`Tel: 571-272-7822
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`Paper: 7
`Entered: January 7, 2020
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2019-01218
`Patent 6,836,654 B2
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`
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`Before JENNIFER S. BISK, NEIL T. POWELL, and JOHN D.
`HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`POWELL, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
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`
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`IPR2019-01218
`Patent 6,836,654 B2
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`Petitioner Samsung Electronics America, Inc., filed a Petition
`(Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–9 of U.S.
`Patent No. 6,836,654 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’654 patent”). Patent Owner
`Uniloc 2017 LLC filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”).
`Having considered the Petition and Preliminary Response, we
`conclude the Petition should be denied for the reasons discussed below.
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`A. Related Matters
`The parties identify a number of district court proceedings involving
`the ’654 patent. Pet. 1; Paper 3, 2. Of the identified district court
`proceedings, Petitioner is involved in one, specifically Uniloc 2017 LLC v.
`Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., Case No. 2-18-cv-00508 (E.D. Tex.) (hereafter
`“the district court proceeding”). Additionally, Petitioner has filed another
`Petition challenging the ’654 patent in IPR2019-01219.
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`Patent 6,836,654 B2
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`B. The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner contends that claims 1–9 of the ’654 patent are unpatentable
`based on the following grounds:
`Claims Challenged
`35 U.S.C. §
`1–3, 7–9
`1031
`4–6
`103
`1, 2, 7–9
`103
`4–6
`103
`3
`103
`
`References/Basis
`Nokia2, Alos3
`Nokia, Alos, Kemppi4
`Matsukida5, Alos
`Matsukida, Alos, Kemppi
`Matsukida, Alos, Miller6
`
`Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of Zygmunt J. Haas, Ph.D.
`(Ex. 1002).
`C. The ’654 Patent
`The ’654 patent relates to protecting against theft of a mobile
`radiotelephony device. Ex. 1001, code (57). The ’654 patent notes a
`previously disclosed method of protecting a radiotelephone by creating a
`
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`1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
`(2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103 effective March 16, 2013. Because the
`’654 patent has an effective filing date prior to the effective date of the
`applicable AIA amendment, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 103.
`2 Owner’s Manual for the Nokia 9000i Communicator, Issue 1.1 (Ex. 1004).
`3 Published U.S. Patent Application No. 2002/0147028 A1, pub. Oct. 10,
`2002 (Ex. 1005).
`4 U.S. Patent No. 4,868,846, iss. Sep. 19, 1989, (Ex. 1006).
`5 Japanese Patent Application Publication No. JP H6-216841, pub. Aug. 5,
`1994 (Ex. 1021).
`6 U.S. Patent No. 6,141,563, iss. Oct. 31, 2000, (Ex. 1022).
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`link between the device and a particular user identification module and
`preventing normal use of the device in the event that the user identification
`module installed in the device is not the linked user identification module.
`Id. at 1:21–29. The ’654 patent laments that this method may allow use of a
`lost or stolen device until the user alerts an operator and the network blocks
`use of the identification module linked to the device. Id. at 1:30–36.
`To address this issue, the ’654 patent discloses a method of blocking
`normal use of a radiotelephony device that has a user identification module.
`Id. at 1:39–50. Specifically, the ’654 patent discloses blocking normal use
`of the radiotelephony device in response to confirmation of the user
`identification module and detection of a period of inactivity of the device.
`Id. Consequently, when the device is lost or stolen, by the time a third party
`has the device, “it has most probably been inactive for a period of time that
`is sufficiently long for its normal operation to be blocked.” Id. at 1:51–54.
`“Thanks to the invention the lost or stolen device becomes totally unusable.”
`Id. at 1:59–60.
