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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`PANASONIC CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA ET AL.
`Petitioners,
`
`vs.
`
`CELLSPIN SOFT, INC.,
`Patent Owner
`
`
`CASE: PR2019-00131
`Patent No. 9,258,698
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S SUR-REPLY TO PETITIONER’S REPLY
`
`1 
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`

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`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
` 
`VI.
`
`
`
`B.
`C.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1
`PANASONIC’S ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE FOLEY
`DECLARATION ARE GROUNDLESS. THE DECLARATION
`SHOULD BE GIVEN FULL WEIGHT ..................................................................2
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION .....................................................................................2
`A.
`“Pairing” is different from “Authentication,” and both are
`different from “Encryption” .........................................................................2
`
`Cellspin’s Construction of “Paired Connection” is Correct ........................3
`Cellspin’s Construction of “Cryptographically Authenticating”
`is Correct ......................................................................................................4
`Cellspin’s Construction of GUI is Correct ...................................................4
`D.
`Cellspin’s Construction of “A Software Application” is Correct ................5
`E.
`THE V2.1+EDR BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION LIST
`MANY OPTIONAL ACTIVITIES. THE MERE MENTION OF
`“BLUETOOTH CONNECTION” IN MASHITA, ONISHI OR
`HIRAISHI DOES NOT ESTABLISH PAIRED CONNECTIONS ........................6
` LIMITATION C (I.E., A PAIRED CONNECTION) IS NOT
`DISCLOSED IN MASHITA, ONISHI or HIRAISHI. FURTHER,
`PANASONIC AND DR. STRAWN’S NEW OBVIOUSNESS
`THEORY IS UNFOUNDED ...................................................................................7
`A.
`Mashita, Onishi or Hiraishi Does Not Disclose Establishing a
`Paired Connection Between a Cellular Phone and Digital
`Camera .........................................................................................................7
`Mashita Does Not Disclose
`the
`“Cryptographically
`Authenticating Identity” Portion of Limitation C ......................................15
`
`Cellspin’s Arguments Apply to the Non-Method Challenged
`Claims. .......................................................................................................20
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`LIMITATION G IS NOT OBVIOUS IN VIEW OF THE
`COMBINATION, INCLUDING BECAUSE THE COMBINATION
`LACKS THE PATENTED FEATURE .................................................................20
`
`
`VII. LIMITATION J IS NOT OBVIOUS IN VIEW OF THE ALLEGED
`COMBINATION ...................................................................................................22
`A.
`Cellspin’s “Teaching Away” Contention is Correct ..................................22
`
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`i 
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`B.
`
`
`The Disadvantage of HTTP Acknowledged by Mashita is
`Relevant to the Challenged Claims ............................................................24
`
`
`VIII. LIMITATION K IS NOT OBVIOUS IN VIEW OF THE
`COMBINATION ...................................................................................................25
`CELLSPIN’S ANTECEDENT BASIS ARGUMENT FOR
`“APPLICATION” FOR CLAIMS 5 AND 8 IS DISPOSITIVE OF
`THOSE AND THEIR DEPENDENT CLAIMS. FURTHER,
`PANASONIC’S NEW “MODULE” THEORY IS IMPROPERLY
`NEW AND FACTUALLY MERITLESS .............................................................26
`THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ....................................26
`
`IX.
`
`X.
`
`
`
`
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`ii 
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`O2 Micro Int’l v. Beyond Innovation Tech., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir. 2008) ...................4,5
`Baldwin Graphic Sys. v. Siebert, 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2008) ..............................5
`01 Communique Lab. v. LogMeIn, 687 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed.Cir.2012) ...........................5
`Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sandoz, 678 F.3d 1280, (Fed.Cir. 2012) ...........................19
`Dippin' Dots v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed.Cir. 2007) .....................................................25
`Power Mosfet Tech. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3D 1396 (Fed.Cir. 2004) ...............................25
`McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843) ........................................................26
`James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1881) .........................................................................26
`Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Minin, 428 U.S. 1 (1976) ...........................................................26
`Edmond v. U.S, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) .................................................................................26
`Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
`Board, 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010) .......................................................................................26
`
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`iii 
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`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Panasonic’s Reply brazenly attempts to assert improper new theories, evidence and other
`
`matters in what should be a reply. This Sur-Reply is subject to, and without waiving, Cellspin’s
`
`objections at Doc 25.
