`U.S. Pat. No. 9,712,494
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
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`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`MPH TECHNOLOGIES OY,
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`Patent Owner.
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`____________
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`Case IPR2019-00823
`Patent 9,712,494
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`____________
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`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Case IPR2019-00823
`U.S. Pat. No. 9,712,494
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`Page
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`I.
`II.
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`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................ 4
`A.
`The “Mobile Computer” Limitation ...................................................... 4
`III. THE PETITION FAILS TO SHOW A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
`THAT THE RFC3104-GRABELSKY COMBINATIONS RENDER THE
`CLAIMS OBVIOUS (ALL CLAIMS, ALL GROUNDS) ............................. 6
`A.
`“The Intermediate Computer Does Not Have The Cryptographic Key
`To Decrypt The Encrypted Data Payload” (All Claims) ...................... 7
`1. The Combination Does Not Say Anything About This Limitation . 7
`2. The Petitioner Ignores What The Combination Actually Does Say
` ................................................................................................... 19
`“The Intermediate Computer Configured To Receive From A Mobile
`Computer A Secure Message Sent To The First Network Address”
`(All Claims) ......................................................................................... 22
`1. Petitioner’s Argument That “Either RFC3104’s Host Y Or X”
`Could Be A “Mobile Computer” Whose Address Would
`Change Is Unclear And Unsupported ....................................... 23
`2. RFC3104’s “Roadwarrior” Scenario Does Not Teach The “Mobile
`Computer” Limitation ............................................................... 27
`a.
`Overview Of RFC3104’s “Roadwarrior Scenario” ........ 27
`b.
`The Petition Incorrectly And Inconsistently Maps Both
`RSIP Client X And Host Y To The Claimed “Mobile
`Computer” ....................................................................... 32
`RFC3104’s Roadwarrior Scenario Does Not Involve
`“Mobility” As Claimed and Described in the Patent ..... 45
`i
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`B.
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`c.
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`3. RFC3104 Teaches Away ................................................................ 49
`IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 51
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page
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`COURT DECISIONS
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`AC Techs. S.A. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`912 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .............................................................................. 9
`Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc.,
`832 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 24
`Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC,
`805 F.3d 1064 (Fed Cir. 2015) ............................................................................. 23
`DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,
`567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 51
`Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`899 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................ 17
`DSS Tech. Mgmt. Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`885 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..................................................................... 24, 25
`In re Nuvasive,
`842 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 24
`International Business Machines Corporation v. Iancu,
`759 F. App’x 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................ passim
`Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`848 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .............................................................................. 24
`Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc.,
`882 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................ 51
`AGENCY DECISIONS
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`Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Blitzsafe Tex., LLC,
`IPR2016-01473, Paper 9 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2017) .................................................. 17
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`Apple Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co.,
`IPR2016-01863, Paper 35 (PTAB Apr. 13, 2018) ........................................ 17, 18
`Ciena Corp. v. Oyster Optics, LLC,
`IPR2018-00070, Paper 54 (PTAB May 9, 2019) ................................................. 24
`Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC,
`IPR2017-01881, Paper 29 (PTAB Feb. 26, 2019) ............................................... 25
`Facebook, Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc.,
`IPR2017-01524, Paper 7 (PTAB Dec. 4, 2017) .................................................. 43
`Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skyworks Sols., Inc.,
`IPR2014-00529, Paper 8 (PTAB Sept., 23, 2014) ........................................ 17, 18
`Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Microspherix LLC,
`IPR2018-00393, Paper 43 (PTAB July 8, 2019) .................................... 12, 16, 19
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`Snap Inc. v. Vaporstream, Inc.,
`IPR2018-00397, Paper 36 (PTAB June 28, 2019) .................................. 13, 16, 19
`Unified Patents Inc. v. Societa Italiana Per Lo Sviluppo Dell’Elettronica S.P.A.,
`IPR2017-00565, Paper 13 (PTAB June 15, 2017) ........................................ 17, 18
`STATUTES
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`35 U.S.C. § 316 ........................................................................................................ 12
`RULES AND RULEMAKING
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.100 ..................................................................................................... 4
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108 ..................................................................................................... 1
`83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,358 (Oct. 11, 2018) ............................................................. 4
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`EXHIBIT LIST
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`2001
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`U.S. Pat. No. 8,346,949 B2
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`INTRODUCTION
`MPH Technologies Oy (“Patent Owner”) submits this Preliminary Response
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`Case IPR2019-00823
`U.S. Pat. No. 9,712,494
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`I.
