`FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
`CAMDEN VICINAGE
`
`TVnGO LTD. (BVI),
`Plaintiff,
`v.
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC. and
`LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,
`Defendants.
`
`Civil No. 18-10238 (RMB/KMW)
`OPINION
`
`APPEARANCES:
`EYET LAW LLC
`By: Matthew T. Eyet, Esq.
`7 Livingston Avenue, Suite 1105
`New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901
`and
`DUNLAP BENNETT & LUDWIG PPLC
`By: Charles E. Cantine, Esq.
`Joseph Diamante, Esq.
`349 Fifth Avenue
`New York, New York 10036
`Counsel for Plaintiff
`
`WALSH PIZZI O’REILLY FALANGA LLP
`By: Liza M. Walsh, Esq.
`Selina M. Ellis, Esq.
`One Riverfront Plaza
`1037 Raymond Boulevard, Suite 600
`Newark, New Jersey 07102
`and
`MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
`By: Natalie Bennett, Esq.
`Collin W. Park, Esq.
`Eric Kraeutler, Esq.
`
`1
`
`Roku EX1035
`Roku v. Universal Electronics
`IPR2019-01614
`
`
`
`Ghee J. Lee, Esq.
`
`1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
`Washington, D.C. 20004-2541
`
`
`
`Counsel for Defendants
`
`BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
`
`In this patent infringement suit, Plaintiff TVnGO Ltd.
`(BVI) asserts that Defendants LG Electronics, Inc. and LG
`Electronics U.S.A., Inc. (collectively, “LG”), are infringing
`five of TVnGO’s patents1 which claim methods and devices that
`make televisions “smart”-- i.e., able to display both television
`content and internet streaming content. Presently before the
`Court is the issue of indefiniteness, which LG raised in
`connection with the Court’s claim construction inquiry. The
`Court has carefully considered the parties’ pre-hearing
`submissions and post-hearing briefs, the parties’ presentations
`made at the claim construction hearing held on January 8, 2020,
`as well as supplemental briefing which this Court ordered on
`March 6, 2020. For the reasons stated herein, the Court holds
`that ‘220 Patent claims 1, 9, 10, 13, 17, and 20; ‘945 Patent
`claims 1, 4, 8, 9, 12, 15, 19, 21; ‘696 Patent claims 1, 9, 10,
`13, 17 and 20; ‘339 Patent claims 1, 4-7, 12-15 and 18; and ‘621
`
`
`1 The Patents-in-Suit are U.S. Patent Nos. 8,132,220;
`9,124,945; 9,392,339; 9,407,969; and 9,794,621, respectively,
`the ‘220 Patent, the ‘945 Patent, the ‘339 Patent, the ‘969
`Patent and the ‘621 Patent. Each of the ‘945, ‘339, and ‘969
`patents are continuations of the ‘220 Patent. The ‘621 Patent
`is a continuation of the ‘969 Patent.
`2
`
`
`
`Patent claims 1, 4, 9, 11 are indefinite, and therefore not
`amenable to construction.2
`
`I.
`According to TVnGO, the main inventive feature of its
`
`technology to which the Patents-in-Suit are addressed is the
`generation and display of “overlays” which appear on a user’s
`(i.e., a person’s) television screen, thereby creating a user-
`friendly mechanism through which a user can simultaneously view
`broadcast TV content and Internet content. [Transcript p. 53,
`60] Thus, for example, in Figures 7a, 7b and 7c of the Patents-
`in-Suit, which depict a television set (item 40), items 42
`through 45 are overlays, or icons3, containing Internet content,
`and item 41 is broadcast TV content:
`
`
`2 In light of this holding, the Court need not reach, and
`therefore does not reach, the issue of whether the terms
`“combiner unit” and “combiner circuit”, as used in ‘220 Patent
`claims 1, 13, and 17; ‘945 Patent claims 1-10, 12, and 18; ‘339
`Patent claims 1-17, 19, 20; and ‘969 Patent claims 1, 13, and 17
`are indefinite. [See TVnGO’s Post-Hearing Brief, Dkt No. 75, p.
