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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`MEDTRONIC, INC., AND MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, INC.,
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`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`TELEFLEX INNOVATIONS S.À.R.L.,
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`Patent Owner.
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`Case IPR2020-00134
`Patent RE45,760
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`PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR DIRECTOR REHEARING
`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) AND UNITED STATES V. ARTHREX
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`IPR2020-00134
`Patent RE45,760
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`B.
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`A.
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`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`LEGAL STANDARD ...................................................................................... 2
`II.
`III. THE BOARD’S FINDINGS RELATED TO CORROBORATION
`AND DILIGENCE SET DANGEROUS PRECEDENTS
`CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW, AND THE DIRECTOR
`SHOULD REVERSE. ..................................................................................... 2
`The Director must correct the Board’s faulty corroboration
`analysis. ...................................................................................................... 3
`The Director needs to clarify whether the non-inventor
`testimony, alone, is sufficient to corroborate the inventor
`testimony................................................................................................ 5
`Patent Owner’s non-inventor declarations do not corroborate
`inventor testimony that VSI determined that the inventions
`would work for their intended purpose—the Board relied on
`only inventor testimony. ........................................................................ 7
`The Board overlooked evidence disproving reduction to
`practice. ...............................................................................................12
`The Director must correct the Board’s application of the
`“reasonably continuous” diligence standard. ...........................................13
`IV. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................15
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`
`ii
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`IPR2020-00134
`Patent RE45,760
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Prods., Inc.,
`919 F.3d 1320 (2019) ..................................................................................... 13, 14
`ATI Techs. ULC v. Iancu,
`920 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .........................................................................3, 13
`Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,
`481 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2007) .................................................................. 8
`Cooper v. Goldfarb,
`154 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................... 6
`Hahn v. Wong,
`892 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ............................................................................... 4
`In re Meyer Mfg. Corp.,
`411 F. App’x 316 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ........................................................................13
`Lacks Indus., Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc.,
`322 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ...........................................................................4, 6
`Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
`79 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .............................................................................7, 8
`Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.,
`437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................. 3, 4, 7, 11
`Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc.,
`841 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................... 3
`Singh v. Brake,
`222 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................................................................... 3
`Toshiba Memory Corp. v. Anza Tech., Inc.,
`IPR2018-01597, 2020 WL 1229855 (PTAB Mar. 12, 2020) ...............................13
`United States v Arthrex, Inc.,
`141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021)............................................................................................ 2
`
`iii
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`IPR2020-00134
`Patent RE45,760
`Xilinx, Inc. v. Intell. Ventures Mgmt.,
`Appeal No. 2014-001131, 2014 WL 1679835 (PTAB Apr. 25, 2014) .................13
`Other Authorities
`MPEP § 2138.06 ......................................................................................................15
`PTO Guidance, Arthrex Q&As | USPTO ................................................................... 2
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`iv
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`IPR2020-00134
`Patent RE45,760
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Petitioner seeks Director review of the Final Written Decision (“FWD,” Paper
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`122) holding that the primary reference, Itou, is not prior art.1 The Board adopted its
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`reduction to practice analysis set forth in its Final Written Decision in IPR2020-
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`00132, Paper 125 (“132 FWD”). FWD at 11. Thus, Petitioner’s analysis here
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`addresses the Board’s analysis in IPR2020-00132.
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`The Board erred in finding that Patent Owner’s predecessor, VSI, reduced the
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`claimed coaxial guide catheter inventions to practice before Itou. The Board found
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`that VSI assembled and tested prototypes embodying the inventions and determined
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`that they would work for their intended purpose. But the Board’s ruling on testing
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`cites only inventor testimony, in violation of established corroboration requirements.
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`No document in the record relates to testing relevant prototypes. The Board cited the
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`declaration of a non-inventor, Erb, but not for any details regarding testing relevant
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`prototypes (because he provides none).
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`The Board’s decision departs from binding authority establishing the contours
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`of corroboration requirements. Neither the Board’s decision nor Patent Owner’s
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`briefing cites a single case finding that an invention was demonstrated to work for
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`its intended purpose based on only after-the-fact testimony, much less only inventor
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`1 Petitioner requested a Precedential Opinion Panel by email.
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`1
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`testimony. Director review is needed to establish the necessity of independent,
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`sufficient corroborating evidence and to correct the Board’s errors here.