`
`Panasonic at least tacitly admits that neither Onishi nor Hiraishi disclose a paired Bluetooth
`
`connection. Panasonic’s erroneous assertion that Mashita discloses a paired connection relies upon
`
`improper new theories and assertions, but it is nonetheless groundless.
`
`Panasonic’s erroneous new theory of Bluetooth/pairing obviousness is improper.
`
`Irrespective, Panasonic fails to cite prior disclosure of a device that has performed any
`
`claimed method or a device that would be capable of the claimed functions. Panasonic’s
`
`assumption that all “Bluetooth” devices are capable of performing every function described in the
`
`Bluetooth specification is incorrect.Ex.2026,¶18.
`
`Panasonic fails to show to show teachings to render obvious at least:
`
`(1) a paired wireless connection between a camera and mobile device;
`
`(2) cryptographic authentication of the mobile device by the camera;
`
`(3) none of the proposed combinations disclose limitation G;
`
`(4) using HTTP to upload received files and additional data, e.g., Mashita teaches away from
`
`a cellular phone using HTTP;
`
`(5) combining Mashita with Hirashi would not work;
`
`(6) GUI’s in general and specifically not for image deletion on the wirelessly connected
`
`camera; and
`
`(7) for claims 5 and 8, a single mobile application performing all the required functions.
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`1 
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`II.
`
`PANASONIC’S ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE FOLEY DECLARATION ARE
`GROUNDLESS.
`
`Dr. Foley was the author of his Declaration atEx.2009.Ex.2026,¶10. The similarities
`
`between Cellspin’s Response and Dr. Foley’s Declaration are due to Cellspin’s Response, which
`
`was drafted by Cellspin’s counsel, having copied or paraphrased matters from the Declaration. Id.
`
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`A.
`
`“Pairing” is different from “Authentication,” and both are different from
`“Encryption”.
`
`
`There are 15 different optional activities following a Bluetooth connection:
`
`Ex.2006,p.19; Ex.2026,¶¶11-12.
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`2 
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`
`
`Ex.2006,p.861.
`
`Despite Panasonic’s attempt to conflate terms, a POSITA would clearly understand that
`
`pairing is different from authentication, and both are different from encryption, and all are
`
`optional in Bluetooth.Ex.2026,¶¶11-12. Which, if any, of these options are chosen for a
`
`connection depends on the requirements of the solution being implemented, for which profile
`
`specifications are used.Id.
`
`B.
`
`Cellspin’s Construction of “Paired Connection” is Correct.
`
`Panasonic misunderstands Cellspin’s construction, which states that a paired connection
`
`provides for encrypted data exchange, not that it’s required.Ex.2026,¶13. The concept of a paired
`
`connection, as established by the Bluetooth became known and adopted by certain other industry
`
`organizations creating wireless technology for device connections, such as WiFi Alliance and
`
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`3 
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`Zigbee Forum.Ex.2026,¶14. For example, WiFi Direct adopted the concept of pairing as defined
`
`by Bluetooth SIG. Id. This can be seen on the Canon website with Canon’s own EOS Utility
`
`software. Id.;Ex.2027,p.4;Ex.2028,p.1. The reason for storing the pairing information is so that it
`
`may be used again to avoid having to reauthenticate/re-pair.Ex.2026,¶14.
`
`Zigbee also adopted the concept of pairing as defined by Bluetooth .Ex.2026,¶14. With
`
`ZigBee, the “originator and recipient will store information about the other node in an entry in its
`
`pairing table.”Ex.2003,6;Ex.2026,¶15.
`
`Due to the parties’ construction/substantive dispute, it would be error not to construe
`
`“paired wireless connection” per Cellspin. See O2 Micro v. Beyond Innovation, 521 F.3d
`
`1351,1362 (Fed.Cir. 2008).
