Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 1 Filed: 09/06/2018
`
`Nos. 18-1638, -1639, -1640, -1641, -1642, -1643
`
`United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
`
`SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, ALLERGAN, INC.,
`Appellants,
`v.
`MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
`TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., AKORN, INC.,
`Appellees.
`
`Appeals from Patent and Trademark Office,
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos.
`IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, IPR2016-01129,
`IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132,
`IPR2017-00576, IPR2017-00578, IPR2017-00579,
`IPR2017-00583, IPR2017-00585, IPR2017-00586,
`IPR2017-00594, IPR2017-00596, IPR2017-00598,
`IPR2017- 00599, IPR2017-00600, IPR2017-00601.
`
`BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE
`REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
`IN SUPPORT OF EN BANC REHEARING
`
`September 4, 2018
`
`Michael A. Albert
`Richard F. Giunta
`Charles T. Steenburg
`Gerald B. Hrycyszyn
`Stuart V. C. Duncan Smith
`WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`Boston, MA 02210
`Tel: (617) 646-8000
`Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
`Regents of the University of Minnesota
`
`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 1
`
`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 2 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
`
`Counsel for amicus curiae Regents of the University of Minnesota (“UMN”)
`
`certifies the following:
`
`1.
`
`The full name of every party represented by me is:
`
` Regents of the University of Minnesota
`2.
`The names of the real parties in interest represented by me are:
`
` Regents of the University of Minnesota
`3.
`All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that own 10
`percent of the stock of the parties represented by me are listed below.
`
` None, amicus curiae is a state entity created by the constitution of the State
`of Minnesota.
`4.
`The names of all law firms and the partners and associates that have
`appeared for the party in the lower tribunal or are expected to appear for the party
`in this court and who are not already listed on the docket for the current case are:
`
` None, amicus curiae did not appear in the lower tribunal, and amicus curiae
`does not expect other counsel to appear on its behalf in this case.
`5.
`The title and number of any case known to counsel to be pending in
`this or any other court or agency that will directly affect or be directly affected by
`this court’s decision in the pending appeal:
`
` Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corporation, No. 2018-1559, -
`1560, -1561, -1562, -1563, -1564, -1565 (Fed. Cir.)
`
` Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corporation,
`No. 5:18-cv-00821 (N.D. Cal.)
`
` Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.,
`No. 3:17-cv-06056 (N.D. Cal.)
` Regents of the University of Minnesota v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`No. 0:14-cv-04666 (D. Minn.)
`
`i
`
`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 2
`
`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 3 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
`
` Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Sprint Solutions, Inc.,
`No. 0:14-cv-04669 (D. Minn.)
` Regents of the University of Minnesota v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`No. 0:14-cv-04671 (D. Minn.)
` Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Cellco Partnership,
`No. 0:14-cv-04672 (D. Minn.)
` Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-01753 (P.T.A.B.)
` Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-01712 (P.T.A.B.)
` Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-02004 (P.T.A.B.)
` Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-02005 (P.T.A.B.)
` Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-01186 (P.T.A.B.)
` Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-01197 (P.T.A.B.)
` Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-01200 (P.T.A.B.)
` Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-01213 (P.T.A.B.)
` Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-01214 (P.T.A.B.)
` Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-01219 (P.T.A.B.)
` LSI Corporation v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,
`No. IPR2017-01068 (P.T.A.B.)
