throbber
IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Intel Corporation
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`Qualcomm Incorporated
`Patent Owner
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
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`PETITIONER’S REPLY
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`I. 
`II. 
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
`Claim Construction .......................................................................................... 3 
`A. 
`PO’s Proposed Construction Is Wrong ................................................. 3 
`1. 
`PO’s Proposed Construction Contradicts The Plain Claim
`Language ..................................................................................... 3 
`PO’s Proposed Construction Would Exclude Disclosed
`Embodiments .............................................................................. 6 
`PO’s Remaining Arguments Have No Merit .............................. 8 
`3. 
`III.  Grounds ............................................................................................................ 9 
`A. 
`The Petition Demonstrates Motivation to Combine Chu with
`Choi 2010 ............................................................................................ 10 
`1.  Motivation Comes From The References Themselves ............. 10 
`2. 
`Petition Explains How To Modify Chu In View Of Choi
`2010 ........................................................................................... 16 
`PO Is Wrong That Petition Fails To Demonstrate a Motivation
`to Combine Chu and Choi 2010 with Myers ...................................... 17 
`1. 
`PO Is Wrong That Choi 2010 Teaches Away From
`“Selective Boost” ...................................................................... 17 
`A POSA Would Have Modified Chu and Choi 2010 To
`Apply Myers’ Power Selection Functionality .......................... 20 
`Claim 3 Is Unpatentable ...................................................................... 24 
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`2. 
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`2. 
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
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`i
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`B. 
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`C. 
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
` Patent Owner’s Response (“POR”) confirms that the challenged claims of
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`the ʼ558 patent are invalid. Indeed, the POR does not challenge Petitioner’s
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`mapping of the limitations to the cited references. Instead, the Patent Owner
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`(“PO”) tries to avoid the prior art by advancing an improper claim construction,
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`and by wrongly suggesting that the prior art references would not have been
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`combined.
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`First, PO seeks to re-write the elements of its claims in the guise of claim
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`construction. But its proffered construction contradicts the surrounding claim
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`language, would exclude disclosed embodiments, and is inconsistent with the
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`specification’s teaching – as PO’s own expert, Dr. Arthur Kelley, admitted in
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`deposition. See Ex. 1128 [Kelley Transcript], 35:15-36:1; 37:5-16; 37:20-38:11;
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`133:4-135:9; EPOS Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2014) (rejecting construction that reads out embodiments); Dow Chem. Co. v.
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`Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1378 (same).
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`Second, PO’s critique that the motivation to combine Chu with Choi 2010
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`does not appear “within the references themselves” (POR, 30) is wrong both
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`legally and factually. On the law, there is no requirement that motive must be
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`found within the four corners of the references being combined. This has been
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`clear since KSR rejected such “[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders
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`1
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`recourse to common sense,” holding them “neither necessary under our case law
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`nor consistent with it.” KSR Intl. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
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`Consistent with KSR, the Petition demonstrated the common knowledge of a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) using secondary references that show
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`how the advantages of modifying a system like Chu to include a boost converter
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`like Choi 2010 were very well-known. PO’s argument is also factually incorrect.
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`As the Petition demonstrated (Petition, 67-71), motivation to modify Chu comes
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`directly from Choi 2010’s express teaching of the advantages of adding a boost
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`converter to a system like Chu’s – advantages to which PO’s expert admitted in
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`deposition. See Ex. 1128, 105:20-106:4; 155:7-156:6.
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`Third, PO’s suggestion that, contrary to the Board’s institution decision
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`(Decision (“DI”), 22-24), a POSA would lack motivation to combine Chu and
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`Choi 2010 with Myers ignores Myers’ express teaching on the benefits of
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`implementing so-called “selective boost” in power management circuits. Teaching
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`that Dr. Kelley conceded at deposition. (Ex. 1128, 100:6-9; 101:6-13; 152:21-
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`153:4; 264:21-265:12; 281:6-282:2.)
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`For these reasons, as set forth more fully below, PO’s arguments should be
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`rejected and the challenged claims found unpatentable.
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
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`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`A.
