UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Panasonic Corporation of North America et al.
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc.
`Patent Owner
`
`CASE: IPR2019-00131
`Patent No. 9,258,698
`
`PETITIONERS PANASONIC CORPORATION AND PANASONIC
`
`CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA’S OPPOSITION TO
`
`CELLSPIN’S MOTION TO STRIKE
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Panasonic Corporation of North America et al.
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc.
`Patent Owner
`
`CASE: IPR2019-00131
`Patent No. 9,258,698
`
`PETITIONERS PANASONIC CORPORATION AND PANASONIC
`
`CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA’S OPPOSITION TO
`
`CELLSPIN’S MOTION TO STRIKE
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
`I.
`II. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 2
`A.
`Legal Standards .................................................................................... 2
`B.
`Panasonic’s Reply Arguments All Fall Within the Proper
`Scope. ................................................................................................... 4
`1.
`The Reply Presents the Same Theory as the Petition
`Regarding Mashita’s Disclosure of “Pairing” and
`“Cryptographically Authenticating.” ......................................... 4
`The Petition Explicitly Argues that Limitation C Would
`Have Been an Obvious Implementation of Bluetooth. .............. 9
`The Reply Presents the Same “GUI” Arguments as the
`Petition. .................................................................................... 11
`The Sentence regarding Limitation J is a Direct and
`Proper Response to Cellspin’s “Teaching Away” Theory,
`and Does Not Change the Direction of Panasonic’s
`Argument. ................................................................................ 11
`The Argument regarding “Modules” relating to Claims 5
`and 8 is a Direct and Proper Response to Cellspin’s
`Narrow Claim Construction of “A” as “A Single.” ................. 12
`The Reply Does Not Present a “Catch-All” Theory of
`Obviousness. ............................................................................ 13
`Cellspin Can Show No Prejudice. ...................................................... 14
`Cellspin Presents No Basis for Striking Substantial Portions of
`the Reply or its Accompanying Evidence. ......................................... 14
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`C.
`D.
`
`-i-
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC,
`805 F.3d 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................ 3, 8
`Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`901 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ...................................................................passim
`Genzyme Therapeutic Prods., Ltd. v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc.,
`825 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 2
`Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.,
`821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 3
`Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Chrimar Sys., Inc.,
`Case IPR2016-01389 (PTAB January 23, 2018) ............................................ 2, 12
`Toyota Motor Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC,
`Case IPR2017-01494 (PTAB December 12, 2018).................................... 4, 7, 14
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R. § 42.23 ....................................................................................................... 2
`
`-ii-
`
`
`
`
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`Petitioners Panasonic Corporation and Panasonic Corporation of North
`
`America (“Panasonic”) file this opposition to Patent Owner Cellspin Soft, Inc.’s
`
`(“Cellspin”) motion to strike or exclude Panasonic’s reply brief and Exhibits 1024,
`
`1026-1028, and 1030-1031 (Paper 45) (the “Motion”).
`
`Cellspin’s Motion is long on hyperbole but short on facts supporting its
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`request. Cellspin identifies eleven supposedly “new” theories or matters in
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`Panasonic’s reply brief (Paper 23) (the “Reply”). But most of these same points
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`are made, explicitly, in Panasonic’s petition for inter partes review (Paper 1) (the
`
`“Petition”). In arguing to the contrary, Cellspin has ignored or mischaracterized
`
`the arguments in the Petition. The remaining few points are direct and proper
`
`responses to arguments made in Cellspin’s patent owner response (Paper 19) (the
`
`“Response”), particularly its “teaching away” argument and unfounded claim
`
`construction positions. These are the types of arguments that are permissible in
`
`reply under Federal Circuit and Board precedent.
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`Accordingly, every purportedly “new” matter is not “new” at all, or else is
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`proper rebuttal. Cellspin has not shown that it is entitled to any relief, much less
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`the drastic step of striking the entire Reply and other accompanying evidence. And
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`beyond its lack of substantive merit, the circumstances do not support granting
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`Cellspin’s belated tit-for-tat Motion. The Board should deny it in full.
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`-1-
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`
`
`
`
`II.
`
`Argument
`A.
`Legal Standards
`A petitioner is permitted to file a reply to a patent owner response that
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`responds to arguments raised in the patent owner response and address issues
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`discussed in the institution decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.23; Patent Trial and Appeals
`
`Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, November 2019 (“Practice Guide”) at
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`73. A petitioner may also submit new rebuttal evidence in support of its reply,
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`including a new expert declaration. Practice Guide at 73 (citing Belden Inc. v.
