Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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` Paper No. 15
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` Entered: October 9, 2019
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`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`
`FACEBOOK, INC., INSTAGRAM, LLC, and WHATSAPP INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`BLACKBERRY LIMITED,
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case IPR2019-00924
`Patent 8,209,634 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, GREGG I. ANDERSON, and
`ROBERT L. KINDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Paper No. 15
`
` Entered: October 9, 2019
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`
`FACEBOOK, INC., INSTAGRAM, LLC, and WHATSAPP INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`BLACKBERRY LIMITED,
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case IPR2019-00924
`Patent 8,209,634 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, GREGG I. ANDERSON, and
`ROBERT L. KINDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2019-00924
`Patent 8,209,634 B2
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`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Facebook, Inc., Instagram, LLC, and WhatsApp Inc., “Petitioner,” filed
`a Petition requesting inter partes review of claims 1, 4−7, 10−13, and 16−18
`of U.S. Patent No. 8,209,634 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’634 patent”). Paper 1
`(“Pet.”). Blackberry Limited (“Patent Owner”), filed a Preliminary
`Response. Paper 10 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With the Board’s authorization,
`Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 12 (“Reply”)), and Patent Owner filed a Sur-
`reply (Paper 14 (“Sur-reply”)).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon considering the
`record developed thus far, for reasons discussed below, we deny the petition
`and do not institute inter partes review.
`
`A. Related Matters
`The parties indicate that the ’634 patent was asserted in BlackBerry
`Limited v. Facebook, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01844-GW-KS (C.D. Cal.). Pet. 1;
`Paper 4.
`Petitioner filed a concurrent inter partes review proceeding, Case
`IPR2019-00925, also involving the ’634 patent.
`
`B. The ’634 Patent
`The ’634 patent relates to graphical user interfaces (“GUIs”) for
`controlling wireless communication devices. Ex. 1001, 1:12–14. The ’634
`patent discloses the challenge of representing multiple services and functions
`to a user on a wireless handheld devices. Id. at 1:32−35. In particular, the
`devices include a GUI with a main or home screen and sub-screens that are
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`navigated through the main screen. Id. at 1:41−43. However, to indicate the
`receipt of a new instant message (“IM”), electronic mail (“e-mail”), or other
`service event, the device uses notification icons “often rendered on a major
`portion of the main screen.” Id. at 1:43−52. To check the new IM or e-mail,
`the user is required to check each application separately, via the activation
`icon, which is inconvenient. Id. at 1:60−65. “[T]here is a demand to have
`information made available to a user quicker than previously available in
`order to optimize the control of the wireless device.” Id. at 1:65−67.
`The ’634 patent, thus, discloses a personal information manager
`(“PIM”) for organizing and managing data items relating to IM, e-mail,
`calendar events, voice mails, appointments, and task items. Id. at 6:10−15.
`To provide a “user-friendly environment” to control the operation of the
`device, the PIM provides a GUI with a main screen displaying icons for
`various software applications. Id. at 7:26−41. In response to a new event
`from an application, the icon associated with that application is visually
`modified to “provide an immediate notification of the event via a change” in
`the main screen. Id. at 7:59−63.
`Figure 4, reproduced below, illustrates the main screen after a new IM
`message has arrived into one of the IM applications. Id. at 8:1−4.
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`FIG. 4 is an illustration of the main screen of FIG. 3 after a new event.
`Ex. 1001, 3:19−20.
`
`In Figure 4 a new received text massage via application “IM 2” is
`indicated with visual modification 400, such as a bubble, and the number
`“1,” which represents the count of the new event. Id. at 8:4−8. The
`’634 patent states that “[p]ersons of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate
`that a visual modification 400 different from a bubble may be used and the
`count may represent other information, such as the number of
`correspondents or ‘buddies’ from which one or more messages have been
`received but remain unread.” Id. at 8:8−13.
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`C. Illustrative Claim
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 7, and 13 are independent. Each
`of challenged claims 4−6, 10−12, and 16−18 depends directly or indirectly
`from claims 1, 7, and 13.
`Claim 1 is illustrative:
`1. A method of providing notifications of unread messages
`on a wireless communication device, comprising:
`displaying at least one icon relating to electronic messaging
`on a graphical user
`interface of
`the wireless
`communication device;
`receiving a plurality of electronic messages on the wireless
`communication device,
`the plurality of electronic
`messages including messages from a plurality of
`different messaging correspondents; and
`in response to receiving at least one of the plurality of
`electronic messages, visually modifying at least one
`displayed icon relating
`to electronic messaging to
`include a numeric character representing a count of the
`plurality of different messaging correspondents for
`which one or more of the electronic messages have been
`received and remain unread.
