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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________
`
`FACEBOOK, INC., INSTAGRAM, LLC, and WHATSAPP INC.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`BLACKBERRY LIMITED,
`Patent Owner
`________________
`
`IPR2019-00528
`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
`________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S SUR-REPLY
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`
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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`IPR2019-00528
`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`Page
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`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1
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`RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS ................................................................... 2
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`A. MacLaurin Fails to Disclose “Tag Type Indicator[s] . . .
`Indicative of a Tag Source” ................................................................. 2
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`1.
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`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`Background of the Dispute........................................................ 2
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`The Challenged Patents are Valid Even Under
`Petitioners’ Interpretation of MacLaurin ................................... 4
`
`The Board Should Adopt BlackBerry’s Proposed
`Construction of “Tag Source” ................................................... 6
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`Other Embodiments in MacLaurin and Other Prior Art
`Cannot Compensate for MacLaurin’s Lack of a “Tag
`Type Indicator . . . Indicative of a Tag Source” ....................... 12
`
`B.
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`Petitioners Failed to Perform the Necessary Obviousness
`Analysis for the “Tag List” Limitation .............................................. 13
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`III. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 15
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`i
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`IPR2019-00528
`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`Page
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`Cases
`
`Abiomed, Inc. v. Maquet Cardiovascular, LLC,
`IPR2017-01204 & -01205, Paper 8 (Oct. 23, 2017) ....................................14
`
`Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
`811 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................10
`
`Amazon.com, Inc. v. ZitoVault, LLC,
`754 Fed. App’x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ........................................................ 7, 8
`
`K/S Himpp v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC,
`751 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................................................................13
`
`Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharma. USA, Inc.,
`395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ...................................................................10
`
`In re Nuvasive, Inc.,
`842 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................14
`
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`ii
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`IPR2019-00528
`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`LIST OF EXHIBITS
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`Exhibit #
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`Description
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`2001
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`2002
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`2003
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`2004
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`2005
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`2006
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`2007
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`2008
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`2009
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`2010
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`2011
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`2012
`
`Declaration of Rajeev Surati, Ph.D.
`
`Excerpts from the American Heritage College
`Dictionary, 4th ed. (2002)
`
`Excerpts from Webster’s New World College Dictionary,
`4th ed. (2008)
`
`Excerpts from Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary,
`11th ed. (2003)
`
`Exhibit 9 from the Deposition of Sandeep Chatterjee,
`Ph.D.
`
`Petitioners’ Opposition to BlackBerry’s Motion for
`Partial Summary Judgment of Infringement in the
`District Court Litigation
`
`Intentionally Omitted
`
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent No. 9,495,335
`
`U.S. Patent Application No. 13/252,807
`
`U.S. Patent Application No. 11/746,285
`
`Redline comparison of ’807 and ’285 Applications
`
`Transcript of November 7, 2019 Deposition of Sandeep
`Chatterjee, Ph.D.
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`
`
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`iii
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`IPR2019-00528
`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`All instituted grounds point to MacLaurin for the “tag type indicator . . .
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`indicative of a tag source” and “displaying a tag list including tags” (plural)
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`limitations. Petitioners’ Reply only underscores, however, that both of these
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`limitations are absent from MacLaurin.
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`First, Petitioners resort to a new, overbroad construction of “tag sources” in
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`an effort to preserve their strained interpretation of MacLaurin (articulated for the
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`first time in the Reply). Petitioners’ construction effectively reads the “indicative
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`of a tag source” limitation out of the claims and should, therefore, be rejected.
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`Under the correct construction, MacLaurin’s alleged “tag type indicator[s]” are not
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`“indicative of a tag source.” Petitioners cannot cure this basic deficiency using
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`MacLaurin’s external tag sources, Rothmuller, or Plotkin because these other
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`embodiments and references also do not disclose “a tag type indicator . . .
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`indicative of a tag source,” as claimed.
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`Second, Petitioners do not dispute that MacLaurin never displays “a tag list”
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`with multiple “tags.” Petitioners’ obviousness assertions for this limitation are
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`conclusory, fail to identify any motivation to stray from MacLaurin’s express
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`teachings, and should, therefore, be rejected.
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`1
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`IPR2019-00528
`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`II. RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS
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`A. MacLaurin Fails to Disclose “Tag Type Indicator[s] . . . Indicative
`of a Tag Source”
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`1.
