IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`Petitioner
`v.
`
`INVT SPE LLC,
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2019-00959
`U.S. Patent No. Patent 7,848,439 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`AND
`RESPONSE TO PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR JOINDER
`TO RELATED INTER PARTES REVIEW IPR2018-01581
`
`

`

`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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` I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
`APPLE’S FOLLOW-ON PETITION IS PRECLUDED BY THE
`GENERAL PLASTIC FACTORS. ................................................................ 3
`A.
`The General Plastic Factors Apply to This Petition and Require that
`It Be Denied. ........................................................................................ 4
`1.
`Factor 1: Apple previously filed a petition directed to the same
`claims of the same patent. ......................................................... 6
`Factor 2: At the time of its first filing, Apple knew of the prior
`art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it. 6
`Factor 3: Apple filed this instant petition to effectively cure
`deficiencies in its earlier-filed, denied petition, after HTC’s
`petition on the same patent on different grounds was instituted.
` ................................................................................................... 7
`Factors 4 and 5: Apple has not provided any explanation for
`the time elapsed between the filings of its multiple petitions
`directed to the same claims of the same patent. ........................ 9
`Factors 6 and 7: The Board should consider its finite resources
`and whether it can conclude trial within a year of institution in
`the exercising of its discretion to institute IPR. ......................11
`The Board Should Deny Apple’s Motion for Joinder Because it is
`Predicated Upon Apple’s Own Strategic Choices and Apple Has Not
`Articulated Any Prejudice it May Suffer in the Absence of a Joinder.
` ............................................................................................................12
`If this Board Grants Apple’s Motion for Joinder, it Should do so
`With the Limitations Identified by Petitioner in Its Motion, With
`Respect to its Role as an “Understudy” in the Joined Proceedings. ..15
`III. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................16
`
`
`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`

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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`On April 8, 2019, Petitioner Apple Inc. (“Apple”) filed a Motion for Joinder,
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`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) and 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.22 AND 42.122(b), seeking to
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`join its Petition for Inter Partes Review (“IPR”), IPR2019-00959 (the “Second
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`Apple Petition”) to another IPR proceeding, instituted following a successful
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`petition by HTC Corporation and HTC America, Inc. (collectively as “HTC”),
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`IPR2018-01581 (the “HTC IPR”).
`
`The HTC IPR, challenging claim 8 of U.S. Patent No. 7,848,439 B2 (“the
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`‘439 Patent”), was instituted on April 1, 2019 and was filed by HTC on August 22,
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`2018. Apple filed a similar Petition for inter partes review on August 21, 2018 (the
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`“First Apple Petition”), challenging claims 1-11 of the ‘439 Patent—notably,
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`including the same claim that is now the subject of Apple’s current petition, albeit
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`on different grounds. On March 7, 2019, this Board denied the First Apple
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`Petition.
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`Apple now seeks a second bite at the apple with its current follow-on
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`petition, which copies verbatim the substance of HTC’s Petition in the HTC IPR.
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`Apple should not be allowed to file another petition on grounds it knew, or had
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`reasons to know, and should have clearly asserted in its first petition. Allowing
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`Apple a second bite at the apple, after considerable delay, is clearly inconsistent
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`1
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`with this Board’s statutory mandate of securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive
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`resolution of every IPR proceeding. Specifically, Apple’s Petition should be denied
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`under the General Plastic factors, essentially rendering moot its Motion for
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`Joinder.
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`In the alternative, Apple’s Motion for Joinder should be denied on the merits
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`because its belated motion is the consequence of its own legal strategy and
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`questionable practice. Moreover, Apple has not identified any unfair prejudice it
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`will suffer in the absence of a joinder. By default, a denial of Apple’s Motion for
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`Joinder should also serve to preclude institution of the Second Apple Petition
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`under the present circumstances, pursuant to Section 315(b)’s one-year time bar.
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`The fact that Apple’s second petition must be denied under the one-year bar is not
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`prejudice.
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`Finally, should the Board allow both institution and joinder in this current
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`petition for IPR, it should strictly join the two IPR proceedings (this Petition and
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`the HTC IPR) with the precise limitations proposed in Petitioner’s motion and
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`further refined herein with respect to its role as an “understudy” in the joined
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`proceedings.
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`2
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`II. APPLE’S FOLLOW-ON PETITION IS PRECLUDED BY THE
`GENERAL PLASTIC FACTORS.
