United States Patent
`Rackman
`
`[19]
`
`[54] ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM FOR
`LITIGATION DOCUMENT PRODUCTION
`[76] Inventor: Michael I. Rackman. 1710 Glenwood
`Rd. , Brooklyn, N. Y. 11230
`
`[21] Appl. No. : 08/300, 163
`Sep. 2, 1994
`[22] Filed:
`
`. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H04L 9/00
`[51] Int. CL
`[52] U. S. Cl. . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380/4; 380/9; 380/21;
`380/23; 380/25; 380/49; 380/50; 380/54
`. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380/3, 4, 5, 9,
`[58] Field of Search
`380/10, 23, 25, 49, 50, 54. 21
`
`[56]
`
`5, 195, 133
`
`References Cited
`U. S. PATENT DOCUMENTS
`3/1 993 Kapp et al.
`
`IIIIIUIIhlllhlllllhllllllllllllhllll
`US005903646A
`[11] Patent Number:
`[45] Date of Patent:
`
`5, 903, 646
`May 11, 1999
`
`5222, 138
`5+97+02
`5, 321, 749
`5, 369, 704
`5/4L993
`
`6/1993 Balabon et al. . .
`3/1994 Kapp et al. . . . . . . .
`6/1994 Virga
`11/1994 Bennett et al. . . .
`7/1996 Fan et al. . . . . . . . . . .
`Primary Examiner — Bernarr E. Gregory
`[57]
`ABSTRACT
`
`. . . . . . . 380/23
`. . . . . . . . . 380/9
`. . . . . . . . 3SO/18
`. . . . . . . . . 380/9
`. . . 3SO/54 X
`
`An access control system for litigation document produc-
`tion. Documents are produced as stored images on an optical
`disk. Documents which are to be redacted or maintained
`confidential are stored in encrypted
`form. As the litigation
`progresses. access by the opposing counseVparty
`to addi-
`tional documents can be eftected by distributing appropriate
`decryption keys.
`
`380/9
`
`66 Claims, 4 Drawing Sheets
`
`MONITOR
`
`10
`
`SCANNER
`
`CPU
`
`PRINTER
`
`KEYBOARD
`
`MAC NETIC
`DISK
`DRIVE
`
`20
`
`OPTICAL
`DISK
`DRIVE
`
`16
`
`22
`
`BlackBerry Corporation Exhibit 1008, pg. 1
`
`

`

`U. S. Patent
`
`May 11, 1999
`
`Sheet 1 of 4
`
`5, 903, 646
`
`FIG. 1
`
`8a
`
`FIG. 2
`
`PAGE RECORD FIELDS
`
`R 00761 2 CONF ID ENTIAL
`
`8b
`
`1. ID NO,
`2. REDACTION-EXISTS FLAG; THIS-IS-IT FLAG
`3. PAIRED ID NO.
`(ONLY IF REDACTION EXISTS)
`4. REDACTION REASON
`(ONLY IF REDACTION EXISTS)
`5. BATES NO.
`6. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES IN DOCUMENT
`7. PRECEDING SAME-REDACTION-LEVEL PAGE ID NO.
`8. NEXT SAME-REDACTION-LEVEL PAGE ID NO.
`9. FIRST-LEVEL CONFIDENTIALITY FLAG, CF1
`10. SECOND-LEVEL CONFIDENTIALITY FLAG, CF2
`11. REDACTION ENCRYPTION & DECRYPTION KEYS
`(ONLY IF REDACTION EXISTS)
`12. CONFIDENTIALITY ENCRYPTION 8 DECRYPTION KEYS
`(ONLY IF CF1=1)
`13. AUTHOR
`14. DATE
`
`14
`
`SCANNER
`
`MONITOR
`
`FIG. 3
`
`10
`
`CPU
`
`PRINTER
`
`18
`
`KEYBOARD
`
`MAGNETIC
`DISK
`DRIVE
`
`20
`
`OPTICAL
`DISK
`DRIVE
`
`16
`
`22
`
`BlackBerry Corporation Exhibit 1008, pg. 2
`
`