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`to the Petition for Inter Partes Review by Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) on claims 1-11
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`of U.S. Patent No. 9,712,494 (Exhibit 1001) (“the ’494 Patent”). The Petition
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`should be denied because it fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that at
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`least one claim is unpatentable under the proposed grounds. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c).
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`The ’494 Patent is a continuation of U.S. Patent No. 8,346,949 (“the ’949
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`Patent”) [Ex. 2001] that Petitioner has challenged simultaneously in IPR2019-
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`00822. Petitioner challenges both Patents using the same three references, and its
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`arguments against the Patents are similar in both petitions. The claims of the
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`present ’494 Patent, however, include at least two elements not found in claim 1 of
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`the ’949 Patent, and not addressed in IPR2019-00822, which provide further
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`reasons why institution of this Petition should be denied.
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`The Petition asserts that claim 1 of the ’494 Patent is obvious over a
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`combination of RFC3104 and Grabelsky. However, these references teach methods
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`significantly different from the claimed invention.
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`First, the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that RFC3104 and
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`Grabelsky teach that “the intermediate computer does not have the cryptographic
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`key to decrypt the encrypted data payload” as all claims require. Petitioner asserts
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`1
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`that RFC3104 “forwards the packet to its destination without the need to decrypt
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`any portion of the packet or be aware of any encryption/authentication keys.” But
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`Petitioner’s cited support in RFC3104 is silent on whether the alleged intermediate
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`computer, RSIP server N, does or does not, in fact, have a cryptographic key to
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`decrypt the encrypted data payload, either for forwarding the packet, or for other
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`purposes. Infra § III-A. Silence does not meet Petitioner’s burden to show that the
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`alleged prior art intermediate computer does not have a cryptographic key to
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`decrypt the encrypted data payload. And worse yet, Petitioner fails to address what
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`RFC3104’s framework actually does say about the examination of data payloads at
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`that computer. This limitation addresses what the ’494 Patent identifies as “clearly
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`a major security problem.” The claimed invention addresses that problem. Apple
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`fails to show that the proposed combination does so.
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`Second, the Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that RFC3104
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`and Grabelsky teach the “mobile computer,” or intermediate computer configured
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`to receive messages therefrom, as the claims require. Petitioner’s assertion that
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`“RFC3104’s host Y or X could be (and often would be) a ‘mobile computer’”
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`combines and conflates different embodiments of RFC3104 in ways that are not
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`taught in the cited art. Indeed, the Petition’s argument relies on attorney argument
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`2
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`and unsupported opinion testimony directly contrary to the express disclosures in
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`the combination, which, in fact, teaches away from this limitation. Infra § III-B.
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`The two deficiencies mentioned above are examples of the Petition’s
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`reliance on conclusory, ipse dixit attorney argument to fill the gaps of its
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`combinations. The accompanying opinion testimony does no more than parrot
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`those conclusory attorney arguments without adding objective support.
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`In summary, the Petition fails to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing
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`against claim 1. All other challenged claims (2–11) depend from claim 1, and
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`include the same limitations and the same gaps in the Petition’s combinations.
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`Institution of inter partes review should be denied.1
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`1 Because partial institution is not permitted, this Preliminary Response only
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`addresses selected arguments sufficient to dispose of the Petition as a whole. For
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`example, the Petition relies on a third reference, Wagner, in additional
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`combinations as to additional limitations of dependent claims 6 and 7. Pet., 59-64.
