`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`
` Plaintiff,
`
`CANON, INC.,
`
`
`
`vs.
`
`TCL ELECTRONICS HOLDINGS
`LTD., et al.
`
`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-00546-JRG
`
`
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`
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`
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`Page 1 of 41
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`CANON EXHIBIT 2009
`Roku, Inc. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha
`IPR2020-00342
`
`
`
`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 2 of 41 PageID #: 4851
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`THE ’130 PATENT ............................................................................................................ 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`“to buffer” / “which had been buffered” / “to . . . buffer” (’130 Claims 1-8) (see
`Op. Br. § III.A) ............................................................................................................ 1
`
`“periodically repeat[ing] accessing of a URL of the moving image-streaming
`content” (’130 Claims 1, 2, 5, 7) (see Op. Br. § II.B) ................................................. 2
`
`“a television broadcast program transmitted through a broadcast signal” (’130
`Claims 2, 7) (see Op. Br. § III.C) ................................................................................ 5
`
`“internet broadcasting content” (’130 Claims 1, 2, 5, 7) (see Op. Br. § II.A) ............. 5
`
`“a control unit for (1) controlling, responsive to the receiving by the operation
`unit of the operation of turning off the power source, to read out the URL
`information stored in the memory unit, and (2) controlling, while the power source
`is in an off state, to periodically repeat accessing of a URL of the moving image-
`streaming content which had been displayed before the turning off the power
`source, so as to receive by the receiving unit and to buffer in the buffering unit the
`latest moving image-streaming content, and (3) controlling, responsive to the
`receiving by the operation unit of the operation of turning on the power source, to
`read out from the buffering unit the latest buffered moving image-streaming
`content and to start the displaying on the display screen of the latest buffered
`moving image-streaming content” (’130 Claim 1) (see Op. Br. § III.B) ..................... 6
`
`F.
`
`The similar “control unit” limitation in Claim 2 (see Op. Br. § III.B) ...................... 10
`
`II.
`
`THE ’767, ’986, AND ’206 FAMILY OF PATENTS ..................................................... 10
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`“USB mass storage class” (’767 Claim 3; ’986 Claim 4) (see Op. Br. § III.I) .......... 10
`
`“USB imaging class” (’767 Claims 4, 5; ’986 Claim 5) (see Op. Br. § III.J) ........... 11
`
`“logically disconnects a communication connection” / “logically disconnect the
`communication with the communication unit” / “communication [with the
`external device] is logically disconnected”/ “communication with the external
`device is . . . a logical disconnection (’767 Claim 2; ’986 Claims 2, 3, 6, 8, 11;
`’206 Claims 4, 7, 8, 10) (see Op. Br. § III.H) ............................................................ 11
`
`“end the display” (’767 Claims 1-3, 5-14; ’986 Claims 4, 7, 8); “[stop / stops /
`stopping of] the display” (’206 Claims 1-4, 7-10, 13-14) (see Op. Br. § III.G) ........ 12
`
`“continue the display” (’767 Claims 1, 4, 11, 13, 14; ’986 Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 10,
`11) (see Op. Br. § III.F) ............................................................................................. 13
`
`“a connection unit configured to connect an external device to be able to
`communicate with the external device” (’767 Claims 1, 11, 13, 14) (see Op. Br.
`§ III.D) ....................................................................................................................... 14
`
`“a communication unit configured to communicate with an external device” (’986
`Claims 1, 6, 10, 11; ’206 Claims 1, 7, 13, 14) (see Op. Br. § III.D) ......................... 16
`
`ii
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`Page 2 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 3 of 41 PageID #: 4852
`
`H.
`
`I.
`
`J.
`
`K.
`
`L.
`
`“a detection unit configured to detect whether or not the external device is
`physically connected to said connection unit” (’767 Claim 6) (see Op. Br. § III.K)
` ................................................................................................................................... 17
`
`“a control unit configured to control said display unit to make a display based on
`data received from the external device with which a communication connection
`is established via [said/the] connection unit” (’767 Claims 1, 11, 13, 14) (see Op.
