Paper No. 61
`Filed: September 1, 2021
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`__________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`__________________
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`PANASONIC CORPORATION, PANASONIC CORPORATION OF NORTH
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`AMERICA, GOPRO, INC., GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
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`GARMIN USA, INC.,
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`Petitioners,
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`v.
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`CELLSPIN SOFT, INC.,
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`Patent Owner.
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`__________________
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`IPR2019-00131
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`Patent 9,258,698 B2
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`__________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR DIRECTOR REVIEW
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. ii
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`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
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`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 2
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`A. THE BOARD ERRED IN RELYING ON ITS OWN NEW THEORY WITH RESPECT
`TO THE ZIGBEE STANDARD AND MADE A PROCEDURAL AND APA ERROR. ...... 2
`B. THE BOARD ERRED BY FAILING TO FULLY ADDRESS AN ESSENTIAL
`ELEMENT OF CELLSPIN’S PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION: THAT “THE
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`COMMUNICATION LINK CAN BE DISCONNECTED AND RECONNECTED
`WITHOUT HAVING TO REPEAT PAIRING OR AUTHENTICATION.” ......................... 3
`C. THE BOARD’S FAILURE TO CONSTRUE “CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY
`AUTHENTICATING,” “A MOBILE SOFTWARE APPLICATION,” AND “GUI”
`WAS ERROR. ..................................................................................................... 4
`D. THE BOARD’S FAILURE TO CONSTRUE “GUI” WAS ERROR. ............................. 7
`E. THE BOARD’S FAILURE TO CONSTRUE “A MOBILE SOFTWARE
`APPLICATION” WAS ERROR. ............................................................................. 7
`F. THE BOARD’S HOLDING THAT THE PRIOR ART TEACHES ALL ELEMENTS
`OF CLAIMS 5 AND 8 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. .............. 8
`G. THE BOARD ERRED BY CREATING ITS OWN THEORY TO INVALIDATE
`CLAIMS 5 AND 8. .............................................................................................10
`H. THE BOARD ERRED BY CONSTRUCTING A NEW AND ERRONEOUS THEORY
`THAT CHERRY-PICKED AN UNRELATED ARGUMENT AND APPLIED IT OUT
`OF CONTEXT. ...................................................................................................12
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`CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................13
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`-i-
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`CASES
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`Alacritech, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,
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`966 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ........................................................................13
`ATI Techs. ULC v. Iancu,
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`920 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .......................................................................... 3
`Fanduel, Inc. v. Interactive Games LLC,
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`966 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .......................................................................... 2
`Frac Shack Inc. v. Fuel Automation Station, LLC,
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`No. 16-CV-02275-STV, 2018 WL 5792613 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2018) .............. 9
`Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp.,
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`865 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................... 5
`In re Gartside,
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`203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ....................................................................6, 11
`In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.,
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`829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................10
`In re NuVasive, Inc.,
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`841 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 2
`In re Varma,
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`816 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 9
`Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal,
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`868 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................... 6
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
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`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 8
`Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co.,
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`881 F.3d 894 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..........................................................................12
`Qualcomm Inc. v. Intel Corp.,
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`2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 22167 (Fed. Cir. 2021)................................................. 2
`SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC,
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`825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. June 10, 2016) .........................................................10
`Sirona Dental Sys. GmbH v. Institut Straumann AG,
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`892 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ........................................................................10
`United States v. Arthrex, Inc.,
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`141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021) .................................................................................1, 13
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`-ii-
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`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
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`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed.Cir.1996) .............................................................................. 5
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`-iii-
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc.,
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`141 S. Ct. 1970 (June 21, 2021), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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`in appeal no. 2020-1948 ordered on August 2, 2021, that this case be remanded to
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`the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for the limited purpose of
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`allowing the Patent Owner Cellspin Soft, Inc. (“Cellspin”) an opportunity to request
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`Director re-hearing of the April 28, 2020, final written decision finding claims 1–22
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`of U.S. Patent No. 9,258,698 (“the ’698 patent”) unpatentable. Patent owner now
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`requests such a re-hearing before Mr. Andrew Hirshfeld, who is performing the
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`functions and duties of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property
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`and Director of the USPTO. The Board’s decision violates the Administrative
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`Procedures Act (“APA”) for at least the following reasons: (1) the Board relied on
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`its own new invalidity theory with respect to the Zigbee standard; (2) the Board
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`never addressed the second essential limitation of Cellpsin’s proposed construction
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`for a “paired wireless connection”; (3) the Board failed to construe terms in dispute
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`such as “cryptographic authentication,” “a mobile software application,” and “GUI”;
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`(4) the Board relied on its own new theories in finding claims 5 and 8 obvious.
