throbber

`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`AMERICAN NATIONAL MANUFACTURING INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SLEEP NUMBER CORPORATION
`f/k/a SELECT COMFORT CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case No. IPR2019-00514
`
`Patent No. 5,904,172
`____________
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`
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`Case No. IPR2019-00514
`Patent No. 5,904,172
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF ..................................... 1
`
`II. Exhibit 2041 – Declaration of John Abraham ............................................... 1
`
`A. Legal Standard for Admissibility of Expert Opinions ................................ 1
`
`B. Dr. Abraham’s Declaration Falls Short of the Reliability and Disclosure
`Required for Admission ..................................................................................... 2
`
`III. Exhibits 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, and
`2053 – Infringement Contentions Related to Third Party Air Controllers ............... 3
`
`IV. Exhibit 2054 – Declaration of George Edwards ............................................ 4
`
`V. Exhibit 2055 – Declaration of Carl Degen .................................................... 7
`
`A. Expert Evidence Regarding Commercial Success Requires Controlling for
`other Factors that May Explain Sales ................................................................. 8
`
`B. Mr. Degen Did Not Control for Factors Related to Commercial Success ... 8
`
`VI. Exhibit 2058 – Declaration of Elizabeth Patton ...........................................10
`
`VII. Exhibit 2059 – Trial Transcript from Select Comfort Corporation v. John
`Baxter, et al., Case No. 12-CV-02899-DWF-SER (“the Baxter Case”). ................12
`
`VIII. Ex. 2060 – Dires LLC Emails ...................................................................13
`
`IX. Ex. 2061 – Dires LLC Emails ......................................................................13
`
`X. Exhibits 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, and 2075 – PO’s District Court
`Infringement Contentions .....................................................................................14
`
`XI. Exhibit 2084 – Optimus Emails ...................................................................15
`
`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`
`Anderson v. United States,
`417 U.S. 211 (1974) ......................................................................................... 12
`
`Apple Inc. v. INVT SPE LLC,
`IPR2018-01476, 2020 WL 1808193 (Apr. 8, 2020) ........................................... 5
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co. Ltd.,
`839 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 9
`
`Bancorporation v. Kemper Securities Group, Inc.,
`58 F.3d 1306 (8th Cir. 1995) ........................................................................ 4, 14
`
`Cable Elec. Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc.,
`770 F.2d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1985) .......................................................................... 8
`
`Elder v. Tanner,
`205 F.R.D. 190 (E.D. Tex. 2001) ................................................................... 3, 6
`
`Geo. M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Machine Systems Intern. LLC,
`618 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................................................................... 8
`
`Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc.,
`429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .......................................................................... 3
`
`McManaway v. KBR, Inc.,
`852 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2017) .............................................................................. 8
`
`Rembrandt Vision Tech., L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care,
`Inc.,
`725 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................... 7
`
`Ritchie v. Vast Resources, Inc.,
`563 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .......................................................................... 9
`
`Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc.,
`104 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................. 3
`
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`Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No.
`182 v. New York State Teamsters Council Health & Hosp. Fund.,
`909 F. Supp. 102 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) .................................................................. 12
`
`TNS Media Research, LLC v. Tivo Research and Analytics, Inc.,
`629 F. App’x 916 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ..................................................................... 9
`
`United States v. Velarde–Gomez,
`224 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.2000) ........................................................................... 14
`
`Other Authorities
`
`3D-Matrix, Ltd. v. Menicon Co., Ltd.,
`No. IPR2014-00398, 2014 WL 3851279 (PTAB Aug. 1, 2014) ......................... 2
`
`
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`Case No. IPR2019-00514
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF
`
`Pursuant to the Board’s rules, Petitioner American National Manufacturing
`
`Inc. (“ANM”) moves to exclude the following exhibits submitted by Patent Owner
`
`(“PO”) in support of its Patent Owner Response (Papers 46-47; “POR”) and Patent
`
`Owner Surreply (Paper 78; “POS”): Ex. 2041, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048,
`
`2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2070, 2071,
`
`2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, and 2084 under the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”).