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`The Board, in the alternative, found that Patent Owner showed diligent work
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`toward constructive reduction to practice during the entire critical period. In so
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`finding, the Board overcorrected in response to recent appellate decisions finding
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`prior PTAB diligence analyses improperly stringent. The Board applied a diligence
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`standard so relaxed that Patent Owner prevailed despite a record documenting little
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`to no engineering work over an eight-month period. That is not the law. Director
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`review is needed to create guidelines for the proper diligence analysis.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`Under Arthrex, the Director may review final written decisions, and the PTO
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`has clarified that “[t]he Director’s review may address any issue, including issues of
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`fact and issues of law, and will be de novo.” PTO Guidance, Arthrex Q&As | USPTO
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`(emphases added); 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021). Thus, under Arthrex, the Director reviews
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`final written decisions de novo.
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`III. THE BOARD’S FINDINGS RELATED TO CORROBORATION AND
`DILIGENCE SET DANGEROUS PRECEDENTS CONTRARY TO
`ESTABLISHED LAW, AND THE DIRECTOR SHOULD REVERSE.
`Itou is, on its face, prior art. So Patent Owner tried to swear behind the
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`reference. To swear behind Itou, Patent Owner needed to prove prior reduction to
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`practice or prior conception plus diligence from just before Itou through patent
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`2
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`application. See ATI Techs. ULC v. Iancu, 920 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2019);
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`Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1007 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2016).
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`The Director must reverse the Board’s prior reduction to practice and
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`diligence findings and confirm that Itou is prior art. The Board’s findings depart
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`from established case law and PTAB practice. Inventor testimony about prior
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`reduction to practice requires sufficient corroboration, including more than an
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`interested witness’s vague testimony. And Patent Owner cannot prove diligence on
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`a record showing scant patent prosecution activity and de minimis engineering
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`work. The Director must correct these fundamental flaws in the Board’s analysis.
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`A. The Director must correct the Board’s faulty corroboration
`analysis.
`To prove reduction to practice, Patent Owner needed to show “(1) construction
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`of an embodiment . . . that met all the limitations of the [claimed invention]; . . .
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`(2) determination that the invention would work for its intended purpose; and (3) the
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`existence of sufficient evidence to corroborate inventor testimony regarding these
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`events.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Two
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`distinct elements—constructing an embodiment (here, a prototype) and determining
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`that it would work for its intended purpose—require sufficient corroborating
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`evidence. And the corroboration requirement is “more stringent” than for
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`conception. Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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`3
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`Even the most credible inventor testimony requires independent, sufficient
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`corroborating evidence. Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1171-72. Corroborating evidence
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`must be “independent of information received from the inventor.” Hahn v. Wong,
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`892 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Thus, “an inventor’s testimony, standing
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`alone, cannot support a claim of . . . priority,” and under the rule of reason, courts
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`consider “the extent and details of the corroborating testimony.” Lacks Indus., Inc.
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`v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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`The law requires more than a standard credibility assessment.
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`Here, the Board skipped a critical step in its reduction-to-practice analysis: it
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`did not consider whether Patent Owner adduced evidence sufficient to corroborate
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`the inherently self-serving inventor testimony that VSI tested prototypes and
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`determined that the inventions would work for their intended purpose. The Board
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`credited the inventors and relied on their declarations for every finding related to
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`testing and determining that the inventions would work for their intended purpose.
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`See infra § III.A.2. At best, the Board relied on the mere existence of threadbare
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`non-inventor declarations to ratify the inventors’ declarations wholesale.
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`No documents—no photographs, lab reports, test results, etc.—corroborate
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`inventor testimony related to testing and determining that the inventions would work
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`for their intended purpose. See CRTP Reply (Paper 75) at 17-19. The Board noted
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`that Patent Owner adduced numerous documents in support of conception and
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`4
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`reduction to practice, including component parts invoices, engineering drawings,
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`and laboratory notebooks. Parts orders and engineering drawings may support Patent
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`Owner’s claims that certain prototypes—the so-called April and July 2005
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`prototypes—existed and embodied the inventions. See, e.g., 132 FWD at 32-33; Ex-
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`2089; Ex-2092; Ex-2113; Ex-2114. But the Board did not, and could not, rely on any
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`documents to corroborate inventor testimony related to the second piece of the
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`reduction-to-practice puzzle: prototype testing. The only document related to
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`prototype testing is a photograph of a distinct, legally irrelevant prototype, a non-
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`inventive over-the-wire (OTW) GuideLiner device. Ex-2018.
