throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 28
`Date: January 22, 2020
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before DANIEL N. FISHMAN, MICHELLE N. WORMMEESTER, and
`SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
`HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`JUDGMENT
`Final Written Decision
`Determining No Challenged Claims Unpatentable
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition to institute an inter partes
`review of claims 1–6 and 8–20 of U.S. Patent No. 8,683,362 B2 (Ex. 1001,
`“the ’362 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. Paper 2 (“Petition” or
`“Pet.”). Qualcomm Incorporated (“Patent Owner”) filed a Patent Owner
`Preliminary Response. Paper 10. We instituted an inter partes review of
`
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`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`claims 1–6 and 8–20 on all grounds of unpatentability alleged in the Petition.
`Paper 11 (“Institution Decision” or “Inst. Dec.”).
`After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 17,
`“PO Resp.”), Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 19, “Pet. Reply”), and Patent
`Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 21, “PO Sur-reply”).
`Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Andrew Sears (Ex. 1003) and
`Patent Owner relies on the testimony of Dr. Jacob O. Wobbrock (Exs. 2001,
`2006).
`An oral hearing was held on November 21, 2019, and the record
`contains a transcript of this hearing. Paper 27 (“Tr.”).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written
`Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). For the reasons that
`follow, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of
`the evidence that claims 1–6 and 8–20 of the ’362 patent are unpatentable.
`BACKGROUND
`A. Real Parties in Interest
`Petitioner identifies Apple Inc. as the real party in interest. Pet. 72.
`Patent Owner identifies Qualcomm Incorporated as the real party in
`interest. Paper 3, 2 (Patent Owner’s Mandatory Notices).
`B. Related Matters
`The parties identify the following dismissed patent litigation
`proceeding in which the ’362 patent was asserted: Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple
`Inc., Case No. 3:17-cv-02403 (S.D. Cal.). Pet. 72; Paper 3, 2 (Patent
`Owner’s Mandatory Notices); Paper. 16, 2 (Petitioner’s Updated Mandatory
`Notices).
`The parties also identify a second request for inter partes review of
`the ’362 patent: Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., IPR2018–01253. Pet. 72;
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`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`Paper 3, 2 (Patent Owner’s Mandatory Notices). We take official notice of a
`third request for inter partes review of the ’362 patent: Apple Inc. v.
`Qualcomm Inc., IPR2019-00112. See Ex. 1015 (IPR2019-00112, Petition).
`We previously denied institution of the other requests for inter partes
`review. IPR2018-01253, Paper 12 (PTAB Feb. 28, 2019) (Institution
`Decision); IPR2019-00112, Paper 7 (PTAB Apr. 11, 2019) (Institution
`Decision).
`Additionally, Patent Owner identifies two pending patent applications
`that “claim the benefit of U.S. Patent Application No. 12/416,279, from
`which the ’362 patent issued.” Paper 3, 2 (Patent Owner’s Mandatory
`Notices).
`C. The ’362 Patent
`The ’362 patent is titled “Card Metaphor for Activities in a
`Computing Device.” Ex. 1001, code (54). According to the ’362 patent,
`conventional computer systems use overlapping windows in order to allow
`the user the opportunity to run several applications at the same time or open
`multiple copies of a single application, such as opening different documents
`with a word processor. Id. at 1:32–2:2. However, such a graphical user
`interface typically requires a large screen. Id. at 2:3–5. If there is limited
`screen space, users “must choose between . . . making windows smaller and
`thus reducing available workspace within each application . . . [or] stacking
`windows atop each other so that only one window (or very few) is visible at
`a time.” Id. at 2:5–9. This is especially true for mobile devices, such as
`smart phones, which have insufficient screen space to display multiple,
`overlapping windows. Id. at 2:32–47.
`According to the ’362 patent, this problem can be addressed by using
`a computer that provides at least two modes for interacting with multiple
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`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`activities which the user can toggle between as desired. Ex. 1001, 2:51–59.