`Ex. 1001, 19:30–46; 20:11–36.
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`D. Asserted Prior Art and Grounds of Unpatentability
`This proceeding relies on the following prior art references:
`
`a) Ording: U.S. Patent No. 7,434,177 B1, issued Oct. 7, 2008, filed
`as Exhibit 1003;
`
`b) Canfield: U.S. Patent No. 7,281,215 B1, issued Oct. 9, 2007, filed
`as Exhibit 1004;
`
`c) Schwartz: “The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Online Dating and
`Relating,” (1999), filed as Exhibit 1005;
`
`d) Strom: David Strom, Three New Wireless E-Mail Devices,
`Computerworld, Nov. 8, 1999, filed as Exhibit 1015; and
`
`e) McPherson: Frank McPherson, How to do Everything With Your
`Pocket PC (2d ed. 2002), filed as Exhibit 1012.
`
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 4):
`
`Claims
`Challenged
`1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11,
`13, 16, and 17
`
`6, 12, and 18
`
`1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11,
`13, 16, and 17
`
`6, 12, and 18
`
`Statutory Basis
`
`References
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Ording, Canfield, and Schwartz
`
`Ording, Canfield, Schwartz, and
`McPherson
`Ording, Canfield, Schwartz, and
`Strom
`Ording, Canfield, Schwartz,
`McPherson, and Strom
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
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`Petitioner also relies on a Declaration of Sandeep Chatterjee, Ph.D.,
`filed as Exhibit 1002 (“Chatterjee Declaration”).
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review for a petition filed on or after November 13,
`2018, a claim “shall be construed using the same claim construction standard
`that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C.
`282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2018); see Changes to the Claim
`Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before
`the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018)
`(amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) effective November 13, 2018). In
`applying this claim construction standard, we are guided by the principle
`that the words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary
`meaning,” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question
`at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`1312−13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). “In determining the
`meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic
`evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written
`description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc.
`v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
`(citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). There is a “heavy presumption,”
`however, that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. CCS
`Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
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`(citation omitted).
`Petitioner addresses the construction of three phrases:
`(1) wireless communication device;
`(2) messaging correspondent; and
`(3) a numeric character representing a count of the plurality of
`different message correspondents for which one or more of the
`electronic messages have been received and remain unread.
`Pet. 8−11. Patent Owner points out that in the pending litigation, the District
`Court has construed some of these claim terms. Prelim. Resp. 9−10
`(referring to Exhibit 2002). We have considered the claim construction
`analysis and ruling of the District Court, and agree that for purposes of
`institution, those constructions are reasonable. Thus, we adopt the
`following:
`Claim Term or Phrase
`wireless communication device
`
`messaging correspondent
`
`a numeric character representing a
`count of the plurality of different
`
`Preliminary Claim Construction
`No construction is necessary,
`clarifying that the term does not
`require a “small-screen” device.
`Ex. 2002, 20−21; Prelim. Resp. 10.
`Distinct sender of an electronic
`message. Ex. 2002, 24−25; Prelim.
`Resp. 11.
`A numeric character representing
`the number of different messaging
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`messaging correspondents for which
`one or more of the electronic
`messages have been received and
`remain unread
`
`correspondents for one or more of
`the plurality of electronic messages
`that have been received and remain
`unread. Ex. 2002, 27; Prelim. Resp.
`11−12.
`
`
`No other claim terms are in dispute. Thus, we do not expressly
`construe any other term. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad
`Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc.
`v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those
`terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent
`necessary to resolve the controversy.”).
`
`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors
`may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art;
`prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are
`made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active
`workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
`(internal quotation and citation omitted). In that regard, Petitioner proffers
`that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a
`bachelor’s degree in software engineering, computer science, computer
`engineering, or electrical engineering with at least two years of experience in
`software application development, including development of graphical
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`applications on wireless devices, such as development of associated user
`interface features and functionality (or equivalent degree or experience).”
`Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 12−15). Patent Owner, through the testimony
`of Rajeev Surati, Ph.D., proffers a similar level of education and experience,
`except for adding that the two years of experience may involve either work
`or research experience in the fields of “computer hardware, networking,
`and/or user experience design, or an equivalent subject matter, sufficient to
`understand fundamental computer networking and hardware architecture and
`user-interface design.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 24.