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`Not one piece of documentary evidence shows that VSI determined, through
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`testing, that the inventions would work for their intended purpose. Without
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`documents relevant to the “intended purpose” element, the Board relied on only
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`inventor testimony or, at best, the mere existence of non-inventor declarations to
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`credit the inventors.
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`1.
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`The Director needs to clarify whether the non-inventor
`testimony, alone, is sufficient to corroborate the inventor
`testimony.
`It appears that the Board relied on the mere existence of non-inventor
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`declarations to corroborate the inventors’ testimony wholesale. E.g., 132 FWD at 45
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`(noting that “[c]ritical aspects of [Root’s and Sutton’s] testimony are corroborated
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`by other (non-inventor) testimony”). The Board erred, as a matter of law, in relying
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`on only testimony—including the conclusory non-inventor testimony here—to find
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`that VSI determined that the inventions would work for their intended purpose.
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`No case, to Petitioner’s knowledge, has held that an interested, non-inventor
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`witness’s testimony, alone, is sufficient to corroborate inventor testimony when no
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`other evidence tends to show that the inventor determined that the inventions would
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`work for their intended purpose.2 Corroboration requires more than an interested,
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`non-inventor witness’s testimony. That principle dates to the late 19th century. See
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`Lacks, 322 F.3d at 1350 (“Starting with the Supreme Court’s decision in The Barbed
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`Wire Patent Case and ending with our recent decision in Union Carbide v. Shell Oil
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`Co., courts have consistently required documentary corroboration of oral testimony
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`by interested parties . . . .” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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`2 The Board cites Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998), noting certain
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`reasonable limits to the corroboration requirement. 132 FWD at 44-45. But in
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`Cooper, documentary evidence established that the inventor had performed certain
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`experiments (including histological slides), and specific non-inventor testimony
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`confirmed one particular aspect of the experiment. Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330. Cooper
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`did not hold that absent any documentary evidence showing that the inventor
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`determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose, non-inventor
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`testimony is sufficient corroborating evidence.
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`6
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`The same reasoning applies in the reduction-to-practice context. An interested
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`witness’s testimony—even non-inventor testimony—is not sufficient to corroborate
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`presumed-biased inventor testimony. Interested witnesses—like inventors—are
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`inherently unreliable, and well-established corroboration requirements are designed
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`to guard against unreliable, self-serving testimony. See Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1170
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`(noting that the corroboration requirement guards against fraud and “provides an
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`additional safeguard against courts being deceived by inventors who may be tempted
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`to mischaracterize the events of the past through their testimony”); Mahurkar v. C.R.
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`Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (The corroboration “requirement
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`arose out of a concern that inventors testifying in patent infringement cases would
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`be tempted to remember facts favorable to their case by the lure of protecting their
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`patent or defeating another’s patent. . . . [T]he rule provides a bright line for both
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`district courts and the PTO to follow in addressing the difficult issues related to
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`invention dates.”). Non-inventors may still qualify as interested, unreliable
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`witnesses. Here, Erb, a current Teleflex (Patent Owner) employee, and Schmalz, a
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`former VSI employee, are still interested witnesses. Even if they had testified in the
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`same manner and detail as the inventors (they did not, see infra), an interested
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`witness’s testimony, standing alone, is not sufficient to corroborate inventor
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`testimony regarding reduction to practice.
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`2.
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`Patent Owner’s non-inventor declarations do not
`corroborate inventor testimony that VSI determined that the
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`inventions would work for their intended purpose—the
`Board relied on only inventor testimony.
`Even if non-inventor testimony, alone, were sufficient to corroborate inventor
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`testimony related to whether an invention would work for its intended purpose, the
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`Board did not cite any corroborating non-inventor testimony related to determining
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`that the inventions would work for their intended purpose. Indeed, no non-inventor
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`provides independent information relevant to the “intended purpose” element.