`The AIA gives the Director of the USPTO the authority to institute inter
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`partes review subject to certain conditions:
`
`The Director [of the USPTO] may not authorize an inter partes review to
`be instituted unless the Director determines that the information
`presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed
`under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
`petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged
`in the petition.
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (emphasis added). Section 314(a) does not require the Director
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`to institute an inter partes review. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d
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`1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to
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`institute an IPR proceeding.”) Rather, a decision whether to institute is within the
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`Director’s discretion, which the Director has delegated to the Board. See 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.4(a); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he
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`agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office's
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`discretion.”)
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`In General Plastic Industries Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, a
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`precedential decision, the Board denied a petition challenging a patent that was
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`previously challenged before the Board. In that decision, the Board articulated a
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`list of factors to be considered in evaluating whether to exercise discretion under
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`3
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Those factors are:
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`1. whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the
`same claims of the same patent;
`2. whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew of the
`prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it;
`3. whether at the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner already
`received the patent owner's preliminary response to the first petition or
`received the Board's decision on whether to institute review in the first
`petition;
`4. the length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned of
`the prior art asserted in the second petition and the filing of the second
`petition;
`5. whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for the time elapsed
`between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same claims of the
`same patent;
`6. the finite resources of the Board; and
`7. the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final
`determination not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director
`notices institution of review.
`Gen. Plastic, Case IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017) (Section
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`II.B.4.i designated as precedential on Oct. 17, 2017), slip op. at 16.
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`A. The General Plastic Factors Apply to this Petition and Require
`that it be Denied.
`Petitioner alleged that General Plastic does not apply to its current Petition.
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`Not only does Petitioner fail to cite to a single authority in support of that naked
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`assertion, but its arguments in support are wholly unpersuasive. Indeed, General
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`4
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`Plastic applies to follow-on petitions like this one, by the same Petitioner and
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`directed to the same claims of the same patent―this Board has not articulated any
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`exceptions applicable to Apple’s Petition in this regard. The General Plastic
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`factors “bear on the issue of whether the Board should invoke its discretion to deny
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`institution of an inter partes review, based on a follow-on petition on the same
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`patent, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” See Pfizer, Inc. v.
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`Genentech, Inc., Case IPR2018-00331, Paper 13 at 6 (P.T.A.B. July 9, 2018).
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`Apple’s petition is exactly the kind dealt with under General Plastic― a
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`petitioner’s second petition directed towards the same patent, and even more the
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`same claims.
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` In applying the General Plastic factors (see supra, at 3), the Board
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`“consider[s] not only the congressional intent that inter partes review proceedings
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`provide an effective and efficient alternative to district court litigation, but also the
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`potential for abuse of the review process through repeated attacks by the same
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`petitioner with respect to the same patent.” See Gen. Plastic, slip. op. at 18 n.14
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`(citing H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011) (“Allowing similar, serial
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`challenges to the same patent, by the same petitioner, risks harassment of patent
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`owners and frustration of Congress's intent in enacting the Leahy-Smith America
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`Invents Act.”)
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`5
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`1.
`
`Factor 1: Apple previously filed a petition directed to the
`same claims of the same patent.
`The First Apple Petition challenged claims 1-11 of the ‘439 Patent. The
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`Second Apple Petition now challenges claim 8 of the ‘439 Patent. Apple therefore
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`filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent. Accordingly, this
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`factor weighs heavily against institution. See BMW of North America, LLC, v.
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`Blitsafe Texas, LLC, Case IPR2018-00926, Paper No. 7 at 9 (P.T.A.B. October 19,
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`2018) (denying institution) (“Thus, we determine that because BMW was a
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`petitioner in a previous IPR, and because the challenged claims, particularly the
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`independent claims, overlap with that petition, General Plastic Factor 1 weighs
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`heavily against institution.”)
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`2.
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`Factor 2: At the time of its first filing, Apple knew of the
`prior art asserted in the second petition or should have
`known of it.
`While its Petition does not say one way or the other, Apple either knew, or
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`should have known of the prior art it now seeks to assert in this Petition. Apple
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`filed its first petition a day before HTC filed its petition asserting the prior art
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`references which Apple now seeks to rely on. Apple and HTC are co-defendants in
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`the litigation involving the ‘439 Patent. At the very least, a simple search and
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`reasonable diligence should have disclosed these references to Apple at the time of
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`its first filing. See Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Prods., Inc., Case IPR2019-
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`6
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`00062, Paper 13 at 11 (P.T.A.B. April 2, 2019).
