying institution); see also id., Paper 18 (PTAB
`
`April 6, 2020) (denying request for Precedential Opinion Panel review).
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
`
`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`
`
`1.
`General Plastic Factors 6 and 7 Weigh in Favor of Denial
`Apple boldly claims that the “Board’s finite resources will not be adversely
`
`affected by this IPR.” Petition at 8. But Apple only considers the Board’s resources
`
`in relation to the prior denial of institution of a petition filed by ZTE against the
`
`’317 Patent and ignores the duplicative efforts the Board would engage in as a
`
`result of the co-pending District Court Action. Considering the status of the
`
`District Court Action, and Apple’s delay in filing this Petition, granting institution
`
`here would work against the purposes of IPRs to be an “effective and efficient
`
`alternative” to litigation, and would needlessly consume the finite resources of the
`
`Board. Gen. Plastic, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 16-17.
`
`a.
`
`The District Court Action Will Resolve the Same or
`Substantially
`the Same Arguments as Those
`Presented Here
`The scope of Apple’s challenge to the ’317 Patent’s validity in this
`
`proceeding is substantially the same as Apple’s challenge in the District Court
`
`Action. For example, there is overlap in the claims challenged in both proceedings.
`
`Here, Apple asserts that Claims 1-3, 5, 10-15, 17, and 18 of the ’317 Patent are
`
`unpatentable. Petition at 1. These claims cover nearly all the asserted claims
`
`against Apple in the District Court Action at the time Apple filed its Petition,
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case IPR2020-00407
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`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
`
`including the independent claims and the same or similar dependent claims. See
`
`Ex. 2005 at 2.
`
`The prior art that Apple relies on in its Petition is the same, or substantially
`
`the same, as the prior art at issue in the District Court Action. For example, in the
`
`Petition Apple proposes just two grounds, utilizing Hayashida and Abowd. Petition
`
`at 5. In the District Court Action, Apple also relies on Hayashida and Abowd as a
`
`primary ground of invalidity in its invalidity contentions and in its Expert
`
`Invalidity Report served on May 7, 2020. Ex. 2006 at 6, 12-19; Ex. 2007; Ex. 2008
`
`(Expert Report Hayashida Chart); Ex. 2009 (Expert Report Abowd Chart). Indeed,
`
`a sample comparison of the evidence cited in the Petition allegedly supporting
`
`unpatentability of Claim 1 illustrates that the very same issues will be decided by a
`
`jury at the trial in the District Court Action a mere two months after the Board’s
`
`Institution Decision:
`
`Element
`
`1[pre]
`
`1[a]
`
`from
`Alleged Support
`Hayashida Relied on in
`Petition
`Hayashida, 76:13-20
`
`Alleged Support from Hayashida
`Relied on in District Court Action
`Expert Reports
`Hayashida, 1:5-8; 76:5-20
`
`Hayashida, 2:46-55; 7:24-30; 7:50-
`8:21; 10:55-11:8; 13:16-33; Fig. 1, 5
`
`Hayashida, 6:47-49; 6:65-
`67; 7:50-54; 7:66-8:8; Fig.
`1
`
`
`
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`Case IPR2020-00407
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`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
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`Element
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`Alleged Support from Hayashida
`Relied on in District Court Action
`Expert Reports
`Hayashida, 2:46-55; 7:24-42; 7:60-
`8:3; 10:55-64; 13:34-47; Fig. 1, 5
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`from
`Alleged Support
`Hayashida Relied on in
`Petition
`Hayashida, 6:47-49; 6:65-
`67; 7:60-61; 7:28-42;
`10:58-64; 13:35-41; Figs.
`10, 14, 16
`Hayashida, 8:22-31; Fig. 1 Hayashida, 8:22-31; 11:9-14; 13:7-
`10; 13:48-56; 61:62-63:30; 64:66-
`66:39; 66:42-67:59; 67:62-68:18
`Fig. 1, 5, 68-72
`Hayashida, 8:22-31; 8:37-49; Fig. 1,
`9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 20, 23-26, 28-33,
`40-46, 48, 50-52, 69, 71, 73
`Hayashida, Abstract; 1:58-67; 2:1-
`12; 3:9-16; 5:66-6:7; 6:8-16; 14:15-
`26; 14:56-65; 21:7-22:44; 24:9-20;
`30:50-55; 34:49-35:8; 35:36-47;
`49:3-11; 49:44-60; 74:41-52; 74:61-
`67; Figs. 9, 10, 16, 20, 23-26, 28-31,
`41-46, 50-52, 73
`Hayashida, 2:1-12; 5:66-6:7; 22:22-
`44; 23:34-42; 23:54-61; 24:9-20;
`24:41-46; 35:29-34; 38:54-60;
`43:31-40; 71:7-32; 72:45-59; 74:25-
`40; Fig. 17, 20
`Hayashida, 76:5-20
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`1[b]
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`1[c]
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`1[d]
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`1[e][i]
`
`1[e][ii]
`(1[f][i] in Ex.