`
`B.
`
`Cellspin’s Construction of “Cryptographically Authenticating” is Correct.
`
`The touchstone of cryptography is that a person intercepting a transmission cannot
`
`understand it without a cipher/algorithm.Ex.2026,¶19. The notion that cryptographically includes
`
`mere secrecy or security is erroneous.Id. Panasonic’s only argument is that Mashita’s PIN is secret.
`
`See,Ex.1026,¶8. But if one intercepted the PIN, then they would know it.Ex.2026,¶20. This is not
`
`encryption.Id. This construction/substantive dispute must be resolved. See O2 Micro, supra.
`
`Panasonic’s assertion that Mashita’s PIN cryptographic authenticates is, at most, based
`
`upon speculation that one might use the PIN to generate encryption keys. Ex.2026,¶21.
`
`C.
`
`Cellspin’s Construction of GUI is Correct.
`
`Panasonic confuses graphical with “text-based” interfaces.Ex.2026,¶23. Panasonic
`
`incorrectly argues that using keystrokes to highlight areas of character-based interfaces constitutes
`
`a GUI. Id. Even if Cellspin’s proposed construction was rejected in part, an overbroad construction
`
`of GUI would be unreasonable if it allowed using keystrokes to highlight areas of a character-
`
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`4 
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`based interface.Id. It would be error to fail to resolve the parties’ construction/substantive dispute.
`
`See O2 Micro, supra.
`
`Panasonic misunderstands the incorporated ‘802 application, wherein Figure 3 exemplarily
`
`illustrates
`
`the publishing of multimedia content using application 202.Ex.2021,¶¶40-
`
`42Ex.2026,¶25. The “enter screen” on GUI 202a of the application 202 provides options for the
`
`selection of the medium for the multimedia content to be created. Id. One selects the preferred
`
`publication websites or publication virtual spaces 205 using an `add publishers` menu option
`
`provided on the enter screen.Id.
`
`Panasonic fails to understand that devices with a GUI can accept keystroke commands, but
`
`that does not mean that devices that only accept keystroke commands have GUIs.Ex.2026,¶26.
`
`Cellspin’s Construction of “A Software Application” is Correct.
`
`D.
`
`There are numerous references in the ‘698 patent to a single “client application 203.".
`
`Furthermore, Figures 2 and 4 depict one box for client application 203. The modules in Figures
`
`2/4 are clearly consolidated into a single application.Ex.2026,¶28.
`
`Panasonic’s new improper reply theory “fail[s] to see a distinction between using a client
`
`application composed of multiple modules and the combination of Mashita and Hiraishi, which
`
`would render such an approach obvious.”Ex.1024.¶25. However, there are both technical and
`
`usability aspects as to why this is incorrect.Ex.2026,¶29. Further, to teach HTTP server uploads,
`
`Panasonic relies upon on Hirashi. In Hirashi a browser uploads images to a server and a separate
`
`application obtains the camera image.Id. .
`
`When separate applications are used for obtaining the image from the camera and
`
`uploading it to the server, the uploading application must be made aware that there is a new image
`
`ready to be uploaded and where that image resides on the phone.Ex.2026,¶30. A POSITA would
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`5 
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`not have a reason to implement the single application taught in the ‘698 patent with multiple
`
`applications such as “browser” and separate “dedicated software” as would be required when
`
`combining Mashita and Hirashi.Id.
`
`Further, during ‘698 prosecution, the Examiner rejected then claims 1,3,8-9 over a
`
`combination including Hardman.Ex.1004,387;Ex.2029 (“Hardman”). Hardman was cited for its
`
`browser making HTTP requests.Ex.1004,p.390. In response, the Patentee acknowledged that “[i]n
`
`applicant's method,
`
`the software application
`
`(not
`
`the browser)” attached
`
`the user
`
`information.”Id.,p.372.