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`Apple in its denied petition chose to assert obviousness over references from
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`Li, Walton, and Vijayan. The HTC’s petition also identified Li and Vijayan, in
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`addition to Hashem, and Cioffi. With reasonable diligence, Apple knew, or should
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`have known of Hashem and Cioffi, the two non-mutually exclusive U.S. patents in
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`the petitions.
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`The evidence in the record clearly suggests Apple chose not assert these
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`prior art references in the First Apple Petition, which now purport to serve the
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`basis for the Second Apple Petition, simply due to its own strategic considerations.
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`Accordingly, because Apple knew, or should have known about the prior art
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`references, this factor weighs heavily against institution.
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`3.
`
`Factor 3: Apple filed this instant petition to effectively cure
`deficiencies in its earlier-filed, denied petition, after HTC’s
`petition on the same patent on different grounds was
`instituted.
`The third General Plastic factor asks “whether at the time of filing of the
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`second petition the petitioner already received the patent owner's preliminary
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`response to the first petition or received the Board's decision on whether to institute
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`review in the first petition.” Gen. Plastic, slip op. at 16. The Board explained the
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`relevance of this factor in General Plastic in terms of unfair benefit to petitioners
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`from follow-on petitions:
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`7
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`[F]actor 3 is directed to Petitioner's potential benefit from receiving and
`having the opportunity to study Patent Owner's Preliminary Response,
`as well as our institution decisions on the first-filed petitions, prior to its
`filing of follow-on petitions. . . . Multiple, staggered petitions
`challenging the same patent and same claims raise the potential for
`abuse. The absence of any restrictions on follow-on petitions would
`allow petitioners the opportunity to strategically stage their prior art and
`arguments in multiple petitions, using our decisions as a roadmap . . . .
`All other factors aside, this is unfair to patent owners and is an
`inefficient use of the inter partes review process and other post-grant
`review processes.
`Id. at 17-18 (internal citation and footnote omitted).
`
`Apple filed this petition after having the benefit of Patent Owner 's
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`Preliminary Responses in the First Apple Petition and in the HTC IPR.
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`Furthermore, Apple now has the benefit of this Board’s institution decision in the
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`HTC IPR, issued over a month ago, on April 1, 2019.
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` Apple, not only used the responses and the Board’s decision as a roadmap,
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`it copied verbatim the substance of HTC’s Petition which led to successful
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`institution of the HTC IPR. This is precisely the kind of abuse of the inter partes
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`review process this Board sought to curtail with its decision in General Plastic. See
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`also Samsung Electronics Co. et al v. Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC, Case IPR2015-
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`00820, Paper 12 at 4 (P.T.A.B. May 15, 2015) (“This appears, instead, to be a case
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`where Petitioner seeks to use our Decision to Institute in IPR2014-01184 as a
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`guide to remedy deficiencies in the earlier filed petition, i.e., a ‘second bite at the
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`8
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`apple’ . . . Interpreting our rules to allow Petitioner another chance to argue the
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`unpatentability of the challenged claims would not lead to the just, speedy, and
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`inexpensive resolution of the proceedings.”) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, it
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`is unfair to Patent Owner for Apple to benefit from the earlier petitions and this
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`Board’s institution decision in the HTC IPR, to bring an essentially “bullet-proof,”
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`secure petition on the merits in this instance, effectively curing all earlier
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`deficiencies in its previous petition. It is also an inefficient use of the IPR process.
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`This factor weighs heavily against institution.
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`4.
`
`Factors 4 and 5: Apple has not provided any explanation
`for the time elapsed between the filings of its multiple
`petitions directed to the same claims of the same patent.
`The fourth General Plastic factor considers “the length of time that elapsed
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`between the time the petitioner learned of the prior art asserted in the second
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`petition and the filing of the second petition.” Gen. Plastic, slip op. at 16.
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`Similarly, the fifth General Plastic factor queries “whether the petitioner provides
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`adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions
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`directed to the same claims of the same patent.” Id.
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`As discussed above in discussion regarding Factor 2, the record establishes
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`that Petitioner should have been aware of all of the prior art references it now
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`asserts when it conducted its prior art search for the first petition. Additionally, at
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`9
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`the very least, Apple had actual notice of the prior art references with the HTC
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`filing on August 22, 2018, containing the exact substance of Petition’s current
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`petition. Thus, Apple knew of the references for close to eight (8) months before it
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`chose to file this Petition. See BMW of North America, LLC, Case IPR2018-00926,
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`Paper 7 at 12. (“Petitioner knew of Michmerhuizen [reference] several months
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`before filing this Petition, in April 2018. Petitioner does not provide any
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`explanation related to the timing of its Petition. If there was a reasonable
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`explanation for Petitioner's delay, Petitioner does not provide it.”)