`
`D. Illustrative Claim
`Claim 1 is independent. Each of claims 2–9 depends, directly or
`indirectly, from independent claim 1. Claim 1 is illustrative and recites:
`1. A mobile radiotelephony device, comprising:
`blocking means for preventing a normal operation of the mobile
`radiotelephony device, wherein the normal operation includes
`processing of outgoing calls;
`timing means for activating the blocking means in response to
`the mobile radiotelephony device being inactive during the
`normal operation of the mobile radiotelephony device for a
`defined period of time subsequent to a mounting of a linked
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`user identification module inside the mobile radiotelephony
`device; and
`deblocking means for permitting the normal operation of the
`mobile radiotelephony device in response to a supply of a
`deblocking code to the mobile radiotelephony device
`subsequent to the mounting of the linked user identification
`module
`inside
`the mobile radiotelephony device and
`subsequent to the defined period of time.
`Ex. 1001, 6:39–56.
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review for a petition filed on or after November 13,
`2018, the “[claims] of a patent … shall be construed using the same claim
`construction standard that would be used to construe the [claims] in a civil
`action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the [claims] in
`accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as
`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history
`pertaining to the patent.” Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for
`Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal
`Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.100(b) (2019)) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) effective November
`13, 2018); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed.
`Cir. 2005). Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and
`only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor
`Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed.
`Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795,
`803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
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`Petitioner notes that certain terms in the claims use the word “means,”
`thereby triggering a presumption that the terms invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112,
`sixth paragraph. Pet. 6–9. Petitioner also notes that construing means-
`plus-function limitations involves identifying structures disclosed in the
`Specification that correspond to the functions recited in the claims.
`Id. at 6 (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348–49
`(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)). Petitioner asserts that the functions recited in
`the claims require a special purpose computer, such that the Specification
`“must disclose corresponding structure in the form of an algorithm for
`performing the claimed function.” Id. (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at
`1352). Petitioner argues that the Specification “does not set forth an
`algorithm for performing the functions,” but “merely restates the
`functions recited in the claims.” Id. at 6–7. Petitioner explains that “for
`purposes of this proceeding, Petitioner assumes that Patent Owner will
`argue that the corresponding structure for the identified functions is
`software executed by a processor that performs the identified functions
`(or equivalents thereof) recited in the claims and described in [certain
`portions of the Specification identified by Petitioner].” Id. at 7.
`Patent Owner declines to adopt the position Petitioner “assume[d]”
`Patent Owner would. Prelim. Resp. 10. Instead, Patent Owner argues that
`Petitioner’s claim construction arguments unambiguously assert that the
`Specification does not contain any structure corresponding to the functions
`recited in the claims. Id. at 9–10. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s
`position prevents discerning adequately the basis of Petitioner’s challenges
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`under § 103. Id. at 10. Patent Owner argues that we should deny institution
`for these reasons. Id. at 9–12.
`For purposes of this decision, we do not find it necessary to construe
`expressly any claim term. Nor do we find it necessary to determine whether
`Petitioner’s claim construction arguments, by themselves, prove fatal to its
`Petition. We note, however, that if Petitioner is correct that the challenged
`claims contain means-plus-function limitations with no corresponding
`structure in the Specification, Patent Owner’s concerns about understanding
`the basis of Petitioner’s challenges under § 103 are valid. This raises
`concerns regarding whether it would be efficient to conduct an inter partes
`review based on Petitioner’s challenges under § 103.
`
`B. Discretion to Institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`The Director has discretion to institute an inter partes review under 35
`U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (stating
`“[t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted
`unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition .
`. . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
`prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition”
`(emphasis added)). In exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37
`C.F.R. § 42.108(a), we are mindful of the goals of the AIA—namely, to
`improve patent quality and make the patent system more efficient by the use
`of post-grant review procedures. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40
`(2011).
`Petitioner argues that certain considerations weigh in favor of
`exercising discretion to institute inter partes review. Pet. 77–78. Petitioner
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`explains that it presents alternative unpatentability grounds based on Nokia
`and Matsukida because “[t]he Matsukida-based grounds are presented in the
`unlikely event that the Board finds Nokia to not be a printed publication.”
`Id. at 77. Petitioner asserts that it would not prove unduly burdensome to
`evaluate the alternative grounds because of simplicity of the technology and
`similarity between the alternative grounds. Id.