`
`
`
`
`
`Date: September 4, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Michael A. Albert
`Michael A. Albert
`
`
`
`ii
`
`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 3
`
`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 4 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST ................................................................................ i
`TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv
`STATEMENT OF INTEREST .................................................................................. 1
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 3
`I. The Panel Decision Concerns Critically Important Issues. ......................... 3
`II. IPR Is A Suit by the Petitioner, Not the U.S. .............................................. 4
`A. The Exception Applies Only to Suits “Commenced and
`Prosecuted” by the U.S. ......................................................................... 4
`B. IPR Is Not “Commenced and Prosecuted” by the U.S. ........................ 5
`C. The Director’s Purported “Political Responsibility” for
`Institution Does Not Support the Panel’s Decision. ............................. 8
`III. IPR Meets All of FMC’s Criteria. ............................................................... 9
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 13
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 14
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND FILING ........................................................ 15
`
`
`iii
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`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 4
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`

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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`A123 Sys. v. Hydro-Quebec,
`626 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ..........................................................................7, 9
`Alden v. Maine,
`527 U.S. 706 (1999) .................................................................................... 4, 8, 12
`Applications in Internet Time v. RPX,
`897 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. July 9, 2018) .................................................................. 6
`Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill.,
`501 U.S. 775 (1991) ............................................................................................... 4
`City of Ont. v. Quon,
`560 U.S. 746 (2010) ............................................................................................... 2
`Cohens v. Virginia,
`19 U.S. 264 (1821) .............................................................................................4, 6
`Covidien v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found.,
`2017 WL 4015009 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2017) ............................................ 9, 10, 11
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wash.,
`334 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 11
`Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth.,
`535 U.S. 743 (2002) ..................................................................................... passim
`Hans v. Louisiana,
`134 U.S. 1 (1890) ...................................................................................... 9, 10, 12
`In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l,
`829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................... 6, 7, 10
`Novartis v. Torrent Pharm.,
`853 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 10
`Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy,
`138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) .................................................................................... 7, 10
`
`iv
`
`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 5
`
`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 6 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
`
`R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States,
`304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002) .................................................................................. 12
`SAS Inst. v. Iancu,
`138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) ............................................................................ 5, 6, 8, 10
`U.S. ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ.,
`171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999) ..............................................................................5, 9
`U.S. ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst.,
`173 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir.), supplemented, 173 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1999) .............. 8
`Vas-Cath v. Curators of Univ. of Mo.,
`473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .................................................................... passim
`Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens,
`529 U.S. 765 (2000) ............................................................................................... 5
`Xechem v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr.,
`382 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .............................................................................. 7
`STATUTES
`28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 ................................................................................................ 9
`31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)............................................................................................... 5
`31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) .....................................................................................5, 9
`35 U.S.C. § 200 .......................................................................................................... 3
`35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)-(2) ........................................................................................... 6
`35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) ................................................................................................. 6
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide,
`77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012) .................................................................6, 7
`RULES
`Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) ................................................................................................. 1
`
`v
`
`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 6
`
`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 7 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
`
`REGULATIONS
`37 C.F.R. § 42.2. ........................................................................................................ 6
`37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) ..................................................................................................... 8
`37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3) .............................................................................................. 6
`46 C.F.R. § 502.282 (2001) ....................................................................................... 5
`46 C.F.R. § 502.61(a) (2001) ..................................................................................... 5
`
`
`
`
`vi
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`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 7
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`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 8 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
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`STATEMENT OF INTEREST
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`Private parties filed petitions for IPR of UMN patents. UMN moved to
`
`dismiss them based on sovereign immunity. Although the Patent Trial and Appeal
`
`Board (“Board”) determined that sovereign immunity applies, the Board found
`
`UMN waived immunity by asserting the patents in court.
`
`In UMN’s appeal of that decision (Case No. 2018-1559), the parties
`
`opposing UMN argue, as do Appellants here, that the panel decision here
`
`concerning tribal immunity disposes of UMN’s case. Doc. 137 at 7. Although the
`
`panel’s ruling on tribal immunity does not apply to UMN’s state sovereign
`
`immunity, the risk that it could be so applied provides UMN a compelling interest
`
`in en banc rehearing of the panel’s decision here.
`
`Although state and tribal immunity are not coextensive, and thus caselaw
`
`applicable to one does not necessarily apply to the other, this brief nonetheless
`
`takes as a premise Appellants’ contrary presumption. Based on that premise, the
`
`panel decision is inconsistent with the Court’s prior holding that sovereign
`
`immunity applies to USPTO proceedings in Vas-Cath v. Curators of University of
`
`Missouri, 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and with Supreme Court precedent,
`
`which further demonstrates a need for en banc rehearing. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).1
`
`
`1 No party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no one
`other than UMN and its counsel contributed money intended to fund the
`preparation or submission of this brief. UMN has moved for leave to file this brief.