`
`Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1077-78, 1081-82 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Id. at 74-75
`
`(citing Genzyme Therapeutic Prods., Ltd. v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360,
`
`1365-69 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Chrimar Sys., Inc., Case
`
`IPR2016-01389 (PTAB January 23, 2018) (Paper 69) at 88-89 (denying motion to
`
`strike IEEE standard document first submitted in reply).
`
`The Federal Circuit has cautioned against the Board “parsing [a petitioner’s]
`
`arguments on reply with too fine of a filter.” Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures
`
`I LLC, 901 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding the Board abused its
`
`discretion in declining to consider a reply brief argument and accordingly vacating
`
`and remanding the final written decision). Precedents of the Federal Circuit and
`
`the Board provide guidance as to the proper scope of a reply. For example, an
`
`argument that “expands on a previously argued rationale as to why the prior art
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`-2-
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`
`
`disclosures are insubstantially distinct from the challenged claims” is proper. Id. at
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`1381. In contrast, the Board may properly refuse to consider “entirely new
`
`rationales” first raised in reply. Id. (citing Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina
`
`Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
`
`Furthermore, a reply and accompanying expert declaration appropriately
`
`may respond to arguments presented in the patent owner response and its
`
`accompanying expert declaration, for example by explaining why the patent
`
`owner’s characterizations of the prior art are wrong. Belden, 805 F.3d at 1078.
`
`The Board properly may rely on such reply arguments in its final written decision
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`both to reject the patent owner’s arguments and in stating affirmative reasons to
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`find unpatentability required for a prima facie case. Id. at 1079. And while the
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`Practice Guide states that a reply should not be accompanied by “new evidence …
`
`that could have been presented in a prior filing,” this must be read in context to
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`refer to evidence necessary to “make out a prima facie case of unpatentability”—
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`otherwise, as the Federal Circuit noted, it “might cover most responsive evidence”
`
`if read literally. Id. at 1078 n.4; see Practice Guide at 73-74.
`
`Responding to a claim construction proposed in the patent owner’s response,
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`both by disputing the construction and by explaining how the prior art would meet
`
`that construction, is an appropriate reply argument. See Ericsson, 901 F.3d at 1380
`
`(finding particular error in the Board’s refusal to consider petitioner’s arguments
`
`-3-
`
`
`
`about how the prior art’s disclosures met a claim construction first proposed by
`
`patent owner in its response and first adopted by the Board in its final written
`
`decision); Toyota Motor Corp. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, Case IPR2017-
`
`01494 (PTAB December 12, 2018) (Paper 36) at 44-45 (when patent owner
`
`proposed additional limitations for construction of a claim term and argued that
`
`prior art did not disclose those limitations, denying motion to strike reply
`
`arguments contending that the prior art did disclose those limitations).
`
`Striking a party’s brief is an exceptional remedy. Practice Guide at 80.
`
`Generally, a party should request authorization to file a motion to strike within one
`
`week of the allegedly improper submission. Id. at 81.
`
`Panasonic’s Reply Arguments All Fall Within the Proper Scope.
`B.
`In this section, we address each of the eleven supposedly “new” theories or
`
`arguments identified by Cellspin in Sections III.A-K of its Motion, grouping
`
`similar points together by subject matter.
`
`1.
`
`The Reply Presents the Same Theory as the Petition Regarding
`Mashita’s Disclosure of “Pairing” and “Cryptographically
`Authenticating.”
`Cellspin’s objections in Sections III.C, D, E, F, G and H of its Motion all
`
`relate to Mashita’s disclosure of “Limitation C” (using the “common limitations”
`
`nomenclature as in the Petition and subsequent documents in this IPR). Limitation
`
`C in Claim 1 reads: “establishing a short-range paired wireless connection between
`
`-4-
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`
`
`the digital camera device and the cellular phone, wherein establishing the short-
`
`range paired wireless connection comprises, the digital camera device
`
`cryptographically authenticating identity of the cellular phone” (emphasis added).
`
`The Petition and accompanying expert declaration (Ex. 1024) explain in
`
`detail how Mashita discloses Limitation C. First, the Petition notes that the ’698
`
`patent describes Bluetooth pairing as a specific example meeting this limitation,
`
`and that Mashita likewise discloses a Bluetooth connection between a camera and
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`phone. Petition at 38-39. But the Petition did not stop there.