`Specifically, the ’362 patent describes using a card metaphor “in which each
`activity can be represented within an area of the screen.” Id. at 2:60–3:5.
`“[I]n a full-screen mode, one activity occupies substantially an entire display
`screen. The card thus fills substantially the entire display screen, although in
`some embodiments some areas of the screen may be reserved for status
`indicators, alerts, messages, and the like.” Id. at 3:9–13. In a second mode,
`referred to as a “card mode,” “one activity is visible within a card, and a
`portion of at least one other card is also visible. Thus, a card that has focus
`(i.e., that the user is interacting with) is visible in full, while at least one
`other card is only partially visible.” Id. at 3:14–19. When in card mode, the
`user can change the location of the cards “so as to change focus from one
`card to another” or a card can be moved off screen. Id. at 3:19–29.
`D. Illustrative Claims
`Petitioner challenges claims 1–6 and 8–20 of the ’362 patent. Pet. 1.
`Claim 1 is independent, is illustrative of the subject matter of the challenged
`claims, and reads as follows:
`1.
`A computer system comprising:
`a physical button;
`a processor coupled to the physical button;
`a touch-sensitive display screen coupled to the processor,
`the processor to receive gesture input on the touch-sensitive
`display screen and operate the computer system in any one of at
`least two display modes, wherein:
`during a given duration, the processor
`operates at least a first application and a second
`application concurrently;
`in a full-screen mode, the processor
`provides, on the touch-sensitive display screen, a
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`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`user interface for only one of either the at least first
`application or the second application;
`in a windowed mode, the processor:
`provides on the touch-sensitive
`display screen, a first card corresponding to
`the first application, and a first portion of a
`second card so that a second portion of the
`second card is not visible on the touch-
`sensitive display screen, the second card
`corresponding to the second application,
`wherein at least the first card displays
`content from operation of the first
`application, the content corresponding to (i)
`an output from an application, (ii) a task,
`(iii) a message, (iv) a document, or (v) a
`web page;
`responds to a directional contact along
`a first direction on the touch-sensitive
`display screen by changing a position of the
`first card relative to the touch-sensitive
`display screen in the first direction; and
`responds to a directional contact of
`moving the first card or the second card
`along a second direction that is different
`than the first direction on the touch-sensitive
`display screen by (i) identifying one of the
`first card or second card as being selected
`based on the directional contact along the
`second direction, and (ii) dismissing the
`selected first card or second card from the
`touch-sensitive display screen in the second
`direction so that the corresponding first
`application or second application is closed;
`wherein the processor, in response to receiving user input
`via the physical button, transitions the computer system at least
`(i) from the full-screen mode to the windowed mode, or (ii)
`from the windowed mode to the full-screen mode.
`
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`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`Ex. 1001, 24:31–25:7
`E. Prior Art and Asserted Grounds
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–6 and 8–20 would have been
`unpatentable on the following grounds:
`Claims Challenged
`35 U.S.C. §
`1–6, 8–20
`103(a)1
`
`
`References
`Jin,2 Elias3
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`A. Legal Standards
`In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the
`Supreme Court set out a framework for assessing obviousness under
`35 U.S.C. § 103 that requires consideration of four factors: (1) the “level of
`ordinary skill in the pertinent art,” (2) the “scope and content of the prior
`art,” (3) the “differences between the prior art and the claims at issue,” and
`(4) “secondary considerations” of non-obviousness such as “commercial
`success, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.” Id. at 17–18.
`“While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular
`case,” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007), the Federal
`Circuit has “repeatedly emphasized that an obviousness inquiry requires
`examination of all four Graham factors and that an obviousness
`determination can be made only after consideration of each factor.” Nike,
`Inc. v. Adidas AG, 812 F.3d 1326, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled on other
`
`
`1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35
`U.S.C. § 103 effective on March 16, 2013. Because the ’362 patent issued
`from an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply the pre-AIA
`version of the statutory bases for unpatentability.