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`ARGUMENT
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`A. The Board Erred in Relying on its Own New Theory with Respect to the
`Zigbee Standard and Made a Procedural and APA Error.
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`The Board erroneously held that the non-Bluetooth Zigbee standard
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`undermined Cellspin’s position. See FWD at 15 (where the Board claims “the
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`ZigBee standard relied on by [Cellspin] undermines [Cellspin]’s argument”). The
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`Board erred in relying on this argument in the first place, given that it was raised for
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`the first time in the Final Decision. Neither the parties nor their experts briefed this
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`argument. Thus, the Board made a procedural error in failing to allow Cellspin an
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`opportunity to assist the Board in understanding the technology in question. See In
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`re NuVasive, Inc., 841 F.3d 966, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (where the Court remanded
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`after a procedural violation in which the Board “did not provide the required
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`opportunity to address the factual assertion . . . on which the Board ultimately
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`relied”); Fanduel, Inc. v. Interactive Games LLC, 966 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
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`2020) (holding that the Board must (a) timely inform the parties of “the matters of
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`fact and law asserted”; (b) provide the parties an opportunity to submit facts and
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`arguments for consideration; and (c) permit each party to present oral and
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`documentary evidence); Qualcomm Inc. v. Intel Corp., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS
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`22167, *1 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (pursuant to 5 U.S.C.S. § 706 the Board violated the
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`patent owner's procedural rights under the APA because the owner did not receive
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`notice or an opportunity to be heard, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.S. § 554(b)(3), regarding
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`-2-
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`the Board's construction). The Board’s conclusion regarding Zigbee was also
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`incorrect. The Board misunderstood the Zigbee standard, concluding “Zigbee does
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`not support [Cellspin]’s contention that pairing itself includes encryption” because
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`“[t]he link key establishment to provide encryption occurs after pairing.” FWD at
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`16. What the Board misunderstood is that secure communications are provided for
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`during the Phase 2 pairing process. Had Cellspin been given the opportunity, it could
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`have explained to the Board that the link key exchange that occurs in the Phase 3
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`“key distribution / link key exchange” process merely increases security already
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`provided for in Phase 2.
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`Thus, contrary to the Board’s conclusion, Zigbee bolsters rather than
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`undermines Cellspin’s position. This is likely why Panasonic’s never raised a similar
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`argument. Had the Board raised this concern earlier rather than in its Final Decision,
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`Cellspin could have quickly resolved any confusion between legacy pairing (Phase
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`2) and the newer pairing (Phase 3) regarding security/link-key at that time.
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`B. The Board Erred by Failing to Fully Address an Essential Element of
`Cellspin’s Proposed Construction: that “the communication link can be
`disconnected and reconnected without having to repeat pairing or
`authentication.”
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`The Board also erred by not explaining why non-Bluetooth implementations
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`of a “paired wireless connection” would not include the ability to re-pair without
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`reauthenticating. See ATI Techs. ULC v. Iancu, 920 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
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`(“[T]he Board’s opinion must explicate its factual conclusions, enabling us to verify
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`readily whether those conclusions are indeed supported by ‘substantial evidence’
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`contained within the record.”). Cellspin argued that as with Bluetooth, non-
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`Bluetooth standards like Zigbee “store information about the other node.” Paper 30
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`at 4. And “[t]he reason for storing the pairing information is so that it may be used
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`again to avoid having to reauthenticate/re-pair.” Paper 30 at 4; see also FWD at 14-
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`15.
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`The Board stated that “ZigBee does not support Patent Owner’s contention
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`that pairing itself includes encryption,” but it provided no reasoning as to how
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`Zigbee might undermine the idea of re-pairing without reauthenticating. FWD at 15-
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`16. Even if this Court excluded “provides for encrypted data exchange” from its
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`construction, the reauthentication/re-pairing should remain and alone is sufficient to
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`reverse the Board’s finding of obviousness.
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`C. The Board’s Failure to Construe “Cryptographically Authenticating,” “a
`mobile software application,” and “GUI” Was Error.