`

`U. S. Patent
`
`May 11, 1999
`
`Sheet 2 of 4
`
`5, 903, 646
`
`START
`
`SCAN PAGE
`
`18
`
`ASSIGN ID NO. ; WRITE ID NO. (FIELD 1)
`
`20
`
`IS
`PACE A
`NEW DOCUMENT
`?
`
`NO
`
`22
`
`YES
`
`24
`
`WRITE TOTAL NO. OF PACES (FIELD 6)
`IN EVERY RECORD FOR PRECEDINC
`DOCUMENT
`
`WRITE NEXT PAGE ID NO. (FIELD 8) IN
`RECORD FOR PRECEDING PAGE
`
`GET PRECEDING PACE ID NO. FOR
`FIELD 7 OF CURRENT RECORD
`
`30
`
`IS
`REDACTION
`REQUIRED
`?
`
`YES
`
`NO
`
`CENERATE REDACTED IMAGE WHILE
`RETAINING ORIGINAL AS WELL
`
`32
`
`CENERATE REDACTION ENCRYPTION
`& DECRYPTION KEYS (FIELD 11)
`
`ASSIGN ID NO, TO REDACTED IMAGE;
`REPEAT STEPS 20, 24, 26, & 28 FOR
`REDACTED IMACE
`
`ENTER REASON FOR REDACTION (FIELD 4)
`
`34
`
`36
`
`38
`
`FIG. 4A
`
`BlackBerry Corporation Exhibit 1008, pg. 3
`
`

`

`U. S. Patent
`
`May 11, 1999
`
`Sheet 3 of 4
`
`5, 903, 646
`
`ASSICN BATES NO. TO ORIGINAL PAGE {FIELD 5);
`ASSICN BATES NO. TO REDACTED IMAGE {FIELD 5)
`IF ONE WAS CENERATED
`
`40
`
`42
`
`F IRST-
`LEVEL
`CONFIDENTIALITY
`REQUIRED
`
`44'
`
`YES
`
`SET CF1 FLAG; GENERATE CONFIDENTIALITY
`ENCRYPTION 8 DECRYPTION KEYS {FIELD 12)
`
`46
`
`SECOND-
`LEVEL
`CONFIDENTIALITY
`REQUIRED
`?
`
`YES
`
`SET CF2 FLAG
`
`48
`
`RECORD OPTICALLY ON PRODUCINC PARTY'5 DISK
`THE SCANNED PACE AT A DISK LOCATION
`CORRESPONDING TO THE ASSIGNED ID NO. ,
`AND WRITE FIELDS 1-12 IN RESPECTIVE
`DATABASE RECORD; DO SAME FOR REDACTED
`IMAGE IF IT EXISTS.
`
`RETURN TO START FOR SCANNING
`OF NEXT PACE
`
`FIG. 4B
`
`BlackBerry Corporation Exhibit 1008, pg. 4
`
`

`

`U. S. Patent
`
`May 11, 1999
`
`Sheet 4 of 4
`
`5, 903, 646
`
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`BlackBerry Corporation Exhibit 1008, pg. 5
`
`

