throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________
`
`HTC CORPORATION, HTC AMERICA, INC., and
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
`Patent Owner
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-015891
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: December 11, 2019
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, JOHN F. HORVATH, and
`SEAN P. O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Samsung Electronics America, Inc., which filed a petition in IPR2019-
`00889, has been joined as a petitioner in this proceeding.
`
`

`

`
`
`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`TODD E. LANDIS, ESQUIRE
`JEFFERY R. SWIGART, ESQUIRE
`VINSON & ELKINS LLP
`2200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
`Suite 500 West
`Washington, DC 20037
`202-639-6500
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`BRIAN KOIDE, ESQUIRE
`ETHERIDGE LAW GROUP
`1100 Queensborough Blvd.
`Suite 200
`Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
`843-614-0007
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on December 11,
`2019, commencing at 1:30 p.m., at the United States Patent and
`Trademark Office, USPTO Madison Building, 600 Dulany Street,
`Alexandria, VA 22314.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`
` (Proceedings begin at 1:30 p.m.)
` JUDGE O'HANLON: Please be seated. Good afternoon,
`everyone. This is a hearing in Case No. IPR2018-01589,
`HTC Corporation and HTC America, Inc., versus Uniloc 2017 LLC;
`formerly Uniloc Luxembourg S.A. Samsung Electronics America,
`Inc. has also been joined as a Petitioner in an understudy
`role. This proceeding involves U.S. Patent No. 7,653,508.
` I'd like to start by having counsel
`for the parties introduce yourselves for the record, starting
`with HTC Petitioner.
` MR. LANDIS: Good afternoon. Todd Landis and Jeff
`Swigart for HTC.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: Is there anyone here for the
`Samsung Petitioner?
` MR. VALENTE: Yes, Your Honor. David Valente for
`Samsung.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: Okay. Thank you. For Patent
`Owner?
` MR. KOIDE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Brian M.
`Koide for Uniloc 2017 LLC.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: Thank you. I'm Judge O'Hanlon.
`I'm joined here in the Alexandria hearing room by Judge
`Medley, and we're joined remotely by Judge Horvath. The
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`
`3
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`camera for Judge Horvath is located behind the
`bench, so there's no need to look at the screen when
`addressing him.
` Judge Horvath will only be able to hear what the
`microphones pick up, so I ask counsel to keep that in mind
`when making your presentations today. And I'd also ask
`counsel when referencing demonstratives to please state the
`slide number so that Judge Horvath, as well as Judge Medley
`and myself, can follow along more easily.
` Per our order dated November 6th, each side will
`have 30 minutes of total time to argue. Petitioner will go
`first, followed by Patent Owner. Each side may reserve time
`for rebuttal. If you run over during your argument in chief,
`I will let you continue arguing using the time you have
`reserved for rebuttal. I'll endeavor to let you know when
`this happens, but please be mindful of the timer and the
`lamps. And as usual, speaking objections are not allowed. You
`may note anything you care during your time to argue.
` And with that, I invite Mr. Landis to begin. Mr.
`Landis, do you wish to reserve any time for rebuttal?
` MR. LANDIS: Yes, Your Honor. I'd like to reserve
`ten minutes for rebuttal, please?
` JUDGE O'HANLON: Ten minutes. All right. So I'll
`set the timer for 20 minutes. Okay. Begin when you're ready.
` MR. LANDIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Swigart,
`
`4
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`could we go to Slide 2, please?
` Your Honors, we're here today really, in some ways,
`from two different types of cases. We have the positions that
`Uniloc took during their preliminary response and their
`response, and now the positions that they've taken in their
`sur-reply in this case. I think under either position that you
`look at, this claim, Claim 20, the only claim we're here to
`talk about, should be found unpatentable.
` In the first instance, because as we see on the
`slide, this Board has already found many of the claims in the
`'508 unpatentable, including Claims 3, 13, 15, and 19. Claim
`15 being the independent claim from which Claim 20 depends.
`The Board has also found in its institution decision that
`there's no dissimilarities between Claim 13, Claim 3, and
`Claim 20. They found those claims to be similar.
` And so for the same reasons the Board found Claims
`13 and 3 to be unpatentable, they should find Claim 20 to be
`unpatentable in favor of Fabio -- the Fabio reference.