`
`More detailed reasons are set forth below.
`
`II. Exhibit 2041 – Declaration of John Abraham
`
`PO relies on the declaration of John Abraham to assert nexus for secondary
`
`indicia of nonobviousness, namely, commercial success and copying. POR at 59-60,
`
`63-67; POS at 12, 22-24. ANM duly objected to the admission of his declaration
`
`under FRE 702 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), as Abraham failed to adequately disclose
`
`the basis for his opinions and due to the unreliability of his methods. Petitioner’s
`
`Objections to Patent Owner’s Evidence, Paper 51 (“OBE”) at 5-9. Thus, the
`
`evidence should be excluded.
`
`A. Legal Standard for Admissibility of Expert Opinions
`
`FRE 702 permits expert witness testimony if: “(a) the expert’s scientific,
`
`technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
`
`evidence or determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts
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`or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d)
`
`the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”
`
`Expert opinion testimony in inter partes review proceedings is further governed by
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), which requires that a tendered expert must “disclose the
`
`underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based”; otherwise, the opinion “is
`
`entitled to little or no weight.” See also, e.g., 3D-Matrix, Ltd. v. Menicon Co., Ltd.,
`
`No. IPR2014-00398, 2014 WL 3851279, *5–*6 (PTAB Aug. 1, 2014). An expert
`
`report must disclose the expert’s opinions and reasons for them. FED. PROC.,
`
`LAWYERS ED., § 26:48 (West 2020) (citation omitted). The report cannot be
`
`“sketchy, vague, or preliminary in nature.” Id. If it is, it must be excluded.
`
`B. Dr. Abraham’s Declaration Falls Short of the Reliability and
`Disclosure Required for Admission
`
`Dr. Abraham (PO’s expert for mechanical aspects) generally opines that
`
`certain ANM and Sizewise products practice claims of the patent-at-issue. Ex. 2041,
`
`¶¶ 28–31. He also generally opines certain products of PO practice claims of the
`
`patent-at-issue. Id. at ¶ 32. However, Dr. Abraham admittedly never in anyway
`
`operated, used, tested or even fully assembled a single pump and air mattress in
`
`relation to his work in this proceeding. Ex. 1054 at 29:7–31:5 (“I did not [perform
`
`any testing as part of my work for these IPRs]. . . . I didn’t turn any pumps on and
`
`I didn't operate them. For example, I didn’t inflate any beds with any of the pumps.
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`. . . I did not fully assemble a bed.”). Simply put, that is insufficient and grounds for
`
`exclusion. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir.
`
`1997) (failure to employ the same level of intellectual rigor as in professional work
`
`outside paid litigation is grounds for exclusion).
`
`Moreover, “attempt[ing] to substitute attorney argument for expert testimony”
`
`is improper. Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1068–69 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005). Dr. Abraham’s opinions are predicated on PO’s infringement
`
`contentions from the District Court proceedings—which were prepared by counsel
`
`and merely adopted by Dr. Abraham and claim charts related to certain third party
`
`pumps. Ex. 1054 at 107:21–108:17 (stating contentions drafted by counsel). An
`
`expert reviewing and adopting counsel’s arguments is not a “reliable method” under
`
`FRE 702 and certainly does not show the expert’s “thought processes” as required
`
`under the Board’s rules. See, e.g., Elder v. Tanner, 205 F.R.D. 190, 194 (E.D. Tex.
`
`2001).
`
`III. Exhibits 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, and
`2053 – Infringement Contentions Related to Third Party Air Controllers
`
`PO relies indirectly on several attorney drafted claim charts which purport to
`
`map the claims of the ‘172 Patent to 11 third-party air controllers in an effort to
`
`assert commercial success. POR at 67 (citing to Ex. 2041, ¶¶47-49 which in turn
`
`exclusively cites these exhibits). ANM duly objected to each and every one of these
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`exhibits as irrelevant and improper evidence under FRE 401 and 403, hearsay under
`
`FRE 802, and a violation of the Board’s prohibition on incorporation by reference
`
`under 37 CFR § 42.6(a)(3). OBE at 10-31.