`

`5, 903. 646
`
`1
`ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM FOR
`LITIGATION DOCUMENT PRODUCTION
`
`BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
`
`desire to turn over information which is not responsive
`to a
`document request, it is necessary to mask the irrelevant parts
`of the document. Similarly, privileged parts of a document
`may be redacted, Redactions are easily accomplished during
`the imaging process — blocks of text or other material can be
`located on a page and replaced by a blank image during
`the
`scanning process. But there are two problems with
`this.
`First, the producing party generally wants to have an image
`of the complete, unredacted page, even though the opposing
`party is given a redacted
`image; it necessarily complicates
`the disk-inaking process if two different sets of disks have to
`be made, not to mention
`that producing counsel certainly
`want to have a record of the redacted iinage they produced
`as well as the original. A bigger problem. however. has to do
`with an eventual Order of a Judge, Magistrate Judge, special
`master, etc. that a redacted document must be produced in its
`original form. If all document production
`is to be done by
`way of disks, this means
`that new disks have to be made.
`Alternatively, paper copies of the original documents can be
`provided, but they can no longer be integrated
`in the same
`database which applies to the documents on disk.
`The second document restriction has to do with confiden-
`tality. Very often, a Protective Order is entered into before
`the start of document production. Under
`the terms of a
`typical Order, documents may be marked as confidential,
`in
`which case they are not to be shown by receiving counsel to
`their client, There are even times when there are two levels
`of confidentiality. For example, a first-level confidential
`document may be shown to retained experts and consultants.
`but not the party. while a second-level of "counsel only"
`confidential
`documents may not be shown even
`to the
`experts. For different "team" members on the same side to
`be able to work together,
`they should be able to use copies
`of the same optical disks, yet there is an obvious roadblock
`when there are two or three different subsets of documents
`to which different classes of reviewers are to have access.
`What further complicates
`the confidentiality aspect is that
`it is routine during
`the initial stages of litigation
`to mark
`many documents as confidential even though
`they are not.
`the request of receiving counsel. counsel
`Upon
`for the
`producing party will often acknowledge
`that a document
`previously marked as confidential
`is not, or that a document
`previously marked
`is only
`as highly confidential
`lowly
`(i. e. , it may be shown
`confidential
`to a larger class of
`people). The question is how documents with different levels
`of security can all be placed on the same disk or set of disks
`while selectively restricting access to those documents and.
`more significantly. how to change permitted access to indi-
`vidual documents
`in response
`to attorney agreement or a
`Court Order.
`
`55
`
`SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
`Briefiy, in accordance with the principles of my invention,
`a disk produced
`to the opposing party
`includes a single
`image of a full page if that page is not redacted. But if a
`redacted form of the document
`includes two images — the complete original document with
`is to be produced.
`the disk
`no redactions, and a redacted form which it is desired to turn
`over to opposing counsel. The image of the unredacted
`60 document
`is encrypted. Accessing
`this image in the usual
`in the display of meaningless
`way results
`information. The
`producing
`party knows
`key for each
`the decryption
`encrypted
`image (typically stored in the database record for
`that image in the file of the producing party); the producing
`65 party uses that key to retrieve
`the encrypted unredacted
`image. If it is ever necessary
`to produce a copy of the
`unredacted
`image, all that is necessary is for counsel for the
`
`5
`
`10
`
`15
`
`20
`
`25
`
`30
`
`35
`
`40
`
`45
`
`50
`
`This
`invention
`relates
`access control
`to document
`systems, and more particularly
`to the control of access to
`documents produced during
`the course of litigation.
`One of the defining features of litigation
`in this country is
`the opening up of a party's
`files to the scrutiny of the
`opposing party or parties. Soon after the conunencement of
`a lawsuit, a party will often serve upon the other(s) a Request
`to Produce Documents. Typically,
`that Request calls for
`literally tens or hundreds of thousands, and even millions, of
`documents. A good part of the ensuing
`revolves
`litigation
`around deciding which documents
`should be produced,
`them with "Bates number" identifications,
`stamping
`redact-
`ing parts of documents
`as being
`irrelevant or privileged,
`selected documents with "confidential"
`stamping
`legends,
`logs (lists of documents which are
`preparing privileged
`being withheld on the grounds of attorney-client privilege or
`work product
`immunity),
`reviewing produced documents.
`filing motions concerning
`the propriety of withholding
`or
`redacting documents, etc. Teams of legal assistants
`and
`attorneys are assigned to these various tasks. It is cominonly
`accepted that one of the main reasons for the high cost of
`litigation
`in the United States has to do with document
`production.
`One way to cut down on the cost of document handling
`is
`to produce documents on optical disks. The producing party
`to opposing
`furnishes
`counsel not copies of actual
`documents, but rather optical disks on which the docuinent
`images have been stored. The documents are then accessed
`using an optical disk player. A retrieved document can be
`viewed on a monitor, and a copy can be printed if desired.
`One of the biggest advantages of document production on
`optical disks (besides the savings in rent since it is no longer
`to allocate a "war room" to the storage of pro-
`necessary
`duced paper) is that an associated document database can be
`developed. A database record can be generated for each page
`stored on a disk. (As used herein, a "document" can be a
`single page or a group of related pages. A "page" is a single
`piece of paper. ) The fields of each record can include author.
`date, addressee, recipients of copies, subject matter, names
`etc. When
`mentioned,
`reviewed by
`legal assistants or
`attorneys,
`individual pages can be annotated and indexed. It
`to employ optical character
`is even possible
`recognition
`(OCR) techniques
`so that each page
`is automatically
`scanned, and to develop an associated index. With an index,
`for example,
`there can be displayed
`images of
`successive
`pages all of which mention a particular person by name.
`even before analyzing
`the stored
`images, and documents
`dealing with
`the saine subject matter can be linked and
`viewed simultaneously. The integration of optical disk tech-
`nology and database management
`systeins, especially
`in
`high profile cases, is becoming more cominon. Service
`organizations are being established
`to image the documents
`and provide turnkey systems for attorney use of the resulting
`disk images.
`One major concern with imaging systems used in docu-
`is that of controlling access to "restricted"
`ment production
`documents. Documents can be restricted on two different
`grounds. The first pertains
`to redactions. There are many
`documents which the producing party partially redacts. For
`the same document may pertain not only to the
`example,
`subject rnatter of the particular
`lawsuit involved, but also to
`totally unrelated matters, and should the producing party not
`
`BlackBerry Corporation Exhibit 1008, pg. 6
`
`