`2008)
`
`Hayashida, 8:22-23; 8:37-
`44; Fig. 1
`
`Hayashida, Abstract;
`15:64-16:4; 17:58-59;
`21:64-22:31; 22:32-44;
`37:12-13; 64:38-42; Figs.
`9, 10, 16, 20, 23-26, 28-31,
`41-46, 50-52, 73
`
`
`Hayashida, 2:10-12; 10:58-
`64; 21:64-22:44; 23:39-42;
`43:31-40; Fig. 17, 20
`
`1[e][iii]
`(1[f][ii] in Ex.
`2008)
`Compare Petition at 18-34, 49-55 with Ex. 2008 at 1-28. Other claims show similar
`
`Hayashida, 7:14-16; 10:6-
`14; 12:21-25; 75:46-49;
`76:13-20
`
`substantial overlap. Compare Petition at 40-43 with Ex. 2008 at 29-38.
`
`Apple’s Final Election of Prior Art served on April 7, 2020 shows that
`
`Apple continues to rely on Hayashida and Abowd to set forth its invalidity case at
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`Case IPR2020-00407
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`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
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`trial in the District Court litigation in October 2020—ten months before a final
`
`written decision is expected in this IPR. See Apple’s Final Election of Prior Art
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`(Ex. 2010) at 3.3 In fact, there are four remaining invalidity grounds for the ’317
`
`Patent in the District Court Action, and three rely on Hayashida including a
`
`complete overlap with Apple’s Ground 1. Thus, substantially the same issues will
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`be decided by a jury, using the same prior art, same invalidity theories, and
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`substantially the same citations of the prior art (shown in the above table), all ten
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`months prior to the issuance of a Final Written Decision.
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`Here, no meaningful distinction exists between Apple’s references and
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`grounds used in the Petition versus those in the District Court Action. In the
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`District Court Action, Apple relied upon the same prior art as this Petition until at
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`least April 7, 2020 at which point it selectively dropped certain prior art references
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`in an attempt to compensate for its delay in filing its Petition and avoid
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`discretionary denial. But from August 15, 2019 through April 7, 2020, Apple relied
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`on identical prior art.
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`Nor can Apple avoid denial simply by challenging extraneous unasserted
`
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`3 Apple presents the “system” version of Abowd in the District Court Action, but
`clearly relies also on the literature that it contends supports that system, See, e.g.,
`Ex. 2010; Ex. 2009.
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`Case IPR2020-00407
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`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
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`claims that raise the same invalidity issues as the asserted ones. First, the Court
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`ordered Maxell to elect a narrower set of claims. This narrowing should not have
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`an impact on the Board’s decision. See NetApp Inc. v. Realtime Data LLC,
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`IPR2017-01195, Paper 9 at 7-8 (PTAB Oct. 12, 2017). Second, even though
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`independent Claim 10 is no longer asserted in the District Court Action, Apple
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`itself acknowledges the substantial overlap at least between Claims 1 and 10; it
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`substantially relies on its Claim 1 analysis for Claim 10. Petition at 57-60.
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`The Board should not countenance Apple’s delayed filing of its IPRs, and its
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`attempt to then take advantage of the Court’s narrowing order months after filing
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`its petition in an attempt to avoid discretionary denial. This “gotcha” tactic further
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`exposes Apple’s insincere claim that it seeks efficiency, and runs contrary to why
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`the Board found NHK and Fintiv important to declare precedential.
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`Moreover, Apple’s position in the District Court Action is that there is
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`complete overlap of issues. “Apple reserves the right to amend its election of prior
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`art as appropriate. . . .” Ex. 2010 at 2. Apple’s invalidity contentions in the District
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`Court Action also purport to “incorporate[] by reference all prior art cited during
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`prosecution of the Asserted Patents, and all inter partes review (IPR) petitions
`filed against the Asserted Patents and the prior art cited in these IPR petitions” Ex.
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`2006 at 2. In other words, Apple has expressly and specifically sought to
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`Case IPR2020-00407
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`Patent No. 6,748,317
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response
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`incorporate all of the Petition’s contentions into the District Court Action.
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`Thus, substantially the same issues will be decided by a jury, using the same
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`prior art, ten months prior to the issuance of a Final Written Decision. At bottom,
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`the issues presented in the Petition that differ from what will be argued in the
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`District Court Action do not meaningfully distinguish the arguments in this
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`proceeding from those in the District Court Action. Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v.
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`Evalve, IPR2019-01546, Paper 7, 12-13 (PTAB Feb. 26, 2020) (denying institution
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`despite lack of a 1:1 overlap of claims and prior art, finding such distinction not
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`meaningful).
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`b.
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`The District Court Action Will Be Complete Well
`Before a Final Written Decision in This Proceeding
`Not only are the substantive arguments overlapping, but the District Court
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`Action will be complete well before a Final Writte