`
`1
`
`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 8
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`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 9 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
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`UMN takes no position on other issues presented in the underlying case,
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`which may be capable of resolution on narrower grounds. See City of Ont. v.
`
`Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (deciding on “narrower grounds” is “preferable”).
`
`2
`
`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 9
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`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 10 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`The Panel Decision Concerns Critically Important Issues.
`
`Public universities are among the country’s largest research institutions and
`
`obtain many patents stemming from their research. Pursuant to national policy, the
`
`importance of which Congress codified in the Bayh-Dole Act, UMN “use[s] the
`
`patent system to promote the utilization of [its] inventions.” 35 U.S.C. § 200.
`
`Patent licensing is a critical source of educational funding. Consistent with their
`
`obligation to safeguard public resources, public universities choose judiciously to
`
`engage in litigation. Stripping them of their sovereign immunity enables private
`
`parties to wage war on state-owned patents, threatening that revenue and imposing
`
`litigation costs on the public fisc.
`
`The panel’s decision would also upset the constitutional balance of power
`
`between States and the United States (“U.S.”) that sovereign immunity protects.
`
`The panel found IPR exempt from sovereign immunity largely because the
`
`Director acts as a “gatekeeper” with discretion to halt an IPR. Add.11. That
`
`reasoning could subject States to any private-party-initiated agency proceeding –
`
`where States have long had the protection of sovereign immunity – so long as a
`
`federal official has the option to dismiss the proceeding. Whether Congress can
`
`skew the balance of power merely by creating such a “gatekeeper” requires careful
`
`scrutiny.
`
`3
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`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 10
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`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 11 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
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`II.
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`IPR Is A Suit by the Petitioner, Not the U.S.
`
`The panel found that an agency official’s discretion to let IPRs proceed
`
`makes them more like proceedings brought by the U.S. than by private parties, thus
`
`exempting them from sovereign immunity. Add.11. But controlling caselaw and
`
`the statute that created IPR establish that private parties, not the U.S., commence
`
`and prosecute IPRs.
`
`A. The Exception Applies Only to Suits “Commenced and
`Prosecuted” by the U.S.
`
`The exemption from sovereign immunity for suits brought by the U.S.
`
`applies only to proceedings “commenced and prosecuted” by the U.S. Alden v.
`
`Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999). The terms “commenced” and “prosecuted” are
`
`significant – they appear in the Eleventh Amendment and have established
`
`meanings: “[t]o commence a suit, is to demand something by the institution of
`
`process in a Court of justice; and to prosecute the suit, is, according to the common
`
`acceptation of language, to continue that demand.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
`
`264, 408 (1821); see also Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 501
`
`U.S. 775, 785 (1991) (a suit is “by” the U.S. if brought “at the instance and under
`
`the control of responsible federal officers”). The focus of these terms is on the
`
`party making a claim – i.e., the “process sued out by that individual against the
`
`[sovereign].” Cohens, 19 U.S. at 408. Federal Maritime Commission v. South
`
`Carolina State Ports Authority (“FMC”) reaffirmed this focus, holding that private
`
`4
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`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 11
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`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 12 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
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`actions adjudicated by the agency should not be confused with actions the statute
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`permits the agency to “commence” or “originate.” 535 U.S. 743, 768 (2002); 46
`
`C.F.R. §§ 502.61(a), 502.282 (2001).2
`
`Analogously, the U.S. does not “commence” or “prosecute” qui tam cases,
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`even though a private relator brings the suit “for” and “in the name of” the U.S.,
`
`and a federal official has the option to dismiss the suit. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1),
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`(c)(2)(A); see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 293-94
`
`(5th Cir. 1999) (sovereign immunity applies because of the relator’s control over
`
`“whether to sue,” “what manner to make demands, and “whether to settle”); Vt.
`
`Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 766 (2000) (expressing
`
`“serious doubt” that sovereign immunity permits qui tam suits against sovereigns).
`
`B.
