4/14/2019
`
`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`
`Chaffing and Winnowing: Confidentiality without Encryption
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Ronald L. Rivest
`MIT Lab for Computer Science
`March 18, 1998 (rev. July 1, 1998)
`http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/chaffing.txt
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` A
`
` major goal of security techniques is ``confidentiality''---ensuring that
`adversaries gain no intelligence from a transmitted message. There are
`two major techniques for achieving confidentiality:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
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`
`
`
`
`This paper introduces a new technique, which we call ``chaffing and
`winnowing''---to winnow is to ``separate out or eliminate (the poor
`or useless parts),'' (Webster's Dictionary), and is often used when
`referring to the process of separating grain from chaff.
`
`Novel techniques for confidentiality are interesting in part because
`of the current debate about cryptographic policy as to whether law
`enforcement should be given when authorized surreptitious access to
`the plaintext of encrypted messages. The usual technique proposed for
`such access is ``key recovery,'' where law enforcement has a ``back
`door'' that enables them to recover the decryption key.
`
`Winnowing does not employ encryption, and so does not have a
```decryption key.'' Thus, the usual arguments in favor of ``key
`recovery'' don't apply very well for winnowing. As usual, the policy
`debate about regulating technology ends up being obsoleted by
`technological innovations. Trying to regulate confidentiality by
`regulating encryption closes one door and leaves two open
`(steganography and winnowing).
`
`We now explain how a confidentiality system based on winnowing works.
`There are two parts to sending a message: authenticating (adding
`MACs), and adding chaff. The recipient removes the chaff to obtain
`the original message.
`
`The sender breaks the message into packets, and authenticates each
`packet using a secret authentication key. That is, the sender appends
`to each packet a ``message authentication code'' or ``MAC'' computed
`as a function of the packet contents and the secret authentication
`key, using some standard MAC algorithm, such as HMAC-SHA1 (see
`Krawczyk et al. (1997)). We have the transformation of appending a
`MAC thus:
`
`
`
`
`-- Steganography: the art of hiding a secret message within a
`
`larger one in such a way that the adversary can not
`
`discern the presence or contents of the hidden message.
`
`For example, a message might be hidden within a picture
`
`by changing the low-order pixel bits to be the message bits.
`
`(See Wayner (1996) for more information on steganography.)
`
`-- Encryption: transforming the message to a ciphertext such that
`
`an adversary who overhears the ciphertext can not determine
`
`the message sent. The legitimate receiver possesses a secret
`
`decryption key that allows him to reverse the encryption
`
`transformation and retrieve the message. The sender may have
`
`used the same key to encrypt the message (with symmetric
`
`encryption schemes) or used a different, but related key
`
`(with public-key schemes). DES and RSA are familiar
`
`examples of encryption schemes.
`
`packet --> packet, MAC
`
`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`
`1/8
`
`Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC
`IPR2019-00879 (US 9,059,969)
`Exhibit 2018
`
`

`

`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`4/14/2019
`The packet is still ``in the clear''; no encryption has been
`performed. We note that software that merely authenticates messages
`by adding MACs is automatically approved for export, as it is deemed
`not to encrypt.
`
`There is a secret key shared by the sender and the receiver to
`authenticate the origin and contents of each packet---the legitimate
`receiver, knowing the secret authentication key, can determine that a
`packet is authentic by recomputing the MAC and comparing it to the
`received MAC. If the comparison fails, the packet and its MAC are
`automatically discarded. The sender and the receiver can initially
`create and agree upon the secret authentication key with any standard
`technique, such as authenticated Diffie-Hellman.
`
`We note that it is typical for each packet to contain a serial number
`as well. For example, when a long file is transmitted it is broken up
`into smaller packets, and each packet carries a unique serial number.
`The serial numbers help the receiver to remove duplicate packets,
`identify missing packets, and to correctly order the received packets
`when reassembling the file. The MAC for a packet is computed as a
`function of the serial number of the packet as well as of the packet
`contents and the secret authentication key. As an example, we might
`have a sequence of the form:
`
`(1,Hi Bob,465231)
`
`(2,Meet me at,782290)
`
`(3,7PM,344287)
`
`(4,Love-Alice,312265)
`of triples of sequence number, message, and MAC.