`

`producing party to inform opposing counsel of the decryp-
`tion key for that image. Opposing counsel can then insert the
`decryption key in the database record associated with
`the
`from the
`unredacted page in question. and upon retrieval
`disk the decryption key will be used to decrypt the image for
`display or printing. Each redacted image preferably has its
`own decryption key so that there may be control of access
`to pages on a case by case basis. (The exact form of the
`image on the disk
`encryption of the complete, unredacted
`is not important. For example,
`and its subsequent decryption
`ouss
`the image may be enaypted
`the individual bits representing
`technique. Alternafively,
`using any standard cryptographic
`them-
`the unredacted
`image may
`the pixels representing
`selves not be encrypted, but they may stored in unordered
`locations on the optical disk, with a decryption key being
`required to retrieve them in proper order. There are numer-
`schemes which can be employed, and it is
`cryptographic
`in the art how to encrypt and decrypt stored
`well known
`images. )
`If a document
`it may be stored in the usual
`is confidential
`in the associated
`flags are placed
`way, but appropriate
`status. In this
`the confidentiality
`database record to represent
`is controlled by the
`case, access to confidential documents
`to enable retrieval
`is required
`operating systein. A password
`of documents characterized by each level of confidentiality,
`by receiving counsel
`are distributed
`and the passwords
`to the controlling Protective Order. Control of
`according
`thus depends on the integ-
`access to confidential docuinents
`rity of receiving counsel. but that is the case today anyway.
`flags are write-
`if the confidentiality
`However,
`even
`it is not difficult for a party with a computer
`protected.
`to effectively change or bypass a flag, e. g. , in
`background
`in which case a password would not be required to
`memory,
`is made non-
`document which
`access a confidential
`in this way. For this reason, the Protective Order
`confidential
`may provide that attorneys are not to distribute
`image disks
`to any person who is not to
`with confidential documents
`Instead, a disk can be
`have access to such documents.
`flags in the
`duplicated and any pages whose confidentiality
`level of
`record represent a specified
`associated database
`confidentiality can be blanked out. In such a case. passwords
`would not be required since an unauthorized person would
`not be given a disk with images of confidential documents
`in the first place.
`The problem with both of these schemes
`is that often
`that particular documents
`it is ordered
`litigation
`during
`non-
`be deemed
`confidential
`designated
`originally
`initially designate documents
`(Many attorneys
`confidential.
`as confidential because it is easier not to have to make a
`decision. ) It therefore becomes necessary to change access
`to confidential documents on a case by case basis. For this
`reason, the preferred embodiment of my invention entails
`just as the originals of
`iinages
`confidential
`encrypting
`images are encrypted. Access is controlled by
`redacted
`key for any
`decryption
`turning over
`the confidentiality
`to view it.
`to a person authorized
`document
`in redacted
`is to be produced
`If a particular document
`and one of the
`first
`it is also confidential,
`form and
`schemes (password or disks without
`confidentiality-protect
`then the document
`is employed,
`is
`confidential documents)
`form and
`stored on the disk in both redacted unencrypted
`unredacted encrypted form using a redaction encryption key;
`the flags in both associated records are the same, represent-
`ing the same level of confidentiality. Should a redacted.
`confidential docuinent have to be produced
`in unredacted