`3]
`
` At the claim construction hearing, TVnGO explained, by
`way of example, that the icon could take the form of a commonly
`recognized logo, such as the Netflix logo. [Transcript p. 60,
`95, 100]
`
` 3
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`According to the specifications, if a user wishes to view
`
`the content represented by a particular overlay-- for example,
`item 42-- she may use a particular key on her remote control to
`select the desired overlay, which will result in the display of
`a secondary window, item 45. Engaging the same key for a second
`time will enlarge the secondary window to occupy substantially
`the whole area of the television screen, as shown in Figure 7c.
`Engaging the same key for a third time will cause the television
`screen display to revert to the situation shown in Figure 7a.
`[‘220 Patent, 7:25-50; ‘945 Patent, 7:35-60; ‘339 Patent, 7:28-
`50; ‘969 Patent, 7:35-60; ‘621 Patent, 7:43-65]. The parties
`dispute whether the Patents-in-Suit “particularly . . . and
`
`4
`
`
`
`distinctly” disclose, 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), how the patented
`technology functions to produce items 42 through 45.
`
`The claim terms primarily at issue are “overlay activation
`criterion” and “overlay activation signal.”4 Copies of the
`Patents-in-Suit are attached to this Opinion as Exhibits A
`through E.5
`
`II.
`Patent claims must “particularly point[] out and distinctly
`
`claim[] the subject matter” of the invention. 35 U.S.C. §
`112(b). If a claim does not do so, it is invalid as indefinite.
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 902
`(2014). “[A] patent claim is indefinite if, when ‘read in light
`of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution
`history, the claim fails to inform, with reasonable certainty,
`those skilled in the art6 about the scope of the invention.’”
`
`
`4 The term “special overlay activation signal” appears in
`the ‘954 and ‘621 Patents, however the parties make no separate,
`independent arguments with respect to the word “special.” Thus,
`the parties’ arguments, and the Court’s analysis, applies
`equally to both “overlay activation signal” and “special overlay
`activation signal.”
` See also Docket Entries 1-1 (‘220 Patent), 1-2 (‘945
`Patent), 1-3 (‘339 Patent), 1-4 (‘969 Patent), and 1-5 (‘621
`Patent).
` The parties have stipulated on the record that, for the
`purposes of the issues addressed herein, the parties’ differing
`formulations of a person skilled in the art (“POSA”) have no
`material impact on claim construction. [Transcript, p. 16-17]
`
`
` 6
`
` 5
`
`5
`
`
`
`BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed.
`Cir. 2017) (quoting Nautilus). “‘The internal coherence and
`context assessment of the patent, and whether it conveys claim
`meaning with reasonable certainty, are questions of law.’”
`United Access Techs., LLC v. AT & T Corp., 757 F. App’x 960, 969
`(Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
`Likewise, claim construction is an issue of law, Markman v.
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), and “[a]
`determination that a patent claim is invalid for failure to meet
`the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 is a
`conclusion that is drawn from the court’s performance of its
`duty as the construer of patent claims.” Fisher-Price, Inc. v.
`Graco Children’s Prod., Inc., 154 F. App’x 903, 906 (Fed. Cir.
`2005) (internal citation and quotation omitted); see also,
`Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1377
`(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“In the face of an allegation of
`indefiniteness, general principles of claim construction
`apply.”).7
`
`
`7 TVnGO asserts that the Court should defer its
`indefiniteness ruling “until TVnGO has had an opportunity to
`take fact discovery.” [Post-hearing brief, Dkt No. 75, p. 3;
`Supplemental brief, Dkt. 81, p. 9-10] The Court concludes,
`however, that discovery in this particular case would not be
`helpful to the Court’s legal inquiry given the nature of the
`claims’ indefiniteness. As discussed herein, the claims, as
`written, contain inherent, irreconcilable inconsistencies. Even
`if, as LG hypothesized at the claim construction hearing,
`6
`
`
`
`III.