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`The Board errred in failing to address key disputed elements. The parties
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`disputed the meaning of the term “cryptographically authenticating.” Yet despite the
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`parties’ dispute, the Board declined to define this term. See FWD at 18 (“Thus, we
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`find it unnecessary to construe the term ‘cryptographically authenticating’ to address
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`-4-
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`the patentability issues before us.”). This was error.1 See Homeland Housewares,
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`LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Just as district
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`courts must when the parties raise an actual dispute regarding the proper scope of
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`claims, resolve that dispute, the Board also must resolve such disputes in the context
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`of IPRs.”) (markings omitted). Here, although the Board recognized the term
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`“cryptographically authenticating” was disputed (see FWD at 17), it erred in
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`declining to construe it. See FWD at 17.
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`The Board’s reason for not construing “cryptographically authenticated” was
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`particularly problematic. The Board held that “the prior art teaches . . . authentication
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`is cryptographic” and “[t]hus, we find it unnecessary to construe the term
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`‘cryptographically authenticating’ to address the patentability issues before us.”
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`FWD at 18. This holding was flawed for at least two reasons. First, the approach was
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`backwards. Rather than construing the term and then analyzing the prior art, the
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`Board allowed the prior art to influence its construction of the term. See Vitronics
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`Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“It is well-settled
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`that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic
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`1 The Board construed this term in its Institution Decision; Cellspin rebutted that
`construction. Because the Board declined to construe this term in its Final Decision,
`it would not be proper to assume the Board relied on the construction it provided in
`its Institution Decision. See Homeland Housewares, 865 F.3d at 1375 (finding a term
`was not construed despite having been construed in the Instituion Decision).
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`-5-
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`evidence of record . . . .”). This backwards approach invited hindsight bias and
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`impaired the Board’s ability to assess the prior art objectively.
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`Second, the Board provided insufficient reasoning. The Board only
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`concluded—in essence and without explanation—that “cryptographically” need not
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`employ “encryption.” See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“We
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`have expressly held that the Board’s opinion must explicate its factual conclusions,
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`enabling us to verify readily whether those conclusions are indeed supported by
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`‘substantial evidence’ contained within the record.”).
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`In Nidec Motor, the Board held it was unnecessary to determine whether a
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`preamble was limiting because its decision would be “unaffected by [that]
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`determination.” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal,
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`868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). Having “specifically
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`addressed the issue,” the Nidec Motor court upheld the Board’s decision. Id. Here,
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`by contrast, the Board neither specifically addressed the issue nor reasoned that its
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`decision would be unaffected if it adopted Cellspin’s position. Unlike Nidec Motor,
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`Construction was necessary to resolve the instant dispute because the Board could
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`not have found the ’698 Patent invalid had it adopted Cellspin’s definition. Thus,
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`because the Board declined to construe this term, Cellspin respectfully asks the
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`Director to adopt Cellspin’s construction in its de novo claim construction analysis
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`and reverse the Board’s decision.
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`-6-
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`D. The Board’s Failure to Construe “GUI” Was Error.
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`The Board erred by declining to construe the disputed term “GUI.” See O2
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`Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362-63. Indeed, both parties provided constructions for the
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`disputed term GUI. Paper 19 at 19; Ex. 1013 at 3. The Board then further erred by
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`holding “graphical user interface” (GUI) need not be graphical. See FWD at 46. As
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`Cellspin explained, “a user interface is only a GUI if it is graphical and Onishi’s
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`interface is not graphical.” FWD at 46 (markings omitted). Panasonic disputed
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`Cellspin’s construction but agreed that “GUI” should include “a user interface
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`involving graphical elements” (Paper 1 at 11) “and a pointing device such as a
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`mouse or stylus.” (Ex. 1013 at 3). The Board declined to construe this term and then
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`erroneously held that the prior art teaches GUI. FWD at 46-47. Had the Board
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`adopted either Cellspin or Panasonic’s construction of this term, it could not have
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`concluded that Mashita or Onishi teach GUI that had a pointing device.
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`E. The Board’s Failure to Construe “A Mobile Software Application” Was
`Error.
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`Cellspin argued that both claims 5 and 8 require “a single application” (203)
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`to perform all functions that are attributable to the mobile software application.
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`Paper 19 at 43; see FWD at 48 (where the Board noted that, “[a]ccording to
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`[Cellspin], claim 5 requires four steps and claim 8 requires six steps and all must be
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`performed by a single application”). Panasonic recognized that Cellspin’s proposal
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`represented a claim construction dispute (Paper 23 at 6), but the Board declined to
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`-7-
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`construe the term and resolve the dispute. Without a construction to guide its
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`holding, the Board then dispensed of the need to show any evidence of such a single
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`mobile software application that performs all the claimed functions.
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`It was error for the Board not to resolve the dispute or construe the term. See
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`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2008) (“When the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of
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`a claim term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it.”). Absent the Board’s failure to
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`properly define the term “a mobile software application,” claims 5 and 8 could not
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`have been held invalid.