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`The Board found reduction to practice based on VSI’s purported testing to
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`determine that the prototypes would work for their intended purpose: “to increase
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`backup support for delivery of interventional cardiology devices,” with “crossing
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`tough or total occlusions [being] one noted benefit of the invention.” 132 FWD at
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`51-53. Without exception, reduction to practice requires demonstrating that the
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`invention would work for its intended purpose. CRTP Sur-Sur-Reply (Paper 107) at
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`9-10. Demonstrating that an invention would work for its intended purpose requires
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`testing in all but simple cases. Id. Courts have found that catheters, in particular,
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`require testing. See, e.g., Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1578; Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson &
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`Johnson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (reduction to practice after
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`patentee “submitted documentation of the successful test results of a catheter
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`embodying the . . . invention”). Thus, the Board evaluated whether VSI’s testing
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`“was sufficient to determine that the RX GuideLiner prototypes would work for the
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`intended purpose.” 132 FWD at 52.
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`8
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`But the Board relied on only inventor testimony to find that VSI performed
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`the requisite testing, citing “proof” of testing from only inventor declarations. E.g.,
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`132 FWD at 40 (finding that “[t]he prototypes were tested using bench-top coronary
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`models . . . to simulate the native anatomy and environment” and “[t]he testing done
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`using this model included performing pull tests as well as simulations comprising
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`the following steps: a) inserting a standard guide catheter into the coronary model;
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`b) advancing the prototype into the guide catheter until the prototype’s distal end
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`extended beyond the guide catheter’s distal end; and c) delivering a stent or balloon
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`catheter into and through both devices,” citing only inventor testimony), 40-41
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`(“Both Mr. Root and Mr. Sutton attest that this testing was sufficient to confirm that
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`the RX GuideLiner would work for its intended purpose, namely facilitating delivery
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`of interventional cardiology devices into challenging coronary anatomy by
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`providing increased backup support as compared to a guide catheter alone.”). The
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`Board cited no evidence corroborating this testimony. Id.
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`The Board’s decision confirms that Patent Owner did not offer any non-
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`inventor testimony to confirm that VSI tested relevant prototypes before the U.S.
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`filing of Itou on September 23, 2005. The Board included a passing reference to
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`single paragraph from Erb’s declaration, but the Board did not—and could not—use
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`Erb for independent confirmation that VSI tested relevant prototypes (the April and
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`July 2005 prototypes). See Ex-2122 ¶ 11 (discussing only early prototypes and tests
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`9
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`for delivery of stents and balloons that he “was not personally involved in”). Erb
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`offers no details regarding which prototypes’ testing he was “involved in,” the timing
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`of relevant testing, details of that testing, or whether that testing demonstrated that
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`the inventions worked for their intended purposes. Id.; see also CRTP Reply at 19-
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`21; CRTP Sur-Sur-Reply at 12-13. He machined early components that no one
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`argues embodied the claims. Ex-2118, App’x A-E (charting only April and July 2005
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`prototypes as embodying the claims). Erb offers no prototype or testing specifics or
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`detail regarding how VSI knew that prototypes “worked.” His role during “testing”
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`was to “stand[] there next to whoever was testing.” CRTP Reply at 20. Indeed, the
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`Board does not appear to appreciate the limits of Erb’s knowledge, mischaracterizing
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`his work as “developing these [the relevant April and July] prototypes.” 132 FWD
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`at 33-34. Erb did not develop the prototypes that Patent Owner relies on for reduction
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`to practice, did not test those prototypes, and can offer no specifics about who tested
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`them and when, with what result. His five-and-a-half-page declaration, which does
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`not even specify that whatever testing he recalls occurred before Itou, does not
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`provide sufficient corroboration.
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`Schmalz, Patent Owner’s other primary non-inventor witness, offers even less
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`than Erb, and the Board does not cite her when finding that VSI tested prototypes
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`and determined that the inventions would work for their intended purpose. She
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`admitted that she has no personal knowledge of the relevant prototypes. CRTP Reply
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`10
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`at 21. She cannot judge whether an invention would work for its intended purpose—
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`she is not an engineer. Id. Instead, the former VP of Regulatory and Clinical Affairs
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`could only assume reduction to practice based on an incomplete Product
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`Requirements Document—a document that the Board appreciated is “somewhat less
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`probative in showing actual reduction to practice.” 132 FWD at 41.