`PO’s Proposed Construction Is Wrong
`PO contends that the term “[a PMOS] transistor [having]…a source that
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`receives the boosted supply voltage or the first supply voltage” should be
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`construed such that “the PMOS transistor must be able to receive, selectively,
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`either the boosted supply voltage or the first supply voltage (referred to herein as a
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`“selective boost”).” (POR, 9.) According to PO, a PMOS transistor that received
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`only the first voltage or only the boosted voltage would not meet this limitation.
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`This proposed construction is far from the broadest reasonable construction of
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`“or,” is contrary to the plain meaning, and would exclude disclosed embodiments.
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`It should be rejected.
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`1.
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`PO’s Proposed Construction Contradicts The Plain Claim
`Language
`Claim 6 recites “a P-channel metal oxide semiconductor (PMOS) transistor
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`[having]…a source receiving the boosted supply voltage or the first supply
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`voltage.” Ex. 1101, 11:41-62. As Dr. Kelley conceded, the term “or” is a
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`conjunction that identifies two alternatives: this “or” that. (Ex. 1128, 130:10-18
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`(“Q. I’m asking at the Schoolhouse Rock level, or is a conjunction that joins two
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`alternatives, correct? A. Well, if we’re going to import Schoolhouse Rock into the
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`deposition, in that context, yes, it is.”).) Under its plain English meaning, the
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`requirement for an amplifier that operates based on “the first supply voltage or the
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`3
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`boosted supply voltage” is met by an amplifier that operates based on either
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`alternative alone. (Id., 130:19-131:2 (“Q.…If I said I would like coffee or tea, you
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`could give me tea and that would meet my requirement, right? A. In that
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`hypothetical abstract outside the bounds of the ’558, sure.”).) PO has identified no
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`sound basis to deviate from that broad plain meaning.
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`To the contrary, the POR concedes that the common meaning of “or” in
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`patent claims is to recite alternatives. See, POR, 20 (“The use of ‘or’ is sometimes
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`an acceptable mechanism for claiming alternatives such that only one of the
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`limitations need be found in the prior art to support anticipation.”.) And that is
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`exactly how Hon. Dana M. Sabraw construed “or” in related litigation on the ’558
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`patent before the United States District Court for the Southern District of
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`California. (Ex. 1126 [Claim Constr. Order], 5-6 (holding the limitation “a source
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`receiving the boosted supply voltage or the first supply voltage” in claim 6 does
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`not require “selective boost”).) Indeed, Dr. Kelley admitted PO’s proffered
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`construction contradicts Judge Sabraw:
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`Q. And just to be clear, you're giving an opinion that is contrary to
`Judge Sabraw’s claim construction, right?
`I understand what the Judge did. And I’ve reached a different
`conclusion.
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`A.
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`4
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`Ex. 1128, 147:10-151. But if “or” covers either alternative alone under the Phillips
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`standard that Judge Sabraw used, it is certainly at least that broad under the
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`broadest reasonable construction rule applicable here. Facebook, Inc. v.
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`Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 Fed. Appx. 864, 869 (“The broadest reasonable
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`interpretation of a claim term may be the same as or broader than the construction
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`of a term under the Phillips standard. But it cannot be narrower.”) A PMOS
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`transistor that received either one of the recited alternatives – e.g., the “boosted
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`supply voltage” alone – would thus meet the claim.
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`Moreover, other claims demonstrate that PO knew how to recite a “selective
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`boost” requirement when it wanted – using language different from claim 6.
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`Independent claim 6 and dependent claim 7 provide one such example. Claim 6
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`recites “a source receiving the boosted supply voltage or the first supply
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`voltage….” Claims 6 is therefore met using only one of the boosted or first supply
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`voltage. Indeed, as noted above, Judge Sabraw found that claim 6 does not require
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`“selective boost.” (Ex. 1126, 5-6.) By contrast, dependent claim 7 adds the
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`limitation “the supply generator is operative to generate the second supply voltage
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`based on the envelope signal and either the boosted supply voltage or the first
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` 1
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` Objections omitted in transcript quotations.
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`supply voltage.” If claim 6 already required “selective boost,” then claim 7 would
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`add nothing. But consistent with claim differentiation doctrine, claim 7’s
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`additional language “and either” has meaning. For that reason, claim 7 could not
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`be read to require only one of the boosted or first supply voltage. It is therefore
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`that additional language appearing in claim 7 (which does not appear in claim 6)
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`that adds a requirement for the amplifier to be able to select between “either” the
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`boosted voltage “or” the first supply voltage. Because claim 6 lacks this “and
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`either” language, it has no such requirement. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
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`1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation
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`gives rise to a presumption that the limitation…is not present in the independent
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`claim.”) Ex. 1127, ¶X.