`Although we are confronted with very similar proposals from both
`parties, neither party argues that the obviousness determination hinges on a
`particular level of ordinary skill. Accordingly, we do not find it necessary to
`define the level of skill with specificity save to note that the level of ordinary
`skill is evidenced by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261
`F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the absence of specific
`findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error
`where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for
`testimony is not shown).
`
`C. Obviousness over the Combination of Ording and Canfield
`All the grounds presented in the Petition rely on the combination of
`teachings from Ording and Canfield. Pet. 4. Because our determination
`whether to institute is decided by Petitioner’s reliance of the Canfield
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`reference, we focus our analysis on the information presented by Petitioner
`and Patent Owner regarding Canfield.
`
`1. Overview of Canfield (1004)
`Canfield is entitled “IM Conversation Counter and Indicator.”
`Ex. 1004, (54). Canfield describes that user interfaces (“UIs”) facilitate
`access to information and services by users navigating resources in an online
`service. Id. at 1:16−19. Icons, windows, and menus in a UI “must be
`arranged to enable a user to locate preferred information and services
`quickly and easily.” Id. at 1:26−28. Thus, Canfield provides an IM
`conversation counter and indicator for a tabbed IM user interface. Id. at
`2:45−48. The conversation counter “inform[s] the user of information
`relating to the concurrent IM sessions, such as the total number of
`concurrent IM sessions, the number of new IM sessions, and the number of
`ongoing IM sessions having a new IM message waiting to be viewed.” Id. at
`2:61−66; see also 9:29−33. According to Canfield “[a] new IM session (i.e.,
`a new conversation) may be flagged differently from an ongoing IM session
`with a new message.” Id. at 3:12−14.
`Figure 7, reproduced below, illustrates one example of a tabbed IM
`user interface, such as that presented to a user of an IM service provided by
`America Online Instant Messenger. Id. at 8:43−46; 10:18−20.
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`Figure 7 illustrates an example of a graphical user interface, presented to a
`user of an IM service provider, and includes annotations to highlight
`conversation counter 650. Ex. 1004, 2:35−37.
`The UI shown in Figure 7 depicts conversation counter 650
`(highlighted in yellow and enclosed in red box). “The information provided
`to the user by the conversation counter 650 indicates that there are eight (8)
`total concurrent IM sessions, no new IM sessions (by omission), and three
`(3) ongoing IM session[s] having a new IM message waiting to be viewed.”
`Id. at 10:57:61.
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`2. Reasonable Likelihood Determination
`Independent claims 1, 7, and 13 recite “a numeric character
`representing a count of the plurality of different messaging correspondents
`for which one or more of the electronic messages have been received and
`remain unread.” Under the claim construction discussed supra, Section
`II.A., this claim language means “the number of different messaging
`correspondents for one or more of the plurality of electronic messages that
`have been received and remain unread.” Petitioner relies on Canfield as
`teaching this limitation. Pet. 38−41. According to Petitioner, Canfield
`determines the number of IM sessions that contain new or unread messages.
`Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:53−62). The claim language requires, however,
`that the number “represent” a count of the plurality of different messaging
`correspondents. The number of IM sessions with a new message does not
`“represent” the number of different messaging correspondents.
`Nevertheless, Petitioner argues that “[t]he number of [] IM sessions
`with [the] new messages, therefore, would represent a count of the number
`of messaging correspondents” as required by the claims, because the IM
`sessions shown in Canfield “represent one-to-one conversations.” Id. at
`39−40 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 96). In other words, Canfield does not describe the
`conversation counter as “representing” the number of different messaging
`correspondents from which a received message remains unread. Rather,
`Canfield’s conversation counter, although focused on IM sessions, would
`also coincide with the number of messaging correspondents (read here
`senders of IMs).
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`Patent Owner responds that the distinction between “sessions” (or
`conversations) and “senders” is not insignificant. Prelim. Resp. 34−35. The
`’634 patent describes messaging correspondents as “buddies,” which
`according to Patent Owner, are distinct from the IM sessions they would
`participate in. Id. Thus, according to Patent Owner, a “session” and
`“messaging correspondents” are different things and mean different things to
`a user. Id. at 35−36. But because Petitioner has relied on expert testimony
`to bridge the gap between these differences, Patent Owner argues that such
`leap of logic is unsupported and that notwithstanding the testimony, the
`number of “sessions” does not disclose the required “count” of messaging
`correspondents. Id.