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`Background of the Dispute
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`Petitioners originally identified two related sentences in MacLaurin they
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`argued disclose the “tag type indicator . . . indicative of a tag source” limitation.
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`Pet. at 35-46 (quoting MacLaurin at 7:48-51, 8:19-23 as allegedly disclosing “it is
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`desirable to easily distinguish between ‘automatic’ and ‘explicit’ tag types” and
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`that MacLaurin accomplishes this result “utilizing different sizes, fonts, colors,
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`and/or symbols and the like”). But, as explained in Section VII.A.1 of
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`BlackBerry’s Patent Owner Response, MacLaurin describes two separate modes: a
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`tagging mode used to manually tag files; and a recall mode used to subsequently
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`find files using tags. Even Petitioners’ expert, Dr. Chatterjee, admitted that
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`MacLaurin’s recall mode is “a totally different thing” from MacLaurin’s tagging
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`mode. Ex. 2012 (Chatterjee Tr.) at 122:11-14. And the two sentences identified
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`by Petitioners describe MacLaurin’s recall mode, whereas Petitioners only rely on
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`MacLaurin’s tagging mode as allegedly rendering obvious the Challenged Claims.
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`Petitioners no longer contend that MacLaurin at 7:48-51 describes
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`MacLaurin’s tagging mode. See Reply at 16 (arguing that the two sentence
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`describe “‘both’ the recall and tagging features). Petitioners maintain, however,
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`that MacLaurin at 8:19-23 describes MacLaurin’s tagging mode. Reply at 11. The
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`2
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`relevant sentence recites: “[I]f an automated tag and an explicit tag (one entered by
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`a user) are both presented to the user, each type of tag can be distinguished
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`utilizing different sizes, fonts, colors, and/or symbols and the like.”
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`As BlackBerry explained in its Patent Owner Response, MacLaurin at 8:19-
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`23 cannot describe MacLaurin’s tagging mode, because MacLaurin would never
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`display “automated tag[s]” for a user to select. In automated/automatic item
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`tagging, after a user beings typing, a tag is “automatically associated with the
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`selected items without further user action.” See MacLaurin at Abstract (emphasis
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`added). This is in contrast to “suggested tags” displayed in MacLaurin’s tagging
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`mode. See id. at 8:17-18 (requiring “the user hits the enter/return key (or similar)”
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`before “apply[ing] the items to the tag”); compare Fig. 9 (tagging files “without
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`further user interaction”) with Figs. 10-11 (tagging files by “providing the user
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`with at least one item tag suggestion in response to the user [input/selection]”).
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`Petitioners do not dispute that no suggested tags are displayed when an
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`automatic/automated tag is assigned to a file; instead, Petitioners now contend that
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`MacLaurin’s discussion of “automated tags” at col. 8:19-23 refers to “a previously-
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`assigned ‘automatic’ tag [that] can later appear as a tag suggestion to a user when
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`tagging items.” Reply at 15 (emphasis in original). Under Petitioners’ revised
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`theory, an “‘automatic’ tag” assigned to a first file can later because a “suggested
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`3
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`tag” for a second file if it is “associated with a similar item, a recently used tag,” or
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`“a commonly used tag.” Id. (quoting MacLaurin at 4:48-53).
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`2.
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`The Challenged Patents are Valid Even Under Petitioners’
`Interpretation of MacLaurin
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`Petitioners’ current interpretation of MacLaurin cannot save Petitioners’
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`invalidity theories: if MacLaurin at 8:19-23 describes visually distinguishing
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`between “previously-assigned” automated tags and “previously-assigned” explicit
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`tags, then this distinction would not be “indicative of a tag source,” since both sets
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`of “previously-assigned” tags would be from the same “tag source.”