`
`Attorney arguments, like these claim charts, are not competent evidence under
`
`FRE 401. Bancorporation v. Kemper Securities Group, Inc., 58 F.3d 1306, 1312 n.
`
`5 (8th Cir. 1995) (Statements of counsel are not evidence and do not create issues of
`
`fact).
`
`The infringement contentions are further hearsay under FRE 802 as they are
`
`the self-serving statements of PO itself. No exception to the hearsay rule applies.
`
`Finally, the Board should view the use of these drafted infringement
`
`contentions as a circumvention on the Board’s page and word limitation on attorney
`
`argument and prohibition on incorporation by reference. 37 CFR § 42.6(a)(3). The
`
`POR makes the oblique statement that there are 11 controllers that practice the 172
`
`Patent, and then indirectly reference these claims charts. In effect, dropping
`
`hundreds of pages of attorney argument into this proceeding while only taking up a
`
`scant few lines in PO’s substantive filings.
`
`IV. Exhibit 2054 – Declaration of George Edwards
`
`PO relies on the declaration of George Edwards. POR at 63-64, 66; POS at 22
`
`and 24. ANM duly objected to the admission of Edwards’ Declaration under FRE
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`702 and 73 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) as he did not disclose the underlying basis for his
`
`opinions and did not use reliable methods. OBE at 32-36. Thus, this evidence should
`
`be excluded.
`
`Dr. Edwards, PO’s software expert, generally opines that certain ANM and
`
`Sizewise products practice claims of the patent-at-issue and that software of such
`
`ANM products is substantially similar to certain software of PO. See Ex. 2054 at
`
`12–13. PO relies on these opinions to assert nexus for secondary indicia of
`
`nonobviousness, namely, commercial success and copying. POR at 63–66.
`
` Dr. Edwards relies on his inspection of PO’s own source code to opine
`
`similarity with ANM’s source code. Ex. 2054, ¶ 46; see also Ex. 1056 at 351:20–
`
`354:2. However, PO chose not produce its own source code in this proceeding,
`
`although it was free to do so. Without that source code, one cannot conduct a proper
`
`analysis. See Ex. 1056 at 356:6–14 (analogously, Dr. Edwards admitting without
`
`ANM code he could not have provided claim charts). This alone is grounds for
`
`exclusion. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. INVT SPE LLC, IPR2018-01476, 2020 WL
`
`1808193, *16 (Apr. 8, 2020) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.65) (giving little to no weight,
`
`“even if ‘unrebutted’,” to evidence of secondary indicia because testimony was
`
`“only conclusory statement that was not supported by any record evidence”).
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`Even if PO had produced its code in this proceeding, Dr. Edwards provides
`
`no analysis to support his conclusory opinion related to PO’s own source code. See
`
`Ex. 1056 at 354:16–356:5 (Dr. Edwards stating that, for PO’s products or code, he
`
`did not provide claim charts, identify source code files, or identify relevant function
`
`or variable names). The entirety of Dr. Edwards “analysis” of PO’s products and
`
`code appears to be in ¶¶ 33 and 34 of his Declaration. See Ex. 1056 at 354:3–355:1.
`
`Those two paragraphs are entirely conclusory and fail to adequately disclose the
`
`basis for his opinions. See, e.g., Elder v. Tanner, 205 F.R.D. 190, 194 (E.D. Tex.
`
`2001) (excluding expert who merely “state[d] an ultimate opinion without some
`
`discussion of their thought process.”).
`
`Similarly, the record of this proceeding does not contain source code related
`
`to ANM and Sizewise products. Instead of relying on direct evidence, Dr. Edwards’s
`
`opinions are based on infringement contentions (prepared by counsel (see § II.B.