`
`IPR Is Not “Commenced and Prosecuted” by the U.S.
`
`The words “inter partes” mean “between parties.” As those words suggest,
`
`IPRs are proceedings between parties that are adjudicated (not brought) by the
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`Board.
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`The petitioner, not the U.S., “commence[s]” IPR with the petition. SAS
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`Institute v. Iancu explained that the AIA “doesn’t authorize the Director to start
`
`proceedings on his own initiative.” 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018). Rather, “the
`
`proceedings begin with the filing of a petition.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide,
`
`
`2 Citations omitted and emphasis added throughout, unless otherwise stated.
`
`5
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`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 12
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`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 13 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
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`77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,757 (Aug. 14, 2012); SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1353 (explaining
`
`that “[a]t its outset, a party must file a petition”). A party “demand[s] something
`
`by the institution of process” with a petition. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 408. Later, the
`
`Board’s institution decision marks the transition from the “Preliminary
`
`Proceeding” to the “Trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2.
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`The petitioner, not the U.S., also “prosecute[s]” IPRs. SAS explained that
`
`IPR is “a party-directed, adversarial process,” and rejected the idea that the
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`Board’s discretion made IPR “(another) agency-led, inquisitorial process.” 138 S.
`
`Ct. at 1355. Although the Board has “discretion on the question whether to
`
`institute review, the petitioner’s petition, not the Director’s discretion, . . . guide[s]
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`the life of the litigation.” Id. at 1356; id. at 1357 (“[T]he petitioner’s contentions,
`
`not the Director’s discretion, define the scope of the litigation . . . .”).
`
`The Board adjudicates the parties’ dispute. See Applications in Internet
`
`Time v. RPX, 897 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. July 9, 2018) (IPR is an “adversarial
`
`proceeding[]” to enforce “a petitioner’s right”). The Board decides cases based on
`
`party arguments, not on arguments that the Board develops. See In re Magnum Oil
`
`Tools Int’l, 829 F.3d 1364, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Once a Final Written
`
`Decision issues, the parties, not the Board, may be subject to estoppel. 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 315(a)(1)-(2); § 315(e)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3).
`
`6
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`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 13
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`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 14 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
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`The Board’s authority to either “terminate the proceeding or issue a final
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`written decision” upon settlement does not empower the Board to take over
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`“prosecution” of the IPR. Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy, 138 S. Ct.
`
`1365, 1371 (2018). The Board can still only adjudicate the parties’ arguments.
`
`See Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380-81. Indeed, typically, settlement ends the
`
`proceeding “unless the Board has already decided the merits.” 77 Fed. Reg. at
`
`48,768.
`
`Oil States is not contrary. Oil States concerned whether the USPTO could
`
`exercise a federal power, not the scope of that power. The panel mis-cited Oil
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`States as holding that “IPR is a matter which arises between the Government and
`
`[patent owners].” Add.7. Oil States actually held that patents are public rights
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`that “arise between the Government and [the patent owner],” 138 S. Ct. at 1373,
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`which does not mean that proceedings regarding those rights are “commenced and
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`prosecuted” by the U.S. Declaratory judgment actions, inventorship actions, and
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`interferences all “reconsider[]” patents (Add.7), and yet sovereign immunity
`
`applies to each. A123 Sys. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213, 1219-20 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2010) (declaratory judgment actions); Xechem v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson
`
`Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (inventorship actions); Vas-
`
`Cath, 473 F.3d at 1382 (interferences).
`
`7
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`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 14
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`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 15 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
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`C. The Director’s Purported “Political Responsibility” for Institution
`Does Not Support the Panel’s Decision.