`In conducting the indefiniteness inquiry, the Court
`considers: the language of the claims; the specifications; and
`the prosecution histories of the Patents-in-Suit. BASF Corp,
`875 F.3d at 1365 (quoting Nautilus). Section A considers the
`claims and the specifications of the Patents-in-Suit. Section B
`addresses the prosecution histories.
`A.
`As LG has persuasively demonstrated, the use of the terms
`
`“overlay activation criterion” and “overlay activation signal”--
`neither of which are terms of art, nor defined by the
`specifications8-- create irreconcilable inconsistencies into the
`Patents-in-Suit. These inconsistencies manifest not only when a
`POSA views each Patent-in-Suit individually (“intra-patent
`inconsistencies”), but as well as when a POSA attempts to
`understand the terms across the span of the Patents-in-Suit
`
`
`discovery were to reveal that persons skilled in the art at LG
`subjectively understood what TVnGO’s patents claimed
`[Transcript, p. 66-67], that evidence could not overcome the
`legal conclusion that the claims, as drafted, and read in light
`of the specification and prosecution history, do not inform a
`POSA, with a reasonable amount of certainty, the scope of the
`invention.
` TVnGO does not disagree with these findings. Contrast
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (“the specification is always highly
`relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
`dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a
`disputed term.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
`7
`
` 8
`
`
`
`(“inter-patent inconsistencies”). Consequently, these
`inconsistencies render each Patent-in-Suit indefinite.
`Intra-Patent Inconsistencies
`Three intra-patent inconsistencies exist: (1) the ‘220 and
`‘969 Patents both have the same inconsistency; (2) the ‘945 and
`‘621 Patents both have another inconsistency; (3) and the ‘339
`Patent has yet another inconsistency.
`First, independent claims 1 and 13 of each of the ‘220 and
`‘969 Patents use the term “overlay activation criterion” in a
`manner that is inconsistent with the use of that same term in
`dependent claims 9 and 20, and the specifications of both
`patents. In claims 1 and 13, “overlay activation criterion”
`must necessarily come from the Internet because the claim states
`that “overlay activation criterion” is a component of the
`“overlay-enabling digital data” which data, the claim explicitly
`states, is provided “over the Internet.” [‘220 Patent, 8:61-9:7,
`10:25-40; ‘969 Patent, 9:7-20, 10:36-50] However, claims 9 and
`20, as well as the specifications, state that “user command
`information” may be a component of “overlay activation
`criterion” and that such information is provided at the user’s
`premises and not over the Internet. [‘220 Patent, 7:2-6, claim
`3, claim 15; ‘969 Patent, 7:10-15, claims 3 and 15] Thus, the
`intrinsic evidence presents a POSA with irreconcilably
`inconsistent information: the ‘220 and ‘969 Patents indicate
`
`8
`
`
`
`that “overlay activation criterion” comes from the Internet and
`simultaneously not from the Internet-- i.e., from the user’s
`premises. To state it more to the point, the Patents fail to
`inform a POSA of the invention’s scope with reasonable
`certainty.
`Second, the claims of the ‘945 and ‘621 Patents are
`internally inconsistent with their own specifications. The
`claims in which “overlay activation signal” appear refer to a
`signal that causes overlays stored in memory to be displayed.
`[See, e.g., ‘945 Patent, claim 1 at 9:23-26, claim 12 at 10:35-
`38; ‘621 Patent, claim 1 at 9:21-24] However, the
`specifications of both patents use “activate” to refer only to
`the pressing of a remote control key corresponding to a
`displayed overlay thereby “activating” the overlay to display
`the IP content to which the overlay corresponds. [‘945 Patent,
`7:16-34, 45-49; ‘621 Patent, 7:25-42, 52-57] Thus, a POSA
`looking at either the ‘945 Patent or the ‘621 Patent cannot know
`what happens upon receipt of an overlay activation signal
`because the patents teach two different results. A POSA is left
`to wonder, or in other words, is confused: does the overlay
`activation signal result in the display of a stored overlay, or
`does it result in the display of IP content? The patents
`provide no guidance as to how a POSA could confidently choose
`between the two possibilities. See Media Rights Techs., Inc. v.