`form. but still on a confidential basis, producing counsel
`the redaction
`turn over to receiving counsel
`need only
`
`decryption key. Counsel for the receiving party, who are
`password at the start of the pro-
`the confidentiality
`given
`duction process, and/or who have disks with all documents
`stored thereon. can then use the decryption key to retrieve
`image. But a person who does not have
`the full unredacted
`access to confidential documents. and who is not provided
`images of confi-
`password and/or
`with the confidentiality
`in the first place, still has no access to the
`dential documents
`the
`image). When using
`full image (or even the redacted
`in which confidential docu-
`scheme, however.
`preferred
`images will be doubly
`some
`ments are also encrypted,
`to encrypt or decrypt
`the
`It is a simple matter
`encrypted.
`in the att, It is
`same image with two keys, as is well known
`that together with the optical disks, the
`to be understood
`the database file, e. g. , on magnetic
`producing party provides
`decryption key for
`the confidentiality
`includes
`disk, which
`image so that receiving counsel
`each encrypted confidential
`can image the confidential documents. A database file with-
`to
`out the confidentiality decryption keys may be furnished
`all those persons who want to review documents but who are
`not to have access to confidential documents. (Even though
`for imaging non-
`records may not be necessary
`database
`confidential documents. even furnishing a "blank" database
`should the reviewing party want to
`record is advantageous
`the documents as will be described below. ) If there
`annotate
`provide just one decryption key — it is just a matter of who
`to
`it is still sufficient
`levels of confidentiality,
`are two
`is given the key. But no matter who has the confidentiality
`decryption key, the full original of a redacted image cannot
`the redaction decryption key.
`be retrieved without
`In an extreme case in which it is ordered that a document
`be made
`fully
`is both redacted and confidential
`which
`is to distribute both
`available to everyone, all that is required
`the redaction decryption key and the confidentiality decryp-
`tion key for that document. The point is that by storing on
`forms of an original page,
`the disk redacted and unredacted
`and controlling access by the distribution of redaction and
`it is
`records,
`in database
`decryption keys
`confidentiality
`a litigation a particular per-
`possible to control throughout
`son's changing access to pariicular documents.
`
`BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
`Further objects, features and advantages of the invention
`will become apparent upon consideration of the following
`in
`the drawing,
`in conjunction with
`detailed description,
`which:
`FIG. I depicts
`the form of a page of a document as it
`in paper form;
`litigation,
`might be produced
`today, during
`FIG. 2 lists the fields in each record associated with a page
`stored on an optical disk;
`FIG. 3 is a block diagram of the equipment which is used
`in accordance with the invention, both for making optical
`images of documents
`to be produced, and
`disks containing
`images;
`for accessing the resulting
`FIGS. 4A and 4B comprise a flowchart of the steps in the
`method of creating a master optical disk for use by the
`producing party; and
`FIG. 5 is a flowchart
`the steps in the method
`illustrating
`of producing, from the master optical disk. an optical disk to
`be produced to opposing counseL
`
`DETAILED DESCRIPrlON OF THE
`PREFH~ EMBODIMENT
`is in the context of
`the following description
`the principles of the
`in litigation.
`documents
`
`Although
`producing
`
`5
`
`10
`
`15
`
`20
`
`25
`
`30
`
`35
`
`40
`
`45
`
`50
`
`55
`
`65
`
`BlackBerry Corporation Exhibit 1008, pg. 7
`
`