`
`supra)), which contain only conclusory identification of certain function names and
`
`variable names and without explanation of how lengthy functions or specific
`
`variable in the code meet various claim elements. See, e.g., Ex. 1055 at 283:18–
`
`284:6 (Dr. Edwards stating he “wouldn’t typically provide an analysis of my thought
`
`process”). The
`
`information Dr. Edwards provides
`
`(including unredacted
`
`infringement contentions) is insufficient to permit meaningful cross-examination.
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`See, e.g., Ex. 1055 at 263:10–269:6 (Dr. Edwards unable to definitely state whether
`
`identified “deflate factor” variable was modified as required by claim or was a static
`
`variable and waffling when asked if his declaration with unredacted contentions
`
`provided sufficient information to answer). This is grounds for exclusion.
`
`Rembrandt Vision Tech., L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc., 725 F.3d
`
`1377, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Dr. Edwards cannot hide behind the District Court
`
`protective order as an excuse for failing to explain the basis for his opinions. While
`
`that Order prohibited quoting the code verbatim, nothing prevented him from
`
`describing the code’s operation or his underlying thought process.
`
`V. Exhibit 2055 – Declaration of Carl Degen
`
`PO relies on the declaration of Carl Degen, its economics expert, in support
`
`of the purported commercial success of the patent. POR at 66; POS 24. ANM duly
`
`objected to the admission of Deegan’s testimony under FRE 702 and 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.65(a) for his failure to consider other causes (e.g. marketing) for increase or
`
`decreases of sales of ANM’s products. OBE at 36-8.
`
`Mr. Degen is an economist. He opines that ANM recognized commercial
`
`success, measured by sales of certain component parts to its mattress systems. A
`
`finding of commercial success based on sales requires proof that the patents were
`
`the cause of the sales. However, Mr. Degen avoided the recognized methods of
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`causation analysis. He admits this deficiency in his work. Mr. Degen’s deficient
`
`analysis resulted in opinions that are unreliable.
`
`A. Expert Evidence Regarding Commercial Success Requires
`Controlling for other Factors that May Explain Sales
`
`Commercial success, as an indication of non-obviousness, requires proof that
`
`“success of the product is due to the claimed invention”. Geo. M. Martin Co. v.
`
`Alliance Machine Systems Intern. LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`“Other economic and commercial factors unrelated to…the patented subject matter”
`
`must be identified and measured so that the effect of the invention can be understood.
`
`Cable Elec. Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
`
`See, McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 852 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Other plausible
`
`causes of the injury or condition must be excluded with reasonable certainty”). The
`
`failure to do so renders an opinion inadmissible under FRE 702.
`
`B. Mr. Degen Did Not Control for Factors Related to Commercial
`Success
`
`Mr. Degen opined that Petitioner’s sales of component parts showed
`
`commercial success but no part of his analysis demonstrated that use of PO’s patents
`
`were a cause of the sales. Mr. Degen’s methodology merely was to compare
`
`Petitioner’s average unit sales of selected component parts in four time-periods that
`
`he constructed. Ex. 2055 ¶ 19-20, 26. Mr. Degen concluded that the average unit
`
`sales of the parts increased, at a statistically significant rate, in those time-periods
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`when the parts allegedly incorporated the features of the three patents at issue in
`
`these proceedings (comparison of time-period 1 (base period) with time-period 2 and
`
`comparison of time-period 3 with time-period 4) and increased at a rate that was not
`
`statistically significant in a time-period when the component parts allegedly
`
`incorporated the features of one of the patents (comparison of time-period 2 with
`
`time-period 3). (Ex. 2055 ¶ 21-25). Mr. Degen also compared “adoption rates”. This
`
`is a simple ratio of the average sales of some of the component parts divided by
`
`average sales of air mattresses. This ratio showed that sales of mattresses are nearly
`
`equivalent to sales of the accused component parts. Ex. 2055 ¶ 26, 29.