`
`9
`
`
`
`Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
`(explaining that indefiniteness results when “no informed and
`confident choice is available among the contending
`definitions.”).
`Third, and similarly, the ‘339 Patent’s use of the term
`“overlay activation criterion” is inconsistent with the meaning
`of “activating” an overlay in its own specification. Claim 1 of
`the ‘339 Patent states that an overlay activation criterion
`causes the display of overlays9, whereas the ‘339 Patent’s
`specification, like the specifications of the ‘945 and ‘621
`Patents, indicates that activating an overlay results in the
`display of IP content. [‘339 Patent, 7:11-27]
`TVnGO’s attempts to give clarity to the scope of the
`inventions are unpersuasive. Rather than reconcile
`inconsistencies, or provide clear answers to the Court’s
`questions-- neither of which TVnGO has been able to do, despite
`several opportunities to do so-- TVnGO asks the Court to reject
`LG’s arguments because they are merely “attorney argument”
`“unsupported by admissible evidence.” [Supplemental Brief, Dkt.
`81, p. 2] LG’s arguments, however, are supported by the Patents
`themselves, which, of course, are admissible evidence. The
`
`
`9 As discussed infra, this use of overlay activation
`criterion in the ‘339 Patent is irreconcilably inconsistent with
`the ‘621 Patent insofar as the ‘621 Patent teaches that an
`overlay activation signal-- not criterion-- causes the display
`of overlays.
`
`10
`
`
`
`Court has endeavored to construe the claims, most of which TVnGO
`contends needs no construction because their meaning is plain.
`Try as it might, the Court has been unable to do so. Having
`considered the claims, specifications, and prosecution histories
`of the Patents-in-Suit, as set forth supra (and infra), the
`Court cannot construe the claims with any confidence. See also,
`United Access Techs., 757 F. App’x at 969 (“The internal
`coherence and context assessment of the patent, and whether it
`conveys claim meaning with reasonable certainty, are questions
`of law.”).
`Inter-Patent Inconsistencies
`As this Court’s above discussion of the ‘339 and ‘621
`Patents has previewed, “overlay activation criterion” and
`“overlay activation signal” are used interchangeably between the
`‘339 Patent and the ‘621 Patent to achieve the same result:
`display of an overlay. [See ‘339 Patent, claim 1, line 8-10;
`‘621 Patent, claim 1, lines 21-24] However, the specifications
`provide different meanings for these two words. “Criterion,”
`according to the specifications, means condition, such as time
`and channel information [see, e.g., ‘339 Patent 3:61-67; ‘621
`Patent 4:26-28], whereas “signal” means a selection or
`indication from the user [see, e.g. ‘339 Patent 4:64-67; ‘621
`Patent 5:8-12]. According to the specifications, and as TVnGO
`states in its brief, the “criterion” comes from the Internet,
`
`11
`
`
`
`whereas the “signal” comes from the user via the remote control.
`[Dkt. No. 75, p. 8, 10, 14] The simultaneous use of two
`different words with different meanings to achieve the same
`result-- display of an overlay-- produces an irreconcilable
`inconsistency within the Patents-in-Suit which cannot inform a
`POSA, with reasonable certainty, the scope of the invention.
`Because “no informed and confident choice is available among the
`contending definitions,” Media Rights Techs., Inc., 800 F.3d at
`1371, the claim terms are indefinite. Contrast Phillips v. AWH
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Because
`claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the
`patent, the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate
`the meaning of the same term in other claims.”).