`2 Jin, US 8,633,900 B2, issued Jan. 21, 2014 (Ex. 1005).
`3 Elias, US 2007/0177803 A1, published Aug. 2, 2007 (Ex. 1006).
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`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en
`banc).
`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`Factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill in the
`art include (1) educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems
`encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity
`with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and
`(6) educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v.
`Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696–697 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing
`Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376,
`1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Not all such factors may be present in every
`case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a
`particular case. Id. Moreover, these factors are not exhaustive but are
`merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi
`Sankyo Co. Ltd, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would
`have had at least a Bachelor’s Degree in Computer Science, Computer
`Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Psychology, or a related field, and at
`least five years of experience in the field of human computer interaction.”
`Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–19); see also Pet. Reply 28–30. Petitioner
`further argues that Patent Owner “incorrectly mischaracterizes a portion of
`Dr. Sears’s transcript to try to draw a distinction between the definitions of a
`[person having ordinary skill in the art] provided in the Petition and
`Dr. Sears’s supporting declaration to argue how Dr. Sears arrived at his
`determination.” Pet. Reply 30; see also id. at 29–30 (citing Ex. 2010
`13:8–19:17).
`Patent Owner argues for a lower level of ordinary skill in the art:
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`A person of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant time
`period would have had at least a Bachelor of Science Degree in
`electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science,
`or in a related field, with at least 2 years of industry experience
`in touch sensitive computer systems or gesture-based control of
`computer systems. Alternatively, a person of ordinary skill in
`the relevant timeframe could have been someone lacking formal
`technical education but having practical experience that would
`be equivalent to such education.
`PO’s Resp. 6–7 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 33–35).
`Patent Owner further argues Petitioner and Dr. Sears disagree as to the
`qualifications of a person having ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 7–8.
`Patent Owner also argues that “both Petitioner and Dr. Sears appear to have
`relied solely on Dr. Sears’s personal experiences and judgment, which is not
`the correct analysis for determining the qualifications of one of ordinary skill
`in the art.” Id. at 8 (citing Evtl. Designs, 713 F.2d at 696–97).
`First, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Sears
`and Petitioner substantially disagree as to the level of skill of a person
`having ordinary skill in the art. Although the identification of the level of
`ordinary skill in the art in the Petition is not identical to Dr. Sears‘s
`testimony—the Petitioner omits the word “typically” and adds the
`qualification that “[a]dditional relevant education . . . may compensate for
`any deficits”—Petitioner’s proposal is substantially the same as Dr. Sears’s
`testimony. Compare Pet. 3, with Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–19 (Sears Decl.). That is,
`we fail to see how the differences are material and Patent Owner has not
`argued that any difference in the formulation would result in a different
`outcome.
`Second, we disagree with Patent Owner that Dr. Sears—and by
`extension Petitioner—did not consider the proper factors. Dr. Sears testified
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`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`that his identification of the level of skill was based on his experience in the
`field. Ex. 1003 ¶ 18. In his deposition, he further explained that this was
`based both on his “research experience” and “practical experience” working
`for “Goddard Space Flight Center” and “[Sun] [M]icrosystems.” Ex. 2010,
`14:22–15:15 (Sears Dep.). Although Dr. Sears may not have considered all
`of the factors identified in Environmental Design, his testimony appears to
`be based on several of the factors—that is, the level of skill of people who
`were working with him and solving problems in the field. See id. at 16:15–
`17:22.
`Third, besides the reference to a person having ordinary skill in the art
`having a psychology degree, Drs. Sears and Wobbrock are in agreement
`regarding the education of a person having ordinary skill in the art. See
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 18; Ex. 2006 ¶ 38. As Dr. Sears has not explained why a
`psychology degree would be relevant to the claimed invention—which is
`directed to “application management in computing devices” (see Ex. 1001,
`1:24–28)—there is not sufficient evidence to support its inclusion in the
`level of ordinary skill in the art. See Envtl. Designs, 713 F.2d at 696–697.