`
`The Petition explained in detail how, through its disclosure of using
`
`matching PIN codes and physical addresses to establish a Bluetooth connection,
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`Mashita discloses cryptographic authentication, and—critically—“as a POSITA
`
`would understand, this cryptographically authenticated Bluetooth connection is a
`
`paired connection.” Petition at 40 (emphasis added); see also id. (“Mashita
`
`discloses a digital camera cryptographically authenticating the identity of a cellular
`
`phone to establish a short-range paired wireless connection with the cellular
`
`phone.”) (emphasis added); at 39 (specifically referencing the discussion of
`
`“cryptographically authenticating” as support for the disclosure of “pairing”). The
`
`Petition further explained that a POSITA would have understood Mashita’s
`
`disclosure in light of the Bluetooth specifications, which in turn disclosed how two
`
`devices established a paired Bluetooth connection and cryptographically
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`-5-
`
`
`
`authenticate each other. Petition at 40-41 (citing Ex. 1017, pp. 27, 29, 50-51 and
`
`Ex. 1024, ¶87).
`
`The Petition explicitly stated that Mashita’s PIN entry process disclosed
`
`pairing. Petition at 42 (“Mashita’s process of a user entering a PIN in the devices
`
`is effectively the same as the ‘cryptographically authenticating’/‘pairing’ process
`
`of a user entering a passkey disclosed in the ’698 Patent.”); see also Ex. 1024, ¶76
`
`(cited in Petition at 39) (“A POSITA would understand that establishing a link, and
`
`inputting the same PIN into both the cellular phone and the digital camera, both
`
`result in a paired connection.”) (emphasis added). The Petition carefully
`
`compared the ’698 patent with Mashita to explain how the two had an effectively
`
`identical disclosure of pairing/cryptographically authenticating. Id. at 41-42.
`
`The Reply begins (at 7-8) by reiterating, as argued in the Petition, that
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`“Mashita and the ’698 patent both describe essentially the same pairing and
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`cryptographically authenticating process” using a PIN or passkey—Cellspin does
`
`not argue that this portion of the Reply is “improper.” The Reply then directly
`
`addresses each argument raised in the Response as to why Mashita supposedly
`
`does not disclose Limitation C. Id. at 9-19. Cellspin challenges some (not all) of
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`these arguments.
`
`Cellspin’s arguments are all wrong:
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`-6-
`
`
`
` Cellspin asserts that the Reply improperly introduces new matter in arguing that
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`Mashita’s disclosed PIN entry/match results in Bluetooth pairing (Motion at 8-
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`12). This argument was explicitly discussed in detail in the Petition (at 40-42),
`
`as explained above, and in Ex. 1024 (¶¶76, 83-87). It also properly rebuts
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`Response arguments (at 23-24, 34-35) that Mashita does not disclose pairing.
`
` Cellspin claims that it is “new” for the Reply to argue that a PIN is not
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`materially different from a passkey in Bluetooth (Motion at 9). The Petition (at
`
`42) explicitly states, “entering a PIN” is “effectively the same” as the pairing
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`“process of a user entering a passkey….” This argument also is proper rebuttal
`
`to the Response argument (at 38-39) that a PIN and passkey are not the same.
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`This is bolstered by the fact that the patent claims do not use the word passkey,
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`so it was not until Cellspin raised the issue that Panasonic needed to address it.
`
` Cellspin asserts that the discussion of how pairing would result in a “link key”
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`in the Reply is improper (Motion at 11-12). Besides the general discussion of
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`pairing in the Petition, the Petition (at 41) cited Exhibit 1017 at 27, 29, 50-51,
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`which describes generating of link keys in the pairing process. This argument
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`is also proper rebuttal to the Response argument (at 24) regarding the supposed
`
`importance of “link keys”—a term appearing nowhere in the ’698 patent.
`
` Cellspin claims that the Reply improperly discusses encryption, decryption, or a
`
`cryptographic algorithm (Motion at 12-13). This is proper rebuttal to Cellspin’s
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`-7-
`
`
`
`claim construction (Response at 15-16) that invokes an algorithm. See
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`Ericsson, 901 F.3d at 1380; Toyota Motor Corp., Paper 36 at 44-45. In any
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`event, Exhibit 1017 at 50-51 (cited in the Petition at 41) explicitly discloses
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`how PIN-based Bluetooth pairing uses algorithms.