`Br. § III.E) .................................................................................................................. 18
`
`“control unit acquires class information indicating a class of the external device
`from the external device via said connection unit, controls said display unit to
`[continue/end] the display based on the data received from the external device at
`the time of disconnection of the communication connection with the external
`device if the class of the external device indicated by the class information is a
`predetermined class, and controls said display unit to [end/continue] the display
`based on the data received from the external device at the time of disconnection
`of the communication connection with the external device if the class of the
`external device indicated by the class information is not the predetermined class”
`(’767 Claims 1, 13) (see Op. Br. § III.E) ................................................................... 19
`
`“a display control unit configured to display, on a display unit, an image received
`from the external device via the communication unit, and if communication with
`the external device is disconnected, to stop the display of the image received from
`the external device, wherein the display control unit varies a period of time from
`the disconnection to the stopping of the display of the image depending on a type
`of the external device (’206 Claim 1) (see Op. Br. § III.E) ....................................... 20
`
`“a display control unit configured to display, on a display unit, an image received
`from the external device via the communication unit, and if communication with
`the external device is disconnected, to stop the display of the image received from
`the external device, wherein the display control unit varies a period of time from
`the disconnection to the stopping of the display of the image depending on a
`determination result as to whether the disconnection of the communication with
`the external device is a physical disconnection or a logical disconnection” (‘206
`Claim 7) (see Op. Br. § III.E) .................................................................................... 22
`
`III.
`
`THE ’413 PATENT .......................................................................................................... 23
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`“evaluating a degree of suitability” (’413 Claims 1, 7) (see Op. Br. § III.M) ........... 23
`
`“attribute of [a/the] remote control device” (’413 Claims 1, 5, 7, 11) (see Op. Br.
`§ III.L) ........................................................................................................................ 25
`
`“operation device” (’413 Claims 2, 8) (see Op. Br. § II.C) ....................................... 26
`
`“operation form” (’413 Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10) (see Op. Br. § II.D) ....................... 27
`
`“an acquiring unit which acquires an attribute of a remote control device” (’413
`Claim 7) (see Op. Br. § III.N) .................................................................................... 27
`
`“a determining unit which determines an operation form corresponding to the
`remote control device from among a plurality of operation forms previously stored
`in a storing unit based on the attribute of the remote control device acquired by
`
`iii
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`Page 3 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 4 of 41 PageID #: 4853
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`the acquiring unit … wherein the determining unit determines the operation form
`corresponding to the remote control device by evaluating a degree of suitability
`between the remote control device and each of the plurality of operation forms
`based on the attribute of the remote control device acquired by the acquiring unit.
`(’413 Claim 7) (see Op. Br. § III.N) .......................................................................... 28
`
`G.
`
`“a controlling unit which displays an operation screen related to the operation
`form which is determined by the determining unit displayed” (’413 Claim 7) (see
`Op. Br. § III.N) .......................................................................................................... 30
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 30
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
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`Page 4 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 5 of 41 PageID #: 4854
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Agis Software Dev. LLC v. Huawei Device USA Inc.,
`No. 2:17-CV-513-JRG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174041 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 10,
`2018) ..........................................................................................................................................8
`
`Apple Inc. v. Andrea Elecs. Corp.,
`Nos. 2018-2382, -2383, 2020 WL 593661 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 7, 2020) .........................................3
`
`Cellular Commc’ns Equip. LLC v. HTC Corp.,
`No. 6:13-CV-507, 2015 WL 1048890 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2015) ..............................................7
`
`Cellular Commc’ns Equip. LLC v. HTC Corp.,
`No. 6:16-CV-475-KNM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3759
`(E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2018) ................................................................................................... passim
`
`
`
`Cellular Commc’ns Equip. LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`No. 6-14-cv-00759, 2016 WL 1237429 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2016) ........................................14
`
`Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. ITC,
`899 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................7
`
`IPS Grp., Inc. v. CivicSmart, Inc.,
`No. 3-17-cv-00632, 2018 WL 6567843 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2018) ...........................................8
`
`MTD Prods. Inc. v. Iancu,
`933 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2019)......................................................................................9, 15, 18
`
`Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) .................................................................................................................23
`
`Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..........................................................................................15, 17
`
`Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
`325 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003)......................................................................................9, 16, 17
`
`Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei Device Co.,
`No. 2:17-CV-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018) ...............................9
`
`Optis Wireless Tech. LLC v. ZTE Corp.,
`No. 2:15-cv-300-JRG-RSP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52657
`(E.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2018) ................................................................................................ passim
`
`
`
`v
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`Page 5 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 6 of 41 PageID #: 4855
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`PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns,
`815 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................6, 16
`
`Saint Lawrence Commc’ns LLC v. ZTE Corp.,
`No. 2:15-CV-349, 2016 WL 6275390 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2016) .............................................9
`
`In re Smith Int’l, Inc.,
`871 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................24
`
`TEK Glob., S.R.L. v. Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc.