`

`5, 903, 646
`
`3Q
`
`invention
`are applicable wherever documents
`are to be
`distributed
`in redacted form or on a restricted-access basis.
`there may be a need
`and
`to furnish greater access to
`particular
`individuals
`as time goes by.
`As depicted in FIG. 1, a typic' page produced
`to oppos-
`is a copy of an original document
`ing counsel in litigation
`redactions or additions. The typical form of
`with perhaps
`redaction
`is shown by the numeral Sa, an area of text or
`drawing which has been made all white or all black. This is
`most readily accomplished on the copying machine
`itself
`is used
`to make
`which
`the copy; sophisticated
`copying
`include the capability of redacting a selected area
`machines
`on the copy. The area Sb in FIG. 1 often contains two pieces
`of added information,
`shown in enlarged form at the bottom
`of the drawing. First, an identification
`number, called a
`"Bates number" after the machine which
`is often used to
`stamp the number on the page, is placed so that it does not
`obscure
`the text. The number very often includes one or
`more letters, followed by a numeral. If there is a legend to
`be placed on the page, such as "confidential" as shown
`in
`FIG. I (although
`the legend is quite often longer), it should
`also be placed at a position where
`it does not obscure the
`text. The legend is typically placed on the page simply by
`using a stamp specially made for the purpose. There are
`other ways in which
`the Bates number
`(used in a generic
`sense) or legend may be placed on the sheet, including
`the
`use of stick-on labels, and copying machines which generate
`additional
`text or numerals.
`The hardware of my invention, shown in FIG. 2, consists
`of conventional components. The system is controlled by a
`CPU 10. Monitor 12, keyboard IS, magnetic disk drive 20
`and printer 16 are conventional components
`to be found in
`practically every personal computer
`system. Optical disk
`drive 22, which has both a write and read capability,
`is
`similarly
`conventional
`in every respect; such drives are
`available at the present time at a cost of no more than a few
`thousand dollars. Scanner 14 is also a standard component
`to digitize a document whose image is to be
`and functions
`recorded on an optical disk. CPU 10 can be used to control
`the recorded
`image by adding a "confidential"
`legend, a
`Bates number. redactions and encryption of the image. The
`individual
`and method steps of my
`hardware
`components
`invention are all conventional.
`As will be described below. the method of the invention
`can be best implemented
`by the party producing documents
`first recording an optical disk a master, for his/her own use.
`From this disk a copy, but a copy with differences,
`is made
`to be produced to opposing counsel. (Similarly. the database
`associated with the master disk is copied for the opposing
`party, but with changes. ) in order to make a copy of one disk
`from another. optical disk drive 22 preferably
`includes
`the
`capability of reading from one optical disk and writing on
`another;
`in the alternative,
`two drives can be used under
`control of CPU 10.
`In the illustrative embodiment of the invention,
`the data-
`base records associated with
`the pages on optical disk
`include a number of fields, which fields preferably are the
`same for all parties and for all copies of the optical disks. As
`will become apparent below, the producing party has a disk
`which is not necessarily
`the same as the one furnished
`to
`opposing counsel, but for any disk image
`the associated
`database
`record preferably
`contains
`the same
`fields, no
`matter whose copy of the optical disk is involved. This is
`if the parties agree in advance
`most advantageous
`that they
`will both (or they will all, if there are multiple parties)
`produce documents
`in the same form, and with the same
`database
`fields, so that at least the "templates'*
`for the
`
`database records come with
