IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`SYNKLOUD TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`HP INC.,
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`Civil Action No. 19-1360-RGA
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
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`David S. Eagle, Sean M. Brennecke, KLEHR HARRISON HARVEY BRANZBURG LLP,
`Wilmington, DE; Daniel S. Carlineo, Nelson M. Kee, CARLINEO KEE, PLLC, Washington,
`D.C., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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`Kelly E. Farnan, Travis S. Hunter, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, DE;
`Richard A. Cederoth, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Chicago, IL; Ching-Lee Fukuda, Ketan V. Patel,
`SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, New York, NY, Attorneys for Defendant.
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`September 28, 2020
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`Defendant.
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`/s/ Richard G. Andrews
`ANDREWS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
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`Before me is Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (D.I. 17). I have
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`considered the parties’ briefing. (D.I. 18, 21, 24). Because I find that some of the asserted claims
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`of the patents at issue do not satisfy the test for eligibility under § 101 of the Patent Act, I will
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`grant Defendant’s motion in part and deny it in part.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff filed this patent infringement lawsuit asserting infringement of “at least claim 1”
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`of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,098,526 (“the ’526 patent”) and 10,015,254 (“the ’254 patent”) on July 22,
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`2019. (D.I. 1). Plaintiffs submitted a First Amended Complaint on November 12, 2019 further
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`asserting claims 1 of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,694,590 (“the ’590 patent”) and 7,879,225 (“the ’225
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`patent”).1 (D.I. 15).
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`Defendant alleges that the Asserted Patents are invalid for claiming ineligible subject
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`matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (D.I. 18 at 1). Specifically, Defendant alleges that the ’526 and
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`’254 patents are directed at the abstract idea of storing and retrieving data from a remote
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`location, that the ’590 patent is directed to receiving, reformatting and delivering a message and
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`that the ’225 patent is directed to communicating instructions to a remote recipient in the same
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`manner as if to a local recipient. (Id.). Defendant also contends that the claims of the Asserted
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`Patents contain no inventive concept, merely implementing abstract ideas using common
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`computer components and functionality that were routine or conventional. (Id. at 2).
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARDS
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`A. Rule 12(b)(6)
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`1 The four patents are exhibits 1, 3, 6, and 8 at D.I. 15-1.
`2
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`Defendant moves to dismiss the pending action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), which
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`permits a party to seek dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
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`can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to
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`state a claim because the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit are ineligible for patent
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`protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a threshold test.
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`Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010). Therefore, “patent eligibility can be determined at
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`the Rule 12(b)(6) stage … when there are no factual allegations that, taken as true, prevent
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`resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law.” Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades
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`Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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`When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all
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`factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
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`Umland v. Planco Fin. Servs., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
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`only appropriate if the complaint does not contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
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`to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
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`(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fowler v.
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`UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). However, “a court need not accept as true
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`allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit, such as the
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`claims and patent specification.” Secured Mail Solns. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d
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`905, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
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`B. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
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`Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter. It provides:
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`“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
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`composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
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`3
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`subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court
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`recognizes three categories of subject matter that are not eligible for patents—laws of nature,
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`natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
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`The purpose of these exceptions is to protect the “basic tools of scientific and technological
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`work.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 86 (2012). “[A]
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`process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical
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`algorithm,” as “an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or
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`process may well be deserving of patent protection.” Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks and
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`emphasis omitted). In order “to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible
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`application of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the
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`words ‘apply it.’” Id. at 72 (emphasis omitted).
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`In Alice, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the framework laid out in Mayo “for
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`distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from
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`those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” 573 U.S. at 217. First, the court
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`must determine whether the claims are drawn to a patent-ineligible concept. Id. If the answer is
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`yes, the court must look to “the elements of the claim both individually and as an ‘ordered
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`combination’” to see if there is an “‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of
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`elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
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`than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (alteration in original). “A claim that
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`recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure that the [claim] is more than a
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`drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].” Id. at 221. Further, “the prohibition
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`against patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [the
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`idea] to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 222 (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610-11).
