Case IPR2019-00612
`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`
`and
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`FIRSTFACE CO., LTD.,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`________________
`
`Case IPR2019-00612
`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`________________
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
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`Case IPR2019-00612
`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
` 
`I.
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`THE ’557 PATENT AND THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS .......................... 3
`A.
`Problem Presented ................................................................................. 3
`B.
`Claim Construction ............................................................................... 5
`1.
`“simultaneously” ......................................................................... 7
`2.
`“inactive state” and “active state” ............................................. 10
`3.
`“user identification unit” ........................................................... 12
`III. LEVEL OF SKILL IN THE ART ................................................................. 15
`IV. SUMMARY OF THE REFERENCES ......................................................... 16
`A.
`Fadell ................................................................................................... 16
`B. Gagneraud ........................................................................................... 19
`C.
`iOS ....................................................................................................... 20
`D. Goertz .................................................................................................. 20
`E.
`Herfet ................................................................................................... 22
`V. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ........................................................ 23
`VI. THE PETITION DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
`CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE UNPATENTABLE UNDER GROUND 1. ........ 25
`A.
`The cited art, even when combined, does not disclose performance of
`user identification simultaneously with switching the display to an active
`state. 26
`Fadell Does Not Perform User Identification Simultaneously
`1.
`with Switching the Display to an Active State. .................................. 26
`2.
`The deficiencies of Fadell are not resolved by Gagneraud....... 31
`B. A POSITA would not combine Fadell with Gagneraud to arrive at the
`claimed invention. .......................................................................................... 34
`1.
`Petitioners have not adequately articulated a motivation to
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`Case IPR2019-00612
`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`combine Fadell with Gagneraud. ........................................................ 34
`2.
`Combining Fadell and Gagneraud would alter the fundamental
`operation of Fadell. .............................................................................. 37
`3.
`Power management considerations would dissuade a POSITA
`from combining Fadell with Gagneraud ............................................. 38
`VII. THE PETITION DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
`CHALLENGED CLAIMS ARE UNPATENTABLE UNDER GROUND 2. ........ 40
`A. Goertz does not disclose an activation button that switches the display
`from an inactive state to an active state. ........................................................ 41
`B.
`The cited references do not disclose performing user identification
`simultaneously with switching the display to an active state. ....................... 42
`1.
`Goertz does not perform user identification simultaneously with
`switching the display to an active state. .............................................. 42
`2.
`The deficiencies of Goertz are not resolved by Herfet. ............ 43
`There is no motivation to combine Goertz with Herfet. ..................... 46
`1.
`Petitioners have not adequately articulated a motivation to
`combine Goertz with Herfet. ............................................................... 46
`2.
`Herfet teaches away from the proposed combination by
`restricting its application to the power-on sequence. .......................... 49
`VIII. NO PRIOR ART REFERENCE DISCLOSES A DEVICE THAT
`PERFORMS FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION AND SIMULTANEOUSLY
`ACTIVATES THE DISPLAY SCREEN “BY A PRESS OF THE ACTIVATION
`BUTTON.” ............................................................................................................... 50
`IX. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 51 
`
`
`C.
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`Case IPR2019-00612
`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,
`725 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ....................................................................... 6, 7
`
`
`Advanced Fiber Techs. Trust v. J&L Fiber Servs.,
`674 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................... 9
`
`
`Affymetrix, Inc. v. Hyseq, Inc.,
`123 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Cal. 2001) .................................................................. 14
`
`
`Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc.,
`325 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ......................................................................... 14
`
`
`Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 38
`
`
`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ........................................................................... 9
`
`
`CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp.,
`349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ......................................................................... 24
`
`
`Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc.,
`149 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ........................................................................... 7
`
`
`Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Patent of Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC,
`Case No. IPR2012-00001, Paper 15 (PTAB Jan. 9, 2013) ................................ 24
`
`
`Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.,
`91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ........................................................................... 14
`
`
`Hill-Rom Servs. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................. 6
`
`
`In re Gordon,
`733 F.2d 900, 221 USPQ 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ......................................... 25, 37
`
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`
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`In re Rijckaert,
`9 F.3d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ................................................................... 24
`
`
`In re Royka,
`490 F.2d 981 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ........................................................................... 24
`
`
`K/S HIMPP v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC,
`751 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................. 33, 45, 46
`
`
`Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ........................................................................... 7
`
`
`Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................... 36, 48
`
`
`KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ..................................................................................... 24, 33
`
`
`Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,
`379 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 14
`
`
`Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.,
`868 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ......................................................................... 12
`
`
`Personalized Media Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n,
`161 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ........................................................................... 13
`
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ........................................................................... 5
`
`
`Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc.,
`711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ........................................................................... 6
`
`
`Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.,
`274 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ........................................................................... 6
`
`Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ........................................................................... 6
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ....................................................................... 6, 8
`
`Unified Patents Inc. v. Velos Media, LLC,
`Case IPR2019-00883, Paper No. 16 (PTAB Nov. 15, 2019) ............................ 33
`
`Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,
`655 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ......................................................................... 24
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ................................................................... 6
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................... 12, 13
`
`Rules, Statutes, and Other Authorities:
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ................................................................................................. 23, 24
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) .................................................................................................. 24
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ..................................................................................... 12, 13, 14, 15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282(b) .................................................................................................... 5
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) .................................................................................................. 23
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) ................................................................................................. 23
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) .......................................................................................... 35, 48
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ............................................................................................... 5
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 .................................................................................................... 1
`
`M.P.E.P § 2143.01(V) ............................................................................................. 25
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`Case IPR2019-00612
`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`PTAB 2018 Trial Practice Guide Update, pp. 3-4 ............................................ 35, 48
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`TABLE OF EXHBITS
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`Exhibit
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`Description
`
`2001
`
`2002
`
`2003
`
`2004
`
`2005
`
`2006
`
`2007
`
`Declaration of Dr. Alfred C. Weaver
`
`Anand L. Shimpi, iPhone 3G - First Battery Life Results (July 11,
`2008), http://www.anandtech.com:80/show/2566 (retrieved from
`http://web.archive.org/web/20100412072814/http://www.anandtech.c
`om:80/show/2566)
`
`James Galbraith, Test results: iPhone 4 battery life (July 1, 2010)
`https://www.macworld.com/article/1152460/iphone4_battery.html
`(retrieved from
`http://web.archive.org/web/20120427120056/https://www.macwor
`ld.com/article/1152460/iphone4_battery.html)
`
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2012/0167170 to Shi, et
`al.
`
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2012/0133484 to Griffin
`
`Declaration of Thomas Cecil
`
`Deposition Transcript of Benjamin Bederson
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, Patent Owner Firstface Co., Ltd.
`
`(“Firstface” or “Patent Owner”) submits this Response to the Petition of Apple
`
`Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
`
`(together, “Petitioners”) seeking inter partes review of claims 1, 8-9, and 15 of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557 (Ex. 1101, the “’557 patent”).
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The ’557 patent claims an elegant solution to the problem of incorporating
`
`fingerprint recognition into a mobile device while maintaining usability.
`
`According to the challenged claims, a press of the activation button when a
`
`device’s display is in an inactive state causes the device to perform a user
`
`identification function (via a fingerprint recognition) simultaneously with
`
`switching the display to an active state. By initiating performance of fingerprint
`
`recognition with the same button that turns on the display, and turning on the
`
`display regardless of whether authentication is successful, the claimed inventions
`
`increase device security while allowing users to interact with their devices as they
`
`have grown accustomed. Ex. 2001, ¶ 72
`
`None of the prior art references cited by Petitioners disclose simultaneous
`
`user identification and display activation. The primary references, Fadell and
`
`Goertz, disclose sequential operations; thus, Petitioners rely on secondary
`
`references, Gagneraud and Herfet, for their purported disclosure of powering on a
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`device simultaneously with authenticating a user. But, as Petitioners appear to
`
`concede, these secondary references also do not address switching a display from
`
`an inactive state (i.e., a state in which the display is turned off yet the device itself
`
`is on) to an active state, certainly not in any relevant context. The references, even
`
`when combined, thus do not disclose all claim limitations.
`
`Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that a POSITA would combine Fadell
`
`with Gagneraud or Goertz with Herfet. Petitioners’ stated motivation to combine
`
`these references is conclusory. Moreover, the evidence affirmatively indicates that
`
`a POSITA would not combine the references.
`
`Finally, even if Petitioners could overcome the aforementioned hurdles,
`
`Petitioners cannot show that any prior art reference, alone or in combination,
`
`discloses performing fingerprint recognition simultaneously with switching the
`
`display from an inactive state to an active state “by pressing the activation button.”
`
`Because the prior art does not disclose all limitations of the challenged
`
`claims, and because a POSITA would not combine the cited references, Petitioners
`
`have failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any challenged claim
`
`is obvious. The Board should therefore determine that the challenged claims are
`
`not unpatentable over the cited art.
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`II. THE ’557 PATENT AND THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS
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` 
`
`A.