`the optical disks ready to be
`filled in by the individual parties. (Because it is a trivial
`to add fields to database
`matter
`records,
`it is not really
`necessary
`that all databases
`start out with the same record
`5 fields. ) FIG. 3 depicts the record fields used in the illustrative
`embodiment of the invention.
`Field 1 is an identification number. This number
`is not the
`Bates number which may be on the page image. In fact, it
`may not be necessary to place Bates numbers on the images
`io themselves, provided
`the parties agree that the disk identi-
`fication numbers will be used to identify documents. The ID
`in field I simply points to the location or address on
`number
`a disk where a particular
`image is to be found.
`Field 2 consists of two bits. a redaction-exists
`flag. and a
`this-is-it flag. The former flag is a 1 if the document
`is being
`to opposing counsel
`produced
`in redacted
`form. As dis-
`is an image pair-
`cussed above, what is actually produced
`an encrypted
`unredacted
`image, and an unencrypted
`redacted
`image. (Even
`the
`latter
`image may have been
`encrypted with a confidentiality
`key, and
`encryption
`the
`if it is
`former
`image may have been doubly encrypted
`confidential. ) The second flag identifies a particular
`image as
`one of these two forms. If the this-is-it flag is a I, then the
`associated image is in redacted form; if the flag is a 0. then
`the associated
`image is not redacted
`it will be
`(although
`encrypted). If the redaction-exists
`flag is a 0, then there is
`only one associated (unredacted)
`image, and the value of the
`this-is-it flag is irrelevant.
`If there is a redaction of an original page, then the disk
`produced to opposing counsel includes
`two images. In order
`to relate those two iinages to each other, field 3, which
`is
`non-zero only if there is a redaction
`in the first place (as
`represented by the redaction-exists
`the ID
`flag), contains
`35 number of the paired image. Th u s if the su bj ect image is not
`redacted and it is stored at an address represented by the ID
`in field 1, then field 3 will contain the ID number of
`number
`if the location represented
`the redacted image. Conversely,
`by the ID number in field 1 contains the redacted image, then
`~ the location identified by the ID number
`in field 3 contains
`the unredacted
`iinage.
`When a document
`is redacted, sooner or later there is a
`for an explanation. The explanation
`deinand
`(only if a
`document
`is redacted) is placed in field 4, if desired. In this
`45 way. opposing counsel can be furnished with the reason for
`the redaction at the tiine of document production. On the
`other hand, the producing party may want to make a record
`of the reason for the redaction, without
`actually
`telling
`opposing counsel, in which case field 4 is siinply
`left blank
`5o in the copy of the database furnished
`to opposing counsel.
`Code words, e. g. , irrelevant, can be used, or more descrip-
`tive explanations
`can be provided.
`In the absence of a
`redaction, field 4 is left blank, The redaction reason can be
`provided
`in the record for both the redacted and unredacted
`55 images, in only one of the records, or neither.
`If Bates numbers have been placed on documents.
`then
`the Bates number of the subject page may be entered in field
`5 of the record. This is a convenient way to tie disk location
`ID numbers and document-stamped Bates numbers
`to each
`6o other. (It might be thought
`that there is no reason to use
`Bates numbers since every document
`is uniquely
`identified
`by an ID number. However. one advantage
`in actually
`stamping each document, and doing so on the actual docu-
`ments retained by the producing party, is that if the produc-
`65 tion has to be updated as the litigation progresses,
`it may be
`readily determined which documents
`have already been
`produced when reviewing
`the producing party's files once
`
`BlackBerry Corporation Exhibit 1008, pg. 8
`
`