`We agree with Patent Owner that Canfield’s “sessions” do not teach
`the recited “messaging correspondents.” Canfield describes typical instant
`messaging in which an IM between two users comprises a conversation or
`an IM session. Ex. 1004, 3:54−58, 3:12−14. The user sending the IM, or
`sender, is the “messaging correspondent,” according to Petitioner. As stated
`above, Canfield does not report the number of senders from which messages
`remain unread. Canfield reports on the user interface the number of sessions
`with pending unread messages. Id. at 9:33−37. Only in situations when the
`session is between two users (one-to-one conversation) does Canfield’s
`number of sessions with unread messages coincide with the number of
`senders whose messages remain unread. But Canfield is not limited to
`sessions between two users. Canfield expressly describes that a user can
`participate in group chat rooms. Id. at 6:39. Canfield is silent as to how the
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`“sessions” corresponding to group chats would be identified in the IM user
`interface. Canfield is also silent as to whether the group chats would be
`reported in a separate user interface, such that group chats would not alter
`the conversation counter of the IM sessions.
`Furthermore, merely asserting this coincidence does not amount to
`Canfield teaching the limitation. The claim requires the “numeric character
`representing a count” of the “different messaging correspondents.” The
`Specification uses the word “represent” in the sense that the displayed object
`is an expression that stands for something specific. For instance, the
`Specification states that “[i]ndividual applications are each represented by an
`application icon on a screen,” “each icon is represented as a circle,”
`“numeric indicator ‘1’ representing a count of new events,” and “the count
`may represent other information.” Ex. 1001, 3:37−38, 7:52, 8:7−8, 8:10−11;
`see also id. 8:21−24 (explaining that in the case of e-mail messages “a count
`may be of unread e-mail messages or distinct senders of unread e-mail.”).
`Each of these objects stands for something specific. Each icon presents the
`graphical means to identify and access a specific application. Likewise, the
`numeric character presents the graphical means to identify the particular
`event. The numeric character in Canfield does not “represent” the number
`of senders; it displays a different event altogether: number of sessions.
`Thus, even when the sessions are one-on-one conversations, the numeric
`character in Canfield’s conversation counter represents “sessions,” not
`number of senders from which there is an unread message.
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`Petitioner further presents an additional contention that relies on
`Schwartz to modify Canfield “to always limit IM sessions to only one other
`user.” Pet. 40. By limiting all IM sessions to a one-to-one conversation,
`Petitioner contends Schwartz teachings would result in Canfield
`“guaranteeing that the number of IM sessions with new messages always
`represents the number of distinct senders who sent unread messages.” Id. at
`40−41 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 98). We are not persuaded that this cures the
`deficiency we have noted above regarding Canfield. Indeed, we view this
`position as evidence of hindsight because Petitioner’s reliance on Schwartz
`to limit Canfield in the manner asserted is prompted by knowledge of the
`claim requirements.
`Our review of Schwartz instead shows no reason to modify Canfield
`in the manner asserted. Schwartz, entitled “The Complete Idiot’s Guide to
`Online Dating and Relating,” states that one online dating service, Odigo,
`does not provide “group chat capability” because it provides other ways to
`make connections such as search and user-tracking facilities. Ex. 1005,
`174.1 In other words, Odigo provides for other ways to “bump into other
`Odigo users” while exploring Web sites. Id. The lack of group chats in
`Odigo is contrasted by Gooey, the second program that Schwartz describes
`as providing for interaction with other Web surfers, just like in Odigo. Id. at
`172. Gooey allows group chats. Id. Thus, the choice of one-on-one versus
`group chatting functionality depends on the design of the social platform and
`
`
`1 The page numbers reflect pagination of the original source.
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`both seem to be viable alternatives to connect with other users. But why
`would a person of ordinary skill in the art modify Canfield to allow only
`one-on-one IMs when Canfield is configured to allow also group chatting?
`Petitioner asserts that Schwartz provides express motivation, and that a
`desire for privacy would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art
`to modify Canfield to restrict all IMs to one-on-one communications.
`Pet. 48 (citing 1002 ¶¶ 116, 118). Petitioner also states that it would have
`been “obvious to try.” Id. at 48−49.