`
`Problem Presented
`
`The ’557 patent explains that, as mobile communications devices have
`
`proliferated, their capabilities have expanded from simple communication to
`
`include innumerable other features and functions. See, e.g., Ex. 1101 (’557 patent),
`
`1:26-33. Indeed, while early mobile communications devices were largely used
`
`only as telephones, they now have cameras, web browsers, games, word-
`
`processing and messaging applications, e-mail software, and numerous other
`
`applications and features. As developers added functionality to these devices, they
`
`also added complexity. For example, historically, newly-added functions required
`
`that a device display be turned on before the functions could be accessed or
`
`executed, requiring a user to perform multiple initiating steps. Id., 1:34-38.
`
`Moreover, many of the functions required a new button, adding complexity and
`
`congestion to the user interface. Id.; see also Ex. 2001, ¶ 73.
`
`The inventors of the ’557 patent, including Firstface’s co-CEO, Jae Lark
`
`Jung, developed innovative solutions for improving the user experience with these
`
`increasingly complex devices. The inventors recognized that users habitually turn
`
`on the display of their devices with one specific button. Id., 1:45-56. Accordingly,
`
`the inventors developed technologies involving use of that button—which the ’557
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`patent often calls the activation button—to perform multiple functions or
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`operations (often at once). Id., 1:52-56. The activation button can be used, for
`
`instance, to turn on the display and perform a user identification process, such as
`
`fingerprint, facial, or iris recognition. Id., 1:62-64, 8:3-9. To further enhance user
`
`experience, the inventors also recognized that the user would prefer that the display
`
`turn on even if authentication fails. See Ex. 1101, claim 1. This configuration gives
`
`the user assurance that the terminal is operating normally and, as such, successfully
`
`received the user’s fingerprint (despite authentication failure). In addition, the
`
`function(s) performed may differ based on how the user presses the activation
`
`button. For example, a single press of the button can turn on the display and initiate
`
`one function, while a double press can turn on the display and initiate another
`
`function. Id., 4:40-5:6; see also Ex. 2001, ¶ 74.
`
`The claims of the ’557 patent are directed to using the activation button to
`
`perform a fingerprint recognition function simultaneously with turning on the
`
`display of the mobile device. See, e.g., id., claim 1; see also Ex. 2001, ¶ 75. Claim
`
`1 is representative:
`
`1. A mobile communication terminal comprising:
`a display unit; and
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`an activation button configured to switch from an inactive state,
`which is an OFF state of the display unit, to an active state, which is
`an ON state of the display unit; and
`a user identification unit configured to operate a user
`identification function,
`wherein the user identification function is performed
`simultaneously with switching from the inactive state of the display
`unit to the active state of the display unit by pressing the activation
`button,
`wherein the user identification function includes a fingerprint
`recognition.
`
`B. Claim Construction
`
`Claim terms subject to inter partes review are to be “construed using the
`
`same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a
`
`civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance
`
`with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.100(b). To this end, claim terms generally receive their ordinary and
`
`customary meaning. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`This is the meaning given by a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the filing
`
`date of the relevant patent application. Id. at 1313. Indeed, “unless compelled to do
`
`otherwise, a court will give a claim term the full range of its ordinary meaning as
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`understood by an artisan of ordinary skill.” Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274
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`F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). A court will only give a claim term a meaning
`
`other than its plain and ordinary meaning “(1) when a patentee sets out a definition
`
`and acts as his own lexicographer, or (2) when the patentee disavows the full scope
`
`of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Hill-Rom
`
`Servs. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v.
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`Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
`
`Notwithstanding the primacy of the claim language, courts interpret claim
`
`language “in light of the intrinsic evidence of record, including the written
`
`description, the drawings, and the prosecution history.” Power Integrations, Inc. v.
`
`Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting
`
`Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
`
`(internal quotation marks omitted)). The specification can be useful, for example,
`
`to “determine whether the inventor has used any terms in a manner inconsistent
`
`with their ordinary meaning.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1996). Additionally, “[i]diosyncratic language, highly technical terms, or
`
`terms coined by the inventor are best understood by reference to the specification.”
`
`3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2013). Although the specification can be a useful guide to how the inventor used a
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`disputed term, “limitations discussed in the specification may not be read into the
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`claims.” Id.; see also Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348
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`(Fed. Cir. 2009).
`
`The prosecution history can also inform the meaning of the claim language
`
`“because it may contain contemporaneous exchanges between the patent applicant
`
`and the PTO about what the claims mean.” Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc.,
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`149 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The prosecution history, however, cannot be
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`relied upon “to construe the meaning of [a] claim to be narrower than it would
`
`otherwise be unless a patentee limited or surrendered claim scope through a clear
`
`and unmistakable disavowal.” 3M Innovative Props., 725 F.3d at 1322.