`Fourth, both experts are in general agreement as to the relevant
`amount of industry experience—a relatively small amount—and neither has
`offered any testimony that the exact amount of experience makes a
`difference. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 18; Ex. 2001 ¶ 33.
`Fifth, both experts use the phrase “at least” in describing the level of
`ordinary skill in the art. However, qualifiers such as “at least” expand the
`range indefinitely without an upper bound, and thus precludes a meaningful
`indication of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, we do not use
`them in setting forth the level of skill in the art.
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`Accordingly, we find that a person having ordinary skill in the art has
`a Bachelor’s Degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical
`engineering, or a related field, with between two and five years of
`experience. Moreover, additional relevant education or industry experience
`may compensate for any deficits.
`C. Claim Construction
`In this inter partes review, we construe claim terms in this unexpired
`patent according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)
`(2018).4 “Under a broadest reasonable interpretation, words of the claim
`must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with
`the specification and prosecution history.” Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812
`F.3d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In addition, the Board may not “construe
`claims during [an inter partes review] so broadly that its constructions are
`unreasonable under general claim construction principles.” Microsoft Corp.
`v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis
`omitted), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d 1290. An
`inventor may provide a meaning for a term that is different from its ordinary
`meaning by defining the term in the specification with reasonable clarity,
`deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir.
`1994).
`
`
`4 Per recent regulation, the Board will apply the Phillips claim construction
`standard to petitions filed on or after November 13, 2018. See Changes to
`the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial
`Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340
`(Oct. 11, 2018) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019)). Because
`Petitioner filed its petition before November 13, 2018, we apply the broadest
`reasonable interpretation standard.
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`Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner identified any claim limitation
`that needed construction. See Pet. 3; PO Resp. 6.
`“[W]e need only construe those claim limitations ‘that are in
`controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”
`Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013,
`1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.,
`200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Because the parties did not request the
`construction of any limitation and no express constructions are necessary to
`resolve a controversy, we do not construe any of the limitations.
`D. Obviousness over Jin and Elias
`1. Jin
`Jin is titled “Screen Display Method for Mobile Terminal” and relates
`“to a screen display method for a mobile terminal wherein a plurality of
`contents belonging to the same level or a plurality of applications in
`execution can be displayed together on a single screen in response to user
`inputs.” Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:15–20. Jin’s mobile device “provides a
`screen display method for a mobile terminal wherein a plurality of
`applications in execution can be simultaneously displayed on the screen.”
`Id. at 2:1–4.
`Jin’s Figure 1 is reproduced below.
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`
`
`Ex. 1005, Fig. 1. Jin’s Figure 1 “is a schematic block diagram illustrating a
`mobile terminal to display contents and applications in accordance with the
`principles of the present invention.” Id. at 2:65–67. As shown in Jins’s
`Figure 1, “the mobile terminal includes a memory unit 101, 3D/2D driver
`103, input unit 105, control unit 107, and display unit 109.” Id. at 3:56–58.
`“The control unit 107 controls the overall operation of the mobile terminal.”
`Id. at 4:36–37. Jin’s mobile terminal can be used to display content and
`applications in various formats. See, e.g., 3:62–4:3, 4:36–56.
`For example, as shown in Jin’s s Figure 4, reproduced below, Jin’s
`display can show the content of a single window.
`
`
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`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`Ex. 1005, Fig. 4. Jin’s Figure 4 “is a screen representation of a content
`window” that “corresponds to a state where the artist ‘AAA’ is selected and
`songs released by the artist ‘AAA’ are listed. That is, the control unit 107
`recognizes selection of the artist ‘AAA’, and displays a descriptive listing of
`the selected artist ‘AAA’ on the display unit 109.” Id. at 3:6, 6:12–16.
`Jin further discloses that “in response to a multi-window display
`request, the control unit 107 controls the display unit 109 to display those
`contents at the same level as the currently displayed content in the form of
`an opaque stack, transparent stack, tile board, or folding fan.” Ex. 1005,
`4:36–42.