`There's no distinction. And when Patent Owner made their
`preliminary response and made their actual response in this
`case, they made the exact same arguments they made, and that
`this Board heard from -- during the Apple IPR where they found
`Claims 3, 13, 15, and 19 to be unpatentable. They're the
`exact same arguments.
` And for the reasons the Board didn't find those
`
`5
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`arguments persuasive there, they shouldn't find them
`persuasive here because as the Board found in the institution
`decision, Claim 20 is not dissimilar from those other claims.
`Faced with this, I think, inevitable conclusion, Patent Owner
`decided to switch the game, and in their sur-reply, they now
`try to make new arguments that were never before made, not in
`their response. New arguments about patentability. And to do
`so, what they have done is they've taken some claim language
`and what appears to me to be is they're now trying to construe
`that claim language. In particular, the word cadence.
` They've made two arguments, as far as I can tell, in
`their sur-reply. One is that the fact that the word window is
`plural in Claim 20 lends to some distinct patentability for
`Claim 20. The problem is cadence windows was in Claim 19,
`too. And the Board found Claim 19 to be unpatentable over
`Fabio. So the argument that they're making now really doesn't
`have any merit, and has already been decided by this Board
`that Fabio teaches cadence windows.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: Mr. Landis, what about Patent
`Owner's argument that measured cadence, which that exact
`phrase is not in the prior claims, but the arguments of that
`phrase means you must consider more than one previous step?
` MR. LANDIS: Two points to that, Your Honor. First,
`the argument that they're making is a claim construction
`argument. And the support for that claim construction
`
`6
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`argument when you look into the patent, actually comes from a
`preferred embodiment. It doesn't say it's in every
`embodiment. They're reading a limitation into the claim.
`They're doing something that the Federal Circuit has told us
`time and time again, and which patent owners routinely argue
`about during claim construction, you shouldn't do. You
`shouldn't read limitations from preferred embodiments in the
`claims. That's point one.
` Point two, Your Honor, is I believe they're
`conflating two concepts here. They're conflating validation
`with cadence. Cadence is, just by its own definition, is a
`rhythmic series of something; in this case, steps. Fabio
`teaches this exact concept. In Column 3 -- I'll get you the
`exact cite, Your Honor. In Column 3, Lines 22 through 29 of
`the Fabio reference, it teaches looking at a sequence of steps
`in order to get a predetermined condition of regularity for
`the gait of the person. The gait of the person being the
`cadence of that person's steps.
` This is exactly what Fabio teaches. It teaches that
`you're going to look at cadence, you're going to measure the
`cadence in terms of steps and come up with some baseline. And
`then when the person starts walking, you're going to determine
`whether they're in the baseline or not. And that's how Fabio
`works. So Fabio doesn't teach anything different, and I don't
`think it matters whether you accept -- whether the Board
`
`7
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`accepts the definition of cadence or of measured cadence that
`they have now put forth -- Patent Owner has now put forth,
`because Fabio teaches a measured cadence as part of the
`system.
` So even if the Board were to accept these new
`arguments, I think you still have to come to the conclusion
`that it's taught in Fabio.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: And does Fabio consider a measured
`cadence, as you've discussed, simply by looking at one prior
`step?
` MR. LANDIS: I don't believe so, Your Honor. I
`think the one prior step -- this is, again, is where I think
`the conflation comes in. The one prior step is the validation
`part, and it -- they don't validate based on the prior step,
`as the Board has found in the past; it's really the current
`step. But the one step, that process is used for the
`validation part.
` When we're talking about the cadence part, the
`measured cadence, that is done with a sequence of steps, as is
`said in column -- well, it's in more than one place, but in
`Column 3, for example, Lines 22 through 29, and in Column 5,
`Lines 40 through 45. They're talking about the gait. And the
`gait of the person is the cadence, the measured cadence of the
`walk. You get a window, you get a threshold, and then you
`look when they start to walk whether they're within that
`
`8
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`threshold. And if they are, then they -- then Fabio says you
`start to count. You start to count the steps if you're in
`that window.