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`Petitioners point out that automatic/automated tags are “generated by the
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`tagging system,” while explicit tags are “from a user.” Reply at 19. But in
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`Petitioners’ invalidity theory, those tags are first assigned to files, and MacLaurin
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`later searches those “previously-assigned” tags to present “suggested tags” for the
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`next file. See Reply at 15. The identity of the entity that first generates a tag (e.g.,
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`the “tagging system” or a “user”) does not dictate the tag’s “source.” For example,
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`one of the tag sources described in the ’173 Patent is “a list of friends from an
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`online service like FacebookTM.” ’173 Patent at 5:43-44. The ’173 Patent
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`describes this as a single “source,” even though each one of the “friends” originally
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`created his or her own profile (e.g., entered his or her own name). See FIG. 4B
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`(showing five tags with names of different Facebook friends). Thus, the identity of
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`4
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`the person (or system) who initially created a tag does not dictate the “source” of a
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`tag, and tags created by multiple entities can still all be from the same “tag source.”
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`Instead, as explained in Section VI.A of BlackBerry’s Patent Owner
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`Response and further addressed in Section II.B.3 of this Sur-Reply, a “tag source”
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`is a “separately searchable collection of tags,” as reflected in BlackBerry’s
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`proposed construction. Petitioners have no basis to assert “previously-assigned”
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`automated and explicit tags are two different “tag sources” under BlackBerry’s
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`construction of that term, and MacLaurin thus does not disclose “a tag type
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`indicator . . . indicative of a tag source” under Petitioners’ revised interpretation of
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`MacLaurin if BlackBerry’s construction of ‘tag source” is adopted.
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`Petitioners, in contrast, contend MacLaurin’s “previously-assigned” tags
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`constitute more than one “tag source” only because “the ability in MacLaurin to
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`distinguish the automatic and explicit tags (and present different indicators for
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`each) . . . confirms the existence of separately recognizable collections of tags.”
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`Reply at 19 (emphasis added). Petitioners’ argument harks back to its proposed
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`construction of a ‘tag source” as “a recognizable collection of tags”. Reply at 10
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`(emphasis in original).
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`The parties’ dispute thus boils down to claim construction: should the term
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`“tag source” be construed as “a separately searchable collection of tags”
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`(BlackBerry’s proposal) or as “a recognizable collection of tags” (Petitioners’ new
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`5
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`
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`proposal on reply). Since BlackBerry’s construction is correct, all of Petitioners’
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`IPR2019-00528
`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`Grounds must fail.
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`3.
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`The Board Should Adopt BlackBerry’s Proposed
`Construction of “Tag Source”
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`As explained in Section VI.A of BlackBerry’s Patent Owner Response, the
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`Board should construe the term “tag source” as “separately searchable collection of
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`tags.” “[S]eparately searchable” is grounded in the intrinsic record and correctly
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`focuses on how “tags” are obtained, and not just their subject matter. Petitioners’
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`proposal—“a recognizable collection of tags”—is a continuation of their effort to
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`remove any substantive meaning from the claimed “tag source,” allowing
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`Petitioners to identify multiple “tag source[s]” even where there is just a single
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`“source.”
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`In its Reply, Petitioners contend that BlackBerry’s proposed construction is
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`ambiguous. Reply at 1-3. But in that same section, Petitioners correctly explain
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`“separately searchable” means each tag source is “capable of being searched
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`without having to search another tag source.” Reply at 2. The ’173 Patent
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`specification thus teaches that it is possible to search “one” tag source or multiple
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`tag sources. ’173 Patent at 5:39-4. This also means that it must be possible to
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`search just one tag source without searching the others, which leads to the
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`conclusion that “tag sources” are “separately searchable,” as reflected in
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`6
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`BlackBerry’s proposal. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. ZitoVault, LLC, 754 Fed. App’x
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`965, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that, because the claims require “multiple
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`‘sessions,’” this “suggest[s] that the system recognizes distinct sessions”).
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`Petitioners also argue BlackBerry is importing a “separately searchable”
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`requirement into the claims. Reply at 3-8. This is incorrect. BlackBerry is
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`applying the plain meaning to the term “tag source.” The fact that the claims recite
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`“one or more tag sources” means that there must be a difference between a
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`collection of tags that is from just “one” tag source and a collection of tags that is
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`from multiple tag sources. The correct focus in this analysis is on how tags are
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`obtained—that is, whether they are “from” different sources, as recited in the
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`claims. This is confirmed by the ’173 Patent’s specification, where tags from
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`different “sources” can, e.g., be obtained from different applications. See ’173
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`Patent at 3:40-55, 5:39-47, 5:56-61, 6:27-52; see also id. at Fig. 1.
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`Petitioners’ criticism of the ’173 Patent’s specification is misplaced and
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`irrelevant. Petitioners contend “[n]othing in the specification describes how any
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`search of the tag sources is carried out.” Reply at 4-5. Their own expert undercuts
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`this argument, however, with his admission that the specification discloses “the
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`ability to search just one tag source” and “the ability to search multiple tag
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`sources.” Ex. 2012 (Chatterjee Tr.) at 55:13-21. Next, Petitioners argue the
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`sources in the specification are exemplary (Reply at 5-6), but that renders them no
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`7
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`less useful in understanding the plain meaning of “tag sources.” Finally,
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`Petitioners contend that nothing in the specification precludes data from being
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`stored in different locations (e.g., locally vs. at a server) (Reply at 6-8), but the
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`physical location does not control whether two collections of tags are from
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`different sources. See, e.g., ’173 Patent at 1 (“Internet Browser 138” and “Address
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`Book 142” are two “tag sources” even though both are local to communication
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`device 100).
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`Not only is BlackBerry’s proposed construction correct, but Petitioners have
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`failed to present any workable alternative. Effectively acknowledging there must
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`be some manner for distinguishing tags from different sources, Petitioners contend
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`“[a] construction more consistent with ZitoVault would have been ‘a recognizable
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`collection of tags,’ which Petitioner[s] believe[] is already implicit in [their]
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`proposed construction.” Reply. at 9 (emphasis in original).1 Petitioners provide no
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`1 While Petitioners’ proposed construction uses the same word (“recognizable”)
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`also found in the construction approved in ZitoVault, this similarity is superficial at
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`best. The claim term “session” in ZitoVault had a temporal aspect that allowed
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`different “sessions” to be distinguished based on their “recognizable” beginnings
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`and ends. In contrast, the word “recognizable” does not modify any concrete
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`characteristic that can be used to distinguish different “tag sources.”
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`8
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`objective criteria for what qualifies as “recognizable,” however, allowing
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`Petitioners to argue any arbitrary collection of tags qualifies as a “tag source.” For
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`example, Petitioners provide no explanation how their proposed construction
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`would allow one of ordinary skill to determine how many “tag sources” are present
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`in Rothmuller. Compare Ex. 2012 (Chatterjee Tr.) at 86:25-88:15 (testifying he
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`was “not really sure how to answer” the question of “[h]ow many different tag
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`sources are illustrated in [a] figure” summarizing Rothmuller’s categories and
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`types) with Ex. 1023 (Chatterjee Reply Decl.) ¶ 51 (maintaining that either
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`categories or types in Rothmuller can “qualify as tag sources”). Thus, Petitioners’
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`proposed construction of “a recognizable collection of tags” fails to address the
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`deficiencies in Petitioners’ original interpretation of this term.
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`Indeed, Petitioners’ proposed construction of “tag source” renders the claim
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`limitation “said tag type being indicative of a tag source associated with the tag”
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`superfluous. Under Petitioners’ interpretation, the mere ability to “display[] a tag
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`type indicator” for a collection of tags (or otherwise distinguish them) renders that
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`collection of tags “recognizable” and thus a “tag source.” See, e.g., Reply at 15
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`(emphasis added):
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`The Petition further explained
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`that
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`the ability
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`in
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`MacLaurin to distinguish the automatic and explicit tags
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`(and present different indicators for each) further
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`9
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`confirms
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`the existence of separately recognizable
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`collections of tags. (Petition at 32; Ex. 1002, ¶74.)
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`Nothing more is required by the claim as properly
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`construed.
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`Accordingly, if Petitioners’ interpretation were adopted, any “tag type
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`indicator” would automatically designate “tag source”—the additional claim
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`requirement that “the tag type” is “indicative of a tag source” would be redundant
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`and devoid of meaning. Petitioners’ proposed construction for “tag source,”
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`therefore, cannot be correct. See Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharma. USA, Inc., 395
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`F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A construction that gives meaning to all the
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`terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”); Akzo Nobel
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`Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 811 F.3d 1334, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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`(rejecting broad construction of “pressurized collection vessel” because it “would
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`render ‘collection’ entirely superfluous and allow any pressurized vessel to
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`constitute a ‘pressurized collection vessel”).
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`Finally, Petitioners’ non-infringement position in district court litigation is
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`fatal to its claim construction argument here. In district court, Petitioners argued
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`the “tag type indicator . . . indicative of a tag source” limitation is not met because
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`“[t]he supposed ‘tag type indicators’ identified by BlackBerry, at best, correspond
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`to categories of tag suggestions – not their sources.” Ex. 2006 at 13. Petitioners
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`thus argued that “categories of tag suggestions”—which Petitioners do not dispute
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`10
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`would qualify as “recognizable collection[s] of tags”—are distinguishable from tag
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`“sources.” Petitioners now contend they made this litigation statement in a
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`different context (Reply at 9-10), but they cannot escape their admission that tag
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`“categories” and “sources” are different concepts. Petitioners’ district court
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`argument thus demonstrates the incorrectness of their IPR construction—even
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`Petitioners themselves disagreed with this construction when arguing non-
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`infringement.2
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`Accordingly, BlackBerry’s proposed construction of “tag source” to mean a
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`“separately searchable collection of tags” should be adopted. And once
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`BlackBerry’s proposed construction is adopted, there is no dispute Facebook’s
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`prior art references lack multiple “tag sources” and fail to disclose “a tag type
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`indicator . . . indicative of a tag source,” as claimed.
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`2 In contrast, BlackBerry’s position is consistent: the term “tag sources” should be
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`construed according to its plain meaning. In this IPR, it is necessary to construe
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`that plain meaning to resolve a dispute between the parties. Petitioners have not
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`identified any equivalent dispute in district court litigation that would need to be
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`resolved by expressly construing “tag sources.”
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`11
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`4. Other Embodiments in MacLaurin and Other Prior Art
`Cannot Compensate for MacLaurin’s Lack of a “Tag Type
`Indicator . . . Indicative of a Tag Source”
`
`Petitioners cite MacLaurin’s discussion of “external tag sources” as
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`allegedly “render[ing] obvious the presence of multiple distinct tag sources used
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`for tagging items.” Reply at 19-20. This argument misses the point. The
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`Challenged Claims require “a tag type indicator . . . indicative of a tag source.”
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`The only alleged disclosure in MacLaurin cited by Petitioners for this limitation is:
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`“[I]f an automated tag and an explicit tag (one entered by a user) are both
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`presented to the user, each type of tag can be distinguished utilizing different sizes,
`
`fonts, colors, and/or symbols and the like.” MacLaurin at 8:19-23. This sentence
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`only discloses visually distinguishing between “an automated tag and an explicit
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`tag”—MacLaurin never discloses further distinguishing if a tag is from an
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`“external tag source[].”
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`Petitioners also cannot rely on Rothmuller or Plotkin to cure MacLaurin’s
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`lack of the claimed “tag type indicator . . . indicative of a tag source.” Petitioners
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`acknowledge “the proposed combination set forth in the Petition did not rely on
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`Rothmuller or Plotkin for the claimed ‘tag sources’” and contend it is “irrelevant”
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`whether “Rothmuller or Plotkin disclose distinct ‘tag sources.’” Reply at 21. But
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`if Rothmuller and Plotkin’s categories are not “tag sources,” then Rothmuller and
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`Plotkin’s category icons cannot be “indicative of a tag source.” Rothmuller and
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`12
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`Plotkin, therefore, also fail to disclose “a tag type indicator . . . indicative of a tag
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`source,” as claimed.
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`Accordingly, MacLaurin’s discussion of external tags, Rothmuller, and
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`Plotkin all fail to disclose “a tag type indicator . . . indicative of a tag source,” as
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`claimed. Petitioners have, therefore, not identified any prior art disclosure of this
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`limitation. Moreover, the claimed “tag type indicator . . . indicative of a tag
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`source” is not a minor claim limitation that can be addressed via reliance on
`
`common sense, but goes to the very core of the innovation claimed by the ’173
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`Patent. Petitioners cannot prevail on obviousness without identifying this claim
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`limitation in some prior art reference. See K/S Himpp v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC,
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`751 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that “obviousness” “require[s]
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`record evidence to support an assertion that [the claimed] structural features . . .
`
`were known prior art elements”). The Board should, therefore, affirm the validity
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`of the Challenged Claims.
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`B.