`
`Similarly, in the ‘220 Patent, for example, when the
`overlay activation criterion is met, the result is the
`generation of an overlay. [‘220 Patent, claim 1, lines 9-11; see
`also ‘969 Patent, claim 1, lines 21-24] In contrast, however,
`in the ‘339 Patent, the result of the overlay activation
`criterion being met is the display of an overlay. [‘339 Patent,
`claim 1, lines 8-10] TVnGO maintains this is exactly as it
`should be-- that “when we say ‘generate’ [an overlay] what we
`mean is display.” [Transcript, p. 56; see also p. 98, 108 (using
`“display” and “generate” interchangeably); Dkt. 75, p. 13 (“When
`the claim language describes displaying the overlay, it is
`
`12
`
`
`
`referring to generating the overlay.”); Dkt. No. 78, p. 2
`(“‘generating’ . . . means generating ‘display screens’”)]
`However, TVnGO cannot point to anything in the claim language,
`or anywhere else, from which a POSA could discern why two
`different words10 are used to denote the same result. Instead,
`TVnGO insists, without any intrinsic evidentiary support, that
`two different words have the same meaning.11 This inherent
`inconsistency injects even more uncertainty into the Patents-in-
`Suit.
`
`Confronted with these irreconcilable inconsistencies, TVnGO
`mischaracterizes LG’s argument. According to TVnGO, “LG’s
`indefiniteness arguments as to overlay activation criterion and
`
`
`10 The verb “generate” means to create or produce or bring
`into existence, whereas the verb “display” means to show or
`reveal something already in existence. Merriam-Webster
`Unabridged Dictionary. This Court is mindful of the Federal
`Circuit’s guidance that “‘a general-usage dictionary cannot
`overcome art-specific evidence of the meaning of a claim term.’”
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322 (internal citation and quotation
`omitted). This Court’s use of a general-usage dictionary in
`this circumstance is merely to illustrate the absence of any
`art-specific evidence to inform the words’ meanings. See id. at
`1322-23 (“judges . . . may [] rely on dictionary definitions
`when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary
`definition does not contradict any definition found in or
`ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.”) (internal
`citation and quotation omitted).
`
`11 TVnGO asserts that “LG’s entire ‘generate’ versus
`‘display’ argument is nothing more than its characterization of
`the claims, divorced from the actual claim language.” (Dkt. 78,
`p. 3)(italics in the brief). However, the failing argument is
`TVnGO’s insistence that “generate” and “display” mean the same
`thing.
`
`13
`
`
`
`overlay activation signal are premised solely on the proposition
`that claim terms must have the same meaning across all patents.”
`[Dkt. No. 75, p. 3 (italics in the brief)] LG’s argument,
`however, is not so broad. LG asserts, and this Court agrees,
`the reason the claim terms are indefinite is not simply because
`the terms are used differently. Rather, the terms are
`indefinite because the different uses cannot be reconciled in a
`manner that informs a POSA, to a reasonable degree of certainty,
`of the meaning of claim terms.
`
`Moreover, in an attempt to fill in the blanks of the
`Patents-in-Suit, TVnGO presents the testimony of its expert, Dr.
`Sprenger. In explaining to the Court what a POSA would
`understand, however, Dr. Sprenger actually creates more blanks.
`With respect to “overlay activation criteria,” Dr. Sprenger
`explains,
`[i]n the most basic situation where there is no other
`information from the user regarding preferences for IP
`content, or specific times or channels to view content
`(e.g., all times and all channels are available), the
`TV-Internet Integration Box checks its own timetable
`stored in memory (see, e.g., ‘220 Patent at 4:28-32),
`determines whether the overlay activation criteria is
`met (e.g., confirming that the user is watching Channel
`3 at 7:00 PM which would match the overlay activation
`criteria embedded in OEDD [the overlay enabling digital
`data] 2), and the TV-Internet Integration Box combines
`the overlay-enabling digital data with the TV video
`signal received at the first input, outputting the
`combined video signal to the TV set.