`
`The second process involved in sending a message is ``adding chaff'':
`adding fake packets with bogus MACs. The chaff packets have the
`correct overall format, have reasonable serial numbers and reasonable
`message contents, but have MACs that are not valid. The chaff packets
`may be randomly intermingled with the good (wheat) packets to form the
`transmitted packet sequence. Extending the preceding example, chaff
`packets might make the received sequence look like:
`
`(1,Hi Larry,532105)
`
`(1,Hi Bob,465231)
`
`(2,Meet me at,782290)
`
`(2,I'll call you at,793122)
`
`(3,6PM,891231)
`
`(3,7PM,344287)
`
`(4,Yours-Susan,553419)
`
`(4,Love-Alice,312265)
`In this case, for each serial number, one packet is good (wheat) and
`one is bad (chaff). Instead of randomly intermingling the chaff with
`the wheat, the packets can also be output in sorted order, sorting
`first by serial number, and then by message contents.
`
`To obtain the correct message, the receiver merely discards all of the
`chaff packets, and retains the wheat packets. But this is what the
`receiver does anyway! In a a typical packet-based communication
`system the receiver will automatically discard all packets with bad
`MACs. So the ``winnowing'' process is a normal part of such a system.
`(Receiving a packet with a bad MAC could conceivably trigger more of a
`response from the receiver, but not normally; the detection of a
`missing packet is determined at a different level of the protocol
`stack, rather than upon receipt of a bad packet, since the packet may
`have been transmitted more than once and been received OK already.)
`
`Let us verb a word, and let ``chaffing'' mean the process of adding
`chaff to a sequence of packets. As above, ``winnowing'' is the (usual)
`process of discarding all packets with bad MACs. We call the good
`packets ``wheat'' for consistency of metaphor.
`
`
`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`
`2/8
`
`Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC
`IPR2019-00879 (US 9,059,969)
`Exhibit 2018
`
`

`

`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`4/14/2019
`How much confidentiality does chaffing provide? This depends on the
`MAC algorithm, on how the original message is broken into packets, and
`on how the chaffing is done.
`
` A
`
` typical MAC algorithm (such as HMAC-SHA1) will appear to act like a
```random function'' to the adversary, and in such a case the adversary
`will not be able to distinguish wheat from chaff. It is possible in
`principle, however, to have an unfortunate MAC algorithm that
```leaks'' information about the message being MAC'ed, allowing the
`adversary to gain an advantage in distinguishing wheat from chaff.
`For example, one could define a LEAKY-HMAC-SHA1 MAC algorithm to have
`an output that is the concatenation of the output of the HMAC-SHA1
`algorithm together with the low-order bit of the message being MAC'ed.
`However, in practice (and in theory) one looks for MAC algorithms that
`are indistinguishable from random functions, and such algorithms
`also work fine in a chaffing and winnowing application.
`
`Note that the problem of providing confidentiality by chaffing and
`winnowing is based on the difficulty (for the adversary) of
`distinguishing the chaff from the wheat. It is *not* based on the
`difficulty of breaking an encryption scheme, since there is no
`encryption being performed (although confidentiality may be obtained
`nonetheless, just as for steganography).
`
`If the adversary sees only one packet with a given serial number, then
`that packet is probably wheat, and not chaff. So a good chaffing
`process will add at least one chaff packet for each packet serial
`number used by the message.
`
`The adversary may also distinguish wheat from chaff by the contents of
`each packet. If the wheat packets each contains an English sentence,
`while the chaff packets contain random bits, then the adversary will
`have no difficulty in winnowing the wheat from the chaff himself.