` So I think Fabio is not talking about measuring
`cadence on a single step, and frankly, that would -- kind of
`wouldn't make any sense. I mean, a cadence somewhat requires
`more than one step in the end.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: But Claim 20 says adjusting the
`cadence window is based on a measured cadence. And I believe,
`in your petition, you rely on the validation interval of Fabio
`to be the cadence window, and isn't that adjusted based on one
`measured step?
` MR. LANDIS: So it's -- I think the window is
`validated based on one measured step. I'm not sure it -- I'm
`not sure you're determining the cadence based on one measured
`step.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: But it's the cadence window that is
`based on a measured cadence. And you've identified in your
`petition Fabio's validation interval TV to be the cadence
`window. And doesn't Fabio adjust that for each new step based
`on the timing of the most recent previous step?
` MR. LANDIS: So, Your Honor, the window I think that
`we're talking about here is what I believe I'm referring to
`when I'm talking about measuring the sequence of steps in
`Fabio. So the sequence of steps -- by measuring the sequence
`
`9
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`of steps and getting the cadence, you can determine the window
`for the cadence; the cadence window itself.
` Then, once you want to validate whether or not
`that's in -- when something's within that window, you're
`looking at a step. But the window itself, according to Fabio
`and the teachings of Fabio, is done -- is determined by
`looking at a sequence of steps. And that's, again, Column 3
`and Column 5. So, Your Honor, I mean, again, the --
` JUDGE HORVATH: Let me ask you a question, Mr.
`Landis.
` MR. LANDIS: Sure.
` JUDGE HORVATH: But isn't -- I mean, in Fabio
`there's a formula for what the value of TV is. You would
`agree that TV is the cadence window in Fabio, correct?
` MR. LANDIS: Yes, Your Honor.
` JUDGE HORVATH: And so TV has a -- let me see if I
`can get to Fabio. I think it's in Column 5 --
` MR. LANDIS: I think the Column 4, Line 40, Your
`Honor?
` JUDGE HORVATH: Line 40, yes. So it depends on
`several times and a difference between times. It depends on
`the time of the previous step K-1, right?
` MR. LANDIS: Yes, sir.
` JUDGE HORVATH: And it also depends on a difference
`in time between step K-1 and K-2, right?
`
`10
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
` MR. LANDIS: Yes, Your Honor.
` JUDGE HORVATH: That's what -- Delta K-1, or Delta
`TK-1, I should say, is the difference in time between steps K-1
`and K-2. So this -- in Fabio, you would agree then that
`this cadence window TV is determined based on, really, two
`times. The time of the step K-1, and the time of step K-2.
`Wouldn't you agree with that?
` MR. LANDIS: Your Honor, I believe that's correct.
`I think what Your Honor's saying is there's two times -- and
`I'm just looking at them to make sure, but I believe you're
`correct, Your Honor.
` JUDGE HORVATH: Okay. Thank you.
` MR. LANDIS: So, Your Honors, again, these arguments
`that we're hearing now from Patent Owner are wholly new
`arguments. I think that the Board could rightly not consider
`them, but even if we do consider them, I don't think they do
`anything to prevent Claim 20 from being found unpatentable
`based on Fabio. I think Fabio still teaches all of the
`elements and anything that's new from Claim 20.
` And again, I would also say that the only way Patent
`Owner gets here is by putting forth a construction that we've
`seen for the first time now, and that construction is based on
`preferred embodiments out of the patent. It's not a
`construction, it's not a definitional construction. There was
`no lexicography, nor have they argued it. In fact, they
`
`11
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`didn't really formally argue that it needed construction, but
`they did put forth many definitional statements within their
`response.
` So for those reasons, Your Honor, I think that Claim
`20 should be found unpatentable and I'm going to yield my time
`now, unless Your Honors have any more questions for me?
` JUDGE HORVATH: I do have one more question for you.
` MR. LANDIS: Sure.
` JUDGE HORVATH: So Claim 20 depends from Claim 19,
`which, itself, depends from Claim 15, correct?
` MR. LANDIS: Yes, Your Honor.
` JUDGE HORVATH: So in Claim 15, that's where we
`first are introduced with this concept of cadence windows.
`And in particular, in Claim 15, which is, sort of, Column 16,
`line -- let's say, 35 or so, to 37, it says -- or let's take
`it a little bit earlier; 34 roughly to 38. There's a mode
`logic that switches the device from non-active to active mode
`after a number of periodic human motions are detected within
`appropriate cadence windows.