`
`Even the cases erroneously relied upon by Panasonic provide an exception that a/an means
`
`“one” when there is a clear intent expressed in intrinsic evidence or otherwise when the language
`
`of the claims themselves, the specification, or the prosecution history necessitate. See Baldwin
`
`Graphic Sys. v. Siebert, 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2008)); 01 Communique Lab. v. LogMeIn,
`
`687 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed.Cir.2012). At a minimum, even if Panasonic’s erroneous argument was
`
`accepted, the claims, specification and prosecution history meet this exception.
`
`IV.
`
`
`
`THE V2.1+EDR BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION LIST MANY
`OPTIONAL ACTIVITIES. THE MERE MENTION OF “BLUETOOTH
`CONNECTION” IN MASHITA, ONISHI OR HIRAISHI DOES NOT ESTABLISH
`PAIRED CONNECXTIONS.
`
`The Bluetooth Specification lists many optional activities.Ex.2026,¶16. The mere mention
`
`of “Bluetooth” in Mashita, Onishi or Hiraishi does not establish that the connections described in
`
`those references are paired. Id. The words “pair,” “paired” or “pairing” do not appear in these
`
`references.
`
`Fundamentally, Panasonic fails to cite the prior disclosure of a device that has performed
`
`Bluetooth pairing or even one that is capable of performing Bluetooth pairing.Ex.2026,¶18.
`
`Panasonic’s apparent assumption that the mere use of the word “Bluetooth” or “Bluetooth
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`6 
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`Connection” capability means that a device is capable of performing every function described in
`
`the voluminous Bluetooth specification is incorrect and unsupported.Id. Cellspin’s expert Dr.
`
`Foley is very well-versed in Bluetooth (e.g., was previously Executive Director and CEO of the
`
`Bluetooth SIG) and he is not aware of any commercial products which implement each and every
`
`feature in the specifications. Id. Panasonic has cited none.
`
`Even if the devices taught by Onishi, Hiraishi or Mashita had been disclosed as Bluetooth
`
`compliant, which they were not, there is no requirement that Bluetooth compliant devices be
`
`capable of pairing with other devices, that they be capable of cryptographic authentication, or that
`
`they be capable of many other features disclosed in a Bluetooth specification. Id. For example,
`
`there are error codes for when pairing is not allowed. Id. Further, there are Bluetooth compliant
`
`devices that lack the capability to pair or cryptographically authenticate.Id.
`
`V.
`
`
`
` LIMITATION C (I.E., A PAIRED CONNECTION) IS NOT DISCLOSED IN
`MASHITA, ONISHI OR HIRAISHI. FURTHER, PANASONIC AND DR.
`STRAWN’S NEW OBVIOUSNESS THEORY IS UNFOUNDED.
`
`A. Mashita, Onishi or Hiraishi Does Not Disclose Establishing a Paired
`Connection Between a Cellular Phone and Digital Camera.
`
`
`Panasonic mischaracterizes Mashita’s “PIN” as a passkey and then leaps to Mashita
`
`allegedly “pairing.”Ex.1026,¶¶9,40,94;Ex.2026,¶31. Panasonic conflates PINs/passkeys and
`
`pairing/authentication.Ex.2026,¶31.
`
`The concept of a passkey isn’t raised or mentioned in Mashita.Ex.2026,¶32;Ex.1006.
`
`Mashita
`
`states
`
`twice
`
`that
`
`only
`
`the
`
`physical
`
`device
`
`addresses
`
`are
`
`stored.Ex.1006,¶30&94;Ex.2026,¶32. No cryptographically created entity is derived from any PIN
`
`or passkey.Ex.1006,¶30;Ex.2026,¶32. Mashita’s 48-bit Physical address
`
`is NOT a
`
`cryptographically created entity derived from a PIN or passkey.Id.
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`7 
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`In Bluetooth the concept of a PIN and passkey are very different .Ex.2026,¶33. Panasonic
`
`bases its references to pairing in Bluetooth based on the v2.0+EDR Specification or older versions.
`
`However, in December 2007, the v2.1+EDR Bluetooth Core Specification was the current
`
`specification adopted by the Bluetooth SIG.Ex.2026,¶34. In v2.1+EDR, the older security modes
`
`relied upon by Panasonic were excluded. Id. Table 5.1 from the v2.1+EDR specification notes
`
`this:
`
`
`
`Ex.2006,p.1269;Ex.2026,¶34. In late 2007, a POSITA would not look at the excluded security
`
`modes for guidance.Ex.2026,¶34. Instead, they would look to the allowed security modes,
`
`specifically, the mandatory one--Security mode 4.Id.