`

`S. 903. 646
`
`5
`
`10
`
`15
`
`20
`
`25
`
`30
`
`to most of the fields
`again. ) Once again, and this applies
`can be
`in FIG. 2, the Bates number
`information
`depicted
`in both database records in the case of a redacted
`provided
`document.
`to
`In order to automate document control. it is convenient
`group pages together if they are in the same document. For
`example. all pages of a single
`letter should be grouped
`together as a single document. This does not mean that the
`inust be stored on a disk in successive
`individual pages
`locations. Were this required, it would not be possible to add
`if a missing page is found. Instead, what is
`to a document
`is a way to link the individual pages of a single
`required
`document. Field 6 includes a number which represents
`the
`total nuinber of pages in the document which includes
`the
`page associated with the subject database record. Field 7
`identifies the ID number of the preceding page (if any) in the
`same document. Because there are redacted and unredacted
`documents which can be stored on the disk. the preceding
`the page in the same-redaction-
`page ID number
`identifies
`level document. For example. if the current page is in the
`then field 7 will represent
`redacted form of the document,
`the disk location of the preceding page
`in the redacted
`the linking of pages in the
`In order to inaintain
`document.
`if even a
`is desired,
`that this
`same document,
`assuming
`is redacted. then all pages should
`single page in a document
`be placed on the disk twice, once as part of a redacted form
`of the document. and once as part of an unredacted form of
`individual pages in the redacted
`the document. even though
`form might themselves be unredacted. Field 8 is comparable
`the ID number of the next
`to field 7, except that it contains
`page (if any) in the document of the same redaction level.
`In the illustrative embodiment of the invention,
`there are
`two levels of confidentiality. Field 9 contains a first-level
`flag. CF1. If the single bit in this field is a 0.
`confidentiality
`the requesting party can look at the
`that even
`it means
`document. If the bit is a 1, it might mean that no employees
`or agents of the requesting party may have access to the
`can look
`document, but that independent experts/consultants
`flag, CF2, in field 10,
`at it. The second-level confidentiality
`represents a higher level of confidentiality. If this flag is a 0.
`level represented by a I in
`it means that the confidentiality
`to create only two classes of docuinent
`field 9 is intended
`those who have access to all documents,
`and
`reviewers,
`those who have access only to non-confidential
`documents.
`But if the bit in field 10 is a 1. then it means that: there are
`three groups of people, those who can look at ail confidential
`those
`(e. g. , counsel for the requesting party).
`documents
`who do not have access to high-level confidential documents
`and those who have access to no confi-
`(e. g. , consultants),
`dential documents. The two flags, CF1, CF2 simply identify
`the particular page as being in one of three possible subsets
`of documents.
`Thus far it has been said that a non-confidential
`image
`in its redacted form
`is produced
`is to be redacted
`which
`without any encryption, but the original image is produced,
`it is possible to
`in encrypted form. (Although
`in its entirety,
`encrypt only the redacted portion of an image. it is simpler
`image in encrypted
`to produce on disk the entire unredacted
`form. ) If redaction of a page
`is to be effected,
`the
`then
`and decryption
`producing party requires both encryption
`keys. an encryption key in order to store the original form of
`the page. and a decryption key to retrieve this complete page
`(the key to be given to the receiving party only if it is later
`in unre-
`that the document should be produced
`determined
`dacted form). The encryption and decryption keys are stored
`in field 11. Obviously,
`the database, when first turned over
`to the receiving party, does not include any keys in field 11.
`
`Field 12 similarly
`and
`includes confidentiality
`encryption
`decryption keys for the stored image, but only if CF1=1 to
`is confidential. The decryption
`that the document
`represent
`key may be given to any party who is to have access to the
`the
`receiving counsel only requires
`document.
`(Although
`decryption key, both keys can be placed in the field for the
`benefit of the producing party, as will be described below,
`and it does not change things if receiving counsel is given
`the encryption key as well