`
`Importantly, none of the challenged arguments are “necessary to make out a
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`prima facie case for” unpatentability. See Practice Guide at 73-74. The evidence
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`and argument necessary to make out a prima facie case are laid out in detail in the
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`Petition as explained above (of course, these arguments appropriately confirm the
`
`prima facie case and could be cited accordingly in the final written decision). The
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`arguments all “expand[] on a previously argued rationale” and/or “respond to the
`
`patent owner’s criticisms,” as numerous precedents confirm is appropriate. See
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`Ericsson, 901 F.3d at 1381; Belden, 805 F.3d at 1079.
`
`Cellspin repeatedly misstates the Petition’s arguments about Mashita’s PIN
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`entry. Response at 11 (“Panasonic’s Petition did not rely upon Mashita’s PIN
`
`entry for pairing. It only relied upon the PIN for “cryptographically
`
`authenticating” because the PIN was secret.”) (emphasis in original); see also id.
`
`at 8, 9. The foregoing discussion shows that these statements are wrong. And
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`Cellspin knows they are wrong. Cellspin’s own Response (at 35) acknowledges
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`that Panasonic did rely upon Mashita’s PIN entry for pairing:
`
`Dr. Strawn asserts that, “A POSITA would understand that establishing
`a link, and inputting the same PIN into both the cellular phone and the
`
`-8-
`
`
`
`digital camera, both result in a paired connection.” This assertion is
`incorrect. Ex. 2009,¶104.
`In sum, Cellspin’s arguments in Sections III.C, D, E, F, G, and H that
`
`Panasonic introduced improper new arguments regarding Mashita’s disclosure of
`
`pairing are entirely without merit and must be rejected.
`
`2.
`
`The Petition Explicitly Argues that Limitation C Would Have
`Been an Obvious Implementation of Bluetooth.
`Cellspin’s contention that Panasonic “had no obviousness theory with regard
`
`to paired wireless connections” is also wrong. See Motion at Section III.A.
`
`First, the Petition specifically argues that, aside from Mashita’s disclosure of
`
`Limitation C, Limitation C at least would have been obvious given the prior art’s
`
`disclosure of Bluetooth connections. Petition at 41 (“Thus, by explicitly disclosing
`
`a Bluetooth connection, Mashita, Onishi, and Hiraishi, each reference discloses or
`
`at least renders obvious to a POSITA the ‘cryptographically authenticating’
`
`portion of this limitation”), at 39 (referring to this discussion when discussing
`
`“paired” connections), at 39 (“A POSITA also would understand that ‘paired’ or
`
`pairing refers to the establishment of the Bluetooth connection between the two
`
`devices” in Mashita, Onishi, and Hiraishi). In the Institution Decision, the Board
`
`cited this argument. Paper 11 at 23, see also id. at 26. Indeed, Cellspin’s
`
`Response repeatedly argued that “the cited references do not disclose or render
`
`obvious short-range paired wireless connections,” showing that Cellspin knew this
`
`-9-
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`
`
`argument was raised in the Petition. Response at 40, 41, 42 (first emphasis added,
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`second emphasis in original).
`
`Second, contrary to Cellspin’s claim, the Petition did expressly rely upon
`
`specific content in the Bluetooth specifications on this point. Petition at 41 (citing
`
`disclosure in Ex. 1017 of how two devices establish paired Bluetooth connections
`
`in arguing that the prior art’s disclosure of Bluetooth would at least have rendered
`
`Limitation C obvious). The Petition (at 35) also cited the Bluetooth Basic Imaging
`
`Profile (“BIP”) (Exhibit 1020) for its disclosure of Bluetooth connections,
`
`discussed further below. Notably, Cellspin cites only to pages 38-39 of the
`
`Petition in Section III.A, omitting the obviousness arguments on this point
`
`elsewhere in the Petition (e.g., page 41).
`
`Third, the Reply arguments are also proper rebuttal to Cellspin’s Response.
`
`In particular, Cellspin’s expert witness responded to Panasonic and Dr. Strawn’s
`
`discussion of the BIP by arguing that it does not require, and does not recommend,
`
`using a paired Bluetooth connection. Ex. 2009, ¶¶112-113; Response at 37-38.
`
`The Reply (at 21-22) directly rebuts this argument by showing how Dr. Foley’s
`
`opinion actually supports obviousness. The Reply (at 20-21) also lays out
`
`testimony from Dr. Foley’s deposition undermining his theory that a POSITA
`
`would not have found pairing to be obvious. This is paradigmatic reply argument.
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`The Motion is an apparent attempt to avoid these damaging admissions.
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`-10-
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`
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`The Reply Presents the Same “GUI” Arguments as the Petition.
`3.