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`Petitioners Failed to Perform the Necessary Obviousness Analysis
`for the “Tag List” Limitation
`
`The Challenged Claims require “displaying a tag list including tags” (plural).
`
`As explained in Section VII.B of BlackBerry’s Patent Owner Response, the
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`portions of MacLaurin cited by Petitioners do not disclose “displaying” any such
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`list. At best, the cited portions describe generating “a list of tag suggestions,” but
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`13
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`
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`those suggested tags are then displayed one at a time, starting with a single “‘best
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`guess’ tag.” MacLaurin at 4:42-48, 5:25-37, 8:9-10, 8:51-53; see also MacLaurin
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`at Fig. 8 (“suggested tag ‘graphics’ 802”). A single tag is not a “list,” and
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`displaying one tag at a time, as described in MacLaurin, does not disclose
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`“displaying a tag list including tags” (plural).
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`Petitioners do not contest that MacLaurin does not disclose this limitation,
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`and instead argue that “it would have been obvious to display the tag
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`suggestions . . . in the form of a tag ‘list.’” Reply at 23; see also id. at 23-24 (“[I]t
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`would have been obvious that that mode would provide a tag list in light of the
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`other disclosures in MacLaurin . . . .”). But Petitioners provide none of the
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`analysis necessary to prevail on an obviousness argument. They do not, for
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`example, identify any motivation to depart from MacLaurin’s express teaching of
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`displaying one tag at a time to instead display a “tag list,” as claimed. See Pet. at
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`30-31; Ex. 1002 (Chatterjee Decl.) ¶¶70-71; see also In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d
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`1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that obviousness requires an
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`“articulation[] of motivation to combine” that “must be supported by a ‘reasoned
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`explanation,’” as opposed to “‘conclusory statements’ alone”). This obviousness
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`analysis is required even when combining disparate disclosures in a single prior art
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`reference, as Petitioners purport to do here. See Abiomed, Inc. v. Maquet
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`Cardiovascular, LLC, IPR2017-01204 & -01205, Paper 8, at 10-12 (Oct. 23, 2017)
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`14
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`IPR2019-00528
`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`(denying institution where “[p]etitioner’s challenge treats the various features of
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`[the prior art’s] different embodiments as if they are interchangeable with one
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`another” without “provid[ing] sufficient rationale to combine the teachings of . . .
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`different embodiments”).
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`Petitioners, therefore, did not engage in the necessary obviousness analysis,
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`and their obviousness argument for the “displaying a tag list including tags”
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`(plural) limitation thus fails.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`In view of the foregoing, BlackBerry respectfully requests that the Board
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`find the Challenged Claims of the ’173 Patent valid.
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`Date: March 16, 2020
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` By: /Jim Glass/
`James M. Glass (Reg. No. 46,729)
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
`New York, NY 10010
`Email: jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`Phone: 212-849-7142
`Fax: 212-849-7100
`
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`BlackBerry Limited
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`15
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`IPR2019-00528
`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`CERTIFICATE OF LENGTH (37 C.F.R. §§ 42.24(D))
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that, according to the word-processing
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`system used to prepare the foregoing document, this document has 3,186 words and
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`thus complies with the applicable word limit.
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`Date: March 16, 2020
`
` By: /Jim Glass/
`James M. Glass (Reg. No. 46,729)
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
`New York, NY 10010
`Email: jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`Phone: 212-849-7142
`Fax: 212-849-7100
`
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`BlackBerry Limited
`
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`16
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`IPR2019-00528
`U.S. Patent No. 8,279,173
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(E), 42.105(A))
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing document was served in
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`its entirety on March 16, 2020 upon the following parties via Electronic Mail.
`
`Heidi L. Keefe
`Andrew C. Mace
`Mark R. Weinstein
`Yuan Liang
`
`Cooley LLP
`Attn: Patent Group
`1299 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Suite 700
`Washington, DC 20004
`
`Email: hkeefe@cooley.com
`Email: amace@cooley.com
`Email: mweinstein@cooley.com
`Email: yliang@cooley.com
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`Date: March 16, 2020
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` By: /Jim Glass/
`James M. Glass (Reg. No. 46,729)
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
`New York, NY 10010
`Email: jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`Phone: 212-849-7142
`Fax: 212-849-7100
`
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`BlackBerry Limited
`
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`17
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