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`2.
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`PO’s Proposed Construction Would Exclude Disclosed
`Embodiments
`PO’s construction should also be rejected, because it improperly excludes
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`disclosed embodiments. EPOS, 766 F.3d, 1347; Dow, 257 F.3d, 1378; Anchor
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`Wall Sys., Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
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`2003).
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`Specifically, starting at column 8, line 24, the ’558 specification teaches
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`“another design of supporting operation with a lower battery voltage[.]” (Ex.
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`1101, 8:24-25.) In this embodiment, “the entire envelope tracker is operated based
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`on the Vboost voltage from boost converter 180” alone (i.e., solely based on the
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`6
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`“boosted supply voltage”), without ever operating based on battery voltage (i.e.,
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`never based on the “first supply voltage”). (Id., 8:25-26.) As Dr. Kelley admitted
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`in deposition, PO’s construction would exclude this embodiment:
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`Q.
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`A.
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`If you're right that the selective boost and the or means I have to
`be able to use either boost or first, then under that circumstance,
`claim [6] and 13 would not cover the embodiment at column 8
`line 24 that uses Vboost alone. Is that fair?
`I think that’s fair.
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`(Ex. 1128, 134:12-18.) Because PO’s proposed construction would exclude
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`this disclosed embodiment, it should be rejected. EPOS, 766 F.3d, 1347;
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`Dow, 257 F.3d, 1378; Anchor, 340 F.3d, 1308.
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`PO’s argument is also an improper attempt to limit claim 6 solely to one
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`disclosed embodiment (to the exclusion of others). For example, PO contends that
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`column 1, lines 42-50 discloses a form of “selective boost.” Whether the
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`specification here means what PO says is debatable. But what is beyond dispute is
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`that column 1 discloses merely “one design” as an “example” that in no way limits
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`the claims:
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`In one design, the envelope amplifier may further receive the first
`supply voltage and may generate the second supply voltage based on
`either the first supply voltage or the boosted supply voltage. For
`example, the envelope amplifier may generate the second supply
`voltage (i) based on the boosted supply voltage if the envelope signal
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`exceeds a first threshold and/or if the first supply voltage is below a
`second threshold or (ii) based on the first supply voltage otherwise.
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`(Ex. 1101, 1:42-50. (emphasis added).) PO’s citation to 8:55-62 is similarly
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`misplaced. (Id., 8:55-62 (“In one design….For example,…”).) As the Federal
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`Circuit has admonished, confining claims to one disclosed embodiment is the
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`“cardinal sin” of claim construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d, 1320 (“although the
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`specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have
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`repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”); see also
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`Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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`(“a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read
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`into a claim”); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir.
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`2004) (same); E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
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`2003) (cautioning against “importing limitations”). PO’s blatant attempt to do so
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`here should be rejected. Ex. 1127, ¶10.
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`3.
`PO’s Remaining Arguments Have No Merit
`Finally, PO suggests that Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Alyssa Apsel, somehow
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`“agreed that it would not make sense to interpret the boosted supply voltage as
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`purely optional in the context of the claims” (POR, 24), because “when asked
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`about a similar ‘based on’ limitation in claim 6,” she supposedly “admitted that it
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`makes sense to interpret ‘based on’ as requiring a boosted supply voltage to be an
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`available supply voltage.” Id.
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`The language from claim 6 that Dr. Apsel addressed in this testimony recites
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`“generat[ing] a second supply voltage for the power amplifier based on the
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`envelope signal and the boosted supply voltage.” (Ex. 2006 [Apsel Transcript],
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`41:21-23; Ex. 1101, 11:49-51.) This is not similar to “a source receiving the
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`boosted supply voltage or the first supply voltage,” which plainly recites “or.”
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`(Ex. 1101, 11:58-60.) By reciting “or,” claim 6 is clear that either one of the
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`“boosted supply voltage” or “the first supply voltage” is alone sufficient to meet
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`the claim’s requirement. Ex. 1127, ¶12.