`
`The panel misinterpreted Alden by giving significance to the Director’s
`
`alleged “political responsibility” for IPR. Alden used “political responsibility” as
`
`an explanation for why suits “commenced and prosecuted” by the U.S. are exempt
`
`from sovereign immunity: resting the power to “commence[] and prosecute[]”
`
`with a federal official is critical because the official has “political responsibility for
`
`each suit.” 527 U.S. at 755-56. By contrast, Alden explained that permitting
`
`private suits against a sovereign removes the required “control” that federal
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`“political responsibility” provides. Id. at 756; see also U.S. ex rel. Long v. SCS
`
`Bus. & Tech. Inst., 173 F.3d 870, 885 (D.C. Cir.), supplemented, 173 F.3d 890
`
`(D.C. Cir. 1999) (private qui tam suits “remov[e the U.S.] from direct
`
`accountability and from the subtle political pressures that might have precluded the
`
`lawsuit in the first place”). Thus, where a private party controls the decision to
`
`bring suit, courts cannot sidestep sovereign immunity simply because a federal
`
`official has some discretion in determining whether or how a case proceeds. Id.
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`Additionally, the panel did not explain how the Director has political
`
`responsibility for institution; nor could it since the Board, rather than the Director,
`
`decides whether to institute. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a); see SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1353. As
`
`the Board has noted, its members are “impartial officers designated, on behalf of
`
`the Director, to review the petition and preliminary response.” Covidien v. Univ. of
`
`8
`
`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 15
`
`

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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 16 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`
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`Fla. Research Found., 2017 WL 4015009, at *10 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2017); id. at
`
`*7 (rejecting the argument that IPR is “brought by the federal government”). The
`
`Board’s discretion to institute IPR is akin to a district court’s discretion to exercise
`
`declaratory judgment jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02) or a federal official’s
`
`discretion to permit a qui tam case (31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)) – powers that do
`
`not eliminate sovereign immunity. A123, 626 F.3d at 1219-20; Foulds, 171 F.3d at
`
`293-94.
`
`III.
`
`IPR Meets All of FMC’s Criteria.
`
`FMC is the only instance where the Supreme Court has addressed the
`
`application of sovereign immunity to an administrative proceeding. Vas-Cath is
`
`the only instance where this Court addressed the application of sovereign immunity
`
`to USPTO proceedings; it applied FMC and concluded that interferences met
`
`FMC’s criteria. 473 F.3d at 1382. Yet the panel did not follow FMC’s analysis,
`
`nor did it follow or even address Vas-Cath. Under FMC and Vas-Cath, sovereign
`
`immunity applies to IPR.
`
`FMC began with the “Hans presumption” – a presumption that sovereign
`
`immunity bars suits “that were ‘anomalous and unheard of when the Constitution
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`was adopted.’” FMC, 535 U.S. at 755 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18
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`(1890)). FMC gave “great significance” to the fact that private agency proceedings
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`against States did not exist at the founding. Id. To confirm that sovereign
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`immunity applied, FMC compared the agency proceedings with a proceeding that
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`sovereign immunity indisputably barred: private civil litigation against a sovereign.
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`Id.
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`The panel neither applied the Hans presumption nor explained why it should
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`not apply to IPRs which, likewise, did not exist at the founding. Id. Indeed, IPR
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`has all the features FMC found sufficient to apply sovereign immunity:
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` FMC considered “whether [the ALJ’s role was] functionally comparable to
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`that of a judge.” FMC, 535 U.S. at 756. The Board is an “impartial federal
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`adjudicator.” Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1382. It has many “notable
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`similarities” with district court judges. Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *10.
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` FMC considered the “safeguards [that] are available in the judicial process.”
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`535 U.S. at 756-57. IPR is “a party-directed, adversarial process” subject to
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`the APA’s safeguards. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1355; Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at
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`1380-81; e.g., Novartis v. Torrent Pharm., 853 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
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`2017).
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` FMC noted the use of pleadings and discovery. 535 U.S. at 757-58. IPR
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`provides those same procedures. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1353-54 (also noting
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`that IPR has “many of the usual trappings of litigation,” that it “mimics”
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`civil litigation, and that “the petitioner is master of its complaint”); Oil
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`States, 138 S. Ct. at 1371 (noting that the parties to IPR “are entitled to
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`certain discovery” as well as to file declarations and briefs); Covidien, 2017
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`WL 4015009, at *9-*10.