`
`On the other hand, if each wheat packet contains a single bit, and
`there is a chaff packet with the same serial number containing the
`complementary bit, then the adversary will have a very difficult
`(essentially impossible) task. Being able to distinguish wheat from
`chaff would require him to break the MAC algorithm and/or know the
`secret authentication key used to compute the MACs. With a good MAC
`algorithm, the adversary's ability to winnow is nonexistant, and the
`chaffing process provides perfect confidentiality of the message
`contents. To make this clearer with an example, note that the adversary
`will see triples of the form:
`
`(1,0,351216)
`
`(1,1,895634)
`
`(2,0,452412)
`
`(2,1,534981)
`
`(3,0,639723)
`
`(3,1,905344)
`
`(4,0,321329)
`
`(4,1,978823)
`
`...
`and so on.
`
` I
`
` stress that the sending process for chaffing and winnowing is not
`encryption; it is authentication (adding MACs) followed by adding
`chaff.
`
`Let us assume that the original message is broken into very short
`(one-bit) packets, and that MACs have been added to each such packet
`to create the wheat packets. (There is some obvious inefficiency
`here, since each wheat packet may end up being, say about 100 bits
`long, but only transmits one bit. Here each MAC might be 64 bits in
`length, and each serial number 32 bits long. Additional bits might
`
`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`
`3/8
`
`Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC
`IPR2019-00879 (US 9,059,969)
`Exhibit 2018
`
`

`

`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`4/14/2019
`also be present to identify sender, receiver, etc.)
`
`Such a message sequence is not encrypted, and the process for creating
`such a message sequence would presumably not be export-controlled, since
`the message bits are ``in the clear'' and nicely labelled with serial
`numbers.
`
`The process of creating chaff is also easy: just create a chaff packet
`with whatever serial number and packet contents you may like, and
`include a random 64-bit MAC value. This MAC value is overwhelmingly
`likely to be bad, and thus the packet created is overwhelmingly likely
`to be chaff. (The chances of creating a good packet are one in
`2**64---approximately one in 10**19---which is effectively
`negligible.) The person creating the chaff (the ``chaffer'') would do
`so having seen the wheat packets, and would make chaff packets up that
`have the same serial numbers as the wheat packets do, but with
`complementary packet contents. Again, it is assumed here that an
`adversary, not knowing the secret authentication key, can not
`distinguish a good (wheat) packet from a bad (chaff) one.
`
`It is especially intriguing to now observe that creating chaff does
`not require knowledge of the secret authentication key! That is,
`creating chaff is done by creating bogus packets with bogus randomly
`guessed (and thus bad) MACs; to randomly guess a MAC requires no
`knowledge of the secret authentication key.
`
`We could thus have the following intriguing scenario: Alice is
`communicating with Bob using a standard packet-based communication
`scheme. Each packet is authenticated with a MAC created using a
`secret authentication key known only to Alice and Bob. (In practice,
`they might use a different key for packets in each direction, although
`this is not necessary if the packet contents identify sender and
`receiver.) Furthermore, each packet happens to contain only a single
```message bit.'' (Alice wrote their software, and it contained a bug
`that caused this unusual behavior.)
`
`So far, Alice and Bob are not encrypting anything, and are using
`standard messaging techniques that would not be considered as
`encryption and that would not be export-controlled. Alice and Bob
`have no intention of achieving confidentiality of their messages from
`an eavesdropper.
`
`Now, Alice's packets to Bob may be routed from her computer through
`the computer of her Internet service provider, run by Charles, on
`another floor of her building, before being sent on to more major
`trunks of the Internet and then on to Bob.
`
`Charles' computer, for whatever reason, then adds ``chaff'' packets to
`the packet sequence from Alice to Bob. All of sudden, Charles'
`activities provide a very high degree of confidentiality for the
`communications between Alice and Bob! Alice's and Bob's software have
`not been modified in the least to achive this confidentiality!
`Charles does not know the secret authentication key used between Alice
`and Bob! Alice and Bob did not even want or care to have confidential
`communications! Charles is not using encryption and does not know
`any encryption key! Amazing!
`
`Clearly, the cause of the confidentiality is Charles's activities, but
`Charles has no encryption key or decryption key that he could give to
`law enforcement. Alice and Bob share an authentication key, but do
`not perform any encryption, and have no encryption or decryption keys.