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`Similarly here, Apple does not provide any explanation at all for its delay in
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`bringing this current Petition. Instead, it is apparent that Apple chose to wait until
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`the institution of HTC’s IPR on April 1, 2019, following the denial of its own
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`petition on March 7, 2019, to file this petition on April 8, 2019. This excessive
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`delay and questionable practice by Apple should not be encouraged. See Shenzen
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`Silver Star Technology Co., Ltd., v. Irobot Corp., Case IPR2018-00761, Paper No.
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`15 at 19 (P.T.A.B. September 5, 2018) (“But Petitioner waited to file its Petition
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`until after having ample time to consider and tailor its Petition in response to how
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`the Patent Owner responded to the earlier petition, and provides no curative
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`explanation for doing so. An analysis under the General Plastic factors should tend
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`to result in a denial of such petitions, because absent explanation, we have no other
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`10
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`conclusion to make but that the second petition was filed at the time it was filed
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`solely for the tactical reason of using the first petition as a test case.”) Absent
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`Apple’s explanation in this instance, this Board also has “no other conclusion to
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`make but that the [Apple’s] second petition was filed at the time it was filed solely
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`for the tactical reason of using the first petition [and the HTC IPR] as a test case.”
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`Id. Accordingly, this factor also weighs heavily against institution.
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`5.
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`Factors 6 and 7: The Board should consider its finite
`resources and whether it can conclude trial within a year of
`institution in the exercise of its discretion to institute IPR.
`At the very least, Factors 6 and 7 moderately weigh in favor of denial of this
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`IPR. Certainly, it is true that instituting a new proceeding, or adding another party
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`in the case of an ultimate joinder, seldom inherently screams greater efficiency or
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`fewer costs. Indeed, it more typically indicates the opposite.
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`Furthermore, and importantly, denial of this IPR would send a clear and
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`unambiguous message to petitioners that unreasonable delay and questionable
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`tactics in this sort of instance would not be tolerated, bolstering protection for
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`patent owners against unnecessary harassment. That, in turn, would translate into
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`significant future reductions in costs and fees for similarly situated patent owners.
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`Patent Owner has incurred costs and is prejudiced by having to answer this motion.
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`Apple should not be allowed to stand on the sideline and join another party’s
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`11
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`petition, on prior art and claims which were available to Apple at the time of its
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`own petition, much to the prejudice of Patent Owner. This is an improper and
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`belated attempt by Apple to remedy the deficiencies in its first filed petition. See
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`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Case IPR2015-00820, Paper 12 at 4. (“This
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`appears, instead, to be a case where Petitioner seeks to use our Decision to Institute
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`in IPR2014-01184 as a guide to remedy deficiencies in the earlier filed petition,
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`i.e., a ‘second bite at the apple’ . . . Interpreting our rules to allow Petitioner
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`another chance to argue the unpatentability of the challenged claims would not
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`lead to the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of the proceedings.”) (internal
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`citations omitted).
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`All seven General Plastic factors weigh in favor of denial of institution in
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`the current matter, with five of the seven weighing heavily against institution.
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`Accordingly, this Board should deny Apple’s Petition for inter partes review.
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`B.
`
`The Board Should Deny Apple’s Motion for Joinder Because it is
`Predicated Upon Apple’s Own Strategic Choices and Apple Has
`Not Articulated Any Prejudice it May Suffer in the Absence of a
`Joinder.
`An inter partes review may be joined with another inter partes review,
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`subject to the provisions 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), which governs joinder of inter partes
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`review proceedings:
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`(c) JOINDER. -- If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes
`review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that
`the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or
`the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants
`the institution an inter partes review under section 314.
`Pfizer, Case IPR2018-00331, Paper 13 at 10.