`
`(Dkt. 75-2, Sprenger Suppl. Decl. ¶ 12)
`
`14
`
`
`
`First, nothing in the Patents-in-Suit discusses at all a
`
`situation where “there is no other information from the user
`regarding preferences for IP content.” Indeed, Dr. Sprenger’s
`citation to the ‘220 Patent specification provides no support
`for his statements; 4:28-32 of the ‘220 Patent explains what
`happens when a user / subscriber does provide information
`concerning “what type of IP data is to be displayed and when.”
`[‘220 Patent 4:31-32].
`
`Second, Dr. Sprenger’s explanation introduces an entirely
`new concept that also has no support anywhere in the Patents-in-
`Suit: different types of “overlay enabling digital data”
`(“OEDD”)-- e.g., “OEDD 1”; “OEDD 2” and “OEDD 3.” (Dkt. 75-2,
`Sprenger Suppl. Decl. ¶ 10-12, emphasis added) The fact that
`Dr. Sprenger, in attempting to explain what the Patents-in-Suit
`disclose, must create a new embodiment of the patented
`technology, using entirely new terms, clearly illustrates that
`the specifications do not inform a POSA with a reasonable
`certainty as to what the Patents-in-Suit claim.
`B.
`Lastly, the prosecution histories do not save the disputed
`
`claims from indefiniteness. The histories provide nothing more
`than what limited information is disclosed by the
`specifications: “overlay activation criterion” can include
`timing and channel information, and an overlay activation signal
`
`15
`
`
`
`is received from a user. [See Dkt. 75, p. 5, 10] As discussed
`above, this information alone does not allow a POSA to reconcile
`the claims’ inconsistencies.
`Moreover, the Court is unpersuaded by TVnGO’s argument that
`the patent examiners must not have found the terms indefinite
`because if they had, they would not have granted the Patents.
`First, whether an individual patent examiner, or examiners,
`understood what the claim terms meant is not the standard for
`indefiniteness. Second, the argument is tantamount to a
`statement of the basic statutory principle that a patent is
`presumed valid, 35 U.S.C. § 282. This principle is already
`captured by the allocation of the burden of proof to LG (as the
`party seeking to invalidate the patents), id., and the standard
`of proof by clear and convincing evidence, which this Court has
`employed. Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95
`(2011). The presumption alone cannot rebut the intrinsic
`evidence demonstrating that the disputed claim terms are
`indefinite.
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370
`(Fed. Cir. 2017), upon which TVnGO relies, does not stand for
`the proposition that a patent examiner’s knowing allowance of
`claims by itself defeats a conclusion of indefiniteness. In
`Sonix, the Court reversed the District Court’s indefiniteness
`holding because “the intrinsic evidence provided guidance as to
`
`16
`
`
`
`the scope of the claims.” 844 F.3d at 1377. In this case, as
`explained, the intrinsic evidence provides no such guidance. To
`the contrary, it provides confusion. Indeed, Sonix expressly
`states that “application [of the disputed claim terms] by the
`examiner and an expert do not, on their own, establish”
`definiteness. 844 F.3d at 1380 (emphasis added).
`In the Court’s final analysis, a review of the claim terms,
`the specifications, and the prosecution histories leave the
`Court with unresolved inconsistencies as well as unanswered
`questions.
`
`IV.
`Because the Court cannot construe the claims, they are
`
`indefinite. Accordingly, for the above reasons, the Court holds
`that ‘220 Patent claims 1, 9, 10, 13, 17, and 20; ‘945 Patent
`claims 1, 4, 8, 9, 12, 15, 19, 21; ‘696 Patent claims 1, 9, 10,
`13, 17 and 20; ‘339 Patent claims 1, 4-7, 12-15 and 18; and ‘621
`Patent claims 1, 4, 9, 11 are indefinite, and therefore not
`amenable to construction. An Order accompanies this Opinion.
`
`Dated: April 16, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`
`__s/ Renée Marie Bumb____
`Renée Marie Bumb, U.S.D.J.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`17
`
`