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`4
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`Thus, “the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract
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`idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 222.
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`Patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a threshold legal issue. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602.
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`Accordingly, the § 101 inquiry is properly raised at the pleadings stage if it is apparent from the
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`face of the patent that the asserted claims are not directed to eligible subject matter. See
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`Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017),
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`cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018). In these situations, claim construction is not necessarily
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`required to conduct a § 101 analysis. Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1374
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`(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[C]laim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity
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`determination under § 101.” (brackets in original, internal citations and quotations omitted)). The
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`Federal Circuit has held that the district court is not required to address individual claims not
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`identified by the non-moving party, so long as the court identifies a representative claim and “all
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`the claims are substantially similar and linked to the same abstract idea.” Content Extraction &
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`Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
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`(internal quotation marks omitted).
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`1. Abstract Idea
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`“First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to [an abstract idea].” Alice,
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`573 U.S. at 217. “The ‘abstract ideas’ category embodies ‘the longstanding rule that an idea of
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`itself is not patentable.’” Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). “The
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`Supreme Court has not established a definitive rule to determine what constitutes an ‘abstract
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`idea’ sufficient to satisfy the first step of the Mayo/Alice inquiry.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
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`Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that
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`“fundamental economic practice[s],” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611, “method[s] of organizing human
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`activity,” Alice, 573 U.S. at 220, and mathematical algorithms, Benson, 409 U.S. at 64, are
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`abstract ideas. In navigating the parameters of such categories, courts have generally sought to
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`“compare claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in
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`previous cases.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1334. “[S]ome improvements in computer-related
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`technology when appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not abstract.” Id. at 1335. “[I]n
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`determining whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we must be careful to avoid
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`oversimplifying the claims because ‘[a]t some level, all inventions… embody, use, reflect, rest
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`upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.’” In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
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`Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S.
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`at 217).
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`The specification is helpful in determining what a claim is “directed to.” See In re TLI,
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`823 F.3d at 611-12; Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
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`2015). But while the specification may help illuminate the true focus of a claim, when analyzing
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`patent eligibility, reliance on the specification must always yield to the claim language in
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`identifying that focus. ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 766-69 (Fed. Cir.
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`2019). This is because “the concern that drives” the judicial exceptions to patentability is “one of
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`preemption,” and the claim language defines the breadth of each claim. Alice, 573 U.S. at 216;
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`see Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277 (1949) (“[I]t is the claim
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`which measures the grant to the patentee.”). Thus, as part of the “directed to” analysis, I also
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`consider whether a claim is truly focused on an abstract idea (or other ineligible matter), whose
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`use the patent law does not authorize anyone to preempt. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72; see also
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`Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (noting “the preemption concern that undergirds our §101 jurisprudence”);
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`Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1379 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of
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`6
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`preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability.”). “[A] specification full of
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`technical details about a physical invention may nonetheless conclude with claims that claim
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`nothing more than the broad law or abstract idea underlying the claims, thus preempting all use
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`of that law or idea.” ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 769.
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`2. Inventive Concept
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`At step two, I consider whether the claims contain an “inventive concept sufficient to
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`transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221
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`(internal quotations omitted). An “inventive concept” exists when a claim “recite[s] a specific,
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`discrete implementation of the abstract idea” where the “particular arrangement of elements is a
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`technical improvement over [the] prior art.” BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
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`Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015). This focus on specificity is linked with
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`concerns about preemption. See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288,
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`1306 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims eligible at step two because “they describe a specific,
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`unconventional technological solution, narrowly drawn to withstand preemption concerns, to a
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`technological problem”).
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`To pass step two, the claim “must include additional features” that “must be more than
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`well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.2d 709,
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`715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). “If a claim’s only ‘inventive concept’ is the
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`application of an abstract idea using conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has
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`not been transformed into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.” BSG Tech LLC v.