`We are not persuaded by any of the presented rationales for three
`reasons. First, Schwartz does not provide any express motivation. Schwartz
`merely reports on the functions available in Gooey (group chat enabled) and
`Odigo (no group chat availability). It does not state that the one-on-one
`electronic instant message is preferable, as Petitioner argues. See Pet. 48
`(“Schwartz provides an express motivation by acknowledging situations in
`which one-on-one electronic instant messaging or chat is preferable over
`group communications.”). On this point, we accord no weight to the
`Chatterjee Declaration which repeats verbatim this alleged express
`motivation. Ex. 1002 ¶ 116.
`Second, as Patent Owner notes, Canfield provides both one-on-one
`and group chat capabilities. Prelim. Resp. 45−46. Petitioner’s reliance on
`Schwartz results in removing from Canfield the group chat capability under
`the guise that privacy would make such a restriction desirable. But Canfield
`already protects privacy of a conversation because Canfield provides one-
`on-one IM capability. Id. at 46−47 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 56−57). In other
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`words, a Canfield user desiring privacy already has the choice to chat with a
`single user. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 56−57. Removing the group chat in Canfield does
`not improve or otherwise remedy a desire for privacy.
`Third, the “obvious to try” rationale is not applicable to the alleged
`modification of Canfield. In an “obvious to try” analysis: “The evaluation
`of the choices made by a skilled scientist, when such choices lead to the
`desired result, is a challenge to judicial understanding of how technical
`advance is achieved in the particular field of science or technology.” Abbott
`Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Faced with the
`options of group chat and one-on-one communications, Petitioner proffers as
`a reason to combine the mere choosing of one-on-one communication over
`the group chat option. Pet. 48–49 (providing a single sentence as its
`explanation “[a]dapting Canfield in this manner would also have been
`obvious to try because, as Schwartz confirms, whether or not to allow group
`messaging was a choice among known and predictable alternatives”).
`However, Petitioner’s analysis omits the consideration of another choice, to
`allow for both types of communication, which is what Canfield does.
`Petitioner states no persuasive reason for a person of ordinary skill in the art
`to “try” each of the options taught in Schwartz, and end up removing from
`Canfield the group chat functionality. Petitioner attempts to paint Schwartz
`as an all or nothing teaching—whereas providing the option of one-on-one
`conversations somehow would exclude the availability of group chats.
`Canfield teaches otherwise—a design that can incorporate both options.
`Thus, when evaluating the choices available to a skilled artisan, we are not
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`persuaded that the technical result of removing the group chat feature would
`be a “technical advance” in the particular field. See id.
`In any event, Petitioner relies on Schwartz to modify Canfield in such
`a way that renders the number of “sessions” coextensive with a number of
`“messaging correspondents.” Even if Petitioner’s contention regarding
`Schwartz had merit, the result is still a conversation counter that reports the
`number of “sessions” not the number of “messaging correspondents”
`notwithstanding that the numbers may be the same. The claim requires that
`the displayed number “represent” the count of different messaging
`correspondents. Canfield’s teachings are that it informs the user of the status
`of the “sessions.” Schwartz and Petitioner’s arguments do not change that
`fact.
`
`3. Conclusion
`We conclude that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of
`prevailing in its contention that Canfield teaches the limitations recited in
`claims 1, 7, and 13 as asserted by Petitioner. None of the other asserted
`references cure the deficiencies noted above. Accordingly, we determine
`that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with
`respect to at least 1 claim on the grounds asserted.2
`
`
`
`2 Patent Owner requests that we exercise discretion to deny the Petition
`under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Prelim. Resp. 24−32. Because we deny on the
`merits, we need not address this argument.
`19
`
`
`
`IPR2019-00924
`Patent 8,209,634 B2
`
`
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not
`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertions that the
`challenged claims would have been unpatentable under the asserted grounds.
`
`IV. ORDER
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
`ORDERED that the Petition is denied.
`
`
`
`20
`
`
`
`IPR2019-00924
`Patent 8,209,634 B2
`
`
`For PETITIONER:
`
`Heidi Keefe
`Andrew Mace
`COOLEY LLP
`hkeefe@cooley.com
`amace@cooley.com
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`
`Michael Hawkins
`Nicholas Stephens
`Kenneth Darby
`Craig Deutsch
`Kim Leung
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`hawkins@fr.com
`nstephens@fr.com
`kdarby@fr.com
`deutsch@fr.com
`leung@fr.com
`
`Ognjen Zivojnovic
`Sam Stake
`James Glass
`QUINN EMANUEL URQHART, & SULLIVAN, LLP
`ogizivojnovic@quinnemanuel.com
`samstake@quinnemanuel.com
`jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`
`
`
`21
`
`
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