`
`1.
`
` “simultaneously”
`
`In its Institution Decision, the Board construed “simultaneously” as “when a
`
`user just presses the activation button, both the user identification function and the
`
`switching from the inactive state of the display unit to the active state of the
`
`display unit are performed, without additional steps.” Decision at 14-15. Patent
`
`Owner agrees with this construction because it is “in accordance with the
`
`applicants’ express definition provided during prosecution of the ’557 patent.”
`
`Decision at 14; see also Ex. 2001, ¶ 77.
`
`As noted in the Institution Decision, in response to a final office action
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`rejecting the then-pending claims in the application that led to the ’557 patent, the
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`applicants stated:
`
`[I]n view of the specification and the claim language, it is clear that
`the term ‘simultaneously’ in claims 1 and 13 of the present application
`means that, when a user presses the activation button, both the user
`identification function and the switching from the inactive state of the
`display to the active state of the display unit are performed, without
`additional steps.
`Ex. 1102 at 190 (emphasis in original). The applicants applied their definition to
`
`distinguish their inventions over U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2013/0057385 A1
`
`(“Murakami”), a prior art reference cited by the examiner. The applicants argued
`
`that, in Murakami, the data is displayed only on the condition that the user’s
`
`identity is authenticated. Ex. 1102 at 191. If the user is not authenticated, the
`
`device does not display any data. Id. Thus, in Murakami, activation of the display
`
`occurs after performance of the identification function—activation of the display
`
`and fingerprint authentication do not occur without additional steps.. Id.
`
`The Federal Circuit has previously held that a patentee acts as a
`
`lexicographer when it uses the word “means” to define a term. See Thorner, 669
`
`F.3d at 1366 (“[T]he patentee acted as its own lexicographer when the
`
`specifications stated: ‘Multiple embossed’ means ….”). That is precisely what the
`
`applicants did here. Thus, in view of the definition of “simultaneously” in the
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`prosecution history and the claim language, it is appropriate to construe
`
`“simultaneously” as “when a user just presses the activation button, both the user
`
`identification function and the switching from the inactive state of the display unit
`
`to the active state of the display unit are performed, without additional steps.” See
`
`Advanced Fiber Techs. Trust v. J&L Fiber Servs., 674 F.3d 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2012) (“[T]he court correctly relied on a clear definition of a claim term set forth
`
`… in the prosecution history.”) (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288
`
`F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
`
`Petitioners’ proposed construction of “simultaneously” is wrong because it
`
`replaces “without additional steps” with “without additional user action.” Petition
`
`at 17. The definition in the prosecution history—“without additional steps”—says
`
`nothing about user action, and Petitioner has cited nothing that justifies departing
`
`from that definition. Moreover, the discussion of “without additional steps” in the
`
`prosecution history makes it clear that a “step” is not equivalent to “user action.”
`
`As explained above, during prosecution, the applicants distinguished over
`
`Murakami by arguing that activation of the display occurs after performance of the
`
`identification function and only if authentication is successful. Ex. 1102 at 191.
`
`Thus, Murakami did not anticipate the pending claims because the device
`
`performed sequential steps: (1) authenticating the user, and (2) only if
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`authentication is successful, activating the display. The applicants said nothing of
`
`whether a user performed sequential steps. The Board should accordingly adopt
`
`Patent Owner’s proposed construction and reject Petitioners’ proposed
`
`construction.
`
`2.
`
`“inactive state” and “active state”
`
`In its Institution Decision, the Board construed “inactive state” as “a state in
`
`which the mobile communication terminal is communicable but a display screen is
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`turned off, regardless of whether or not the mobile communication terminal
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`performs a predetermined operation, and the mobile communication terminal is not
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`completely turned off.” Decision at 15-16. Similarly, the Board construed the term
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`“active state” to mean “a state in which the display screen of the mobile
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`communication terminal is turned on.” Decision at 16. While the Board did not
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`explicitly construe “an OFF state of the display unit,” or “an ON state of the
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`display unit,” it held that the claims equate those terms with “inactive state” and
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`“active state,” respectively. Decision at 16 .