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`Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A. The ’526 and ’254 Patents
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`The ’526 patent and the ’254 patent are titled “System and Method for Wireless Device
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`Access to External Storage.” Both patents claim priority to the same application. Asserted Claim
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`1 of the ’526 patent recites:
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`A wireless device comprising:
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`at least one cache storage, one wireless interface, and program code configured to cause
`the wireless device to:
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`establish a wireless link for the wireless device access to a storage space of predefined
`capacity assigned exclusively to a user of the wireless device by a storage server, and
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`couple with the storage server across the wireless link to carry out a requested operation
`for remote access to the assigned storage space in response to the user from the wireless
`device performing the operation,
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`wherein the operation for the remote access to the assigned storage space comprises
`storing a data object therein or retrieving a data object therefrom, the storing of a data
`object including to download a file from a remote server across a network into the
`assigned storage space through utilizing download information for the file stored in said
`cache storage in response to the user from the wireless device performing the operation
`for downloading the file from the remote server into the assigned storage space.
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`(’526 patent at 5:61-6:15). Asserted Claim 1 of the ’254 patent recites:
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`A wireless device accessing a remote storage space, the wireless device comprising:
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`at least one cache storage for caching data received from the Internet, and
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`one computer-readable storage device comprising program instructions which, when
`executed by the wireless device, configure the wireless device accessing the remote
`storage space, wherein the program instructions comprise:
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`program instructions for the wireless device establishing a communication link for
`accessing the remote storage space served by a first server;
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`program instructions for the wireless device displaying the remote storage space upon
`receiving information of the remote storage space from the first server; and
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`program instructions for the wireless device coupling with the first server to carry out a
`requested operation for accessing the remote storage space in response to a user, through
`the remote storage space displayed on the wireless device, performing the operation,
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`wherein the operation being carried out for accessing the remote storage space comprises
`from the wireless device storing data therein or retrieving data therefrom, the storing data
`comprising to download a file from a second server across a network into the remote
`storage space through utilizing information for the file cached in the cache storage in the
`wireless device.
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`(’254 patent at 5:64-6:24).
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`The ’526 patent proposes the idea that “the storage of a server can be used as the external
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`storage for wireless devices.” (’526 patent at 2:32-38). Claim 1 of the ’526 patent is directed to a
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`wireless device (1) with a wireless link for access to an assigned server storage space, (2) that
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`can remotely store a data object from the storage space, (3) which includes downloading data
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`from a remote server into the storage space using download information from the wireless
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`device’s cache. (See id. at 5:61-6:15). Claim 2 limits the data object described in Claim 1 to
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`“comprise[] a message or multimedia data of video, digital music, or digital picture.” (Id. at
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`6:16-19). Claim 3 makes the user’s dedicated device one of a “plurality of storage devices.” (Id.
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`at 6:20-23). Claim 4 specifies that download information transmitted to the storage server causes
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`data download. (Id. at 6:24-31). Claim 5 limits the wireless device to “one of a cell phone or a
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`personal data and management device (‘PDA’).” (Id. at 6:32-34). Claims 6 and 10 recite that data
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`can be saved in folders or “folder structures.” (Id. at 6:35-39; 6:53-57). Claims 7 and 8 describe
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`that folders and files can be deleted, moved, copied or renamed. (Id. at 6:40-49). Claim 9
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`describes access to the storage space using a web browser. (Id. at 6:50-52).2
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`The ’254 patent purports to solve the same problem as the ’526 patent, in a like manner.
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`(See ’254 patent at 1:21-33 (“This invention relates to wireless devices accessing and using
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`external storage spaces provided by one or more servers.”); 2:29-33). The ’254 patent recites the
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`2 Claims 1 to 10 are device claims. Claims 11-20 are non-transitory computer-readable medium
`claims that essentially parallel the device claims.
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`same steps for downloading data from a remote web server site into external storage (id. at 5:6-
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`32) and the same steps for retrieving data from the external storage (id. at 5:33-43). The ’254
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`patent has a substantially similar specification as the ’526 patent and both claim priority to the
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`same 2003 patent application.
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`Claim 1 of the ’254 patent is directed to a wireless device that (1) has a communication
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`link for accessing a first server storage space, (2) can display the remote storage space, (3)
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`couples with the first server to access the remote storage space to either store data or retrieve
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`data and (4) includes downloading data from a remote server into the storage space using
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`download information stored in the wireless device’s cache. (See ’254 patent at 5:64-6:24). The
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`dependent claims do not add significant claim limitations. Claim 2 recites that download
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`information transmitted to the storage server cause the server to download a file. (Id. at 6:25-33).