`Jin further describes various ways to change the displayed windows.
`For example, Jin states that “[i]n response to a request for single window
`movement or multiple window movement during display of windows
`associated with same-level contents, the control unit 107 controls the display
`unit 109 to rearrange the windows accordingly.” Ex. 1005, 4:49–52. Jin
`also describes how to scroll windows: “In response to a scrolling request
`during display of same-level content windows, the control unit 107 controls
`the display unit 109 to scroll the front one or all of the windows depending
`upon settings by the user.” Id. at 4:52–56.
`2. Elias
`Elias is titled “Multi-touch Gesture Dictionary.” Ex. 1006, code (54).
`Elias discloses that the gesture dictionary “may take the form of a dedicated
`computer application that may be used to look up the meaning of gestures.”
`Id. at code (57). Elias’ Figure 5 is reproduced below.
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`
`
`Id. at Fig. 4. Elias’ Figure 5 “illustrates an exemplary dictionary entry
`associated with a spread thumb and three finger chord that may be used in
`accordance with some embodiments of the present invention.” Id. ¶ 22. As
`shown in Figure 5, exiting an application is associated with clockwise
`rotation. Id. ¶¶ 44–45.
`3. Analysis of Claims 1–6 and 8–20
`Petitioner argues that the combination of Jin and Elias teaches all of
`the limitations recited in claim 1. See Pet. 5–42; Pet. Reply 2–16. Because
`it is dispositive, we focus our analysis on the following limitation recited in
`claim 1:
`the processor . . . responds to a directional contact of moving
`the first card or the second card along a second direction that is
`different than the first direction on the touch-sensitive display
`screen by (i) identifying one of the first card or second card as
`being selected based on the directional contact along the second
`direction, and (ii) dismissing the selected first card or second
`card from the touch-sensitive display screen in the second
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`IPR2018-01252
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`direction so that the corresponding first application or second
`application is closed.5
`Ex. 1001, 24:45–25:2.
`a) Petitioner’s Arguments
`Petitioner argues the combination of Jin and Elias teaches the
`dismissing limitation recited in claim 1. Pet. 38–40.
`Specifically, Petitioner argues Jin teaches moving a card in a first
`direction in response to a movement on a touch screen in a first direction.
`See Id. at 35–38. According to Petitioner, Jin’s Figures 9A, 9C, and 9E
`“illustrates a multiple window movement request and its result.” Id. at 35
`(citing Ex. 1005, 7:35–39).
`Petitioner provides an annotated drawing, reproduced below, that
`incorporates Figures 9A, 9C, 9D, and 9E of Jin.
`
`
`
`
`5 This limitation is sometimes referred to as the “dismissing” limitation.
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`Pet. 36. Jin’s Figures 9A, 9C, 9D, and 9E “illustrate manipulation of content
`windows for multiple window movement.” Ex. 1005, 3:15–16. Petitioner’s
`drawing above incorporates Figures 9A, 9C, 9D, and 9E with red
`annotations depicting a sequence of events to move multiple windows on the
`display unit. See Pet. 36.
`Petitioner argues, for example, that Jin teaches that “‘the control
`unit 107 can recognize dragging from the front window to the last window
`on the display unit 109 as a multiple window movement request’, illustrated
`in FIG. 9C, in which the front window ‘AAA’ is moved in the direction of
`the dragging in a sliding manner.” Pet. 36 (quoting Ex. 1005, 7:42–46).
`Petitioner further argues that “[i]n response to Jin’s multiple window
`movement request, the control unit 107 rearranges the windows such that
`‘content windows in display become invisible and content windows not in
`display become visible on the display unit 109, as illustrated in FIG. 9E.’”