`
`Even if one used the older, excluded, security modes to gain insight into pairing, one would
`
`still not come to the Panasonic’s conclusions.Ex.2026,¶35. Panasonic contends that the old
`
`Bluetooth security modes require pairing before authentication. This is incorrect as clearly stated
`
`in a page also referenced in the Strawn Declaration:
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`8 
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`
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`Ex.2006,pp.865-867;Ex.2026,¶35. The text states “The LM will request if authentication is
`
`required.” This means that for pairing, authentication is optional.Ex.2026,¶35.
`
`Panasonic quotes text from the Bluetooth specification that a PIN is used for authentication,
`
`NOT pairing.Ex.1024,¶15(“authentication is performed”);Ex.2026,¶35. However, Authentication
`
`is not the same as Pairing. A POSITA understands, and Dr. Strawn has not apparently denied, that
`
`pairing may or may not be performed after authentication is performed.Ex.2026,¶37.
`
`Panasonic alleges that “pairing is optional in Step 7a only if pairing had been performed
`
`previously.” Ex 1024,¶17. This is incorrect.Ex.2026,¶38. Figure 3.1 in v2.1+EDR clearly shows
`
`that:
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`
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`Ex.2006,p.861Ex.2026,¶38. Specifically, “[a] number of these steps may be optionally performed,
`
`such as authentication and encryption.”Ex.2006,p.861;Ex.2026,¶38 .
`
`In Step 7b, it is stated that if a common link key doesn’t exist between the devices, i.e.,
`
`they haven’t previously been paired, and the configuration parameter Authentication_Enable is
`
`set, then the authentication procedure must be executed.Ex.2006,861;Ex.2026,¶39. This
`
`authentication procedure may create link keys used for the authentication without pairing of the
`
`devices.Ex.2026,¶39.
`
`Panasonic incorrectly alleges that, “pairing explicitly happens if a PIN is exchanged as in
`
`Mashita.”Ex.1024,¶17. However, even in the older security modes , a PIN isn’t exchanged between
`
`the devices.Ex.2026,¶40. The PIN is entered into each device and serves as one of multiple inputs
`
`into a key generation algorithm which is utilized in a challenge/response procedure. Id. After
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`10 
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`authentication has been performed, the devices may or may not have been paired.Id. On this point,
`
`Bluetooth v2.1+EDR is clear:
`
`The foregoing states that, “[t]his PIN code will be requested on both sides of the
`
`connection, and authentication performed based on this PIN code.”Ex.2006,p.696;Ex.2026,¶42.
`
`Thus, the PIN code is used for authentication, before pairing is completed.Ex.2026,¶43.
`
`The specification goes on to describe how the pairing process is finished in optional Step 7a shown
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`11 
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`in Figure 3.1: “The last step is for the new link key for this connection to be passed to the host so
`
`that it may store it for future connections.”Ex.2006,866;Ex.2026,¶43.
`
`The descriptions of Figure 3.1 cited above clearly demonstrate how one may authenticate
`
`a device without pairing.Ex.2026,¶45. As such, Mashita does not disclose a paired connection.Id
`
`Mashita only talks about non cryptographic authentication using PIN and saving just the 48-bit
`
`physical addresses of the devices for future connections.Ex.2026,¶49.
`
`Panasonic’s Dr. Strawn admits that, “the keys that result are stored so that when the two
`
`devices talk to each other later, they don’t have to…enter[] the PIN again.”Ex.2030,19:17-20. This
`
`agrees with Cellspin.Ex.2026,¶45.
`
`As shown in the relevant portions of the v2.1+EDR above, it is clear that authenticating
`
`a connection does not necessarily result in the connection becoming paired.Ex.2026,¶49.