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`F. The Board’s Holding that the Prior Art Teaches All Elements of Claims
`5 and 8 Is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence.
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`The Board also erred by failing to acknowledge that the plain language and
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`antecedent basis of the term “a mobile software application” require that a scenario
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`contemplating multiple applications would require each of those applications to
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`perform all of the required functions because the claim language recites that the
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`application is “configured to” perform all functions. This is simply not taught in the
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`prior art. Cellspin raised this fact in its briefing (e.g., Paper 30 at 5), but the Board
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`misquoted Cellspin and lost the meaning of the argument. The Board said,
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`“[Cellspin] responds that if more than a single application falls within the broadest
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`reasonable interpretation of claims 5 and 8, all of the alleged functions recited must
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`be performed by the alleged ‘one or more applications.’” FWD at 48 (citing Paper
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`-8-
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`30 at 26) (emphasis added). However, the unaltered quotation highlights the error in
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`the Board’s holding. What Cellspin actually said was:
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`even if Panasonic’s erroneous Reply argument was accepted, then at
`most, due to antecedent basis, claims 5 and 8 would require all of the
`alleged “one or more applications” to perform all of the functions
`required to performed of [sic] claims 5 and 8.
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`Paper 30 at 26. The key difference here is that every single application being relied
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`upon must be “configured to” perform every single claimed function as the claim
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`language recites. This is in stark contrast to the Board’s holding that some claimed
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`functions may be performed by one application and other claimed functions may be
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`performed by a separate application.
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`This Court addressed a similar issue in In re Varma, holding that rendering
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`“a” as “one or more” should not negate the language that follows the “a.” 816 F.3d
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`1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting “context matters” in defining “a”). “For a dog
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`owner to have ‘a dog that rolls over and fetches sticks,’ it does not suffice that he
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`have two dogs, each able to perform just one of the tasks.” In re Varma, 816 F.3d at
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`1363; see also Frac Shack Inc. v. Fuel Automation Station, LLC, No. 16-CV-02275-
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`STV, 2018 WL 5792613, at *5 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2018) (“But, provided each
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`controller can perform these functions, the system may have multiple controllers.”).
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`As in In re Varma and Frac Shack, if “an application” is rendered as “one or more
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`applications,” then each application must perform all of the functions described in
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`claims 5 and 8.
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`-9-
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`The Board’s holding neither accurately represents Cellspin’s position, nor is
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`it true to the plain language of the claims reciting that the application is “configured
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`to” perform all functions. Thus, because the prior art fails to teach each application
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`like “a mobile software application” that is “configured to” perform all the claimed
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`functions of claims 5 and 8, the Court should reverse the Board’s holding that claims
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`5 and 8 are obvious.
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`G. The Board Erred by Creating Its Own Theory to Invalidate Claims 5 and
`8.
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`The Board may not craft new grounds of unpatentability not advanced by the
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`petitioner. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
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`2016) (“An agency may not change theories in midstream without giving
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`respondents reasonable notice of the change and the opportunity to present argument
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`under the new theory.”). Indeed, this Court has “rejected the argument that ‘the
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`Board is free to adopt arguments on behalf of petitioners that could have been, but
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`were not, raised by the petitioner during an IPR.’” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l,
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`Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Yet, in determining that claims 5 and 8
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`were obvious, the Board contravened this rule by cobbling together its own theory.
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`See Sirona Dental Sys. GmbH v. Institut Straumann AG, 892 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2018) (holding “[i]t would thus not be proper for the Board to deviate from the
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`grounds in the petition and raise its own obviousness theory”).
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`-10-
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`In reaching its conclusion that claims 5 and 8 were obvious, the Board
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`constructed a new theory. In particular, the Board held that Mashita and Hiraishi
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`teach all of the six steps recited in claims 5 and 8 (see above)—but Panasonic’s
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`theory rested on a combination of Mashita, Hiraishi, and Onishi. Relying on its own
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`theory, the Board repeatedly combined Mashita and Hiraishi but omitted Onishi. For
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`example, the Board held:
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`• “Petitioner shows that the combination of Mashita and Hiraishi teaches
`the recited functions.” FWD at 48.
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`• “The combination of Mashita and Hiraishi teach a software application
`as claimed.” FWD at 49.
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`• “We find Petitioner has persuasively shown claims 5 and 8 are taught by
`Mashita and Hiraishi.” FWD at 50.