`Cellspin wrongly contends that the Reply improperly references the Sony
`
`Z520a and N73 in discussing Limitation K (the “GUI” limitation). Motion at 15.
`
`Cellspin acknowledges that the Petition relies upon the combination of Mashita
`
`and Onishi to disclose Limitation K. Id. The Reply (at 27-29) asserts the same
`
`theory. More specifically, the Petition cites testimony from Dr. Strawn which
`
`explicitly references the N73 and Z520a cellular phones to explain that a POSITA
`
`understood that it was commonplace for cellular phones at the time to have a GUI
`
`for deleting media shown on a phone’s screen—including that these phones used a
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`“Navigation Key” or similar key to navigate the GUI. Petition at 68 (citing Ex.
`
`1001, ¶¶130-131, 137, 139). Thus, both the reference to those phones generally in
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`connection with Limitation K, and the specific argument that directional navigation
`
`keys commonly were used to manipulate GUIs, are not “new.” In addition, the
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`Reply arguments rebut Cellspin’s contention that Onishi does not disclose a GUI
`
`because it uses a button to delete files. Response at 45-46.
`
`4.
`
`The Sentence regarding Limitation J is a Direct and Proper
`Response to Cellspin’s “Teaching Away” Theory, and Does
`Not Change the Direction of Panasonic’s Argument.
`Cellspin misunderstands the Reply’s statement that “Mashita could be read
`
`to disclosed Limitation J on its own” and supporting evidence. Motion at Section
`
`III.I. This argument responds to Cellspin’s contention (Response at 30-31) that
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`-11-
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`
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`Mashita taught away from using HTTP. It explains why Cellspin’s teaching-away
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`argument is unpersuasive by highlighting Mashita’s disclosures of using HTTP,
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`which are so close to Limitation J that it “could” be read to disclose that limitation.
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`Reply at 25. Panasonic’s position remains that the combination of Mashita with
`
`Hiraishi meets Limitation J. This is clear from the context. Id. at 25-26.
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`Cellspin also seeks to strike Ex. 1024, ¶¶40-42, and Exs. 1026-1028 and
`
`1030-1031, without providing any basis. Motion at 14. The cited portion of Ex.
`
`1024 further explains what Cellspin acknowledges is the Petition’s obviousness
`
`theory (that substituting HTTP for FTP would have been obvious). The other
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`exhibits are technical standards supporting that explanation, which are appropriate
`
`reply evidence. See Juniper Networks, Inc., Paper 69 at 88-89.
`
`5.
`
`The Argument regarding “Modules” relating to Claims 5 and 8
`is a Direct and Proper Response to Cellspin’s Narrow Claim
`Construction of “A” as “A Single.”
`A substantial portion of Cellspin’s argument is devoted to an issue that the
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`Board should not need to reach. See Motion, Section III.B. Cellspin’s Response
`
`argues that “a” means “a single,” contrary to the well-established claim
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`construction “rule” that “a” in patent claims means “one or more.” See Reply at 6-
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`7. Should the Board reject Cellspin’s incorrect construction, it will not need to
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`address Panasonic’s arguments in Reply showing how, even using Cellspin’s
`
`construction, claims 5 and 8 are still unpatentable in view of the prior art at issue.
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`-12-
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`
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`If the Board does reach this issue, Panasonic’s Reply argument is a direct
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`and appropriate rebuttal to Cellspin’s Response. As Cellspin acknowledges, the
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`Petition relies on Hiraishi’s disclosure of “dedicated software” for these claim
`
`limitations. Motion at 6. The Reply (i) explains how Cellspin’s Response
`
`mischaracterizes this disclosure as meaning a “dedicated application,” (ii) cites
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`further detail from Hiraishi, specifically its disclosure that the software consists of
`
`several modules, and then (iii) explains why it would have been obvious to a
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`POSITA to employ a modular programming approach, as expressly taught in
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`Hiraishi, to meet Cellspin’s new claim construction. Reply, 29-30. Cellspin does
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`not point to anything in the Petition that would be inconsistent with this approach.
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`This is a permissible response to a new claim construction first presented in Patent
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`Owner’s Response—particularly this construction, which is counter to the normal
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`claim construction “rule” and thus was not an argument that Panasonic fairly
`
`should have anticipated. See Ericsson, 901 F.3d at 1380.
`
`6.
`
`The Reply Does Not Present a “Catch-All” Theory of
`Obviousness.