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`The Petition relies solely upon RFC3104 and Grabelsky for all other limitations of
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`all remaining challenged claims, including claims 6 and 7. Pet., 20-64. There is
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`no contention that Wagner cures the deficiencies of RFC3104 and Grabelsky.
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`Therefore, this preliminary response does not address Wagner.
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`3
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`The Petition was filed after November 13, 2018, the date of the Office’s
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`II.
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`adoption of the Phillips claim construction standard for IPRs. That familiar
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`standard therefore applies here, and the claims must be construed “in accordance
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`with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of
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`ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 83
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`Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,358 (Oct. 11, 2018) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)).
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`Patent Owner disagrees with claim constructions used or implied in the
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`Petition for various claim terms. However, only one of them—the “mobile
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`computer” limitation—need be considered at this stage “to resolve the
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`controversy” against institution. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Science & Eng’g, Inc.,
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`200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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`A. The “Mobile Computer” Limitation
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`The “mobile computer” recited in the claims should be construed to require
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`a computer that is capable of moving from one network to another while
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`maintaining a connection. Said another way, the claims should be construed to
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`distinguish the claimed “mobile computer” from a computer that is only capable of
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`static connections.
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`4
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`Claim 1 recites, in part, “the intermediate computer configured to receive
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`from a mobile computer a secure message.” Ex. 1001 [’494 Patent], cl. 1
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`(emphasis added). The ’494 Patent explains that
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`In this text, the term mobility and mobile terminal does not only mean
`physical mobility, instead the term mobility is in the first hand meant
`moving from one network to another, which can be performed by a
`physically fixed terminal as well.
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`Ex. 1001 [’494 Patent], 4:34-38 (emphasis added).
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`The very next sentence in the ’494 Patent differentiates the term “mobile”
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`from static connections. It explains that “[t]he problem with standard IPSec is thus
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`that it has been designed for static connections.” Ex. 1001 [’494 Patent], 4:39-40
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`(emphasis added).
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`Other portions of the specification support construing the claim term
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`“mobile computer” to require a computer that is capable of moving from one
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`network to another while maintaining a connection. See also, e.g., id., 5:16-22
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`(describing prior art method that “provides mobility for the connection” but incurs
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`various problems); 6:32-34 (explaining that “[e]specially, the object of this
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`invention is to forward secure messages in a way that enables changes to be made
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`in the secure connection”) (emphasis added); 7:51-55.
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`5
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`Therefore, the Patent makes clear that when it is using the terms mobility or
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`mobile, such as in the claimed “mobile computer,” it means a computer that is not
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`limited to static connections where, for example, “the end points of an IPSec tunnel
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`mode SA are fixed,” id., 4:41-42, and instead is referring to a computer which can
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`move from one network to another while maintaining a connection.
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`Thus, the term “mobile computer,” as recited in the claims, should be
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`construed to require a computer that is capable of moving from one network to
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`another while maintaining a connection.
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`III.
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`THE PETITION FAILS TO SHOW A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
`THAT THE RFC3104-GRABELSKY COMBINATIONS RENDER
`THE CLAIMS OBVIOUS (ALL CLAIMS, ALL GROUNDS)
`The Petition fails to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing against
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`independent claim 1, and, therefore, also against all other challenged dependent
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`claims (Claims 2-11), because, in particular, the Petition fails to show a reasonable
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`likelihood of demonstrating that the proposed combination of RFC3104 with
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`Grabelsky would render obvious the claim limitations discussed below. Infra
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`§§ III-A–III-B. These limitations are all recited in the only challenged independent
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`claim, claim 1. If any one of them has not been sufficiently demonstrated to have a
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`reasonable probability of being obvious the Petition under the Petition’s proposed
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`grounds, institution must be denied.
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`6
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`“The Intermediate Computer Does Not Have The Cryptographic
`Key To Decrypt The Encrypted Data Payload” (All Claims)
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`A.
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`The Petition fails to substantiate its assertion that RFC3104 teaches that “the
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`intermediate computer does not have the cryptographic key to decrypt the
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`encrypted data payload” as all claims require. Ex.1001, [’494 Patent], cl. 1.