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`Patent Owner’s non-inventor declarations, which neither fill gaps in the
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`documentary record nor confirm the detail that the inventors provide related to
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`prototype testing, fall short under established law. The law requires evidence
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`sufficient to corroborate inventor testimony related to determining that the
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`inventions would work for their intended purpose. Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1169.
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`When it considered whether VSI tested prototypes and determined that they
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`would work for their intended purpose, the Board erred and performed a standard
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`credibility assessment rather than demand independent corroboration of reduction to
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`practice. “[T]he raison d’etre of the corroboration requirement is our refusal to base
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`priority determinations on a court’s uncorroborated assessments of a testifying
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`inventor’s credibility. Even the most credible inventor testimony is a fortiori
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`required to be corroborated by independent evidence.” Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1171-
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`72. The Director should weigh in on this important legal issue and require the Board
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`to delineate between corroboration and credibility. Petitioner asks the Director to
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`provide guidance regarding what constitutes adequate corroborating evidence when
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`determining whether an invention worked for its intended purpose. If the Board can
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`rely on only the existence of non-inventor testimony, as here, to credit everything an
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`inventor says, it will eviscerate the rule of reason. Without correction, reduction-to-
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`practice analyses will revert to simple credibility assessments—precisely what the
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`law’s corroboration requirement prohibits.
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`3.
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`The Board overlooked evidence disproving reduction to
`practice.
`Under the rule of reason, the Board must consider all evidence of record as a
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`whole. But the Board overlooked critical evidence demonstrating that VSI could not
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`have reduced the claimed inventions to practice before Itou. For example, inventor
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`Root assumed a design lock in August 2005 when testifying regarding the timing of
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`reduction to practice. But the record shows that VSI did not freeze its design until
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`years later, undermining Root’s testimony. See CRTP Reply at 23. The Board also
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`did not consider evidence that design changes forced the engineering team to cancel
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`design verification testing—“performance testing to verify the design works as
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`intended”—in December 2005. Id. at 25-26 (citing Ex-1768). Nor did the Board
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`consider evidence that bonding distal and proximal sections to assemble a complete,
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`working RX prototype “took substantial engineering and testing” and, thus, did not
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`happen immediately after receiving the component parts. Id. at 27 (citing Ex-1770).
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`The Board’s failure to consider this evidence demonstrating that the inventors did
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`not have a working embodiment of the invention warrants Director review.
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`12
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`The Director must correct the Board’s application of the
`B.
`“reasonably continuous” diligence standard.
`“[T]o antedate a reference, the applicant . . . must have reasonably continued
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`activity to reduce the invention to practice.” ATI, 920 F.3d at 1369. “Reasonable
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`diligence must be shown throughout the entire critical period.” Arctic Cat Inc. v.
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`GEP Power Prods., Inc., 919 F.3d 1320, 1331 (2019). In the past, the Board correctly
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`applied the diligence standard. See, e.g., Toshiba Memory Corp. v. Anza Tech., Inc.,
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`IPR2018-01597, 2020 WL 1229855, at *15-17 (PTAB Mar. 12, 2020) (Patent Owner
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`did not establish diligence when it could not account for a several-week period);
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`Xilinx, Inc. v. Intell. Ventures Mgmt., Appeal No. 2014-001131, 2014 WL 1679835,
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`at *12 (PTAB Apr. 25, 2014) (“In the absence of an adequate explanation, [six
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`weeks] of delay is sufficient, in and of itself, to defeat Patent Owner’s claim of
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`diligence.”); cf. In re Meyer Mfg. Corp., 411 F. App’x 316, 319-20 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
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`(unexplained two-month gap did not show diligence). But here, the Board appears
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`to have overcorrected, perhaps through misunderstanding the ATI and Arctic Cat
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`decisions. The Board erred, requiring almost nothing to establish diligence.
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`Patent Owner adduced evidence of only scattered “diligence” events between
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`September 23, 2005, and May 3, 2006—few related to actual work on an RX device:
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`• October 2005: counsel opened patent application file (no work until later).
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`• November 2005: VSI created an engineering drawing.
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`• January and March 2006: counsel worked on patent application.
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`• March 15 and April 12, 2006: Sutton and counsel exchanged emails.