`Finally, Cellspin’s argument in Section III.J again mischaracterizes the
`
`record. The quoted portion of Dr. Strawn’s testimony is an introductory paragraph
`
`included at the beginning of his analysis of the prior art summarizing his overall
`
`opinion of unpatentability. It is not a “catch-all” for new obviousness theories.
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`-13-
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`
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`Besides, the Petition similarly argued that “POSITA would have had ample
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`reasons to combine Mashita, Onishi, and Hiraishi.” Petition at 31-32.
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`Cellspin Can Show No Prejudice.
`C.
`Even if some aspect of the Reply had exceeded the proper scope, the
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`circumstances here would not justify granting a motion to strike or exclude.
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`Cellspin did not take advantage of its opportunities to test and respond to the
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`purportedly “new” reply arguments and evidence. Cellspin chose to not depose
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`Dr. Strawn on his second declaration. Cellspin asked for Dr. Strawn’s deposition
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`and the parties scheduled it, but Cellspin then cancelled it. Ex. 1032. Cellspin also
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`could have addressed the reply arguments appropriately in its sur-reply. See
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`Toyota Motor Corp., Paper 36 at 45. Instead, Cellspin chose to base its sur-reply
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`on an impermissible second expert declaration and other evidence. See Paper 44.
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`Cellspin’s claims of prejudice are further belied by its lengthy delay in filing its
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`Motion—only after submitting its sur-reply and after Panasonic notified Cellspin
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`of its intention to move to strike the sur-reply. See Practice Guide at 81.
`
`D.
`
`Cellspin Presents No Basis for Striking Substantial Portions of the
`Reply or its Accompanying Evidence.
`Cellspin identifies no supposedly “improper” matter in the following topics
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`discussed in the Reply: (i) Dr. Foley’s declaration should be given no weight
`
`(Reply Section II); (ii) Claim construction (Reply Section III, Ex. 1024 ¶¶6-9 and
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`23-24); (iii) Regarding Limitation C, that Mashita and the ’698 patent both
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`-14-
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`
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`describe essentially the same pairing and cryptographically authenticating process
`
`(Reply at 7-8), the responses to Cellspin’s various arguments at Reply p. 15-18,
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`that Mashita meets the “cryptographically authenticating” part of the limitation
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`under the proper construction (id. at 18), and the related portions of Ex. 1024
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`(¶¶45-47, 49-57); (iv) Cellspin’s arguments regarding Limitation C do not apply to
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`the non-method challenged claims (Reply Section IV.D); (v) Limitation G is
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`obvious (Reply Section V); (vi) The two disadvantages identified by Mashita are
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`irrelevant to Limitation J (Reply Section VI.B, Ex. 1024 ¶¶32-37); (vii) the
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`argument in Reply Section VI.A that Mashita does not “teach away” (and the
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`related portion of Ex. 1024, ¶¶39, 43-44); (viii) The “first” and “second”
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`arguments regarding Limitation K (Reply p. 27-28, Ex. 1024 ¶ 8); and (ix) These
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`proceedings are constitutional (Reply Section IX). Even if Cellspin’s arguments
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`had merit (they do not), there would be no basis for striking the entire reply.
`
`Dated: January 3, 2020
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: / T. Vann Pearce, Jr. /
`
`T. Vann Pearce, Jr.
`Lead Counsel for Petitioners Panasonic
`Corporation of North America and
`Panasonic Corporation
`
`-15-
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing was served on
`
`January 3, 2020 via electronic service:
`
`David T. Xue
`Karineh Khachatourian
`Rimôn Law
`2479 East Bayshore Road, Suite 210
`Palo Alto, CA 94303
`david.xue@rimonlaw.com
`karinehk@rimonlaw.com
`
`Jennifer C. Bailey
`Adam P. Seitz
`Erise IP, P.A.
`7015 College Boulevard, Suite 700
`Overland Park, KS 66211
`jennifer.bailey@eriseip.com
`adam.seitz@eriseip.com
`PTAB@eriseip.com
`
`Attorneys for Petitioners GoPro, Inc. Garmin International, Inc., and Garmin
`USA, Inc.
`Stephen F. Schlather
`Edmonds & Schlather, PLLC
`1616 South Voss Road, Suite 125
`Houston, TX 77057
`sschlather@ip-lit.com
`
`John J. Edmonds
`Edmonds & Schlather, PLLC
`355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`pto-edmonds@ip-lit.com
`
`Attorneys for Patent Owner Cellspin Soft, Inc.
`
`/ T. Vann Pearce, Jr. /
`
`-16-
`
`
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