`920 F.3d 777 (Fed. Cir. 2019)....................................................................................................9
`
`Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`Case No. 2:18-cv-00506-JRG, 2020 WL 24880 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2020) ............................24
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) ....................................................................... passim
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 .......................................................................................................................25
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 ............................................................................................................... passim
`
`Other Authorities
`
`American Heritage Dictionary (2001) .............................................................................................3
`
`McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms (2003) ...............................................3
`
`MPEP § 2181(I)(A)......................................................................................................................7, 8
`
`Newton’s Telecom Dictionary (2004) .............................................................................................2
`
`Wiley Electrical and Electronics Engineering Dictionary (2004) ...................................................2
`
`
`
`
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`vi
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`Page 6 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 7 of 41 PageID #: 4856
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`EXHIBIT LIST
`
`Exhibit Number
`
`Description
`
`Exhibit 1
`
`Exhibit 2
`
`Exhibit 3
`
`Exhibit 4
`
`Excerpts from Newton’s Telecom Dictionary (2004), TCL-
`CANON_0000009914-17
`
`Excerpts from Wiley Electrical and Electronics Engineering Dictionary
`(2004), TCL-CANON_0000010639-42
`
`Printout of USPTO Class Code 709 (obtained from USPTO website,
`https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc709/sched709.pdf)
`
`Excerpts from File History for U.S. App. No. 10/671,741 (“’130 File
`History”)
`
`[January 4, 2010 Rejection; April 5, 2010 Amendment]
`
`Exhibit 5
`
`Excerpts from McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Computing &
`Communications (2003), TCL-CANON_0000009904-7
`
`Exhibit 6
`
`American Heritage Dictionary (2001), CANONTCL00009266-68
`
`Exhibit 7
`
`Exhibit 8
`
`Exhibit 9
`
`Comprehensive Dictionary of Electrical Engineering (2005), TCL-
`CANON_0000009865-68
`
`Declaration of Dr. Benjamin B. Bederson in Support of Defendants’
`Claim Constructions for Terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 7,746,413 and
`7,810,130, dated January 6, 2020
`
`Declaration of Dr. Robert Akl, D.Sc., in Support of Defendants’ Claim
`Constructions for Terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 8,078,767; 8,346,986; and
`8,713,206, dated January 6, 2020
`
`Exhibit 10
`
`Excerpts from File History of U.S. App. No. 11/750,672 (“’413 File
`History”)
`
`[June 7, 2007 Preliminary Amendment; December 24, 2009 Rejection;
`January 22, 2010 Amendment]
`
`Exhibit 11
`
`Excerpts from the January 21, 2020 Deposition Transcript of Michael
`Ian Shamos, Ph.D., J.D.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vii
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`Page 7 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 8 of 41 PageID #: 4857
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`GLOSSARY
`
`Abbreviation
`
`Definition
`
`POSITA
`
`Op. Br.
`
`Person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`Plaintiff Canon Inc.’s Claim Construction Opening Brief (Dkt. No.