`
`Law enforcement may be able to tap the (unencrypted) line from Alice
`to Charles, but that might be difficult to arrange without Alice's
`knowledge, as Alice and Charles are in the same building, and may even
`
`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`
`4/8
`
`Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC
`IPR2019-00879 (US 9,059,969)
`Exhibit 2018
`
`

`

`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`4/14/2019
`be friendly or colluding. While Charles' chaffing activities may be
`suspicious, they don't consitute encryption and don't involve any
`knowledge of keys on his part; there is no key information he could
`give to any law enforcement agency.
`
`In a variation on the above scenario, Charles is not ``adding chaff''
`but merely multiplexing the stream of packets from Alice to Bob with
`another stream of packets (say from David to Elaine). To Bob, the
`stream of packets from David to Elaine looks like chaff, and is
`discarded. But to Elaine, the converse holds, and she discards the
`stream of packets from Alice to Bob as chaff. What is wheat to one
`pair of communicants is chaff to the other pair, and vice versa. Such
`a situation could arise where Charles is managing a broadcast channel
`such as a satellite link; here both parties naturally receive the
`stream of intermingled packets. If the only way to distinguish one stream
`from another is by the correctness of the MACs, then an adversary will have
`a hard time separating the streams. (Of course, if there are exactly two
`streams being multiplexed, then Alice and Bob can read the stream from
`David to Elaine, and vice versa.)
`
`In such a scenario, the obvious tack for law enforcement to take would
`be to demand to have access to the secret authentication key shared by
`Alice and Bob. But access to authentication keys is one thing that
`government has long agreed that they don't want to have. Having such
`access would allow the government to forge authentic-looking packets
`for any pair of parties that are communicating. This is way beyond
`mere access to encrypted communications, as loss of such
`authentication keys could wreak massive havoc to the structure and
`integrity of the entire Internet, allow hackers not only to overhear
`private messages, but to actually control computers, perhaps to shut
`down power systems or to airline traffic control systems, etc. The
`power to authenticate is in many cases the power to control, and
`handing all authentication power to the government is beyond all
`reason, even if it were for well-motivated law-enforcement reasons;
`the security risks would be totally unacceptable.
`
`One could imagine that Alice and Bob are merely authenticating their
`packets to each other, and that it is not Charles but instead a rogue
`law enforcement agent who is introducing the chaff, and then
`introducing the authenticated and chaffed message as potential
`justification to a judge for demanding the authentication key shared
`by Alice and Bob. If law enforcement had unrestricted right to
`plaintext, then it could demand surreptitious access to all
`authentication keys, even when confidentiality techniques were not
`being used by the participants! Again, such risks are too great to be
`accepted.
`
`Similarly, a rogue law enforcement agent could introduce the chaff to
`Alice and Bob's authenticated packet stream, and then attempt to bring
`Alice and Bob to court for violating some anti-encryption or
`anti-confidentiality law. How can Alice and Bob defend themselves
`against this framing attack? They did nothing but send authenticated
`packets to each other! Again, this shows the difficulty (or
`impossibility) of drafting any kind of reasonable law restricting
`encryption or confidentiality technology.
`
`It is possible to make the chaffing and winnowing technique much more
`efficient, allowing many bits per packet instead of just one. Here is
`one approach. Suppose Alice has a one-megabit message. She might
`pre-process the message using an ``all-or-nothing'' or ``package
`transform'' (Rivest 1997)---this is a keyless (non-encryption)
`transform that takes the message and produces a ``packaged message''
`with the property that the recipient (Bob) can't produce the original
`message unless he has received the entire packaged message. The
`packaging operation can be undone by anyone who receives the packaged
`
`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`
`5/8
`
`Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC
`IPR2019-00879 (US 9,059,969)
`Exhibit 2018
`
`

`

`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`4/14/2019
`message; as noted, packaging is not encryption and there are no shared
`secret keys involved in the packaging operation. Alice might want to
`do so because she wants to ensure that Bob either sees all of the
`message or none of it; he doesn't ever see just part of it. Unless
`the entire packaged message is received, the parts received
`effectively look like random noise.
`
`Alice then breaks her packaged message into 1024-bit blocks,
`authenticates each block with a MAC, and transmits the result to Bob.