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`Claim 3 defines “download information” as file name and location. (Id. at 6:34-37). Claim 4
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`describes displaying the remote storage space on a web browser. (Id. at 6:38-43). Claim 5 makes
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`the wireless device “one of a cell phone, or a personal data assistant.” (Id. at 6:44-46). Claims 6
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`and 7 describe the use of folders and that files and folders may be moved, copied, deleted or
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`renamed. (Id. at 6:47-51, 6:52-57). Claim 8 describes the types of files that may be stored or
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`retrieved (e.g., messages, videos, music or pictures). (Id. at 6:58-62).3
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`Because the asserted claims of the ’526 and ’254 patents are “substantially similar and
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`linked to the same abstract idea,” I will discuss them together.4 See Content Extraction &
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`Transmission LLC, 776 F.3d at 1348.
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`3 Claims 9-15 are server claims and claims 16-20 are method claims
`4 “Courts may treat a claim as representative . . . if the patentee does not present any meaningful
`argument for the distinctive significance of any claim limitations not found in the representative
`claim.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Defendant asserts that
`claim 1 of the ’526 and claim 1 of the ’254 patent are representative of the remaining claims in
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`1. Abstract Idea
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`Defendant argues that the asserted claims of the ’526 and ’254 patents are directed to the
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`abstract idea of “storing data to, or retrieving data from, a remote location, including transferring
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`data from one remote location to another,” merely using computers to automate basic human
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`steps. (D.I. 18 at 14-15). Plaintiff argues that the claims are not abstract because they are directed
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`to solving a problem with computer technology, namely, limited storage space on a wireless
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`device and unlimited access to information on the internet. (D.I. 21 at 8). Plaintiff argues that
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`the patents further include claim elements that improve the wireless device by expanding
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`available storage using an interactive display of the remote storage space. (Id. at 15-16).
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`The Federal Circuit has established that the storage and retrieval of information is an
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`abstract concept. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
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`2017). Storing data is a “generic computer function[ ].” In re TLI, 823 F.3d at 612. “[S]ending
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`and receiving information” over a network are “routine computer functions.” Erie Indem. Co.,
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`850 F.3d at 1329. In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., this Court invalidated a
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`claim for copying data to a remote location because the claim was directed to “the abstract idea
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`of backing up data.” 234 F. Supp. 3d 601, 607 (D. Del. 2017), aff’d, 725 F. App’x 976, 978 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2018); see also WhitServe LLC v. Dropbox, Inc., 2019 WL 3342949, at *4, *8 (D. Del. July
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`25, 2019) (invalidating claims directed to backing up data records), appeal pending, No. 19-2334
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`(filed Aug. 29, 2019). I do not see much difference between backing up data at a remote location
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`and increasing storage capacity by storing data at a remote location. Courts have also found that
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`their respective patents. (D.I. 11 at 4 n.1). Plaintiff disputes the representativeness of the claims.
`(D.I. 21 at 3). Since only claim 1 of each of the ’526 and ’254 patents are expressly asserted, I
`will principally address each claim 1 here, and, for the motion at issue, I merely conclude that
`they are representative of the dependent claims that depend from them.
`11
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`such claims are directed to longstanding practices of human organization. See, e.g., WhitServe,
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`2019 WL 3342949, at *5 (“It is a well-understood practice of human organization that backup
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`copies [of data] are stored in a location separate and distinct from the original location.”);
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`Symantec Corp., 234 F. Supp. 3d at 607 (“It is undisputed that institutions have long backed up
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`data”).
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`Plaintiff asserts that the claimed technology is not directed to an abstract idea because
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`“the claims require synchronized operation of three separate computing devices.” (D.I. 21 at 7,
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`15). These include a remote storage server that allocates storage space to a user, a remote server
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`on the Internet, and a local wireless device. (Id. at 15). Plaintiff does not, however, explain why
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`adding a third generic computing device would render the claims non-abstract. Nor does the
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`“synchronous operation” described in the briefing appear supported by the claims. See
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`ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 766-69. Without more, I am not persuaded that the use of three devices
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`represents an improvement to computer technology or otherwise changes the character of the
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`claims such that they are not directed to an abstract idea.