` So I guess the question I have for you is one, what
`are the -- do the cadence windows -- would you agree that
`the cadence windows refer to the windows within which the
`periodic human motions are detected?
` MR. LANDIS: If Your Honor could give me one second.
`I think they're the windows in which periodic human motions
`
`12
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`are looked to be detected. I'm not certain that they will
`necessarily be detected, but it's the windows in which you
`will look to detect them.
` JUDGE HORVATH: Okay. Fair enough. My next
`question then is, is there anything in Claim 15 that prevents
`-- or that would preclude each periodic human motion -- let's
`assume for the sake of this hypothetical that the steps are
`all detected and validated?
` MR. LANDIS: Yes, Your Honor.
` JUDGE HORVATH: So is there anything within Claim 15
`that would preclude each step from having its own appropriate
`cadence window?
` MR. LANDIS: Well, Your Honor, I think there would
`because it's simply by the fact that you're looking for a
`cadence. And I think that cadence -- it would be hard to have
`a cadence with just one step. You need to know what the
`cadence is. And so I think this is the same reason why Fabio
`teaches what it teaches, which is to -- in order to have a
`cadence, I think you probably need at least two steps so that
`you know that the cadence is.
` JUDGE HORVATH: Well, but earlier we had discussed
`what -- TV being the cadence window, correct?
` MR. LANDIS: Yes.
` JUDGE HORVATH: And you agree that TV is based on
`the timing of two previous steps, K-1 and K-2, correct?
`
`13
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
` MR. LANDIS: Yes. That's correct.
` JUDGE HORVATH: So from those two previous steps, I
`could determine TV in Fabio.
` MR. LANDIS: Yes.
` JUDGE HORVATH: And we -- and that -- your position
`is that is a cadence window, correct?
` MR. LANDIS: Yes, Your Honor.
` JUDGE HORVATH: That I can use to validate a step,
`correct?
` MR. LANDIS: Yes.
` JUDGE HORVATH: And if I validate a step using that
`cadence window, then I will proceed to look for and
`potentially validate a next step. So then, the question is
`does that next step, can that have a different cadence window?
` MR. LANDIS: Your Honor, I think that you can have
`different cadence windows for different cadences, but if you
`have a cadence from which the cadence window is determined,
`then you're going to be within that cadence window, so your
`step would be within that -- well, it would either get
`validated for that window or not for that window.
` I hope I'm understanding Your Honor’s question, but I
`think that once you have determined the cadence window, now
`you're going to determine whether you fall within that cadence
`of that window. Can there be other cadence windows at some
`other time that have been determined? I would say, yes, there
`
`14
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`can be. But once you've determined the window, I think you're
`looking then to decide whether you're in the window or not.
` JUDGE HORVATH: Well, let me try to rephrase the
`question. I'm really trying to get an answer to a question
`which is that if I look at Claim 15, it says that a
`number of periodic human motions are detected within
`appropriate cadence windows, and the question I'm trying to
`ask is, is there anything in Claim 15 that precludes a
`one-to-one correspondence between a human periodic motion and
`a cadence window?
` In other words, can you have one, two, three
`periodic motions, and one, two, three cadence windows within
`which those motions are detected? Or do you have to have one,
`two, three periodic motions within a first cadence window, and
`then four, five, six periodic human motions within a second
`cadence window?
` I mean, is Claim 15 broad enough to accommodate both
`those scenarios or only one of those scenarios? And if so,
`which one?
` MR. LANDIS: The way I read Claim 15, Your Honor --
`and I think I understand Your Honor's question now. The way I
`read Claim 15 is that the periodic motions that you're
`detecting must be tied to the appropriate cadence window. So
`if you're looking at steps one, two, three, you need to
`determine whether they are within an appropriate window for
`
`15
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`steps one, two, three. Not whether they are appropriate for a
`different window.
` So the time -- the way I read the claim is between
`the periodic motion and a particular -- and I know that's not
`the word in the claim, it's appropriate, but the way I read it
`is a particular cadence window. So I hope that answers Your
`Honor's question. I think I understood Your Honor's question,
`and I hope I just answered it.