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`This Court previously held in Vas-Cath that interferences met FMC’s
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`criteria. Vas-Cath’s reasoning is indistinguishable here. Vas-Cath found the
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`following features sufficient to satisfy FMC’s criteria: “adverse parties,
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`examination and cross-examination by deposition of witnesses, production of
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`documentary evidence, findings by an impartial federal adjudicator, and power to
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`implement the decision.” 473 F.3d at 1382. As the Board acknowledged, IPR has
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`all those features. See, e.g., Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *10. Yet the panel
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`neither followed Vas-Cath nor attempted to distinguish it.
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`The Board’s discretion to deny institution does not change the applicability
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`of FMC. Vas-Cath applied FMC, even though the Director had “discretion to
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`begin or discontinue” the interferences. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
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`of Wash., 334 F.3d 1264, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Similarly, the exercise of
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`discretion in declaratory judgment and qui tam claims does not avoid sovereign
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`immunity. Indeed, FMC reasoned that the agency’s obligation to explain the use
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`of discretion makes the adjudication more like civil litigation. 535 U.S. at 757.
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`The panel observed that IPR procedures “do not mirror” those in federal
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`court; but no court has required that proceedings be identical for FMC to apply.
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`FMC relied on the similarities concerning discovery and pleadings only to
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`“confirm” the proceeding was adjudicatory and between adverse parties. Id. at
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`757, 760; id. at 761-67 (finding certain differences irrelevant to the analysis); see
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`also Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1382 (finding the differences between interferences and
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`civil litigation insufficient to prevent the application of FMC); R.I. Dep’t of Envtl.
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`Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31, 46 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding rules that “roughly
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`conform[]” to those of civil litigation to suffice under FMC).
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`The panel’s emphasis on differences further establishes that IPR was
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`“anomalous and unheard of” at the founding, triggering the Hans presumption.
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`FMC, 535 U.S. at 755 (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 18). Subjecting sovereigns to a
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`private party-initiated administrative proceeding could “constitute[] a greater insult
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`to a State’s dignity than requiring a State to appear in an Article III court,” because
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`of the differences. Id. at 760 n.11; see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 (authorizing
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`private suits outside the federal courts “would be even more offensive to . . .
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`sovereignty”). Thus, while IPR has the features that FMC and Vas-Cath found
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`sufficient, the few differences between it and civil litigation only illustrate another
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`way in which it is outside our constitutional tradition and, therefore, subject to
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`sovereign immunity.
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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 20 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`CONCLUSION
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`UMN respectfully requests that this Court grant en banc rehearing of the
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`panel decision.
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`
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`Date: September 4, 2018
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
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`
`
`/s/ Michael A. Albert
`Michael A. Albert
`Richard F. Giunta
`Charles T. Steenburg
`Gerald B. Hrycyszyn
`Stuart V. C. Duncan Smith
`WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`Boston, MA 02210
`Tel: (617) 646-8000
`
`Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
`Regents of the University of Minnesota
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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 21 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
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`I, Michael A. Albert, counsel for amicus curiae Regents of the University of
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`Minnesota, certify that the foregoing Brief complies with the length limits set forth
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`in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(b)(4) and Federal Circuit Rule 35(g).
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`Specifically, this brief contains 2,548 words (excluding the parts of the motion
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`exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(f) and Federal Circuit Rule
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`32(b)) as determined by the word count feature of the word processing program
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`used to create this brief.
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`I further certify that the foregoing brief complies with the typeface
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`requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type
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`style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6). Specifically,
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`this brief has been prepared using a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft
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`Word 2013, in 14-point Times New Roman font.
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`
`
`Date: September 4, 2018
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`
`
`
`/s/ Michael A. Albert
`Michael A. Albert
`
`
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`Case: 18-1638 Document: 156 Page: 22 Filed: 09/06/2018
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND FILING
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`I, Michael A. Albert, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
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`foregoing has been filed using the Court’s CM/ECF system. All counsel of record
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`were served via CM/ECF today.
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`
`
`Date: September 4, 2018
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`
`
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`/s/ Michael A. Albert
`Michael A. Albert
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`15
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`Patent Owner Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`Ex. 2009, p. 22
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