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`PO’s proposed construction should thus be rejected. Ex. 1127, ¶13.
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`III. GROUNDS
`As the Board recognized, PO does not challenge Petitioner’s mapping of the
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`limitations to the cited references. DI, 20, 22. PO does not dispute the prior art in
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`Grounds I-II disclosed all limitations of the asserted claims. POR, 19-49. Ex.
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`2005, ¶¶82-114. PO argues solely a lack of motivation to combine. However,
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`PO’s argument ignores explicit reasons and rationales presented in the Petition and
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`Dr. Apsel’s Declaration that would have motivated a POSA to combine these
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`references. Ex. 1127, ¶14.
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`If the Board rejects PO’s motivation argument (as it should) and confirms its
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`preliminary finding that “Petitioner provides argument and evidence that supports
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`the combination of Chu and Choi 2010,” (DI, 21) and “PO has not shown
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`persuasively that the differences between Chu/Choi 2010 and Myers undermines
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`their combination,” (DI, 24), then claims 1-9 should be found unpatentable for the
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`reasons stated in the Petition and the DI. Ex. 1127, ¶15.
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`A. The Petition Demonstrates Motivation to Combine Chu with Choi
`2010
`1. Motivation Comes From The References Themselves
`According to PO, Chu and Choi 2010 “address different problems with
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`different solutions that are in tension with each other” (POR, 29) and their
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`proposed combination is based on “hindsight reconstruction” (Id., 30). This
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`argument is based upon the contention that a POSA would “either maximize
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`efficiency at the cost of output power degradation (like in Chu), or minimize the
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`output power degradation at the cost of reducing efficiency (like in Choi 2010),”
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`not both. (Id.,31.) PO is mistaken. Ex. 1127, ¶16.
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`First, accepting PO’s argument would require accepting that Chu is not
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`interested in the output signal quality of its supply modulator (which relates to
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`output power degradation) and that Choi 2010 is not interested in the power
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`dissipation of its supply modulator (i.e., efficiency). It would require accepting, in
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`other words, that these are mutually exclusive concerns. But Dr. Kelley testified
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`that engineers in this field commonly “worry about both of those” concerns when
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`designing power management circuits:
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`Q. And so in designing a power management circuit, you're
`balancing those competing concerns providing enough power
`for the load while at the same time being as efficient as you can
`be. Is that fair?
`I'm not sure I'd characterize them as being competing. There’s
`certainly simultaneous concerns. You worry about both of those
`in terms of making your power supply work properly.
`
`A.
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`(Ex. 1128, 13:12-20; see also, id., 13:21-14:2.) That was just as true in the
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`prior art as it is today:
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`Q. So we said at the outset that a person of skill in the art would
`understand that in designing power management, you want to
`have one goal of energy efficiency and also a goal of having a
`signal that actually works; it isn't distorted. Do you recall that?
`A. Yes.
`Q. That was true in 2010, right?
`A. Yes.
`Q.
`So it was true before the '558 patent, right?
`A.
`I guess that's true.
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`(Ex. 1128, 259:7-18.) Ex. 1127, ¶17.
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`It defies logic to accept that, because Chu addresses efficiency and Choi
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`2010 addresses output power degradation, a POSA would not have been motivated
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`to combine the two to reap both benefits. This is particularly true in the design of
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`power management circuits like those in Chu and Choi 2010, where the competing
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`demands of efficiency and output power degradation are a standard engineering
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`trade-off as even the POR concedes. (POR, 29 (“Choi 2010 accepts the trade-off
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`in efficiency in order to achieve a solution to its identified problem of output
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`power degradation.”).) A POSA would thus consider both demands, and would
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`not focus all efforts on only one to the exclusion of the other as the PO argues.
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`See, POR, 31 (“either maximize efficiency at the cost of output power degradation
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`(like in Chu), or minimize the output power degradation at the cost of reducing
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`efficiency (like in Choi 2010)”). Ex. 1127, ¶18.