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`While the Board’s constructions differ slightly from what Patent Owner
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`proposed in its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner believes that the Board’s
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`constructions are substantively identical to what Patent Owner proposed, and thus
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`Case IPR2019-00612
`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`agrees with the Board’s constructions. The specification explicitly defines
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`“inactive state” as follows:
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`The term “inactive state” used herein refers to a state in which
`the mobile communication terminal is communicable but a display
`screen is turned off[.] Even when the display screen is turned off, a
`predetermined function (for example, a music play function or the
`like) is operable. . . . [T]he term “inactive state” used herein refers to a
`concept encompassing states in which the display screen is turned off,
`regardless of whether or not the mobile communication terminal
`performs a predetermined operation. However, a state in which the
`mobile communication terminal is completely turned off is excluded.
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`Ex. 1101, 3:28-38. Similarly, the specification defines “active state” as follows:
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`The term “active state” used herein refers to a state in which the
`display screen of the mobile communication terminal is turned on.
`Switching from the “inactive state” to the “active state” refers to
`switching of the display screen from the OFF state to the ON state,
`regardless of information displayed on the display screen in the ON
`state. For example, the mobile communication terminal can be
`determined to be in the “active state” even when only a lock screen is
`displayed.
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`Id., 3:38-46. The Board’s constructions of “inactive state” and “active state”
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`correctly reflect these definitions. See Ex. 2001, ¶¶ 78-79. And, as the Board
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`recognized, the claims equate “an OFF state of the display unit” and “an ON state
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`of the display unit” with “inactive state” and “active state,” respectively, so no
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`construction of these terms is needed.
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`Case IPR2019-00612
`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`3.
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`“user identification unit”
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`In its Institution Decision, the Board requested briefing on whether “user
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`identification unit” is a means-plus-function term governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112,
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`¶ 6. Patent Owner submits that “user identification unit” is not a means-plus-
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`function term because it evokes a class of structures well-known to a POSITA.
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`And, even if the term “user identification function” did not by itself provide
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`sufficient structure without reference to the specification, the remainder of the
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`claims conveys such structure. Finally, none of the arguments made by the parties
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`turn on the meaning of “user identification unit,” so no further construction is
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`required at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor
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`Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`As an initial matter, “user identification unit” is presumed not to be a means-
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`plus-function limitation. As the Board recognized, “a claim term that does not use
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`the word ‘means’ triggers a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth
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`paragraph, does not apply.” Decision at 17 (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online,
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`LLC, 792 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). “User identification unit” does not
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`use the word “means.” Thus, the term is presumed not to be a means-plus-function
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`term, and that presumption is only overcome “if the challenger demonstrates that
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`the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites
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`Case IPR2019-00612
`U.S. Patent No. 8,831,557
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`‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’”
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`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (citation omitted).
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`“User identification unit” recites sufficiently definite structure because it
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`evokes a class of structures well-known to a POSITA. Even when a term does not
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`evoke a particular structure, it is sufficient if it evokes a class of structures to one
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`knowledgeable in the art. Personalized Media Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. Int'l Trade
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`Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Even though the term ‘detector’
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`does not specifically evoke a particular structure, it does convey to one
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`knowledgeable in the art a variety of structures known as ‘detectors.’ We therefore
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`conclude that the term ‘detector’ is a sufficiently definite structural term to
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`preclude the application of § 112, ¶ 6.”). Claim 1 of the ’557 patent recites a “user
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`identification unit” within the well-defined context of a “mobile communication
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`terminal”—e.g., a phone or tablet—which conveys meaning to one of skill in the
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`art as a class of structures within the field. It is no secret that user identification is
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`a core concept related to personal computing devices—Petitioner’s expert opined
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`in his original declaration that “the concepts of . . . device security and
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`authentication . . . were [] prevalent before the ’557 patent.” Ex. 1103, ¶48. The
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`user identification unit within this context thus connotes a class of structures that is
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`easily understood by one of skill in the art. See Ex. 2001, ¶¶ 80-81. “User
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`identification unit” is, accordingly, not a means-plus-function limitation.
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`Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
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`(finding that “detent mechanism” was not a means-plus-function term because it
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`denotes a type of device with a generally understood meaning in the mechanical
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`arts); Affymetrix, Inc. v. Hyseq, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 1212, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
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`(finding that “‘computer code’ is not a generic term, but rather recites structure that
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`is understood by those of skill in the art to be a type of device for accomplishing
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`the stated functions”).
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`Even if “user identification unit” did not by itself recite sufficiently definite
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`structure, the remainder of the claim provides it with sufficient structure. The
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`Federal Circuit has held that a term that does not by itself connote sufficient
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`structure may connote sufficient structure when the claim provides additional
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`structural detail. See, e.g., Linea