`Id. (quoting Ex. 1005, 7:53–55); see also id. at 37 (summarizing Jin’s
`Figures 9A, 9C, and 9E); Pet. Reply 3 (“In the multiple window movement
`request, Jin recognizes ‘dragging from the front window to the last window’
`and ‘rearrange[] content windows so that the content windows in display
`become invisible and contents windows not in display become visible’ in
`response.”), 7 (“Thus, Jin contemplates the movement of a window based on
`finger movements corresponding to the same.” (citing Pet. 8)), 16 (“First, a
`[person having ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that in
`response to a directional contact along a first direction, as illustrated in
`FIG. 9C above, the first card’s position would change relative to the screen
`in the first direction. FIGs. 9A-9E illustrate this movement.” (citations
`omitted)).
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`Petitioner further argues Elias teaches dragging. Pet. Reply 8 (citing
`Ex. 1006 ¶ 42). Petitioner directs us to an annotated version of Elias’s
`Figure 3, reproduced below.
`
`
`Pet. Reply 3. Elias’s Figure 3 “illustrates an exemplary dictionary entry
`associated with a thumb and two finger chord.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 20. Petitioner
`annotated Elias’s Figure 3 with “Suggest dragging commands” with a red
`arrow pointing to dictionary entry 304 “DRAG.” Pet. Reply 3.
`According to Petitioner, Elias’s Figure 3 “illustrates a dictionary entry
`300 enabling users to perform dragging typically ‘accomplished in
`conventional graphical user interface (“GUI”) system[s] by holding a mouse
`button while moving the mouse.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 42).
`Additionally, Petitioner argues that “Elias’s gesture dictionary provides
`feedback in response to recognizing a gesture motion” and that a person
`having ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that Jin/Elias would
`display feedback that includes animation illustrating the selected window
`moving off the display in the second direction in response to a user
`performing a ‘clockwise rotation 511’ associated with ‘exit[ing], i.e.,
`clos[ing] [an] application’ on a window.” Id. (citing Pet. 14–15, 38–40;
`Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 97–106; Ex. 1006 ¶ 45).
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`During the Oral Hearing, Petitioner argued that its reliance on Elias
`for dragging is not a new argument. See e.g., Tr. 13–17, 48–51.
`Specifically, Petitioner stated its use of Elias’s Figure 5 in the Petition was
`exemplary and that Petitioner intended to refer to the whole dictionary
`gesture dictionary. Id. at 17.
`Petitioner further argues that “a [person having ordinary skill in the
`art] would have been motivated to incorporate, and would have understood
`how to incorporate Elias’s gesture dictionary as a background application on
`Jin’s mobile device.” Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 14); see also Pet.
`Reply 19–20. Petitioner further argues that, as shown in an annotated
`version of Figure 5, reproduced below, “Elias’s dictionary 500 discloses that
`‘[o]ther GUI-related commands may be assigned’ including ‘exit, i.e., close
`application (associated with clockwise rotation 511).’” Pet. 38–39
`(emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 45) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 45, 60, 88,
`95, 96,101, 102); see also Pet. Reply 21.
`
`Id. at 39. Elias’s Figure 5 illustrates an exemplary dictionary entry
`associated with a spread thumb and three finger chord. Ex. 1006 ¶ 22. The
`
`
`
`18
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`

`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`version of Elias’s Figure 5 reproduced above has been annotated by
`Petitioner to label the exit motion as “[c]lose the app.” Pet. 39. According
`to Petitioner, the combination of Jin and Elias teach the dismissing
`limitation:
`
`Jin in view of Elias provides responding to a directional
`contact of moving the first card along a second direction (such
`as, clockwise direction illustrated in 511 in Elias) that is
`different from the first direction. Additionally, moving the card
`in the second direction (illustrated in clockwise direction 511)
`exits, i.e., closes the application corresponding to the first card.
`
`Id.