` JUDGE HORVATH: All right. Thank you.
` MR. LANDIS: All right. Thank you. I have nothing
`further, unless you have more questions? For this time.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: None from me. Thank you.
` MR. LANDIS: Thank you.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: Mr. Koide, we'll now hear from you.
`Do you wish to reserve any time for rebuttal – sur-rebuttal?
` MR. KOIDE: Sure. I'll be reserving 15 minutes,
`Your Honor.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: Fifteen?
` MR. KOIDE: Yeah. And if I go over, I'll -- well, I
`might go over, but. And I apologize, Your Honor. Actually, I
`didn't have a printout of my notes page, so I'm going to use
`my demonstratives somewhat, but I'm going to have to go
`offline to kind of look at my notes page. And just as Judge
`Horvath, I'll refer to the demonstrative slide number for the
`judges in the room. I apologize for that.
`
`16
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
` JUDGE O'HANLON: You may begin when you're ready.
` MR. KOIDE: Okay. Your Honor, let me just start by
`saying I just want to briefly address three kind of
`overarching issues. I want to address what Counsel had
`discussed with you. But the overarching issues and for time
`management, I want to make sure I cover them, but I'll be very
`brief.
` The first two are issues I believe that the Panel
`probably does not want to address. I'm largely doing them to
`preserve issues on appeal, so I'm not going to go into much
`detail here. And after those three issues, I'll go into more
`of the patentable distinctions and some of the issues that
`Counsel had addressed earlier.
` First, with respect to the constitutional issue, I
`want to raise that and make it clear that it's been preserved
`in Paper 8 at 32 and 33 and Paper 11 at 18 to 19. I
`understand the Panel declined to consider that issue given the
`fact they've cited law saying administrative agencies do not
`have jurisdiction to review (indiscernible), but for purposes
`of appeal, I just want to preserve that.
` The Board institution decision was made at the time
`when -- before the Arthrex decision, so that decision should be
`set aside, respectfully. There is -- we would also take the
`position that Arthrex didn't go far enough --
` JUDGE O'HANLON: Are you making arguments
`
`17
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`regarding this proceeding or a separate proceeding?
` MR. KOIDE: This proceeding, Your Honor.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: But we haven't reached a final
`decision in this proceeding yet.
` MR. KOIDE: I understand.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: How can it be --
` MR. KOIDE: I understand. I'm talking about the
`institution decision. The institution decision was made at
`the time when the Panel, pre-Arthrex --
` JUDGE O'HANLON: Do you think Arthrex addresses
`institution decisions?
` MR. KOIDE: I -- it's just our position, Your Honor.
`I understand, but -- even the final written decision in this
`case, I -- it would be our position that Arthrex didn't do
`enough to fix the issue. The fix should've been a -- just
`setting decisions aside and on congressional fix. There's no
`mechanism for meaning for you -- before the PTAB decisions,
`the Arthrex Panel, the Fed Circuit Panel that really come up
`-- we -- it's really unclear to us whether we have the
`authority to do that.
` So it raises serious questions whether the Federal
`Circuit has authority to rewrite the statute, and again, the
`only fix is to declare the statute unconstitutional.
` JUDGE O'HANLON: I don't believe these arguments are
`presented in your briefs. You seem to be expanding greatly on
`
`18
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`what's contained in your briefs.
` MR. KOIDE: Well, they are, Your Honor, but in
`fairness, there's been a lot of changes, as you're aware, in
`the different panels. So I'm just making our position clear.
`I don't want to be approached by opposing counsel down the
`road saying you didn't raise it or you didn't -- so I'm just
`trying to make our position clear right now.
` Second -- the second issue is I think -- again, I
`think it's clear, but the Panel directed the parties to only
`address Claim 20. I want to make it clear, and of course, the
`Apple final written decision came out in between the time of
`the Patent Owner response and the reply. Certain arguments we
`made were predicated on the Apple final written decision not
`being finally resolved, and of course, it was.
` So I just want to make it clear that today we're not
`disputing the underlying points before this Board, but of
`course, we reserve the right to pursue any disputes of that
`decision on appeal. And so I'm not going to address any of
`those in any detail, but I just wanted to say that for the
`record.