`91)
`
`MPF
`
`Means-plus-function
`
`Shamos Decl.
`
`Markman Declaration of Plaintiff’s Expert Michael Shamos, Ph.D.,
`J.D. (Dkt. No. 91-9)
`
`[Exhibit F to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief]
`
`Shamos Tr.
`
`January 21, 2020 Deposition Transcript of Michael Ian Shamos,
`Ph.D., J.D.
`
`[Exhibit 11 to this Response Brief]
`
`Bederson Decl.
`
`Declaration of Benjamin B. Bederson in Support of Defendants’
`Claim Constructions for Terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 7,746,413 and
`7,810,130
`
`[Exhibit 8 to this Response Brief]
`
`Akl Decl.
`
`Declaration of Dr. Robert Akl, D.Sc. in Support of Defendants’
`Claim Constructions for Terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 8,078,767;
`8,346,986; and 8,713,206
`
`’130
`
`’413
`
`’767
`
`’986
`
`’206
`
`[Exhibit 9 to this Response Brief]
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,810,130 (Dkt. No. 91-1)
`
`[Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief]
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,746,413 (Dkt. No. 91-2)
`
`[Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief]
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,078,767 (Dkt. Nos. 91-3, 91-4)
`
`[Exhibit C to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief]
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,346,986 (Dkt. No. 91-5, 91-6)
`
`[Exhibit D to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief]
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,713,206 (Dkt. No. 91-7, 91-8)
`
`[Exhibit E to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief]
`
`viii
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`Page 8 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 9 of 41 PageID #: 4858
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`’767 Family
`
`The ’767, ’986, and ’206 patents.
`
`Joint Claim Construction Statement (Dkt. No. 87, including
`Exhibits A-C)
`
` In this brief, all emphasis added unless otherwise noted.
`
`JCCS
`
` *
`
`ix
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`Page 9 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 10 of 41 PageID #: 4859
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`For the majority of disputed claim terms, Canon asserts “plain and ordinary meaning,” but
`
`then expresses an interpretation of “plain meaning” that contradicts or ignores the intrinsic and
`
`relevant extrinsic evidence, and is contrary to the plain meaning. Canon’s tactic serves only to
`
`push disputes about claim meaning out to a later stage in the case. In contrast, Defendants’
`
`proposed constructions are grounded in the intrinsic record and, where necessary, in
`
`contemporaneous technical dictionaries describing the plain and ordinary meaning—a source
`
`largely absent from Canon’s brief—for explanation of common technical terms.
`
`For nearly half of the disputed terms, the primary issue is whether those terms are written
`
`in MPF format. Each such term recites some “unit,” indisputably a nonce word, followed by a
`
`function—prototypical MPF format. For these terms, Canon cites to inapposite case law and often
`
`recycles arguments from entirely different “unit” terms to argue that a MPF construction does not
`
`apply. Canon’s one-size-fits-all approach is misplaced. Below, Defendants show that those terms
`
`would not be recognized as names of structure, and therefore must be analyzed as MPF terms.
`
`I.
`
`THE ’130 PATENT1
`
`A. “to buffer” / “which had been buffered” / “to . . . buffer” (’130 Claims 1-8) (see Op.
`Br. § III.A)
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`to temporarily store information for flow control /
`which had been temporarily stored for flow control /
`to temporarily store information for flow control
`
`Canon’s Construction
`Plain and ordinary [which is “storing
`with the expectation that the storage be
`reused at a later time,” Op. Br. 7]
`
`Defendants’ construction is consistent with the specification, which describes the purpose
`
`of buffering as “compensating [for] uncertainty of speed on the Internet” to create “smooth
`
`reproduction on the terminal side.” ’130, 1:66-2:3. This is flow control: receive data from a
`
`channel with uncertain speeds, temporarily store the data, and reproduce the data smoothly.
`
`This intrinsic-based understanding of these terms is confirmed by contemporaneous
`
`technical dictionary definitions of “buffer.” Newton’s Telecom Dictionary (2004) defines buffer
`
`
`1 For convenience, in accordance with standard practice, and contrary to Canon’s skipping back and forth between
`patents, Defendants have organized this brief to address all terms in a patent/family before moving to the next patent.
`Defendants provide a citation to the corresponding section of Canon’s opening brief in each claim term heading.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - Page 1
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`Page 10 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 11 of 41 PageID #: 4860
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`as “a temporary storage location for information being sent or received, and serves the purpose
`
`of flow control.” Ex. 1 at ’9917. Wiley Electrical and Electronics Engineering Dictionary (2004)
`
`defines “buffer” as “[a] segment of computer memory utilized to temporarily store information
`
`that awaits transfer or processing ... for instance, to compensate for differences in operating
`
`speeds.” Ex. 2 at ’10642. Storing information for transfer or processing describes flow control.
`
`Canon ignores these definitions2 and advocates an explanation of “plain and ordinary”
`
`meaning—“storing with the expectation that the storage be reused at a later time”—that
`
`improperly imports an intent requirement, such that practice of the claim turns on a programmer’s
`
`subjective expectation. Op. Br. at 7; see also Ex. 11 (“Shamos Tr.”) at 36:10-38:4. Moreover,
`
`since many forms of memory can be “reused at a later time,” it is not clear how this expectation
`
`could be measured or assessed. See Shamos Tr. at 39:3-40:8. Canon cites no intrinsic support for
`
`its construction; it cites only to Dr. Shamos, whose opinion lacks support. Further, Canon’s
`
`position elides the difference between acts of “buffering” and “storing,” while Defendants’
`
`construction recognizes that those are different concepts with different meanings. Shamos Decl.
`
`¶ 52. These differences are confirmed by the ’130 patent: the claims recite “storing” in reference
`
`to URL information (e.g., ’130, 20:39-40), demonstrating that the patentee knew how to recite
`
`“storing” when it wanted to claim “storing,” and applicant amended the claims in prosecution in
`
`response to a rejection to replace “storing” the moving image-streaming content with “buffering”
`
`it, affirming they have different meanings and scope. Ex. 4 (’130 File History) at 13-20; see also
`
`id. at 1-11. Defendant’s construction is correct.
`
`B. “periodically repeat[ing] accessing of a URL of the moving image-streaming
`content” (’130 Claims 1, 2, 5, 7) (see Op. Br. § II.B)
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`repeat[ing] accessing of a URL of the moving
`image-streaming content at regular intervals
`
`Canon’s Construction
`repeat[ing] accessing for a period of time of a
`URL of the moving-image streaming content
`
`
`2 Canon’s expert asserts that Newton’s definition is not applicable because it is limited to “data transmission.” Shamos
`Decl. ¶ 50. However, the ’130 patent is squarely about transmission of data—specifically, of internet broadcasting
`content. E.g., ’130, 20:31-38; Abstract. In fact, the USPTO classified the ’130 patent under class 709, see ’130, cover,
`which is “Electrical Computers And Digital Processing Systems: Multicomputer Data Transferring.” Ex. 3.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - Page 2
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`Page 11 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 12 of 41 PageID #: 4861
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`Defendants’ construction of “periodically” (the key disputed phrase) as “at regular
`
`intervals” does not import a limitation into the claims, as Canon contends; it gives the term its
`
`plain and ordinary meaning consistent with its usage in the ’130 patent, as confirmed by
`
`contemporaneous definitions. In contrast, Canon’s construction—“for a period of time”—is, quite
`
`literally, the exact opposite of what the ’130 patent discloses, as explained below.
`
`The plain meaning of “periodically” is “at regular intervals.” See Ex. 5 (McGraw-Hill
`
`Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms, 2003) at ’9906 (defining “periodic” as “[r]epeating
`
`itself identically at regular intervals”); Ex. 6 (American Heritage Dictionary, 2001) at ’9268
`
`(defining “periodic” as “[h]appening or appearing at regular intervals”); Apple Inc. v. Andrea
`
`Elecs. Corp., Nos. 2018-2382, -2383, 2020 WL 593661, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 7, 2020) (affirming
`
`construction of “periodically” to mean “at regular intervals of time” since it was consistent with
`
`usage of every applicable embodiment). No cited dictionary defines “periodically” or “periodic”
`
`as “for a period of time,” nor does the patent ever refer to “repeating accessing” of a URL for “a
`
`period of time.”
`
`The ’130 patent is clear that “periodically” is used according to its plain meaning, such that
`
`to “periodically repeat[] accessing of a URL” means repeatedly accessing the URL at regular
`
`intervals. The patent is directed to a device that periodically accesses and accumulates moving
`
`image-streaming content while the device is off or while other audiovisual content is enjoyed.
`
`E.g., ’130, Abstract, cl. 1 (device off), cl. 2 (device tuned to other channel). While off or tuned to
`
`another channel, the claimed device “periodically repeat[s] accessing of a URL” of the streaming
`
`content in order to receive that content. According to every disclosed embodiment (and Canon’s
`
`own admission), this periodical accessing is accomplished through the use of a timer that outputs
`
`a timing signal. See, e.g., Figs. 1 (element 117), 1B, 3; 4 (setting timer at step S118); 6 (step
`
`S318); Op. Br. 3-4. The specification is clear that the timer “outputs a timing signal for instructing
`
`periodical connection to the controller of [the] Internet connection” in order to access the Internet
`
`streaming content. ’130, 8:34-38; see also 10:7-10 (“while the power source . . . is in an off state,
`
`the timer 117 outputs the timing signal at the set period (step S123).”). A controller “controls
`
`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - Page 3
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`Page 12 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 13 of 41 PageID #: 4862
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`the Internet connector 105 according to the timing signal, and periodically repeats . . . the
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`operation for receiving the data of the streaming contents.” Id., 10:9-14. Thus, if a timer is set
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`for one minute, every minute the timer will output a signal to access the streaming content.
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`The ’130 patent’s figures further explain the timer, and confirm that repeating access of the
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`streaming content is performed at regular intervals, i.e.,
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`each time a set time on the timer is reached. For
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`example, Figure 4 (annotated, right) discloses that after
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`powering off (S117), a timer is set (S118). Then, once
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`the set time on the timer is reached (S123, “YES”),
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`internet content is received (S121) and buffered
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`(S122), and then the timer is checked again (S123) (the
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`loop highlighted in pink). Every time the “time set at
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`timer” (the “period”) is reached (S123, “YES”), that
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`loop “repeats accessing of a URL.”
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`Canon’s construction that the repeat accessing is done “for a period of time” contradicts
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`the specification and claims in that it requires the system to access the streaming content while the
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`timer is running, but cease accessing the content once the timer has expired. Op. Br. at 3. This
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`interpretation switches the “YES” and “NO” at decision box S123 in Figure 4—when the “time
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`set at timer” is reached (“YES”), the repeat accessing is terminated, whereas if the “time set at
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`timer” is not reached (“NO”), the repeat accessing continues. This is exactly opposite of Figure
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`4 and every disclosed embodiment. Moreover, under Canon’s construction, once the “period of
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`time” expires, no more repeat accessing and buffering occurs so the apparatus will no longer buffer
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`“the latest [i.e., most recent (see JCCS at 2)] moving-image streaming content,” as required by
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`all claims. E.g., ’130, 20:55-57, 21:34-36. Canon’s construction is improper.