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`The components and processes recited in the asserted claims of both patents comprise
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`generic and conventional computer components and functions. Both patents describe the
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`“wireless device” as a generic “cellphone or PDA.” (’526 patent at 2:29-32; ’254 patent at 1:29-
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`33). Both describe “internal storage” of a computing system as comprising “hard disk drives,
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`memory sticks, [and] memory” internally connected to a computing system. (’526 patent at 1:31-
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`33; ’254 patent at 1:29-33). Both patents describe “external storage” as consisting of “hard disk
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`drives” and “memory card[s]” (’526 patent at 1:41-45; ’254 patent at 1:41-45), and the “web-
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`browser” as any “suitable software capable [of] communication with web server software [on a]
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`web server through the HTTP protocol” (’526 patent at 3:27-30; ’254 patent at 3:26-29).
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`Reciting tangible components does not make the claims less abstract where the asserted
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`patents “make[] clear that the recited physical components merely provide a generic environment
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`in which to carry out the abstract idea.” In re TLI, 823 F.3d at 611. Claiming “wireless devices”
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`operating over a communication network also does not make the idea non-abstract. Intellectual
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`Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“An abstract
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`idea does not become non-abstract by limiting the invention to a particular field of use or
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`technological environment, such as the Internet.”). The patents describe the use of a “wireless
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`device,” “a storage server,” “a remote server across a network,” and “a storage server.” (See,
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`e.g., ’590 patent at 5:61, 5:64-67, 6:5-10). The patents therefore use existing computer
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`functionality as a network data storage tool and do not disclose nor claim any improved aspect of
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`the computer or network. See Symantec Corp., 234 F. Supp. 3d at 607.
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`Plaintiff argues that the patent claims include “elements that allow the user to request
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`operations on the remote storage through [a] display on the wireless device giving an intuitive
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`user interface.” (D.I. 21 at 15-16). The Federal Circuit has found patents eligible where “the
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`claims require a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with a prescribed
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`functionality directly related to the graphical user interface’s structure that is addressed to and
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`resolves a specifically identified problem in the prior state of the art.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc.
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`v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2017). That is not the case here. To pass the
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`test set forth in Alice, the patent must describe how to solve the purported problem in a manner
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`that goes beyond asserting the “principle in the abstract.” See ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 769; see
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`also Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[A] result, even
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`an innovative result, is not itself patentable.”). The claimed “display” is neither specific nor
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`structured. See Trading Techs., 675 F. App’x at 1004.
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`The specification does not describe any “intuitiveness” problem with prior art user
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`interfaces or how the recited display resolves any such problem. See ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at
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`766. Plaintiff attempts to construe the “display” terms to “require non-conventional use of
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`display information.” (D.I. 21 at 19). The patent, however, does not describe how any intuitive
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`user interface would work. The claimed “display” is neither specific nor structured. The only
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`interface that is described in the specification is a generic “web-browser” that can “access and
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`browse any web-site on the internet, and Intranet.” (’254 patent at 3:4-7; see also id. at 3:26-29
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`(“[T]he web-browser . . . can be any suitable software tool, which is capable to [sic]
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`communication with web server software . . . .”)). While I normally accept whatever claim
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`construction the plaintiff proffers at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, to the extent that Plaintiff argues
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`that the “display” terms must be construed (D.I. 21 at 19), it is unclear what Plaintiff’s proposal
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`is, and, in any event, whatever structure Plaintiff has in mind does not make the claims non-
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`abstract.
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`Plaintiff also argues that there is a dispute regarding the terms “cache” or “cache storage”
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`that require construction before this Court can rule on Defendant’s motion. According to
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`Plaintiff, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the term “cache” is a high-
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`speed access area in hardware or software of a computing device that temporarily stores data.
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`(D.I. 21 at 14). Plaintiff defines “cache storage” as hardware or software memory of a computing
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`device that allows high-speed access of temporarily stored data. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that the
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`claims thus recite specific structure that cannot be considered abstract and that Defendant’s
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`motion improperly “short circuits” the definition of the claim terms to any generic internal
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`storage. (Id.). Plaintiff supports its argument by asserting that the “utility, efficiency, and ease of
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`use in the claims of the ’526 patent are in part driven by using already existing download
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`information from the cache storage, without requiring a user to manually enter the download
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`information.” (Id.). But the only reference to storage in the specification of the ’526 and ’254
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`patents explains that the internal and external storage spaces are comprised of generic
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`components. (’526 patent at 1:31-33, 1:41-45; ’254 patent at 1:29-31, 1:41-43). In any event, the
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`proposed “cache” constructions do not make the claims any more or less abstract.
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`Plaintiff asserts that the combination of elements in the independent claims and the
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`dependent claims result in the improvement of electronic devices. (D.I. 21 at 3). Specifically,
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`Plaintiff contends that the claimed technology makes existing user interfaces on electronic
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`devices more dynamic and efficient in accessing information from the Internet by improving the
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`manner in which devices perform operations to access remote storage. (Id.)
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`Courts must distinguish between claims “directed to an improvement in computer
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`functionality”—which are not abstract—and claims “simply adding conventional computer
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`components to well-known business practices”—which are abstract. In re TLI, 823 F.3d at 612.
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`In Enfish, in which the Court held that the claims at issue were not directed to an abstract idea,
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`the invention focused on a “specific improvement . . . in how computers could carry out one of
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`their basic functions of storage and retrieval of data,” and not on “asserted advances in uses to
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`which existing computer capabilities could be put.” 822 F.3d at 1335-36. Even though the
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`invention could be run on a general-purpose computer and was not defined by reference to
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`physical components, the claims were specifically directed to a self-referential table rather than
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`any form of storing tabular data. Id. at 1336. The specification taught that the self-referential
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`table functioned differently than conventional database structures and achieved other benefits
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`over conventional databases. Id.
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`Despite Plaintiff’s assertions, the claims here use generic technology and do not recite
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`“specific improvements in computer capabilities.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337. Plaintiff asserts,
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`“The specification discloses that the download information from the ‘cached’ storage . . . comes
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`from software modules that obtain download information from web-pages that are open on a
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`wireless device.” (D.I. 21 at 8, citing D.I. 15-1, Ex. 1 at 5:13-16). The claims do not, however,
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`identify a “particular improvement in how this is done” with computer technology. See Uniloc
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`USA v. ADP, LLC, 772 F. App’x 890, 897 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Accenture Global Servs.,
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`GMBH v. Guideware Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rejecting claims that
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`contained no “detailed software implementation guidelines”). The Supreme Court has rejected
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`the idea that claims become patent eligible simply because they disclose a specific solution to a
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`particular problem. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 599-601 (concluding that claims fell outside section
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`101 notwithstanding the fact that they disclosed a very specific method of hedging against price
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`increases); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (rejecting the argument “that if a process
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`application implements a principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls within the
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`patentable subject matter of § 101”). Indeed, although the claims at issue in Alice described a
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`specific method for conducting intermediated settlement, the Court nonetheless unanimously
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`concluded that they fell outside § 101. See 134 S. Ct. at 2358-60.
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`The patents fail to provide any detail on how the software modules, cached storage,
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`webpages, or wireless devices operate or present an improvement over the conventional
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`functionality of each of these components. There is no modification of conventional cache
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`memory or how “download information” is stored therein. And there is no description of how
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`“download information” is obtained other than a passive results-oriented statement that software
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`modules obtain download information which then “becomes available in the cached webpages
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`[of the wireless device] after the web-browser access[es] the website.” (D.I. 15-1, Ex. 1 at 5:13-
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`17). The patent thus appears to describe nothing more than the generic operation of cache
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`memory, as understood by a skilled artisan. See Symantec Corp., 234 F. Supp. 3d at 607-08
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`(claims ineligible