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`Petitioner relies exclusively on RFC3104 for this limitation.
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`Petitioner’s argument fails for two independent reasons. First, the Petition
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`fails to identify any RFC3104 disclosure concerning whether its alleged
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`“intermediate computer” has cryptographic keys. Silence alone is not enough to
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`render the limitation obvious. Second, the Petition completely fails to address
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`what the RFC3104 framework actually does disclose about examining payloads.
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`In short, the Petition barely even attempts to show that this limitation is met, and
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`its attempt is woefully inadequate to meet its burden to show a basis for institution.
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`1.
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`The Combination Does Not Say Anything About This
`Limitation
`As explained in the ’494 Patent, the intermediate computer not having the
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`cryptographic keys is a significant feature of the invention, as it prevents the
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`intermediate computer from having access to possibly sensitive data, which the
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`’494 Patent explains would be a major security problem. Ex. 1001 [’494 Patent],
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`6:18-20 (“Having decrypted packets of various customer networks in plaintext
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`7
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`form in the intermediate host is clearly a major security problem.”). Despite the
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`importance of this limitation, the Petition dedicates only two sentences to its
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`argument that this limitation of all the claims is met.
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`The Petition’s entire argument with respect to the alleged obviousness of this
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`limitation is as follows:
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`With respect to element [1G], packets arriving at RSIP server N are
`demultiplexed based on parameters accessible from the IP header and
`the IPSec protocol header. RFC3104, 5; Goldschlag Decl., ¶123. Server
`N then searches for a “matching mapping” using these fields and
`forwards the packet to its destination without the need to decrypt any
`portion of the packet or be aware of any encryption/authentication keys,
`or establish a new connection. RFC3104, 5; Goldschlag Decl., ¶123.
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`Pet., 50.
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`This brief argument fails to identify any disclosure, or even any mention
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`whatsoever, of this limitation in RFC3104. Petitioner cites only one page of
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`RFC3104, page 5. That page is, at best, absolutely silent on whether the alleged
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`intermediate computer, RSIP server N, does or does not have a cryptographic key
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`to decrypt the encrypted data payload. As such, the Petition’s showing is deficient
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`with respect to this element.
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`Silence does not suffice for Petitioner to meet its burden of showing that the
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`alleged prior art’s intermediate computer does not have a cryptographic key, as
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`8
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`claim 1 of the ’494 Patent and its dependents require. Although depending on the
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`circumstances “a reference need not state a feature’s absence in order to disclose a
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`negative limitation,” AC Techs. S.A. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 912 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
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`2019), RFC3104’s silence here is dispositive. The cited disclosure of RFC3104
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`does not even disclose secure forwarding of the encrypted data payload, which is
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`expressly recited in the challenged claims, let alone the decrypting of that payload
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`that is the subject of the intermediate computer limitation at issue here. What is
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`more, as will be explained in the next section, infra § III-B.2, the Petitioner
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`completely fails to acknowledge or address what the RFC3104 framework actually
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`does say concerning examining data packet payloads, and makes no attempt
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`whatsoever to reconcile these disclosures with its two-sentence argument that this
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`limitation is somehow met by page 5 of RFC3104, which is silent on the issue.
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`Of course, a limitation sometimes can be taught by a reference without that
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`reference containing an explicit disclosure expressly setting forth the limitation.
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`For example, in Sud-Chemie, Inc. v. Multisorb Technologies, Inc., 554 F.3d 1001,
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`1004-05 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the limitation required “uncoated” film. That limitation
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`was permissibly found to be disclosed by a prior art reference that disclosed a film,
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`“did not describe the film as coated[,] and did not suggest necessity of coatings.”
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`AC Techs., 912 F.3d at 1367 (citing Sud-Chemie, 554 F.2d at 1004-05). And in AC
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`9
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`Technologies, a limitation required copying data “independently of an access of the
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`computer unit.” Id. at 1363. That limitation was permissibly found to be disclosed
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`by a reference where the reference made clear that it taught copying that did not
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`“requir[e] access of” the computer unit during copying, and taught copying the
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`data between units without regard to whether the “computer unit” was one of those
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`units or not. Id. at 1367. The facts here are quite different. As mentioned above,
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`and explained further below, the cited disclosure is silent about whether
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`RFC3104’s alleged secure forwarding does not require the RLSI server to have a
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`cryptographic key (infra § III-A.2).
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`The Petition’s deficient argument with respect to this limitation is much like
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`the deficient unpatentability argument that the Federal Circuit recently rejected in
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`International Business Machines Corp. v. Iancu, 759 F. App’x 1002 (Fed. Cir.
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`2019) (nonprecedential), and multiple Board cases that have applied IBM to reject
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`similar arguments. IBM reversed a finding by the Board that a prior art reference
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`anticipated the claims at issue, ruling that there was no substantial evidence
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`supporting the Board’s conclusion that that reference taught the claimed absence of
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`a feature by its “silence” concerning whether that feature was present or absent.
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`Id. at 1008-1012.
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`10
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`The Board in IBM had construed the patent’s “single-sign-on operation” to
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`mean “a process by which a user is authenticated at a first entity and subsequently
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`not required to perform another authentication before accessing a protected
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`resource at a second entity.” Id. (emphasis added). The patent owner argued that a
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`prior art reference, Mellmer, did not meet this limitation via the use of an
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`accessCard resulting in a second user authentication, arguing that the user of such a
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`card would be required to perform another authentication. Id. The Board found
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`otherwise, agreeing instead with the IBM petitioner’s argument that the reference
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`was silent as to what information was included on the accessCard, and thus taught
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`a process involving only one user authentication. Id.
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`The Federal Circuit reversed. The Court explained that “silence” did not
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`meet the petitioner’s burden to show the limitation of no requirement to perform
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`another user authentication:
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`The overall finding that this portion of Mellmer teaches a process
`involving only one user authentication action is not supported by
`substantial evidence. To begin with, even if the Board were correct that
`Mellmer is “silent” about the content of the accessCard, that
`characterization would not alone support a finding that there was no
`user authentication action in this scenario if, as appears, the Board
`meant that it simply could not tell one way or the other whether the
`accessCard contains credentials. Silence in that sense would not by
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`itself suffice for the Petitioner to meet its burden to prove, by a
`preponderance of the evidence, that there was no user authentication
`action in this scenario. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
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`Id. (emphases added). Thus, the Court explained, “silence . . . by itself” in the
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`cited reference, id., does not suffice for a petitioner to meet its burden of showing
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`the absence a particular process or feature in the prior art.
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`The Board has referred to IBM on at least two occasions in support of
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`findings that petitioners have failed to meet their burden of showing a negative
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`limitation, or other claimed absence, by silence in the prior art. Specifically, in one
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`IPR the claims at issue included the limitation: “the hormone is not an anti-
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`neoplastic agent.” Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Microspherix LLC, IPR2018-
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`00393, Paper 43, 66 (PTAB July 8, 2019). The Board’s final written decision
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`rejected the petitioner’s challenge to the claims, finding that the silence in the cited
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`prior art could not meet the petitioner’s burden to show that this limitation was
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`obvious. As the Board explained: “[w]e determine that Petitioner has not satisfied
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`the negative limitation that the hormones disclosed in Zamora's device are not for
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`treating cancer, such as prostate cancer. Silence as to whether a hormone is anti-
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`neoplastic is not sufficient.” Id. (citing IBM, 759 F. App’x at 1011).
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`12
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`Similarly, in Snap Inc. v. Vaporstream, Inc., the Board construed the claim
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`at issue to require “an arrangement of displays that enables reduced traceability of
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`electronic messages (e.g., by separately displaying identifying information and
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`message content).” IPR2018-00397, Paper 36, 8-9 (PTAB June 28, 2019). Based
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`on this construction, the Board emphatically rejected the petitioner’s argument that
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`absence of content in the prior art sufficed to render obvious that message content
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`was absent from other disclosed information. The petitioner’s position was that the
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`prior art reference, Wren, “teaches the separation of header information and
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`message content because there is no message content in Figure 9A.” Id. at 32
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`(emphasis by Board) (citing IBM, 759 F. App'x at 1002, 1010-1011). The Board
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`rejected Petitioner’s argument. Id. The Board explained that these “facts [we]re
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`similar to those of [IBM]” and that, as in IBM, the reference’s mere silence was not
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`sufficient to teach the limitation: “Wren’s silence as to what the ‘New Movie’ text
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`represents and where it originated is insufficient for Petitioner to prove that it is not
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`message content.” Id. at 31-32. The Board therefore rejected the argument. Id.
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`Consistent with these cases, Petitioner here has failed to meet its burden to
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`show any likelihood that RFC3104 renders obvious the ’494 Patent’s limitation
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`that “the intermediate computer does not have the cryptographic key to decrypt
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`the encrypted data payload.” Ex. 1001 [’494 Patent], cl. 1 (emphasis added). To
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`13
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`begin with, as noted above, this claimed feature is critical to accomplishing the
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`express purpose of the limitation in question, which is, inter alia, “to securely
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`forward the encrypted data payload to the destination address.” Ex. 1001, [’494
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`Patent], cl. 1 (emphasis added). As the specification of the ’494 Patent explains:
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`with the method of the invention the confidentiality of the packets is
`not compromised, while simultaneously having no extra overhead
`when compared to standard IPSec. The intermediate computer does not
`know the cryptographic keys used to encrypt and/or authenticate the
`packets, and can thus not reveal their contents.
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`Ex. 1001, [’494 Patent], 10:32-37 (emphasis added). This is just an example of the
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`patent’s disclosure; the specification is replete with discussion of the intermediate
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`computer not having the cryptographic key and the important role of this absence
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`in the secure forwarding disclosed and claimed. See, id., e.g., 6:10-14; 6:67-7:3;
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`14:46-55; 19:19-23; 21:50-54.
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`As noted above, the Petition’s entire analysis with respect to this claim
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`element (which the Petition refers to as element [1G]) is only two sentences long.
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`Pet., 49-50. However, the Petition’s assertion that RFC3104 “forwards the packet
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`to its destination without the need to decrypt any portion of the packet or be aware
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`of any encryption/authentication keys” only attempts to show, at most, that it is not
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`necessary to have the cryptographic key for the purpose of forwarding the packet.
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`14
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`Pet., 49-50 (emphasis added). The Petition relies on RFC3104’s discussion of
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`arrival of packets at RSIP server N, demultiplexing of a “minimum tuple” of
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`demultiplexing fields, and use of these fields with a “matching mapping” for
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`forwarding the packet. Id. (citing Ex. 1004 [RFC3104], 5). Petitioner concedes,
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`however, that RFC3104’s disclosure does not include the format of the packets and
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`the mapping mechanism. See Pet., 23 (“RFC3104 does not explicitly disclose the
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`entire format of the IPSec packets or a particular mapping mechanism.”); id., 45
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`(“RFC3104 does not explicitly disclose how RSIP server N searches for a
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`‘matching mapping’”).
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`More to the point, the page of RFC3104 that the Petition’s two-sentence
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`argument repeatedly cites as support (Ex. 1001, [RFC3104], 5) is silent on whether
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`the alleged intermediate computer, RSIP server N, does or does not in fact have a
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`cryptographic key to decrypt the encrypted data payload. Petitioner simply argues
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`that, based on this silence, “Server N then searches for a ‘matching mapping’ using
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`these fields and forwards the packet to its destination without the need to decrypt
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`any portion of the packet or be aware of any encryption/authentication keys.” Pet.
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`49-50 (emphasis added).
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`Even taken on its own terms, Petitioner’s argument fails. First, Petitioner’s
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`argument is that it is not necessary for RSIP server N to have the cryptographic key
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`15
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`for the purpose of forwarding the packet. Critically, however, Petitioner does not
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`even argue that RFC3104 securely forwards the packet. Pet., 49 arguing merely
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`that (“Server N … forwards the packet…”).
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`Next, even if Petitioner’s assertion that RFC3014 “forwards the packet to its
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`destination without the need to decrypt” is taken as true for purposes of argument,
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`neither that assertion, nor the cited support in RFC3104, clarifies one way or the
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`other whether RSIP server N does or does not in fact have a cryptographic key to
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`decrypt an encrypted data payload, either for the limited purpose of forwarding
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`packets or for any other purpose. Silence in this respect does not by itself suffice
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`to show that RFC3014 discloses what is claimed: that “the intermediate computer
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`does not have the cryptographic key to decrypt the encrypted data payload.”
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`Ex.1001, [’494 Patent], cl. 1 (emphasis added). As in IBM, 759 F. App’x at 1011,
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`“[s]ilence in that sense would not by itself suffice for the Petitioner to meet its
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`burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no [recited
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`claim element] in this scenario.” See also, e.g., Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.,
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`IPR2018-00393, Paper 43, 66; Snap, IPR2018-00397, Paper 36, 31-32. Unlike
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`past cases where disclosures of negative limitations have been found, there is, at
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`best, simply no basis here to “tell one way or the other whether” RFC3104’s server
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`16
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`N has a cryptographic key to decrypt an encrypted data payload. IBM, 759 F.
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`App’x at 1011.
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`Beyond the Petition’s reliance on a limited portion of RFC3104, its only
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`other support is the conclusory assertions of Dr. Goldschlag, who again just largely
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`parrots the attorney argument in the Petition. Compare Pet., 49-50 with Ex. 1002
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`[Goldschlag Decl.], ¶123. Such parroting declarations are not evidence. Am.
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`Honda Motor Co. v. Blitzsafe Tex., LLC, IPR2016-01473, Paper 9, 16-17 (PTAB
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`Jan. 24, 2017); Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skyworks Sols., Inc., IPR2014-00529, Paper
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`8, 15 (PTAB Sept., 23, 2014); Apple Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co.,
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`IPR2016-01863, Paper 35, 27 (PTAB Apr. 13, 2018); Unified Patents Inc. v.
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`Societa Italiana Per Lo Sviluppo Dell’Elettronica S.P.A., IPR2017-00565, Paper
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`13, 13 (PTAB June 15, 2017); see also Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
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`Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291, 1300-1302 (Fed. Cir. 2018); 37 C.F.R. §42.65(a). In
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`such circumstances, the Board routinely denies Petitions like this one relying on
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`expert testimony that merely repeat arguments from the petitions. See, e.g., Am.
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`Honda Motor Co. v. Blitzsafe Tex., LLC, IPR2016-01473, Paper 9, 16-17 (PTAB
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`Jan. 24, 2017) (“relying on the Geier Declaration as support is insufficient, when,
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`as here, the cited paragraphs in the Declaration are repeated in the Petition
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`verbatim, and, thus, offer no more explanation or factual support than what appears
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`17
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`in the Petition.”) (citation omitted, emphasis added); Kinetic Techs., Inc. v.
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`Skyworks Sols., Inc., IPR2014-00529, Paper 8, 15 (PTAB Sept. 23, 2014) (denying
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`institution) (“Merely repeating an argument from the Petition in the declaration of
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`a proposed expert does not give that argument enhanced probative value.”); Apple
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`Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co., IPR2016-01863, Paper 35, 27 (PTAB Apr.
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`13, 2018); Unified Patents Inc. v. Societa Italiana Per Lo Sviluppo
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`Dell’Elettronica S.P.A., IPR2017-00565, Paper 13, 13 (PTAB June 15, 2017)
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`(denying institution) (declaration “merely repeats, verbatim, the language of the
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`Petition.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).
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`The only point that Dr. Goldschlag arguably makes beyond what is in the
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`Petition is that, “[i]ndeed, this is th