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`Second, PO’s suggestion that Petitioner’s combination “is not based on any
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`teachings within the references themselves” (POR, 30) is factually wrong and
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`attempts to distort the record. As an initial matter, the Petition cited clear reasons
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`to combine Chu and Choi 2010 that were articulated within the references
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`themselves. It explained, for example, how Choi 2010 explicitly taught advantages
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`of modifying a system like Chu to include a boost converter like that disclosed in
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`Choi 2010’s Figure 5. (See Petition, 44-45 (“These advantages are specifically
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`taught by Choi 2010, and would have motivated a POSA to modify Chu
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`accordingly.”).) The Petition then identified explicit disclosures in Choi 2010
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`(citing in Choi 2010 at 1074 and 1077) that suggest integrating a boost converter
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`for a “stable operation” of the supply modulator and for allowing “robust
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`performance over the battery voltage variation.” (See, e.g., Petition, 45.) Ex.
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`1127, ¶19.
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`Moreover, when asked about these motivations to combine at his deposition,
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`Dr. Kelley readily agreed with Petitioner’s explanation. For example, Dr. Kelley
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`testified that Choi 2010 teaches use of a boost converter to address battery
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`degradation just like the Petition explained:
`
`Q. Now, Choi 2010 does talk about battery degradation, right?
`A.
`Right.
`Q. And Choi 2010 says you can use this boost converter to address
`the battery degradation problem, right?
`A. Yes.
`
`(Ex. 1128, 105:20-106:4.) He also agreed that Choi 2010’s boost converter had the
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`advantage of preventing a linear amplifier’s output from degrading when the
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`battery depletes, just as the Petition explained:
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`Q.
`
`A.
`
`Choi 2010's boost converter prevents a linear amplifier's output
`power from degrading when the battery depletes, right?
`That's true.
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`(Id., 156:3-6; see also, id., 155:7-156:2.) What is more, Dr. Kelley conceded that
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`if Chu’s battery degrades, the power amplifier would not be able to perform – a
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`specific motive to make Petitioner’s proposed combination:
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`13
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`Q.
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`A.
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`If the battery voltage gets too low, the output signal will
`become distorted, right?
`The output signal of the power amplifier. That’s right. If you
`don’t have enough battery voltage, Chu will not function and
`the power amplifier will not be able to perform.
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`(Compare id., 165:17-22 with Petition, 44-48.) In short, Dr. Kelley conceded the
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`exact motivations to combine described in the Petition. Ex. 1127, ¶20.
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`Moreover, PO is wrong to contend that the reason to combine must come
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`directly from the combined art itself. KSR rejected such “[r]igid preventative rules
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`that deny factfinders recourse to common sense” as “neither necessary under our
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`case law nor consistent with it.” KSR, 550 U.S., 421. Motivation may come from
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`industry trends, the ordinary creativity of a POSA, or indeed from “common
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`sense” in the art at that time. Id. (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of
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`ordinary creativity, not an automaton”). The Petition thus explained, corroborated
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`by evidence from secondary references, how the advantages of modifying Chu to
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`include a boost converter like Choi 2010 would have been well-known to POSAs
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`at that time. Petition, 45-47. Ex. 1127, ¶21.
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`Even PO admits that “efficiency and output distortion/robustness problems
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`were generally known in the art” (POR, 30) – the exact concerns that would have
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`motivated the proposed combination of Chu and Choi 210. The Petition addressed
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`these same specific concerns, and explained in detail how they would have
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`motivated this combination, exactly as the Board has recognized. See DI, 21.
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`(“Petitioner cites secondary references in support of the advantages for modifying
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`Chu’s supply modulator to incorporate the boost converter of Choi 2010” and
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`“provides argument and evidence that supports the combination…in accordance
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`with the teachings of these secondary references.”). Ex. 1127, ¶22.
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`Third, Dr. Kelley conceded the reason why a POSA would modify Chu to
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`include Choi 2010’s boost converter – namely, that doing so would extend Chu’s
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`battery life:
`
`A.
`Q.
`
`Q. …If I implemented the boost converter of Choi in Chu such that
`Chu operated off of battery power until the battery depleted and
`then I switched to using boost, that would save power, right?
`That would extend the useful life of the battery.
`Right. By conserving power during the portion of time where
`it's operating off of the battery only, right?
`By both conserving power during the time it's operating off the
`battery and then you turn on the boost, and it lets you more
`fully deplete the battery before you run out of battery.
`Q. Okay. And you would agree with me that extending the useful
`life of a battery is something that is good, right?
`A. Yes.