` Third, and this is an issue that somewhat relates to
`the merits of the claim language, but Petitioner has raised a
`waiver or sometimes phrased as a collateral estoppel argument.
`That's at Paper 12 at 3 to 4. And again, this was after the
`final written decision in the Apple case. They cite --
`
`19
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`they've continually said there's substantial similarity that
`was in their original petition. Again, we've made arguments
`that they didn't really flesh it out in any detail. It's not
`addressed by their expert.
` If you read the petition, Claim 20 really comes
`across as an afterthought. It's kind of tagged on, which
`it's acknowledged it was kind of tagged on to add on to that.
`They also cite Ohio Willow, which is a collateral estoppel
`case for a different test, and that's the differences between
`the (indiscernible) claims, and adjudicated patent claims do
`not materially alter the question of validity. We don't see
`them moving from collateral estoppel, they just kind of threw
`that in. So we don't think they've established or proved
`that; we don't think it should apply.
` As the Panel noted in its institution decision
`citing the Carlin Tech decision and the Panel noted at Page 8
`to 9 of its institution decision, the claim language differs
`between these claims, meaning Claim 20, which is at issue here
`and Claim 3 and 13 of the earlier Apple final written
`decision, indicating that there was a presumption that claims
`are different scope. We -- again, this has been a common
`theme, but they have never really explained the difference in
`scope, and they fault us in saying, Okay, we waive something
`supposedly.
` But they didn't prove it, they didn't rebut that
`
`20
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`presumption, so it's not our duty to then point it out. So I
`don't think there's been any waiver. We note some of the
`differences in our papers. Claims 3 and 13 relate to a
`cadence and a dynamic cadence window. Claim 20 is cadence
`windows, which is previously discussed. And also, adjusting
`based on a measured cadence associated with a period human
`motion.
` And this is addressed to, again, their argument that
`there are -- we have two stories. That we somehow came up
`with one story initially and came up with another one, and we
`dispute that. I would -- I'm new to this case, I joined my
`firm recently, and so I had -- I've read these papers several
`times to get up to speed as lead counsel. And so I think the
`issue that they're trying to do is they're trying to take
`arguments -- we had multiple arguments in one statement in
`something like the Patent Owner response, and saying, Okay,
`well, it's all tied to retroactivity.
` We did not do that. We aren't making only the
`retroactivity argument, and we're also making the arguments
`related to this. And we've outlined in our papers why we
`think that's been preserved.
` JUDGE HORVATH: Could you identify where in your
`Patent Owner response that you made these arguments about
`cadence windows being plural and measured cadence requiring
`multiple cadence periods to do a -- to find a measured cadence
`
`21
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`window? Where in your Patent Owner response is that argument
`made?
` MR. KOIDE: Sure. That would be at our -- Your
`Honor, Patent Owner response Pages 17 to 18. We do not state
`the word -- we don't spell it out as plural, but we are
`focusing on the single aspect. What we state there is, Fabio
`does not disclose -- this is quoting them -- I'm sorry. Fabio
`does not disclose adjusting a cadence window based on a
`measured cadence, as required by the claim language. And it's
`not spelled out expressly there, but that was the point we
`were trying to make.
` It goes on to say, Petitioner does not dispute that
`Fabio Exhibit 1006, (indiscernible) only look at the single
`prior step, and uses the current step to validate the single
`prior step. That gets into a debate about current or the
`retroactivity. Again, that wasn't the only point we were
`making, we were particularly pointing out the single step
`there.
` It goes on to say, Petitioner does not explain how
`Fabio's use of a single prior step can approximate a measured
`cadence, again, as required by the claim language. So could
`it have been more expressed? Could we have spelled it out
`more expressly? Yes, but I think it was identified there.
`And I think patent attorneys sometimes tend to convey things
`in a very compact fashion, and that was what was being
`
`22
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2018-01589
`Patent 7,653,508 B1
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`conveyed at that point.
` JUDGE HORVATH: If I could ask you a question about
`Claim 15?
` MR. KOIDE: Yes.
` JUDGE HORVATH: Which I asked, also, of Petitioner.
`I’d like to give you the opportunity to address that as well.
` So -- and I would like to sort of, maybe, ask it the
`way I asked it the last time to Petitioner. So I'm

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket