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From:
`Sent:
`To:
`Cc:
`
`Subject:
`Attachments:
`
`Dear Honorable Board: 
`
`Carmichael, Jim (External)
`Monday, October 21, 2019 4:09 PM
`Precedential_Opinion_Panel_Request
`dblock-ptab@sternekessler.com; spappas-ptab@sternekessler.com; mspecht-
`ptab@sternekessler.com; MPH-IPRs
`Precedential Opinion Panel request for IPR2019-00820
`2019-10-21 12. IPR2019-00820 - rehearing request.pdf
`
`I write on behalf of Patent Owner MPH Technologies Oy regarding the PTAB decision to institute review of U.S. 
`Patent No. 7,937,581 in case number IPR2019‐00820.  The decision by Judges Hamann, Jivani, and Margolies grants the 
`petition of Apple Inc. for inter partes review and declines to exercise the Director’s discretion under § 325(d) to reject 
`Apple’s petition, despite the fact that both primary references raised in Apple’s petition were extensively discussed and 
`applied in rejections of claims during original prosecution. 
`
`The decision was based on the panel’s erroneous beliefs (1) that the original examiner’s separate rejections over 
`references relied upon in the Petition weighed against exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the 
`separately applied references were not applied simultaneously in the same exact combination as in the Petition and (2) 
`that the panel’s implicit difference of opinion with the examiner concerning what a particular applied reference would 
`have suggested to POSITA counts as a sufficient “error” weighing against exercising § 325(d) discretion under factor (e) 
`of Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017‐01586, Paper 8, (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential). 
`SATISFACTION OF REQUIREMENTS OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 
`Based on my professional judgment, I believe the Board’s panel decision is contrary to the following precedent 
`of the Board:  Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017‐01586, Paper 8, (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) 
`(precedential as to § 325(d) factors). 
`Based on my professional judgment, I believe this case requires an answer to one or more       precedent‐setting 
`questions of exceptional importance:  (1) whether an examiner’s separate rejections over references relied upon in the 
`Petition weighs against exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) merely because the separately applied references 
`were not applied together in the same exact combination as in the Petition and (2) whether second‐guessing what an 
`examiner may or may not have had in their mind when evaluating the exact same applied reference sufficiently counts 
`as an explicit examiner “error” under factor (e) of Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017‐01586, 
`Paper 8, (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential). 
`REASONS FOR RECOMMENDING PRECEDENTIAL OPINION PANEL REVIEW 
`
`As stated in the attached request for rehearing: The Board panel’s decision to decline to exercise discretion 
`under § 325(d) on the Director’s behalf misapprehended or overlooked that an examiner’s separate rejections based on 
`references relied on in the Petition do not weigh against exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) merely because 
`the separately applied references were not applied together in the exact combination in the Petition.  Becton, Dickinson 
`itself expressly addressed a situation in which two references raised in combinations in the petition were applied only 
`separately in previous prosecution, and held that the prior separate discussion and application of the references during 
`prosecution nevertheless weighed in favor of denying institution under § 325(d), not against.  Becton, Dickinson, at 22‐
`23. The informative Board decision of Kayak Software further supports this line of authority, and suggests that to
`conclude otherwise “would exalt form over substance” in the § 325(d) inquiry.  Kayak Software Corp. v. International
`Business Machines Corp., CBM2016‐00075, Paper 16, 8‐9 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2016) (informative).
`
`1
`
`IPR2019-00820
`Ex. 3001 p. 1 of 2
`
`

`

`The Board panel’s decision to decline to exercise discretion under § 325(d) also misapprehended or overlooked 
`that a difference of opinion with an examiner’s purportedly implied views, concerning what a particular applied 
`reference would have suggested to POSITA, is insufficient to supply the type of error contemplated by Becton, Dickinson 
`factor (e) (“whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior 
`art”).  As the Board has previously held when applying this Becton, Dickinson factor: “Requiring a showing of explicit and 
`intrinsic error in a petition for an AIA post‐grant proceeding properly places the burden on the party who seeks to 
`challenge the patentability of the issued claims over the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments 
`presented previously to the Office during examination.  Requiring a showing of error also ensures protection for Patent 
`Owner, where only upon such a showing can the Board readily ascertain whether there are serious doubts about how 
`the patent issued over the same or substantially the same prior art that the Office considered previously during 
`examination.”  Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Mobile Telecomm’ns Techs., LLC, IPR2017‐00642, Paper 31, 21 (PTAB Mar. 14, 
`2018) (emphasis added). 
`
`Those conflicts present questions of wide applicability and undermine the certainty and consistency of the 
`Board’s application of the Director’s statutory discretion under § 325(d).   Accordingly, these issues warrant the 
`attention of the Precedential Opinion Panel.   
`Respectfully submitted,  
`
`James T. Carmichael 
`Lead Counsel for Patent Owner MPH Technologies Oy 
`
`James T. Carmichael
`8000 Towers Crescent Drive, 13th Floor
`Tysons, VA 22182
`(703)646‐9255
`jim@carmichaelip.com
`
`This message may contain privileged and confidential information.  If you are not the intended recipient, kindly contact the sender and destroy all copies
`
`IPR2019-00820
`Ex. 3001 p. 2 of 2
`
`2
`
`

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