`
`A.
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`Ex. 1128, 281:6-282:2. Dr. Kelley testified this modification was well within the
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`skill of a POSA:
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`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`It was within the skill of the person of ordinary skill to build the
`circuit that would switch between the Vbat shown in Choi ‐‐
`sorry ‐‐ shown in Chu Figure 4 and the boosted voltage of the
`boost converter from Choi Figure 5, correct?
`If you decided to do that, yes.
`
`Q
`
`A
`
`Ex. 1128, 284:6-12. In short, the evidence fully demonstrates motivation for this
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`combination. Ex. 1127, ¶23.
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`2.
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`Petition Explains How To Modify Chu In View Of Choi
`2010
`PO further argues that “how or why the references would be combined to
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`produce the claimed invention” is “missing from the prior art.” (POR, 32.) Here
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`again, PO is mistaken. The Petition and the prior art explain how Chu would have
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`been modified to incorporate the boosted voltage teachings of Choi 2010. For
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`example, the Petition explains how “to modify Chu to generate its output supply
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`voltage based on the envelope signal and a boosted supply voltage (rather than
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`Vbattery), using a boost converter such as the one disclosed in Choi 2010.”
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`(Petition, 42.) The Petition also maps (with color coding) corresponding
`
`components of the Chu and Choi 2010 supply modulators to further illustrate
`
`where the boost converter should be incorporated to boost Chu’s supply voltage
`
`Vbattery. (Id., 41-44. Ex. 1127, ¶24.)
`
`16
`
`

`

`B.
`
`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`PO Is Wrong That Petition Fails To Demonstrate a Motivation to
`Combine Chu and Choi 2010 with Myers
`If the Board rejects PO’s “selective-boost” claim construction, then the
`
`Board need not reach PO’s argument about the alleged lack of motivation to
`
`combine Chu, Choi 2010, and Myers because claim 6 would be invalid based on
`
`the combination of Chu and Choi 2010 alone. However, even if the Board were to
`
`accept PO’s mistaken construction, claim 6 would still be invalid based upon this
`
`combination in view of Myers. Ex. 1127, ¶25.
`
`1.
`
`PO Is Wrong That Choi 2010 Teaches Away From
`“Selective Boost”
`PO argues that “a POSA would not have combined Myers with Petitioner’s
`
`hypothetical Chu/Choi 2010 combination because Choi 2010 teaches away from
`
`the use of a selective boost voltage.” (POR, 36-37.) PO is dead wrong. Nothing
`
`in Choi 2010 teaches away from this combination, and PO has failed to even come
`
`close to showing the legal requirement for “teaching away.” Moreover, the
`
`admitted prior art evidence from the ’558 patent itself corroborates that there was
`
`no teaching away and, to the contrary, was substantial motive to modify Choi 2010
`
`to implement “selective boost.” Ex. 1127, ¶26.
`
`First, PO is wrong to contend Choi 2010 teaches away. Specifically, PO
`
`argues “boost is not merely a general preference [in Choi 2010]; Choi 2010
`
`discloses no other manner to achieve its objective of minimizing the degradation of
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`output power.” This assertion is incorrect, because Choi 2010 in fact teaches using
`
`the boosted voltage to “achiev[e] the robust operation against the battery
`
`depletion.” Ex. 1106, 1076. Choi 2010 thus does not teach away from “selective
`
`boost” because a POSA would have understood that a battery supply could have
`
`been used to selectively supply voltage when the battery has not depleted and a
`
`boosted supply when it has. Ex. 1127, ¶27.
`
`Second, in order for a reference to teach away, “a person of ordinary skill,
`
`upon reading the reference, [must] be discouraged from following the path set out
`
`in the reference, or [must] be led in a direction divergent from the path that was
`
`taken” in the claim. Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2013). A reference that “merely expresses a general preference for an
`
`alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage
`
`investigation into” the claimed invention does not teach away. Id. PO has failed to
`
`demonstrate any such criticism, discrediting, or discouragement in Choi 2010.