`Additionally, Petitioner argues that it filed the Petition promptly and
`the district court proceeding is in its early stages. Id. at 77. Petitioner notes
`that it filed the Petition “within eight months of Uniloc’s re-filing of its
`lawsuit.” Id. Petitioner also explains that the schedule of the district court
`proceeding includes a claim construction hearing in December 2019 and jury
`selection beginning in July 2020. Id.
`Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion under
`§ 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review. Prelim. Resp. 3–7. In
`particular, Patent Owner argues that instituting would use Board resources
`inefficiently. Id. at 3. Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s
`characterizations of certain facts. Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s
`assertion that the district court proceeding is in its early stages. To the
`contrary, Patent Owner argues that the timing of the district court proceeding
`relative to this one closely matches the facts in NHK Spring Co., Ltd. v.
`Intri-plex Technologies, IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018)
`(precedential). Prelim. Resp. 4–5. Patent Owner notes, for example, that
`“jury selection at the start of trial before the district court is set for July 6,
`2020, which is . . . six months prior to conclusion of trial before the Board if
`one were instituted, as in NHK Spring.” Id. at 5. Patent Owner also notes
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`the district court schedule includes the claim construction hearing in
`December 2019, as well as the close of expert discovery in March of 2020.
`Additionally, Patent Owner argues that, like NHK Spring, “the same grounds
`proposed in the Petition are included in Petitioner’s invalidity contentions in
`the district court.” Id.
`Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s reliance on this Petition and
`the petition in IPR2019-01219 to challenge the same patent unduly burdens
`the Board and Patent Owner. Id. at 6. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s
`filing of multiple Petitions challenging the same patent also raises concerns
`about fairness, timing, and efficiency. Id. Patent Owner argues that the
`circumstances are not sufficiently rare to warrant filing two Petitions to
`challenge one patent. Id. at 7.
`We find Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the proper use of our
`discretion more persuasive than Petitioner’s. First, as discussed above in
`Section III.A, concerns about whether an inter partes review would be an
`efficient use of the Board’s resources arise from Petitioner’s position that the
`claims recite means-plus-function limitations for which there is no
`corresponding structure in the Specification.
`Second, Petitioner does not distinguish persuasively the facts here
`from the facts in our precedential decision NHK Spring. Pet. 77–78.
`Petitioner bases this assertion on its contention that it filed its Petition
`promptly and the district court proceeding is in its early stages. But
`Petitioner does not identify a significant distinction between the timing of
`the district court proceeding here and the facts in NHK Spring. Petitioner
`acknowledges that jury selection in the district court is scheduled for July 6,
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`2020 (Pet. 77), approximately six months before a trial in this proceeding
`would conclude. Petitioner does not explain, and it is not apparent, how this
`differs from the facts of NHK Spring, where the district court trial was set
`for approximately six months before a trial before the Board would have
`concluded. NHK Spring at 20. Additionally, and importantly, Petitioner
`does not attempt to identify a distinction between the unpatentability
`grounds presented in this proceeding and those presented in the district court
`proceeding, leaving undisputed Patent Owner’s assertion that “the same
`grounds proposed in the Petition are included in Petitioner’s invalidity
`contentions in the district court.” Prelim. Resp. 5. Thus, Petitioner does not
`distinguish the present case from NHK Spring, where “the same prior art and
`arguments” were asserted in the district court proceeding and the Board
`proceeding. NHK Spring at 20.
`In view of the foregoing, we determine that the circumstances present
`here, on the whole, weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny
`institution under § 314(a).
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`Taking account of the information presented in the Petition and the
`Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we exercise our
`discretion under § 314(a) and deny institution. Accordingly, the Petition is
`denied, and no trial is instituted.
`
`V. ORDER
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby
`ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.
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`PETITIONER:
`
`Naveen Modi
`Joseph Palys
`Phillip Citroen
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`josephpalys@paulhastings.com
`phillipcitroen@paulhastings.com
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Ryan Loveless
`Brett Mangrum
`James Etheridge
`Jeffrey Huang
`ETHERIDGE LAW GROUP
`ryan@etheridgelaw.com
`brett@etheridgelaw.com
`jim@etheridgelaw.com
`jeff@etheridgelaw.com
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