`
`b) Patent Owner’s Arguments
`Patent Owner argues that “[t]he Jin-Elias combination does not render
`obvious” the dismissing limitation recited in claim 1. PO Resp. 8–9; see
`also id. 8–48; PO Sur-reply 2–15. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner’s
`argument that the Jin-Elias combination discloses these elements is based on
`the incorrect position that Jin discloses dragging a window on the screen.”6
`PO Resp. 9 (citing Pet. 35–40). More specifically, Patent Owner argues
`“Petitioner incorrectly interprets a statement in Jin about a user dragging his
`finger on a screen to mean windows on the screen are also dragged.” Id.
`(citing Pet. 36). According to Patent Owner, however, “Jin . . . does not
`teach or even show that the windows are dragged with the movement of the
`user’s finger.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005, Fig. 9C, 7:35–55).
`First, Patent Owner argues that “Jin does not teach dragging a window
`to match a finger movement.” PO Resp. 9–10. According to Patent Owner,
`“Jin teaches dragging a finger on the screen (display unit 109) to initiate a
`
`
`6 Patent Owner italicizes the names of references in its papers. We have
`omitted the italics when reproducing the quotes in this Decision.
`
`19
`
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`

`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`‘multiple window movement request’ and rearranging the displayed
`windows after this multiple window movement request is complete.” Id. at
`10 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:35–55). Specifically, Patent Owner argues Jin teaches
`detecting a “multiple window movement request” and, in response to the
`detection, the device “rearranges content windows so that the content
`windows in display become invisible and content windows not in display
`become visible on the display.” Id. at 11 (quoting Ex. 1005, 7:50–55).
`Patent Owner further argues that the windows are rearranged after the
`multiple window movement request (finger dragging) is complete and not
`during the multiple window movement request. Id. at 11–13; see also PO
`Sur-reply 4.
`Patent Owner argues that this timing is confirmed by Jin’s Figure 11,
`an annotated version of which is reproduced below.
`
`
`
`20
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`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`Id. at 14. Jin’s Figure 11 “is a flow chart illustrating an application display
`method according to another exemplary embodiment of [Jin]” and has been
`annotated by Petitioner with yellow highlighting on steps S913
`(“MULTIPLE WINDOW MOVEMENT REQUEST”) and S915 (“MOVE
`MULTIPLE APPLICATION WINDOWS ACCORDING TO PRESET
`ARRANGEMENT”). Ex. 1005, 3:19–21, Fig. 11; PO Resp. 14. According
`to Patent Owner, because “step S915 is not executed until after the multiple
`movement window request has been input[ted],” it “confirms that the
`application windows in Jin are not rearranged until after the multiple
`window movement request is complete.” PO Resp. 14 (emphasis omitted);
`see also id. at 15–25 (arguing that “Jin does not teach or suggest that
`windows in the multiwindow display mode are dragged to match a finger
`movement”); PO Sur-reply 4–6.
`Second, Patent Owner argues Jin does not teach or suggest that a
`selected card will be dismissed from the screen in a second direction in
`response to directional contact of moving that card along the second
`direction. See PO Resp. 26–45; PO Sur-reply 12–15. Specifically, Patent
`Owner argues—for the reasons discussed above—that “Jin does not teach
`dragging a window to match a finger movement;” instead, “Jin’s system
`rearranges a preset number of windows after a user drags a finger on the
`screen.” PO Resp. 27 (citing Ex. 1005, 5:45–50, 7:37–55, 9:28–31). Patent
`Owner further argues Elias does not teach moving a window in a direction
`when performing a gesture to exit an application; instead, it simply teaches
`using a finger gesture to close the window. Id. at 27–30. Patent Owner also
`argues that “Dr. Sears merely alleges that the Jin-Elias combination renders
`obvious dismissing a card from a display.” Id. at 41 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 96).
`
`21
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`

`IPR2018-01252
`Patent 8,683,362 B2
`Third, Patent Owner argues Petitioner does not explain why a person
`having ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jin’s system to dismiss
`a selected card from a screen in a clockwise direction in response to moving
`that card along the clockwise direction. PO Resp. 45–48; PO Sur-Reply
`15–16. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that even if a person of ordinary
`skill in the art would have combined Elias’s

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