`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC 2017, LLC,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2019-01541
`Patent 7,016,676
`
`____________
`
`PATENT OWNER PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PETITION
`
`
`
`
`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`
`II.
`
`RELATED PROCEEDINGS .......................................................................... 2
`
`III. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED UNDER THE
`BOARD’S DISCRETION ............................................................................... 5
`
`IV. THE ’676 PATENT ....................................................................................... 15
`
`V.
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ........................................... 20
`
`VI. PETITIONER DOES NOT PROVE A REASONABLE
`LIKELIHOOD OF UNPATENTABILITY FOR ANY
`CHALLENGED CLAIM .............................................................................. 20
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Claim Construction—Performance of the “Renders” Portion
`of Claim 1 is Required ........................................................................ 21
`
`The Petition does not establish that Gardner alone or in
`view of Balachandran and/or Marth teaches “a control
`station which controls alternate use of the frequency band”
`as recited in Claims 1 and 9. (Ground 1) ............................................ 23
`
`The Petition does not establish that Gardner alone or in
`view of Balachandran and/or Marth teaches “wherein the
`control station … renders the frequency band available for
`access by the stations working in accordance with the
`second radio interface standard if stations working in
`accordance with the first radio interface standard do not
`request access to the frequency band” as recited in Claims 1
`and 9. (Ground 1) ................................................................................ 26
`
`D.
`
`The Petition does not establish that Gardner in view of
`Balachandran teaches dependent claim 2. (Ground 1) ........................ 27
`
`VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 30
`
`
`
`- i -
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`
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §313 and 37 C.F.R. §42.107(a), Uniloc 2017 LLC (the
`
`“Patent Owner” or “Uniloc”) submits Uniloc’s Preliminary Response to the
`
`Petition for Inter Partes Review (“Pet.” or “Petition”) of United States Patent No.
`
`7,016,676 (“the '676 Patent” or “Ex. 1001”) filed by Google LLC (“Petitioner”) in
`
`IPR2019-01541.
`
`The Board should exercise its discretion to deny this burdensome,
`
`redundant, and inefficient Petition. Google presents no justifiable reason for there
`
`to be 6 petitions filed against the ’676 patent. Under these facts, the Board would
`
`be well within its discretion to deny the petition and should do so.
`
`Should the Board reach the merits, the Petition should be denied in its
`
`entirety as failing to meet the threshold burden of proving there is a reasonable
`
`likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
`
`Uniloc addresses each ground and provides specific examples of how
`
`Petitioner failed to establish that it is more likely than not that it would prevail with
`
`respect to at least one of the challenged ’676 Patent claims.
`
`Accordingly, Uniloc respectfully requests that the Board decline institution
`
`of trial on claims 1, 2, 4, and 9 of the '676 Patent.
`
`
`
`
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`-1-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`II. RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`
`The following district court proceedings currently involve U.S. Pat. No.
`
`7,016,676 (’676 patent):
`
`Case Name
`
`Case Number
`
`Court
`
`Filing Date
`
`Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Microsoft
`Corporation
`
`8-18-cv-02053
`(stayed)
`
`CACD Nov 17, 2018
`
`Uniloc 2017 LLC et al v. Google
`LLC
`
`2-18-cv-00495
`(stayed)
`
`TXED Nov. 17, 2018
`
`Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Verizon
`Communications Inc. et al
`
`2-18-cv-00513
`
`TXED Nov. 17, 2018
`
`Uniloc 2017 LLC v. AT&T Services,
`Inc. et al
`
`2-18-cv-00514
`
`TXED Nov. 17, 2018
`
`
`
`The ’676 patent is also the subject of six inter partes review proceedings:
`
`Case Name
`
`Case Number
`
`Court
`
`Filing Date
`
`Google, LLC v. Uniloc 2017 LLC
`
`IPR2019-01541
`
`PTAB Aug. 29, 2019
`
`Ericsson Inc. et al v. Uniloc 2017
`LLC
`
`IPR2019-01550
`
`PTAB Aug. 29, 2019
`
`-2-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
`
`
`Case Name
`
`Case Number
`
`Court
`
`Filing Date
`
`Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. v.
`Uniloc 2017 LLC
`
`IPR2019-01349
`
`PTAB
`
`July 22, 2019
`
`Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. v.
`Uniloc 2017 LLC
`
`IPR2019-01350
`
`PTAB
`
`July 22, 2019
`
`Microsoft Corporation et al v. Uniloc
`2017 LLC
`
`IPR2019-01116
`
`PTAB May 29, 2019
`
`Microsoft Corporation et al v. Uniloc
`2017 LLC
`
`IPR2019-01125
`
`PTAB May 29, 2019
`
`
`
`Institution was denied in IPR2019-01125.
`
`The challenges presented to the claims of the ’676 patent in this and other
`
`inter partes review proceedings are set forth below:
`
`Claim Basis
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`Gardner in view of Marth and Balachandran (Ground 1 of this IPR)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01550)
`
`Lansford (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01550)
`
`Home RF (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Home RF in view of Home RF Tutorial (Ground 2 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Home RF in view of Home RF Liaison Report (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`-3-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`Claim Basis
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`3
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`5
`
`5
`
`5
`
`5
`
`5
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`Lansford (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Sherman (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Gardner in view of Marth and Balachandran (Ground 1 of this IPR)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01550)
`
`Lansford (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01550)
`
`Home RF (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Home RF in view of Home RF Tutorial (Ground 2 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Home RF in view of Home RF Liaison Report (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Lansford (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Sherman (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Sherman (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`Gardner in view of Marth and Balachandran (Ground 1 of this IPR)
`
`Home RF (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01125)
`
`Home RF in view of Tutorial and SWAP Spec (Ground 2 of IPR2019-01125)
`
`Home RF in view of Haartsen (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01125)
`
`Home RF in view of Home RF Tutorial and Haartsen (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01125)
`
`Sherman in view of Trompower (Ground 2 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Shellhammer in view of Trompower (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Shellhammer in view of Panasik (Ground 5 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Sherman (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`-4-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`Claim Basis
`
`8
`
`8
`
`8
`
`8
`
`8
`
`9
`
`9
`
`9
`
`Shellhammer in combination with Haartsen (Ground 2 of IPR2019-01550)
`
`Shellhammer in combination with Panasik (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01550)
`
`Sherman in view of Trompower (Ground 2 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`Shellhammer in view of Trompower (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`Shellhammer in view of Panasik (Ground 5 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`Gardner in view of Marth and Balachandran (Ground 1 of this IPR)
`
`Sherman (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`
`
`III. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED UNDER THE BOARD’S
`DISCRETION
`
`This Petition presents all of the same burdens and inefficiencies due to the
`
`filing of multiple petitions to attack a single patent.
`
`The ’676 patent has only nine claims. Yet, 6 IPRs have been filed
`
`challenging the ’676 patent, presenting an array of assertions against the individual
`
`claims, including multiple challenges against the same claims challenged in this
`
`Petition presented across 4 different petitions. Despite the Petition’s arguments to
`
`the contrary, the facts show undue burden, inefficient overlap, and unexplained
`
`differences across the various petitions and challenges. The table above in the
`
`Related Proceedings section shows all of the IPR challenges levelled against the
`
`claims of the ’676 patent (to date). The table below focuses on the claims
`
`-5-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`challenged in this IPR (highlighted in yellow) to show the repeated attacks against
`
`these claims.
`
`
`
`Claim Basis
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`2
`
`4
`
`Gardner in view of Marth and Balachandran (Ground 1 of this IPR)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01550)
`
`Lansford (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01550)
`
`Home RF (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Home RF in view of Home RF Tutorial (Ground 2 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Home RF in view of Home RF Liaison Report (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Lansford (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Sherman (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Gardner in view of Marth and Balachandran (Ground 1 of this IPR)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01550)
`
`Lansford (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01550)
`
`Home RF (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Home RF in view of Home RF Tutorial (Ground 2 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Home RF in view of Home RF Liaison Report (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Lansford (Ground 4 of IPR2019-01116)
`
`Sherman (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01349)
`
`Gardner in view of Marth and Balachandran (Ground 1 of this IPR)
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`-6-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`Claim Basis
`
`9
`
`9
`
`9
`
`Gardner in view of Marth and Balachandran (Ground 1 of this IPR)
`
`Sherman (Ground 1 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`Shellhammer (Ground 3 of IPR2019-01350)
`
`
`
`The precedential decision in General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon
`
`Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357 (PTAB Sep. 6, 2017) (Paper 19) identifies
`
`seven non-exclusive factors that bear on the issue of whether the Board should
`
`invoke its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.108(a). These factors include:
`
`1.
`
`whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition
`
`directed to the same claims of the same patent;
`
`2.
`
`whether at the time of filing of the first petition the
`
`petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second
`
`petition or should have known of it;
`
`3.
`
`whether at the time of filing of the second petition the
`
`petitioner already received the patent owner’s
`
`preliminary response to the first petition or received the
`
`Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the
`
`first petition;
`
`-7-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`4.
`
`the length of time that elapsed between the time the
`
`petitioner learned of the prior art asserted in the second
`
`petition and the filing of the second petition;
`
`5.
`
`whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for
`
`the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`directed to the same claims of the same patent;
`
`the finite resources of the Board; and
`
`the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a
`
`final determination not later than 1 year after the date on
`
`which the Director notices institution of review.
`
`See General Plastic, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19, 9–10 (citations omitted).
`
`Moreover, the Board has statutory authority to use its discretion to manage
`
`multiple proceedings before the Board involving the same patent. 35 U.S.C. §
`
`325(d).
`
`Each of the General Plastic factors 1, 2, and 4-7 weigh in favor of
`
`exercising discretion to deny the Petition.
`
`General Plastic Factor 1
`
`Regarding General Plastic factor 1, directed to whether a petitioner filed any
`
`previous petition directed to the same claims of the same patent, the table above
`
`-8-
`
`
`
`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
`
`
`shows numerous instances where the same claims were challenged. And when all
`
`challenges against the ’676 patent are considered, Google does not explain why it
`
`filed a petition containing such redundant grounds against the same claims
`
`challenged in other petitions. In other words, Google only contends that it has
`
`reason to challenge claim 4 but it does not provide any reason to include the other
`
`challenges. Petition, pp. 52-54. Further, as will be noted below, Google does not
`
`even construe claim 4 in this IPR. Instead, Google seeks to present this IPR
`
`against claim 4 and a later invalidity challenge based on indefiniteness. To wit,
`
`Google asserts regarding claim 4 that “it raises a number of indefiniteness issues,
`
`but to the extent that it has a discernible meaning, it should be construed to track
`
`the ’676 patent specification’s related disclosure.” Petition, p. 47. Thus, there is
`
`no reason to address Google’s obviousness challenge here when both obviousness
`
`and indefiniteness challenges can be addressed in the underlying district court
`
`litigation.
`
`Further Google cites no authority to contend that it “has no relationship to
`
`either Microsoft’s or Marvell’s petitions” (Petition, p. 52) other IPRs filed by
`
`defendants in parallel district court litigation should not be considered. Rather, the
`
`opposite is true. Given the overlap, Google provides no explanation as to why it
`
`elected to file its own Petition rather than coordinating with the other defendants
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`-9-
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`(or relying on joinder process of 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) for the overlapping
`
`challenges). Google makes no assertion that it tried, and failed, to coordinate with
`
`the other defendants.
`
`In this regard, Google does not explain why its challenges to claims 1, 2, and
`
`9 are any different than other duplicative challenges to claims 1, 2, and 9, only
`
`concluding the other “challenges are based on references not asserted here that
`
`disclose systems and methods that function differently from Petitioner’s prior art.”
`
`Petition, p. 53. Google make no attempt at all to explain those alleged differences.
`
`Indeed, Google makes no showing that its challenges are different and any better
`
`than the other petitioners’ challenges. See Medtronic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc.,
`
`Case IPR2014-00487, Paper 8 at 6 (Sept. 11, 2014) (informative) (denying
`
`institution, explaining in part that “[w]hile Petitioner argues that the grounds are
`
`not redundant to those instituted on in the ’506 Proceeding, Petitioner does not
`
`provide any specific reasoning to support that argument, other than to state that the
`
`grounds are based on different prior art references.”); see also Apple Inc. v.
`
`Corephotonics Ltd., IPR2018-01356, Paper 9 at 7-8 (Feb. 5, 2019) (finding that
`
`where a petitioner “merely argues that its Petition ‘is not redundant’” because the
`
`asserted reference was not raised in another petition this circumstance “weigh[s] in
`
`-10-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution ... on the basis of 35 U.S.C. §
`
`314(a)”).
`
`General Plastic factor 1 weighs in favor of exercising discretion to deny the
`
`Petition.
`
`General Plastic Factors 2, 1 4, and 5
`
`Regarding General Plastic factors 2, 4 and 5, regarding whether the length
`
`of time between when petitioner knew of the references and filed the petition was
`
`adequately explained, relating to prior knowledge of the references, Google does
`
`not state when it learned of the references used in its Petition. Thus, the Board
`
`may presume Google has known of each of the references well before any petition
`
`against the ’676 patent was first filed and has no explanation for its delay. And
`
`while Google presents several observations about the timing in the litigations
`
`(Petition, pp. 53-54), Google does not actually explain why it did not file a petition
`
`soon after learning of the references. And given Google’s disavowal of Microsoft
`
`and Marvell’s actions, nothing Microsoft or Marvell did prevented Google from
`
`
`
`1General Plastic factor 3 is neutral as no preliminary response or decision to
`
`institute was filed in a prior IPR prior to Google’s filing.
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`-11-
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`filing an IPR promptly after learning of the references. General Plastic factors 2,
`
`4, and 5 weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny the Petition.
`
`General Plastic factors 2, 4, and 5 thus heavily weigh in favor of exercising
`
`discretion to deny the Petition.
`
`General Plastic Factors 6 and 7
`
`General Plastic factors 6 and 7 are directed to efficiency and the Board’s
`
`resources and are informed by the Board’s guidance in the July 2019 Trial Practice
`
`Guide Update:
`
`Based on the Board’s prior experience, one petition
`
`should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in
`
`most situations. Two or more petitions filed against the
`
`same patent at or about the same time (e.g., before the
`
`first preliminary response by the patent owner) may place
`
`a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and
`
`the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and
`
`efficiency concerns. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). In addition,
`
`multiple petitions by a petitioner are not necessary in the
`
`vast majority of cases. To date, a substantial majority of
`
`patents have been challenged with a single petition.
`
`Trial Practice Guide Update, 26 (July 2019); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide
`
`(November 2019), 59.
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`-12-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`The unnecessary burdens identified by the Board are certainly presented
`
`here. Google presents no argument that its petition would be an efficient way to
`
`evaluate the validity of claims 1, 2, and 9 in addition to the redundant challenges
`
`against these same claims. As noted above, Google does not even explain how its
`
`Petition differs from the prior challenges. See TomTom, Inc. v. Blackbird Tech,
`
`LLC, IPR2017-02025, Paper 7 at 15-17 (March 12, 2018) (noting that the Board is
`
`“mindful of the potential inequity of parties filing multiple petitions,” where
`
`Petitioner has “relie[d] on substantially similar references and analyses” and “[has]
`
`not shown sufficiently, how the [asserted] references are different enough to
`
`warrant institution”). With regard to claim 4, as noted above, this IPR would not
`
`resolve all of the Google’s stated challenges to the validity of claim 4. Denial of
`
`institution for this Petition is thus appropriate under the Board’s discretionary
`
`authority in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`Moreover, given the delays in presenting its challenges, Google has all but
`
`assured that any IPR in this case will have a different schedule than any other IPR
`
`against the ’676 patent. The Board has already instituted IPR2019-01116 and set a
`
`schedule in that proceeding.
`
`For all these reasons, General Plastic factors 6 and 7, and factors 1, 2, 4, and
`
`5 heavily weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny the Petition. No factor
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`-13-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`supports Petitioner. Under these facts, the Board be well-within its discretion to
`
`deny the Petition. Google’s Petition should be denied.
`
`Discretion Under § 325(d)
`
`Despite six IPRs having been filed against the ’676 patent, rather than review
`
`each of the factors pertaining to § 325(d), the Petition states that it “is not redundant
`
`of Microsoft’s or Marvell’s petitions because (i) none challenges claim 4, and (ii)
`
`their unpatentability challenges are based on references not asserted here that
`
`disclose systems and methods that function differently from Petitioner’s prior art.”
`
`Pet. 53.
`
`The Board should weigh Petitioner’s lack of explanation in these
`
`circumstances against institution. See Medtronic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., Case
`
`IPR2014-00487, slip op. at 6 (Paper 8) (Sept. 11, 2014) (informative) (denying
`
`institution, explaining in part that “[w]hile Petitioner argues that the grounds are not
`
`redundant to those instituted on in the ’506 Proceeding, Petitioner does not provide
`
`any specific reasoning to support that argument, other than to state that the grounds
`
`are based on different prior art references.”).
`
`Institution should be denied under § 325(d).
`
`
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`-14-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`IV. THE ’676 PATENT
`
`The ’676 patent is titled “Method, network and control station for the two-
`
`way alternate control of radio systems of different standards in the same frequency
`
`band.” The ʼ676 patent issued March 21, 2006, from U.S. Patent Application No.
`
`10/089,959 filed April 4, 2002, which was a National Stage Entry of PCT No.
`
`PCT/EP01/09258 filed August 8, 2001 and published as W002/13457, which in
`
`turn claims priority to German Application No. DE10039532.5 filed August 8,
`
`2000.
`
`The inventors of the ’676 patent observed that, at the time of the invention, a
`
`radio system for wireless transmission of information was allowed to use
`
`transmission power only in accordance with standards by the national regulation
`
`authority. The national regulation authority determined on what frequencies with
`
`what transmission power and in accordance with what radio interface standard a
`
`radio system is allowed to transmit. There was also provided so-called ISM
`
`frequency bands (Industrial Scientific Medical) where radio systems transmitted in
`
`the same frequency band but in accordance with different radio interface standards.
`
`’676 patent, column 1, lines 10-23. And in the event of interference, methods were
`
`standardized for an active switching to another frequency within the permitted
`
`frequency band, for controlling transmission power, and for the adaptive coding
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`-15-
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`and modulation to reduce interference. However, despite operating in the same
`
`frequency band, different radio systems have different Medium Access Controls
`
`(MAC), and despite the utilization of methods such as Transmitter Power Control
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`(TPC) and Dynamic Frequency Selection (DFS), those methods did not make
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`optimum use of spreading radio channels over the stations which operate under
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`different radio standards. ‘676 patent, column 1, line 24 to column 2, line 10.
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`According to the ’676 Patent, there is provided a method, a wireless network
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`and a control station which make efficient use of radio transmission channels
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`possible by an interface control protocol method for a radio system, which system
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`comprises at least a frequency band provided for the alternate use of a first and a
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`second radio interface standard, the radio system comprising stations which
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`operate in accordance with a first radio interface standard and/or a second radio
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`interface standard, respectively, a control station being provided which controls the
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`alternate use of the frequency band. This is based on the idea of providing a
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`comprehensive standard exchange of implicit or explicit control information in
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`systems that have the same radio transmission methods but different radio
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`transmission protocols. This makes simple and efficient use possible of a radio
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`channel via a plurality of radio interface standards. ‘676 patent, column 2, lines 14-
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`28.
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`A first number of stations preferably forms a wireless local area network in
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`accordance with a first radio interface standard and a second number of stations
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`forms a wireless network in accordance with a second radio interface standard. The
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`control station is preferably a station that operates in accordance with both the first
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`and the second radio interface standard. The control station can utilize the common
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`frequency band more effectively when the demand for transmission capability in
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`accordance with the first and second radio standard varies. The control station may
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`release the common frequency band for access by stations operating under the
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`second radio interface if stations operating in accordance with the first radio
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`interface standard do not request access to the frequency band. The control station
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`controls the alternate access by the first wireless network and the second wireless
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`network to the common frequency band. The control station receives requests for
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`capacity from various stations and assigns capacity accordingly. The release of the
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`common frequency band for the second radio interface standard may be effected,
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`for example, by explicitly sending control information to the stations of the second
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`radio interface standard. As another example, control can be effected in that the
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`control station determines the respective duration in which the stations operating in
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`accordance with the second radio interface standard can utilize the common
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`frequency band. ‘676 patent, column 2, line 36 to column 4, line 26.
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`-17-
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`IPR2019-01541
`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`The '676 Patent issued with five independent claims, namely claims 1, 6, 7,
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`8, and 9. The text of challenged claims 1, 2, 4, and 9 is copied herein for the
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`convenience of the Board:
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`1. An interface-control protocol method for a radio
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`system which has at least one common frequency band
`
`that is provided for alternate use by a first and a second
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`radio interface standard, the radio system comprising:
`
`stations which operate in accordance with a first
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`radio interface standard and/or a second radio interface
`
`standard, and
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`a control station which controls the alternate use of
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`the frequency band,
`
`wherein the control station controls the access to
`
`the common frequency band for stations working in
`
`accordance with the first radio interface standard and
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`renders the frequency band available for access by the
`
`stations working in accordance with the second radio
`
`interface standard if stations working in accordance with
`
`the first radio interface standard do not request access to
`
`the frequency band.
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`
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`2. The method as claimed in claim 1, herein the control
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`station determines the respective duration in which the
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`stations working in accordance with the second radio
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`interface standard are allowed to utilize the frequency
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`band.
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`
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`4. The method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the
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`duration of operation in accordance with the first and
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`second radio interface standards is laid down only
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`approximately while the respective standards are violated
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`regularly or from time to time.
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`
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`9. A wireless network comprising at least one common
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`frequency band provided for alternate use by a first and a
`
`second radio interface standard, the wireless network
`
`comprising:
`
`stations which work in accordance with a first
`
`radio interface standard and/or in accordance with a
`
`second radio interface standard, and
`
`a control station which controls the alternate use of
`
`the common frequency band,
`
`wherein the control station controls the access to
`
`the common frequency band for stations working in
`
`accordance with the first radio interface standard and--
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`renders the frequency band available for access by the
`
`stations working in accordance with the second radio
`
`interface standard if stations working in accordance with
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`the first radio interface standard do not request access to
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`the frequency band.
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`
`
`V.
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`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`Google’s formulation (Petition, p. 7) of the level of ordinary skill in the art is
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`one of many petitioners have proposed across the various petitions challenging the
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`’676 patent. Rather than attempt to synthesize and reconcile these different
`
`expressions at this stage of the proceeding, for purposes of this Preliminary
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`Response only, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA.
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`Moreover, Patent Owner does not provide its own definition because Petitioner has
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`not met its burden of showing that the cited references render any of the disputed
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`claims of the ’676 patent obvious.
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`VI. PETITIONER DOES NOT PROVE A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
`OF UNPATENTABILITY FOR ANY CHALLENGED CLAIM
`
`Petitioner has failed to establish that it is more likely than not that it would
`
`prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged '676 Patent claims. By not
`
`addressing additional arguments, Patent Owner in no way concedes that any
`
`argument by Petitioner is correct.
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`Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish entitlement to relief. 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Because the Petition only presents a theory of obviousness,
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,016,676
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`Petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the
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`challenged patent claims would have been obvious in view of the references cited
`
`in the Petition. Petitioner “must specify where each element of the claim is found
`
`in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.104(b)(4). The Board should reject the Petition because Petitioner fails to meet
`
`this burden for any of the grounds.
`
`The Petition presents the following ground of purported unpatentability:
`
`Ground References
`1
`Gardner in view of Marth and
`Balachandran
`
`
`
`35 U.S.C. §
`103
`
`Challenged Claim(s)
`1, 2, 4, 9
`
`A. Claim Construction—Performance of the “Renders” Portion of
`Claim 1 is Required
`
`At this preliminary stage, Patent Owner submits that the Board need not
`
`construe any claim term in a particular manner in order to arrive at the conclusion
`
`that the Petition is substantively deficient. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co.,
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`642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“need only be construed to the extent
`
`necessary to resolve the controversy”). Nevertheless, a construction applied in the
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`Institution Decision in IPR2019-01116, Paper 8, is addressed below.
`
`The Board in IPR2019-01116 construed the final “wherein” clause of claim
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`1 to require two steps. Institution Decision, IPR2019-01116, Paper 8 at 16-17
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`(“we read the wherein clause of claim 1 as setting forth two steps, both carried out
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`by the control station”). The Board, however, found the “renders” portion of claim
`
`1 to be conditional and that “the associated action need not be performed,” relying
`
`on Ex parte Schulhauser, Appeal No. 2013–007847 (PTAB April 28, 2016)
`
`(precedential).
`
`The Board erred when finding the “renders” portion of claim 1 need not be
`
`performed. First, the Board erred in finding Ex parte Schulhauser to be “binding
`
`authority.” Schulhauser was precedential as to the meaning of a condition under
`
`the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. Schulhauser, at 5-6. Under the
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`Phillips standard, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
`
`banc), Ex parte Schulhauser is not binding. Also, the Board erred under the
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`Phillips standard because reading the “renders” portion in a manner that does not
`
`require performance creates inconsistencies with the language of the claim and the
`
`specification. Claim 1 is directed to “alternate” control of a frequency band.
`
`Claim 1, for example, recites a “common frequency band that is provided for
`
`alternate use by a first and a second radio interface standard” and “a control
`
`station which controls the alternate use of the frequency band.” (emphasis added).
`
`And, as noted above, the specification discloses additional detail regarding the
`
`alternate control. But, if the rendering portion of claim 1 does not need to be
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`performed, then claim 1 would not involve any alternate control at all, it would
`
`only require “access to the common frequency band for stations working in
`
`accordance with the first radio interface standard.” Thus, the “renders” portion of
`
`claim 1 cannot be disregarded as the control called for by this portion is required to
`
`be performed. A POSITA would interpret it as requiring rendering “the frequency
`
`band available for access by the stations working in accordance with the second
`
`radio interface,” with the understanding that the control station can only do so
`
`when “stations working in accordance with the first radio interface standard do not
`
`request access to the frequency band.” When provided with that meaning, the
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`claim is consistent with the specification and remainder of the claim concerning
`
`the provision of alternate control.
`
`B.
`
`The Petition does not establish that Gardner alone or in view of
`Balachandran and/or Marth teaches “a control station which
`controls alternate use of the frequency band” as recited in Claims
`1 and