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`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - Page 4
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`Page 13 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 14 of 41 PageID #: 4863
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`C. “a television broadcast program transmitted through a broadcast signal” (’130
`Claims 2, 7) (see Op. Br. § III.C)
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`Defendants’ Construction
`a television program simultaneously
`transmitted to a plurality of recipients
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`Canon’s Construction
`Plain and ordinary
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`There can be no legitimate dispute that a television “broadcast” is transmitted to a plurality
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`of recipients, as the ’130 specification and contemporaneous dictionaries confirm. E.g., ’130,
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`1:12-16 (broadcasts transmitted using “broadcast waves, satellites, etc.”); Ex. 1 at ’9916; Ex. 2
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`at ’10641; Ex. 7 at ’9867. Defendants’ construction is well-supported. Canon’s assertion that
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`Defendants’ construction requires “two-way interaction” between a sender and receiver is wrong:
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`Defendants’ construction, like contemporaneous definitions, requires merely transmission to
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`recipients, not any action by recipients. Meanwhile, Canon asserts an interpretation of “plain
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`meaning” that contradicts the plain meaning of the term. Canon asserts that “television broadcast
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`program” is any “TV programming”—ignoring and reading out the word “broadcast” entirely. In
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`Canon’s interpretation, TV programming never broadcasted would meet the plain meaning of a
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`“television broadcast.” Canon is wrong.
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`D. “internet broadcasting content” (’130 Claims 1, 2, 5, 7) (see Op. Br. § II.A)
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`Defendants’ Construction
`internet content simultaneously transmitted to
`a plurality of recipients
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`Canon’s Construction
`content obtainable over the Internet by more
`than one user
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`Defendants’ construction of “internet broadcasting content” gives meaning to all words of
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`this term and comports with the intrinsic evidence. In contrast, Canon’s construction reads
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`“broadcasting” out of the claim limitation entirely and contradicts the claim language.
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`As confirmed by numerous contemporaneous dictionaries, the plain and ordinary meaning
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`of “broadcast” (including with respect to data and streaming content transmissions over the
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`internet) is to simultaneously transmit to a plurality of recipients. See Ex. 1 at ’9916; Ex. 2
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`at ’10641; Ex. 7 at ’9867. Canon’s construction (“obtainable . . . by more than one user”), on the
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`other hand, improperly conflates “internet broadcasting content” with any content obtainable over
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`the internet. By definition, any internet content is capable of being obtained (“obtainable”) by
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`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - Page 5
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`Page 14 of 41
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`Case 2:18-cv-00546-JRG Document 92 Filed 02/19/20 Page 15 of 41 PageID #: 4864
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`more than one user. Therefore, Canon’s construction treats “internet broadcasting content” the
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`same as any “internet content,” reading “broadcast” out of the claim completely. Cf. PPC
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`Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns, 815 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he general
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`assumption is that different terms have different meanings.” (quotations omitted)). And Canon’s
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`improper conflation contradicts the claim language, which makes clear that “internet broadcasting
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`content” is a specific type of internet streaming content; they are not coextensive. All claims recite
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`an apparatus or method for receiving “moving image-streaming content through an internet, the
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`moving image-streaming content being internet broadcasting content.” E.g., ’130, 20:31-38.
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`That language of clarification would be unnecessary and redundant if “internet broadcasting
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`content” refers, as Canon proposes, to any internet content (“content obtainable over the Internet
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`by more than one user”).
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`Canon’s “push/pull” argument is a red herring as it has nothing to do with the meaning of
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`“broadcast”; it has to do with how content is accessed—as the passage that Canon cites confirms.
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`Op Br. at 1-2 (“‘internet broadcasting … also covers ‘pull type’ transmission … through which a
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`user can access and obtain contents from the Internet”). In the push type conventional television
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`context, a user tunes to a channel to access the frequency of the content that is being pushed by the
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`broadcaster. In the pull type context of a streaming broadcast, as the patent explains, ’130, 1:46-
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`53, a user has to request access to content before distribution to that user occurs. That difference
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`does not alter the meaning of “broadcast,”3 and Defendants’ construction does not exclude
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`preferred embodiments.
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`E. “a control unit for (1) controlling, responsive to the receiving by the operation unit
`of the operation of turning off the power source, to read out the URL information
`stored in the memory unit, and (2) controlling, while the power source is in an off
`state, to periodically repeat accessing of a URL of the moving image-streaming
`content which had been displayed before the turning off the power source, so as to
`receive by the receiving unit and to buffer in the buffering unit the latest moving
`image-streaming content, and (3) controlling, responsive to the receiving by the
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`3 Canon’s expert’s c