`This message is packaged and authenticated, but not encrypted: an
`eavesdropper can easily reconstruct the message given all of the
`blocks.
`
`However, Charles can add 1024-bit chaff blocks, where each chaff block
`has 1024 bits of random data and a random (and presumably wrong) MAC.
`Again, adding the chaff provides extremely strong confidentiality,
`since an eavesdropper can not distinguish the chaff from the wheat.
`Other transforms, besides the packaging transform, might work as well.
`
`For an adversary, the difficulty of separating the wheat blocks from
`the chaff will be proportional to the number of ways a subsequence of
`blocks can be picked as and tested for being wheat; this will be
`exponential in the total number of blocks, assuming that the fraction
`of chaff blocks is guaranteed not to be close to zero or close to one.
`We note that when packaging is used, it is not necessary to have as
`many chaff packets as wheat packets, since the adversary must identify
`the wheat packets precisely (with no omissions or deletions) in order
`to retrieve the message. Thus, for long messages, the relative number
`of chaff packets needed can be quite small, and the extra bandwidth
`required for transmitting chaff might be insignificant in practice.
`
`Chaffing and winnowing bear some relationship to steganography. I am
`reminded of the steganographic technique of sending an
`innocuous-looking letter whose letters are written in two different,
`but very similar fonts. By erasing all letters in one font, the
`hidden message written in the other font, remains. For this technique
`(as with most steganographic techniques), security rests on the
`assumption that the adversary will not notice the use of two fonts.
`With chaffing and winnowing, the adversary may know (or suspect) that
`there are two different kinds of packets, but he is unable to
`distinguish them because he does not possess the secret authentication
`key.
`
`Chaffing and winnowing also bear some resemblance to encryption
`techniques. Indeed, the process of authenticating packets and then
`adding chaff achieves confidentiality, and so qualifies as encryption
`by anyone who uses a definition of encryption that is so broad as to
`include all techniques for achieving confidentiality. But this fails
`to note the special structure here, wherein a non-encrypting
`key-dependent first step (adding authentication) followed by a
`non-encrypting keyless second step (adding chaff) achieves
`confidentiality. Since the second step can be performed by anyone
`(e.g. Charles in our example), and since the first step (adding
`authentication) may be performed for other good reasons, we see
`something novel, where strong confidentiality can even be obtained
`without the knowledge and permission of the original sender.
`(Variations on chaffing and winnowing, such as omitting the plaintext
`bits altogether and letting the receiver infer them from the MAC's, destroy
`these nice properties.)
`
` I
`
` note that the use of MAC's can be replaced by digital signatures.
`Not the ordinary kind of digital signatures, since then anyone would
`be able to distinguish wheat from chaff. But the recent ``designated
`verifier signatures'' of Jakobsson, Sako, and Impaglizazzo (Jakobsson
`et al '96), which can only be verified by those the signer designates,
`
`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`
`6/8
`
`Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC
`IPR2019-00879 (US 9,059,969)
`Exhibit 2018
`
`

`

`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`4/14/2019
`would work fine. (Chaum has also independently invented the
`same concept.)
`
` I
`
` note that it is possible for a stream of packets to contain more
`than one subsequence of ``wheat'' packets, in addition to the chaff
`packets. Each wheat subsequence would be recognized separately using
`a different authentication key. One interesting consequence of this
`is that if law enforcement were to demand to see an authentication key
`so it could identify the wheat, the sender could yield up one such key
`that identifies a wheat subsequence containing an innocuous message as
`the wheat, and leaving everything else as ``chaff''. The real message
`would still be buried in the chaff. This is reminiscent of the
`technique of ``deniable encryption'' proposed by Canetti et
`al. (1997).
`
`In the chaffing and winnow approach, Alice and Bob use standard
`authentication techniques, and then someone adds chaff to the sequence
`of authenticated packets. It is worth observing that Alice and Bob
`can obtain a covert or subliminal channel by replacing a portion of
`each MAC for an ordinary message by a portion of the ciphertext for a
`hidden message. Without an authentication key, law enforcement cannot
`detect this channel. But this is outside our model.