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`
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`These statements present a new premise not raised by Panasonic, omitting at
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`the very least that Panasonic relied on prior art Onishi for providing a “GUI to Delete
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`a media file on the camera.” Paper 1 at 65. The Board’s reliance on only Mashita
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`and Hiraishi deviates from Panasonic’s theory and provides a standalone reason to
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`reverse, or at the very least vacate and remand.
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`In fact, not only did the Board fail to incorporate Panasonic’s theory that
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`Onishi taught a “GUI to Delete,” the Board’s final decision fails to even mention the
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`“GUI to Delete” element at all. In failing to account for every element of claims 5
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`and 8, the Board erred which provides a standalone reason to reverse, or at the very
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`least vacate and remand. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1316.
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`-11-
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`H. The Board erred by constructing a new and erroneous theory that
`cherry-picked an unrelated argument and applied it out of context.
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`In addition to creating a new theory that combined Hiraishi and Mashita but
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`omitted Onishi, the Board constructed yet another theory that borrowed unrelated
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`reasoning from a different argument. The Board held that “a storage medium stor[es]
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`software program codes implementing functions of the communication devices
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`(digital camera and cellular phone)” FWD at 49. This represented the Board’s own
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`theory for claim 5 and 8. Indeed, Panasonic never raised this argument in its petition
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`against claims 5 and 8. Instead, Panasonic raised this argument in support of the
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`unrelated element “non-transitory computer readable medium” in independent claim
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`13. See Paper 1 at 69. It was error for the Board to graft in an argument that Panasonic
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`never raised for claims 5 and 8. Moreover, the Board’s citation is not even applicable
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`in this context. Panasonic’s argument was merely that the program is stored on a
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`storage medium, not that “program codes” stored on a disk implies a single “mobile
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`software application.” See Paper 1 at 69. Thus, the Board erred by constructing its
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`own incorrect theory.
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`While it may be sufficient for the Board to implicitly adopt a petitioner’s
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`argument when “obviousness determinations flow directly from its rejection” of a
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`respondent’s argument, and “the Board’s analysis is commensurate” with the
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`petitioner’s, neither of those criteria are met here. See Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co.,
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`881 F.3d 894, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2018). First, the Board did not reject Cellspin’s
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`-12-
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`arguments but instead repeatedly insisted that it had been persuaded by Panasonic’s
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`arguments. See FWD at 47-51. Second, the Board’s analysis is not commensurate
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`with Panasonic’s; instead, the Board independently constructed its own theory
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`entirely distinct from either party’s. As a result, the Board’s reasoning is “untethered
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`to either party’s position,” and thus an inference of the Board’s adoption of
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`Panasonic’s argument would be improper. See Alacritech, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 966
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`F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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`CONCLUSION
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`For these reasons, Cellspin respectfully requests that the Director review and
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`vacate the FWD. Moreover, under Athrex, this review cannot be performed by Mr.
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`Hirshfeld, who currently holds the title of “performing the functions and duties of
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`the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the
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`USPTO.” Though there is no doubt that Mr. Hirshfeld holds that interim title with
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`the utmost integrity, skill, and experience, “[o]nly an officer properly appointed to a
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`principal office may issue a final decision binding the Executive Branch.” Arthrex,
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`Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (June 21, 2021).
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`-13-
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`Dated: September 1, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Peter J. Corcoran III/
`Reg. No. 56,037
`CORCORAN IP LAW PLLC
`4142 McKnight Road
`Texarkana, Texas 75503
`Telephone: 903-701-2481
`Facsimile: 844-362-3291
`Email: peter@corcoranip.com
`
`Attorney for Appellant,
`Cellspin Soft, Inc.
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`-14-
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on September 1, 2021, a copy of the foregoing document
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`was served by filing this document through the PTAB’s E2E Filing System as well
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`as
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`delivering
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`a
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`copy
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`via
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`electronic
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`mail
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`to
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`Director_PTABDecision_Review@USPTO.gov and upon the following attorneys
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`of record for the Petitioner:
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`vpearce@orrick.com
`TVPPTABDocket@orrick.com
`Jennifer.Bailey@eriseip.com
`Adam.Seitz@eriseip.com
`PTAB@eriseip.com
`karinehk@rimonlaw.com
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`/Peter J. Corcoran III/
`Reg. No. 56,037
`CORCORAN IP LAW PLLC
`4142 McKnight Road
`Texarkana, Texas 75503
`Telephone: 903-701-2481
`Facsimile: 844-362-3291
`Email: peter@corcoranip.com
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`Attorney for Appellant,
`Cellspin Soft, Inc.
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