`
`Mr. Degen’s unit sales and adoption rate analyses are mere time-period
`
`comparisons and, as a matter of law, do not demonstrate causation. TNS Media
`
`Research, LLC v. Tivo Research and Analytics, Inc., 629 F. App'x 916, 935 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2015). “The commercial success of a product can have many causes unrelated
`
`to patentable inventiveness.” Ritchie v. Vast Resources, Inc., 563 F.3d 1334, 1336
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2009). For example, advertising and marketing may be the cause of
`
`commercial success. 2 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents, Section 5.05
`
`[2][f][v][B] (Mathew Bender). Similarly, consumer preferences and experiences
`
`may be the cause of commercial success. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co. Ltd., 839
`
`F.3d 1034, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Mr. Degen acknowledged the potential that these,
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`and other factors, could be the cause of ANM’s unit sales. Ex. 1067, 105:21-109:1.
`
`He acknowledged that such data could explain some or all of the difference in the
`
`sales he examined. Id., 108:16-109:1. Mr. Degen said a regression analysis might
`
`“sort out which factors were showing a causal relationship”. Id., 106:19-107:1. But
`
`Mr. Degen made no regression or other analysis to determine whether the patents
`
`caused all or any part of Petitioner’s sales. Id., 90:7-16. These admissions
`
`demonstrate that his opinions are not reliable.1
`
`VI. Exhibit 2058 – Declaration of Elizabeth Patton
`
`PO relies on a declaration from its counsel of record in this matter, Elizabeth
`
`Patton. POR at 59-60, and 63. ANM duly objected under FRE 601 and 902 as an
`
`inadmissible lay opinion and under the prohibition of on acting as both a lawyer and
`
`trial advocate under 31 C.F.R. 11.307. OBE at 41-45.
`
`Ms. Patton’s statements and opinions about Petitioner’s unit sales are
`
`inadmissible lay opinions under FRE 601 and 701. Ms. Patton provides “estimates”,
`
`
`1 Mr. Degen’s opinions also fail the test of common sense. Petitioner and its affiliates
`
`did not advertise the patents in any way and the patents are not design features a
`
`consumer could notice (Ex. 1055, ¶56-58). There is no evidence the patents caused
`
`the sales.
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`“understandings” and “beliefs” about the unit sales. Ms. Patton’s analysis
`
`commenced with her “awareness” of a non-compete document which is missing the
`
`essential pages regarding permitted activities (Ex. 2058. ¶ 8 referencing Ex. 2037),
`
`continued through her “understandings” of websites of ANM and an affiliate, Dires,
`
`LLC (Id., ¶ 11-14), leading to her “estimates of how many retailers currently sell
`
`ANM’s Instant Comfort Products” (Id., ¶ 16). From these steps, Ms. Patton states
`
`her conclusion as “I believe [Petitioner experienced] a drastic increase from the
`
`limited of number of customers” in 2011 and “this demonstrates the success” of
`
`Petitioner. Ex. 2058, ¶ 16. Rule 602 requires facts to be presented by persons with
`
`first-hand knowledge, whereas Ms. Patton seeks to testify about statements and
`
`things made by others. Rule 701 requires that lay opinions be based on the witnesses
`
`own professional experiences, whereas Ms. Patton seeks to give her opinion on a
`
`matter that is not in her experience as a lawyer.
`
`Ms. Patton willfully disregards 37 C.F.R. 11.307 by submitting her
`
`declaration as a fact witness regarding commercial success, a contested issue. The
`
`PTAB rule regarding lawyers as witnesses is the same as Model Rule of Professional
`
`Conduct 3.7. Commentary by the American Bar Association explains that Rule 3.7
`
`protects the tribunal from being misled. The tribunal should not be forced to pick
`
`through testimony, attempting to separate highly crafted advocacy from actual fact,
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`MRPC 3.7 Comment ¶ [2-3]. The Rule also protects the lawyer herself from the
`
`inherent conflict between the roles of lawyer and witness. Id. at ¶ [6]. When
`
`appearing as a witness, the lawyer faces the temptation to advocate because that is
`
`her training and it is the reason she was hired by the client. Rule 11.307 reflects
`
`well-reasoned policy of PTAB. It should be followed here.
`
`VII. Exhibit 2059 – Trial Transcript from Select Comfort Corporation v. John
`Baxter, et al., Case No. 12-CV-02899-DWF-SER (“the Baxter Case”).
`
`PO extensively relies on Exhibit 2059, a trial transcript from the Baxter case
`
`with testimony from Craig Miller. POR at 59-62; POS at 21. ANM duly objected
`
`to this exhibit as hearsay under FRE 802, a lack of foundation, and relevance under
`
`FRE 401 and 403. OBE at 45-6.
`
`Trial transcripts are generally hearsay. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S.
`
`211, 219–20 (1974). ANM was not a party to the Baxter case, rather, PO sued Dires,
`
`LLC and its members including Mr. Miller in their personal capacities. As Mr.
`
`Miller was not appearing or testifying on behalf of ANM in that proceeding, the
`
`testimony is hearsay and inadmissible against ANM. See Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
`
`Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No. 182 v. New York State Teamsters
`
`Council Health & Hosp. Fund., 909 F. Supp. 102, 110 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
`
`The trial transcript is also irrelevant under FRE 401 as that trademark case did
`
`not involve the patent-at-issue here and the transcript has no substantive information
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`related to the patented technology. Finally PO further fails to properly lay a
`
`foundation and authenticate as this exhibit is only authenticated through PO’s
`
`counsel who does not have personal knowledge of the underlying substance of Mr.
`
`Miller’s testimony.
`
`VIII. Ex. 2060 – Dires LLC Emails
`
`PO relies on Exhibit 2060, a document from Dires, LLC. POR at 62. ANM
`
`objected to this document (statement by non-party Dires) as hearsay under FRE 801
`
`and as containing hearsay within hearsay. OBE at 23-4. Dires is not a party to this
`
`proceeding, and beyond that fact, several portions of this document also contain
`
`hearsay within hearsay statements, including a print off that purports to be from
`
`Federal Express. See Ex. 2060 at 3. No hearsay exception applies. Additionally,
`
`ANM duly objected to this exhibit as lacking a proper foundation as authenticated
`
`through PO’s counsel who does not have personal knowledge of the underlying
`
`substance of this exhibit. OBE at 46-7. Thus, the evidence should be excluded in
`
`total.
`
`IX. Ex. 2061 – Dires LLC Emails
`
`PO relies on Exhibit 2061 in support of its contentions of secondary indicia
`
`of nonobviousness. POR at 62. ANM objected to this entire exhibit as hearsay under
`
`FRE 801 as it is comprised statements from “Mike Stewart” and “Sarah Davis” who
`
`are not parties to this proceeding or are employees of ANM. There is no hearsay
`
`13
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`

`

`Case No. IPR2019-00514
`Patent No. 5,904,172
`
`exception that applies to this exhibit. OBE at 47-8. Additionally, ANM objected to
`
`this exhibit as lacking a proper foundation as authenticated through PO’s counsel
`
`who does not have personal knowledge of the underlying substance of this exhibit.
`
`Id. Thus, the evidence should be excluded in total.
`
`X. Exhibits 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, and 2075 – PO’s District Court
`Infringement Contentions
`
`PO relies on their District Court infringement contentions against ANM’s and
`
`non-party Sizewise’s products. POR at 64-66. ANM duly objected these exhibits as
`
`irrelevant and improper evidence under FRE 401 and 403, hearsay under FRE 802,
`
`and a violation of the Board’s prohibition on incorporation by reference under 37
`
`CFR § 42.6(a)(3). OBE at 52-63. Thus, the evidence should be excluded in total.
`
`Each of these exhibits are infringement claim chart prepared and drafted by
`
`PO’s attorneys in the stayed district court action. See Ex. 2070 at 12 and 2071 at 12
`
`(contentions signed by counsel for PO); see also Ex. 1054 at 107:11–108:17.