`
`It is also worth noting that the ability to bootstrap from
`authentication techniques to confidentiality mechanisms is not new.
`For example, two parties can use authenticated Diffie-Hellman to agree
`upon an encryption key. In such a case, the parties initially have
`only each other's signature verification keys. After the protocol is
`over, they have a secret shared key that they can use for encryption
`purposes. Chaffing and winnowing differ in that the two parties
`involved may not even explicitly take any steps to achieve
`confidentiality (if someone else is adding the chaff).
`
`Another example of using authentication to achieve confidentiality
`occurs in baseball--a coach will signal to a runner by giving a
`sequence of signals, but the real signal is the one immediately
`following a previously agreed-upon authenticator signal.
`
` A
`
` final example of using authentication to achieve confidentiality
`occurs in the Rex Stout's novel ``The Doorbell Rang.'' Two men wish to
`communicate privately, but fear that the FBI has bugged the room.
`They agree when the speaker raises a finger, his statements are to be
`disregarded. Of course, the FBI's bugs can't tell if the speaker has
`his finger raised or lowered!
`
`In summary, we have introduced a new technique for confidentiality,
`called ``chaffing and winnowing''. This technique can provide
`excellent confidentiality of message contents without involving
`encryption or steganography. As a consequence of the existence of
`chaffing and winnowing, one can argue that attempts by law enforcement
`to regulate confidentiality by regulating encryption must fail, as
`confidentiality can be obtained effectively without encryption and
`even sometimes without the desire for confidentiality by the two
`communicants. Law enforcement would have to seek access to all
`authentication keys as well, a truly frightening prospect.
`
`Mandating government access to all communications is not a viable
`alternative. The cryptography debate should proceed by mutual
`education and voluntary actions only.
`
`
`Acknowledgments
`---------------
`
`Thanks to my dad for suggesting the term ``winnowing,'' to Mark Lomas
`
`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`
`7/8
`
`Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC
`IPR2019-00879 (US 9,059,969)
`Exhibit 2018
`
`

`

`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`4/14/2019
`for noting that multiplexing two streams may allow each to serve as
`chaff for the other, and to Peter Wayner for suggesting the
`relationship to deniable encryption. Thanks to Adi Shamir and David
`Gifford for suggesting the basic idea underlying the more efficient
`implementation of chaffing and winnowing; Aaron Gifford first noted
`that the number of chaff packets might be small in this case. Thanks
`also to Matt Blaze and Markus Jakobsson for comments on the original
`write-up. And finally thanks to Bruce Balden and Enzo Michelangeli for
`bringing the Rex Stout reference to my attention.
`
`
`References
`----------
`
`Canetti, Ran, Cynthia Dwork, Moni Naor, and Rafail Ostrovsky, "Deniable
`
`Encryption", Proceedings CRYPTO '97 (Springer 1997), 90--104.
`
`ftp://theory.lcs.mit.edu/pub/tcryptol/96-02r.ps
`
`Jakobsson, Markus, Kazue Sako, and Russell Impagliazzo, ``Designated
`
`Verifier Proofs and Their Applications'', Proceedings
`
`Eurocrypt '96 (Springer 1996), 143--154.
`
`http://www.bell-labs.com/user/markusj/dvp.ps
`
`Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
`
`Authentication", RFC2104, February 1997.
`
`(Available at ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2104.txt)
`
`Rivest, R. ``All-Or-Nothing Encryption and the Package Transform,''
`
`Proceedings of the 1997 Fast Software Encryption Conference
`
`(Springer, 1997). Also on http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/fusion.ps.
`
`Stout, Rex. The Doorbeel Rang: A Nero Wolfe Novel. (Viking Press, 1965).
`
`Wayner, Peter. Disappearing Cryptography: Being and Nothingness on the Net.
`
`Academic Press, 1996.
`
`
`people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/chaffing-980701.txt
`
`8/8
`
`Ingenico Inc. v. IOENGINE, LLC
`IPR2019-00879 (US 9,059,969)
`Exhibit 2018
`
`