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`• Spring 2006: VSI purchased generic component parts (mostly hypotube).
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`CRTP Reply at 28-29 (with timeline plotting diligence evidence). VSI did not touch
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`the project for entire months. The Board glossed over a three-month period with one
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`data point of documented engineering activity, followed by a month of total
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`inactivity. In ignoring these gaps, the Board found diligence on a sparse record of
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`sporadic prosecution work (indeed, a week-and-a-half’s worth of work over eight
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`months), a handful of components parts purchases, and a company with shifting
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`priorities. Id. at 28-30. Unlike here, the Arctic Cat court excused periods of inventor
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`inactivity only because evidence showed that the inventor “put[] the invention into
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`someone else’s hands for needed testing.” Arctic Cat, 919 F.3d at 1332.
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`The Board ignored not only the quantity of RX work during the relevant
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`period but also the quality of that work. Patent Owner adduced virtually no evidence
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`of engineering work. In September 2005, VSI purchased forming tips (an auxiliary
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`product for shaping the distal tip of a variety of devices), and the Board assumed
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`that “VSI was continuing to refine the prototypes.” 132 FWD at 59-60. In October
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`and November 2005, updates to the VSI Board identified projected timelines for
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`regulatory filings, all of which put the RX version of the GuideLiner behind the
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`OTW version. Id. at 60. The Board assumed parallel engineering work, but the
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`record demonstrates the opposite: VSI, time and again, pushed out its aspirational
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`IPR2020-00134
`Patent RE45,760
`RX deadlines due to lagging engineering work. CRTP Reply at 28-29. In March and
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`April 2006, VSI purchased more hypotubing, but nothing in the record indicates
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`whether or when VSI used those components to continue work on RX.
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`Work cited to show reasonable diligence must directly relate to reduction to
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`practice. MPEP § 2138.06. But the Board relied on the inventor’s conclusions,
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`offered without supporting documents and bolstered only by similarly sweeping
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`conclusions from a non-inventor. 132 FWD at 58-59 (citing Root’s testimony that
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`“they worked on [the RX project] continuously until they brought it to market” and
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`Schmalz’s testimony that “at no time between the start of the regulatory process . . .
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`and the filing of the patent application . . . was the rapid exchange GuideLiner project
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`abandoned or paused”).
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`The Board pulled more inferences from the sparse record than Patent Owner
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`(who devoted a page-and-a-half to diligence, CRTP Response (Paper 36) at 28-29,
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`and nothing additional in sur-reply, see CRTP Sur-Reply (Paper 93) at 12),
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`effectively eviscerating the “reasonably continuous” standard. Petitioner seeks
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`Director review to fix the misapplication of the standard and to clarify whether large
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`gaps of time in work, as here, can constitute diligence.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
`The Director should review the Final Written Decision and find that Itou is
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`prior art.
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`IPR2020-00134
`Patent RE45,760
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`Dated: July 21, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`s/ Cyrus A. Morton
`Cyrus A. Morton
`Reg. No. 44,954
`Robins Kaplan LLP
`2800 LaSalle Plaza
`800 LaSalle Avenue
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`Attorney for Petitioner
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`IPR2020-00134
`Patent RE45,760
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that on July 21, 2021, a copy of Petitioner’s Request for Director
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`Rehearing Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) and United States v. Arthrex was served
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`in its entirety by electronic mail on Patent Owner’s counsel at the following
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`addresses indicated in Patent Owner’s Mandatory Notices:
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`J. Derek Vandenburgh, Reg. No. 32,179
`dvandenburgh@carlsoncaspers.com
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`Dennis C. Bremer, Reg. No. 40,528
`dbremer@carlsoncaspers.com
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`Joseph W. Winkels
`jwinkels@carlsoncaspers.com
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`Peter M. Kohlhepp
`pkohlhepp@carlsoncaspers.com
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`Tara C. Norgard
`tnorgard@carlsoncaspers.com
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`Alexander S. Rinn
`pkohlhepp@carlsoncaspers.com
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`Megan E. Christner, Reg. No. 78,979
`mchristner@carlsoncaspers.com
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
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`s/ Cyrus A. Morton
`Cyrus A. Morton
`Reg. No. 44,954
`Attorney for Petitioner
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`Dated: July 21, 2021
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