`
`Panasonic
`
`contends
`
`that,
`
`“[e]ncrypted
`
`communication…can
`
`only
`
`follow
`
`authentication…”Ex.1024¶22. This is incorrect.Ex.2026,¶51. In for example, in the “Just Works”
`
`association model in Security Mode 4, an unauthenticated link key is created. Id. This link key is
`
`used
`
`to generate an encryption key
`
`for encrypted communication even absent
`
`authentication.Ex.2006,p.1286;Ex.2026,¶51. Even in older security modes, encryption occurred
`
`without authentication.Ex.2006,p.861;Ex.2026,¶51.
`
`The statement cited by Panasonic that, “[w]hen the Bluetooth PIN is referred to on UI level,
`
`the term ’Bluetooth Passkey’ should be used,” relates to “Terms at user interface level.”
`
`Ex.2006,p.1258;Ex.2026,¶55. This Section provides guidelines for presenting terms to end
`
`user.Ex.2006,p.1257;Ex.2026,¶55. These optional recommendations were for consistency
`
`between devices containing any version of Bluetooth technology, making it easier for the end
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`12 
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`user.Ex.2026,¶55. The term used for end users at the UI level has no bearing on how it is used
`
`within the algorithms or procedures in the device. Id.
`
`Panasonic is mistaken regarding answers provided by Dr. Foley regarding Mashita. Figures
`
`6 and 7 are repeated here:
`
`
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`13 
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`Figure 6 represents the flowchart or state machine for the cellular phone while Figure 7
`
`
`
`provides the same for the digital camera.Ex.2026,¶59. Dr. Foley was asked about the state
`
`machine of the cellular phone.Id. That state machine does have the decision point (step S610) to
`
`return and request another photo.Id. This is consistent with his answer. For the complete system
`
`to work in Mashita, the digital camera would have to have a similar decision point in the camera
`
`state machine to wait for the next image.Id. The digital camera state machine depicted in Figure 7
`
`doesn’t have such a decision point.Id. Instead it goes directly from S704 (Transmit File) to S705
`
`(Terminate Local Wireless Link).Id. The digital camera terminates the wireless link with the
`
`cellular phone immediately after transmitting the file.Id. Even if the user selected the path to
`
`receive another image in step S610 (End Transfer Program) and returned to step S604 (Receive
`
`File) it would be impossible to receive another image from the digital camera because the digital
`
`camera would have already terminated the link. Id. There isn’t a complementary decision point
`
`on the digital camera state machine to wait for a second file request. Id.
`
`Furthermore, if the user choses to receive another image in S610, the flow chart returns to
`
`S604 (Receive File), which is below step S602 (Connect Local Wireless Link) meaning that the
`
`cellular phone will not attempt to open the local wireless link again.Ex.2026,¶60. The missing
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`14 
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`state isn’t in the cellular phone, as Dr. Foley was cleverly asked about in the deposition, but in the
`
`digital camera, which he described in his prior declaration. Id.
`
`For a POSITA to implement a digital camera which would allow multiple images to be
`
`transferred using the state machine of Mashita Figure 7, a new decision block would need to be
`
`introduced into the camera device, which was not an obvious modification.Ex.2026,¶61. As
`
`noted, the combined system as described in Mashita works in a fashion where the wireless
`
`connection is terminated after every transaction. Id.
`
`What Panasonic states occurs in the “Terminate Local Wireless Link,” steps S611 in the
`
`cellular phone and S705 in the digital camera has evolved.Ex.2026,¶62. Panasonic newly contends
`
`that terminating the local wireless link is akin to unpairing the devices.Reply,p.18. If this was
`
`correct, then the “Connect Local Wireless Link,” step S602 in the cellular phone and step S701 in
`
`the digital camera might include the process of pairing the devices.Ex.2026,¶62. But the combined
`
`system as described in Mashita works in a fashion where the wireless connection is terminated
`
`after every transaction, i.e., after every image transfer. This would be very user unfriendly and
`
`something which a POSITA would not choose nor have a reason to implement.Id.
`
`Panasonic’s changing positions on establishment and termination of the local wireless link
`
`are necessary because Mashita doesn’t teach paired connections.Ex.2026,¶63.