`
`Attorney argument as a matter of law cannot be evidence. United States v. Velarde–
`
`Gomez, 224 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir.2000); Exeter Bancorporation v. Kemper
`
`Securities Group, Inc., 58 F.3d 1306, 1312 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1995) (Statements of
`
`counsel are not evidence and do not create issues of fact).
`
`The infringement contentions are further hearsay under FRE 802 as they are
`
`the self-serving statements of PO itself. No exception to the hearsay rule applies.
`
`14
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`14706342v.2
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`

`Case No. IPR2019-00514
`Patent No. 5,904,172
`
`Finally, the Board should view the use of these infringement contentions as a
`
`circumvention on the Board’s page and word limitation on attorney argument and
`
`prohibition on incorporation by reference. 37 CFR § 42.6(a)(3). The POR and POS
`
`make oblique statements that “PO’s Infringement Contentions [] further provide
`
`such evidence” of copying and then cite to the above exhibits—in effect dropping
`
`over a thousand pages of attorney argument into this proceeding while only taking
`
`up a scant few lines in PO’s substantive filings.
`
`XI. Exhibit 2084 – Optimus Emails
`
`PO relies on Exhibit 2084, which contains communications from Charles
`
`Dietiker of Optimus Worldwide Solutions and Johnny Sanchez of Costco. POS at
`
`63; POR at 23. ANM duly objected to this exhibit under FRE 801 as the email
`
`contains statements that are not from ANM nor an employee of ANM. OBE at 68-
`
`9. No exception to the hearsay rule applies. Thus, the evidence should be excluded
`
`in total.
`
`15
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`14706342v.2
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`

`

`Case No. IPR2019-00514
`Patent No. 5,904,172
`
`Date: April 29, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`SPENCER FANE LLP
`
`By /s/Kyle L. Elliott .
`Kyle L. Elliott, Reg. No. 39,485
`Kevin S. Tuttle, Reg. No. 52,307
`Brian T. Bear (pro hac vice)
`Mark A. Thornhill (pending pro hac vice)
`Spencer Fane LLP
`1000 Walnut Street, Suite 1400
`Kansas City, Missouri 64106-2140
`Telephone: (816) 474-8100
`
`Jaspal S. Hare, Reg. No. 66,988
`jhare@spencerfane.com
`Spencer Fane LLP
`5700 Granite Pkwy, Suite 650
`Plano, TX 75024
`
`16
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`14706342v.2
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`

`Case No. IPR2019-00514
`Patent No. 5,904,172
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned hereby certifies that a copy
`
`of the foregoing MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE is served in its entirety on
`
`April 29, 2020, by electronic mail, as authorized by Patent Owner’s Updated
`
`Mandatory Notices, directed to the attorneys of record for Patent Owner at the
`
`following correspondence address of record:
`
`Steven A. Moore
`stevemoore@zhonglun.com
`ZHONG LUN
`4322 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 200
`Los Angeles, CA 90010
`
` Kecia J. Reynolds
`kecia.reynolds@pillsburylaw.com
`PILLSBURY WINTHORP SHAW
`PITTMAN LLP
`1200 Seventeenth Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20036
`
`Luke Toft
`ltoft@foxrothschild.com
`
`
`
`
`
`Andrew Hansen (pro hac vice)
`ahansen@foxrothschild.com
`
`Archana Nath (pro hac vice)
`anath@foxrothschild.com
`
`Elizabeth A. Patton (pro hac vice)
`epatton@foxrothschild.com
`
`FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
`222 South Ninth Street, Suite 2000
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`
`
`
`17
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`14706342v.2
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2019-00514
`Patent No. 5,904,172
`
`Date: April 29, 2020
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` /s/Kyle L. Elliott .
`Kyle L. Elliott (Reg. No. 39,485)
`.
`Attorney for Petitioner
`American National Manufacturing, Inc.
`
`18
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`14706342v.2
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`

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