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`Section 315(b) of the statute generally bars institution of inter partes review
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`when the petition is filed more than one year after the petitioner (or petitioner’s
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`real party in interest or privy) is served with a complaint alleging infringement of
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`the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b). That one-year time bar,
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`however, does not apply to a request for joinder. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (final
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`sentence); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). This is an important consideration here
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`because Petitioner was served with a complaint asserting infringement of the ‘439
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`patent more than one year before filing the Petition in this proceeding. Thus, absent
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`joinder of this proceeding to the HTC IPR (IPR2018-01581), institution of the
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`current Petition is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
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`Generally, joinder may be authorized when warranted, but the decision to
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`grant joinder is discretionary. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). As
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`indicated in the legislative history, the Board will determine whether to grant
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`joinder on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular facts of each
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`case. See 157 Cong. Rec. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`(when determining whether and when to allow joinder, the Office may consider
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`factors including the breadth or unusualness of the claim scope, claim construction
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`issues, and consent of the patent owner). “When exercising that discretion, the
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`Board is mindful that patent trial regulations, including the rules for joinder, must
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`be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every
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`proceeding.” See Atoptech, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., Case IPR2015-00760, Paper 14
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`at 6 (P.T.A.B. July 21, 2015) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).)
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`Neither Patent Owner nor Petitioner in the HTC IPR has consented to
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`Apple’s Joinder. Furthermore, here, because Apple’s motion for joinder is needed
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`solely to effectively cure its mistake in the first Petition, and not the least informed
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`by considerations of fairness or justice, this Board should deny it.
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`This is not “a case of changed circumstances--such as new claims being
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`asserted during district court litigation or new threats of infringement-that would
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`make joinder an equitable remedy.” Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Case IPR2015-
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`00820, Paper 12 at 4 (denying joinder on that basis) (“Based on the foregoing, we
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`are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that joinder is appropriate.”)
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`(citing to Micro Motion, Inc. v. Invensys Sys., Inc., Case IPR2014-01409, slip op.
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`at 14 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 18, 2015) (Paper 14); Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
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`Case IPR2013-00109, slip op. at 3, 5 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2014) (Paper 15)). Instead,
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`14
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`it is a case informed by strategic considerations made by the Petitioner and a
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`prejudice, if any, created on its own. Apple has not identified any facts or
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`arguments showing any prejudice or unfairness towards it, should this Board deny
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`its request for joinder.
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`This Board has denied joinder under similar circumstances and should do so
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`here.1 See Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Case IPR2015-00820, Paper 12 at 4
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`(denying joinder).
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`C.
`
`If this Board Grants Apple’s Motion for Joinder, it Should do so
`With the Limitations Identified by Petitioner in Its Motion, With
`Respect to its Role as an “Understudy” in the Joined Proceedings.
`The Board should not grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder for the reasons
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`outlined above. However, should it decide to grant Petitioner’s motion (which it
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`should not), it should do so with the specific limitations Apple has identified in its
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`motion with respect to its role as an “understudy” in the joined proceedings. In
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`addition, with respect to Apple’s proposal that it be permitted to file separate
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`filings as to matters that solely concern itself, and not HTC, Apple should be
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`required to seek permission from the Board first before making any such filings.
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`
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`1 The denial of Apple’s Motion for Joinder automatically forecloses any institution
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`whatever the basis due to application of one-year time bar.
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`15
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`III. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner respectfully requests that Apple’s
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`Petition for Institution and its Motion for Joinder be denied.
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`
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`Dated: May 8, 2019
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/Cyrus A. Morton/
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`Cyrus A. Morton
`Reg. No. 44,954
`Robins Kaplan LLP
`2800 LaSalle Plaza
`800 LaSalle Avenue
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`CERTIFICATION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(D)
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`I certify that the foregoing complies with the type-volume limitation of
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.24 and contains 3,573 words based on the word count indicated by
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`the word-processing system used to prepare the paper, and excluding those
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`portions exempted by § 42.24(a).
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`Dated: May 8, 2019
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`Respectfully submitted,
`/Cyrus A. Morton/
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`Cyrus A. Morton
`Reg. No. 44,954
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`Attorney for Patent Owner
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`17
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`IPR2019-00959
`Patent 7,848,439 B2
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e)(4), the undersigned certifies that on May 8,
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`2019, a copy of PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE and PATENT
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`OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR JOINDER was
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`served in its entirety by electronic mail on Petitioners' counsel at the following
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`address indicated in their Mandatory Notices:
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`LegalTm-HTC-INVT-IPRs@sheppardmullin.com
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`Dated: May 8, 2019
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`Respectfully submitted,
`/Cyrus A. Morton/
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`Cyrus A. Morton
`Reg. No. 44,954
`Robins Kaplan LLP
`2800 LaSalle Plaza
`800 LaSalle Avenue
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
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`Attorney for Patent Owner
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`18
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