`
`B. Mashita Does Not Disclose “Cryptographically Authenticating Identity.”
`
`As already noted, Mashita’s four digit PIN does not “cryptographically authenticate”
`
`anything because it is not used for encryption or decryption, it does not use an algorithm to encrypt,
`
`and it does not otherwise meet any of the requirements for “cryptographic” as properly construed.
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`Panasonic alleges that Cellspin somehow admitted at pp. 17-18 of its Response that
`
`cryptographically authenticating is inherent in Bluetooth pairing. No such admission was made,
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` 
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`15 
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`and as noted herein, that is not the case. Further, as shown above, the Bluetooth specification
`
`permits paired but unauthenticated connections.Ex.2026,¶68.
`
`Panasonic’s argument that the specification describes Bluetooth pairing “as a way
`
`‘cryptographically authenticating’ occurs” is incorrect. What the cited specification says is that
`
`cryptographic authentication is optional, just as the Bluetooth Specification states.’698/3:65-
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`4:21;Ex.2026,¶69.
`
`Panasonic’s new Reply theory that pairing a Bluetooth connection would be obvious is
`
`improper. In any event, Panasonic fails to show any meaningful or persuasive reason for a POSITA
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`to pair the Mashita connection even if Bluetooth was being used.Ex.2026,¶71. Panasonic states
`
`that there are benefits of pairing, without meaningfully describing such benefits, including for
`
`Mashita specifically.
`
`Moreover, Panasonic fails to mention disadvantages of pairing, such as a poor user
`
`experience.Ex.2026,¶73. In late 2007, a POSITA would be inclined not to create a system which
`
`required pairing devices because the Bluetooth specifications didn’t require pairing. Id. Even in
`
`Security Mode 4 introduced in v2.1+EDR, the default security requirement was an
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`unauthenticated link key, which doesn’t require the entry of a PIN, passkey or comparison of a
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`passkey by the user.Ex.2006,p.1273;Ex.2026,¶73.
`
`The specification describing image transfer via Bluetooth, Basic Imaging Profile (BIP),
`
`defines six features including Image Pull and Automatic Archive.Ex.1020,p.15;Ex.2026,¶74.
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`Image Pull is most applicable to the teachings of the ‘698 patent. Id. Image Pull was envisioned
`
`for browsing through the existing images on the digital camera and pulling an image requested by
`
`the user. Id. Automatic Archive typically downloads all the existing images from the digital camera
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`16 
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`to the cellular phone for backup purposes. Id. The two features are significantly different and have
`
`difference security requirements defined in BIP.Ex.1020,pp.1516;Ex.2026,¶74.
`
`The fact that different features had difference security recommendations defined in BIP
`
`demonstrates
`
`that
`
`the authors of BIP considered
`
`the security requirements of each
`
`feature.Ex.2026,¶74. The recommendation as to whether or not pairing should be recommended
`
`for each feature was a conscience decision made by the authors of BIP. Id. After this consideration
`
`by the authors, BIP did not recommend pairing for the Image Pull feature. Id.
`
`Furthermore, both BIP Image Pull, and the Archiving feature, relied upon by
`
`Panasonic,
`
`do
`
`not
`
`recommend
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`“cryptographic
`
`authentication”
`
`in
`
`the
`
`specification.Ex.2026,¶75.
`
`Furthermore, since the Image Pull feature in BIP was envisioned for browsing through the
`
`existing images on the digital camera and pulling an image requested by the user, it does not teach
`
`the methods of the ‘698 patent.Ex.2026,¶76. In the ‘698 claims, the digital camera and cellular
`
`phone must be paired before the image is captured by the digital camera. See, e.g., Ex 1003,11:56-
`
`12:2 (“the new-media is acquired after establishing the short-range paired wireless connection”).
`
`While in BIP it is clear the images already exist on the digital camera for both Archiving and Image
`
`pull: “The Image Pull feature browses through the images stored on the Imaging Responder
`
`device”Ex.1020, p. 16;Ex.2026,¶74. While superficially resembling the teachings of the ‘698
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`patent, the Image Pull feature in BIP teaches a different sequence of steps and different usage
`
`model.Ex.2026,¶77.