`
`Rather, Choi 2010 merely teaches that one way to minimize the impact of a
`
`degrading battery voltage is to boost that voltage. Choi 2010 expresses, in other
`
`words, a preference. Nothing about that teaching discredits or discourages
`
`improving the efficiency of Choi 2010’s boosting by using the boosted voltage
`
`only when needed–for example, only when the power requirements of the
`
`transmission cannot be satisfied by the battery supply. Indeed, as Dr. Kelley
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`admits, this modest modification would result in power savings, and that a circuit
`
`designer would have been more than able to implement such a selectable voltage
`
`supply. (Ex. 1028, 152:21-153:4 “Q. Do you agree that a person of ordinary skill
`
`would have known how to select between two power sources? A. There are many
`
`ways to do that. And so in a very broad question like that I think somebody
`
`might.”).) Ex. 1127, ¶28.
`
`Third, PO’s argument contradicts the ’558 patent. In discussing prior art
`
`Figure 2A, the ’558 patent explains it would be wasteful to operate an amplifier
`
`with the maximum supply voltage at all times. (See, Ex. 1101, 4:7-9 (“The
`
`difference between the battery voltage and the envelope of the RFout signal
`
`represents wasted power….”); Ex. 1128, 173:17-175:2. Choi 2010 similarly
`
`discloses that “[t]he supply voltage of the linear amplifier is boosted to 5V, and it
`
`enables the RF PA operating with the maximum 4.5V supply voltage.” (Ex. 1106,
`
`1077.) A POSA would thus have known that operating Choi 2010’s amplifier with
`
`the boosted voltage at all times needlessly wastes power, as this evidence
`
`corroborates. Ex. 1127, ¶29.
`
`A POSA would have been motivated to reduce this waste. Figure 2B of the
`
`’558 patent depicts, for example, the prior art Average Power Tracking (“APT”)
`
`technique. Ex. 1128, 175:3-10. Plot 270 in Figure 2B below shows reducing
`
`wasted power by selecting between different voltage supplies for an amplifier. It
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`shows switching between a first (lower) supply voltage to a second (boosted)
`
`supply voltage:
`
`
`
`
`
`Ex. 1101, Fig. 2B
`
`Ex. 1101, Fig. 2B
`
`As the PO concedes, selecting between the different voltage supplies in this way
`
`was a known technique to “reduce wasted power.” Ex. 1101, 4:18; Ex. 1128; Ex.
`
`1128, 173:17-175:2; 175:3-10. A POSA reading Choi 2010 would have been
`
`aware of such techniques (e.g., APT), and would thus have been motivated to
`
`modify Chu as described above to take advantage of such known, standard
`
`strategies. Ex. 1127, ¶30.
`
`2.
`
`A POSA Would Have Modified Chu and Choi 2010 To
`Apply Myers’ Power Selection Functionality
`PO argues that “[b]efore the disclosure of the ’558 Patent, a POSA [would]
`
`either maximize efficiency at the cost of output power degradation (like in Chu), or
`
`minimize the output power degradation at the cost of reducing efficiency (like in
`
`20
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01153
`U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558
`Choi 2010). The prior art did not suggest any way to achieve both of these
`
`benefits.” POR, 41-42 (internal citations omitted.) Ex. 1127, ¶31.
`
`PO is wrong. Myers, a prior art patent that issued twelve years before the
`
`’558 patent was filed, proposes one solution for achieving both benefits.
`
`Specifically, Myers teaches that choosing the power source based on the amplitude
`
`of the input signal “allows an amplifier to be operated in a more efficient range,”
`
`and suggests that high efficiency is important to battery life. Ex. 1112, 9:18-21,
`
`1:19-23 (“High dynamic range allows the communications devices to communicate
`
`more reliably over a variety of distances, and high efficiency allows the devices to
`
`operate longer on a single battery.”). Ex. 1127, ¶32.
`
`PO argues that “Myers’ disclosure offers no teaching or suggestion for how
`
`to reconcile the competing objectives of Chu and Choi 2010, and Petitioner does
`
`not rely on Myers to do so.” (POR, 42.) PO is mistaken. As the Petition
`
`described, “Myers also discloses that the second power supply Vdd2 is larger than
`
`Vdd1, and that (like the apparatus in the ’558 patent) the second power source will
`
`be used only when needed and the first power source will be used the rest of the
`
`time.” Petition, 72. Accordingly, Myers reconciles Choi 2010’s objective of
`
`minimizing the output power degradation by selecting the larger power source only
`
`whe

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