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`In the relevant 2007 timeframe, Bluetooth technology had a reputation as being too difficult
`
`for end users to pair devices.Ex.2026,¶71. A POSITA would surely look at Secure Simple Pairing,
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`17 
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`Security Mode 4, the default mode (unpaired, encrypted, unauthenticated and unauthorized), as
`
`the method to implement. Id.
`
`The v2.1+EDR Bluetooth Core Specification lists many optional activities.Ex.2026,¶80.
`
`The mere mention of “Bluetooth connection” in Mashita, Onishi or Hiraishi prior art does not
`
`establish that the connections described in those references are paired. Id. As shown in the figure
`
`below there are 15 optional activities after a Bluetooth connection is established:
`
`
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`Ex.2006,p.19;Ex.2026,¶80.
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`With 15 optional activities, there are 215–1=32767 total combinations of optional activities
`
`after ACL connection establishment.Ex.2026,¶81. Even if all the options are not mutually
`
`exclusive, the number of combinations will be reduced from 32767, but will remain a very large
`
`number of possible combinations. Id. The ‘698 patent specification teaches one particular
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`18 
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`combination from the large number of available options. It is only through hindsight that this one
`
`particular option appears obvious and wasn’t a simple design decision in 2007 when the ‘698
`
`patent was filed. Id. Further, it is improper to select from a laundry list of options, especially here
`
`when hindsight construction is involved, when there are no persuasive reasons to combine, and
`
`when the standard relied upon has a different default and different pertinent use case. See Otsuka
`
`Pharmaceutical, Ltd. v. Sandoz, 678 F.3d 1280,1293–1294 (Fed.Cir. 2012).
`
`Panasonic asserts there are only two options: paired/unpaired. This is an oversimplification
`
`of the Bluetooth connection model.Ex.2026,¶82. Even with only the security modes described in
`
`the Exhibit 2006, v2.1+EDR Bluetooth Core specification, which is what a POSITA would have
`
`consulted for Bluetooth in the 2007 timeframe, there are significantly more options than just paired
`
`or unpaired. A more complete list of options is:
`
`Unpaired, unencrypted, unauthenticated and unauthorized
`Unpaired, unencrypted, unauthenticated and authorized
`Unpaired, unencrypted, authenticated and unauthorized
`Unpaired, unencrypted, authenticated and authorized
`Unpaired, encrypted, unauthenticated and unauthorized (default mode)
`Unpaired, encrypted, unauthenticated and authorized
`Unpaired, encrypted, authenticated and unauthorized
`Unpaired, encrypted, authenticated and authorized
`Paired, unencrypted, unauthenticated and unauthorized
`Paired, unencrypted, unauthenticated and authorized
`Paired, unencrypted, authenticated and unauthorized
`Paired, unencrypted, authenticated and authorized
`Paired, encrypted, unauthenticated and unauthorized
`Paired, encrypted, unauthenticated and authorized
`Paired, encrypted, authenticated and unauthorized
`Paired, encrypted, authenticated and authorized
`
`Ex.2026,¶82. Panasonic’s attempt to oversimplify these connection options as simply
`
`paired/unpaired results in an inaccurate analysis of the Bluetooth specifications and how they are
`
`implemented. Id.
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` 
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`19 
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`The default connection mode described in the v2.1+EDR Bluetooth core specification is
`
`for the connection to be unpaired, encrypted, unauthenticated and unauthorize.Ex.2006,p.1273.
`
`Without other requirements in place for a connection to be paired, there is no substantial reason
`
`that a POSITA would not choose the default connection.Ex.2026,¶84(unencrypted, authenticated
`
`and/or authorized). For example, the most widely used application for image transfer currently
`
`used is AirDrop provided by Apple. Id. AirDrop uses a different connection option that does not
`
`require entering a passkey or doing a numeric comparison on either device. Id. AirDrop doesn’t
`
`pair the devices exchanging images. Id.
`
`C. Cellspin’s Arguments Apply to the Non-Method Challenged Claims.
`
`Eve