Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Paper 9
`
`
`
` Entered: January 16, 2019
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`INTEL CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`QUALCOMM, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
`SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Paper 9
`
`
`
` Entered: January 16, 2019
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`INTEL CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`QUALCOMM, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
`SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Intel Corporation (“Petitioner”) requests inter partes review of claims
`12–14 of U.S. Patent No. 8,698,558 B2 (“the ’558 patent,” Ex. 1001)
`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311 et seq. Paper 2 (“Petition” or “Pet.”).
`Qualcomm Incorporated (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response.
`Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the
`information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that
`there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect
`to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`Upon consideration of the Petition and Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`Response, we conclude the information presented shows there is a
`reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the
`unpatentability of claims 12–14 of the ’558 patent.
`
`A. Related Proceedings
`Apple Inc. is identified as an additional real party-in-interest. Pet. 2.
`The parties inform us that the ’558 patent is presently asserted against
`Petitioner in the litigation Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 3:17-cv-
`01375-DMS-MDD (S.D. Cal.) and against Apple in a proceeding before the
`International Trade Commission (“ITC”) captioned In the Matter of Certain
`Mobile Elec. Devices and Radio Frequency Components Thereof, Inv. No.
`337-TA-1065. Pet. 2; Paper 6, 2. The parties also inform us that additional
`claims of the ’558 patent are at issue in related inter partes reviews,
`specifically claims 1–9 of the 558 patent in IPR2018-01153, claims 15–20 of
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`the ’558 patent in IPR2018-01554, and claims 10 and 11 in IPR2019-01240.
`Pet. 2–3; Paper 6, 2.
`
`B. The ʼ558 Patent
`The ’558 patent is titled, “Low-Voltage Power-Efficient Envelope
`Tracker” and discloses “[t]echniques for efficiently generating a power
`supply for a power amplifier” used in communication system transmitters.
`Ex. 1001, 1:30–31, [54]. The ’558 patent discloses that
`transmitter typically includes a power amplifier (PA) to provide
`high transmit power for the output RF signal. The power
`amplifier should be able to provide high output power and have
`high power-added efficiency (PAE). Furthermore, the power
`amplifier may be required to have good performance and high
`PAE even with a low battery voltage.
`Id. at 1:21–26. The ’558 patent also discloses that the power amplifier
`apparatus may include: (1) in one embodiment, an envelope amplifier and a
`boost converter; (2) in a second embodiment, a switcher, an envelope
`amplifier, and a power amplifier; or (3) in a third embodiment, a switcher
`that may sense an input current and generate a switching signal to charge
`and discharge an inductor providing a supply current. Id. at 1:31–34; 1:51–
`52; 1:66–2:2.
`Figure 3, below, shows an exemplary switcher and envelope
`amplifier. Id. at 4:39–42.
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`
`
`Figure 3 shows switcher 160a and envelope amplifier 170a, which, in turn,
`includes operational amplifier (op-amp) 310 that receives the envelope
`signal. Id. at 4:42–63. Driver 312 has output (R1) coupled to the gate of P-
`channel metal oxide semiconductor (PMOS) transistor 314 and a second
`output (R2) coupled N-channel MOS (NMOS) transistor 316. Id. PMOS
`transistor 318 in envelope amplifier 170a is connected to receive C1 control
`signal via Vboost voltage from Boost Converter 180. Id. PMOS transistor
`320 in envelope amplifier 170 receives a C2 control signal and Vbat voltage.
`Id.
`Within switcher 160a, current sense amplifier 330 has its input
`
`coupled to current sensor 164 and its output coupled to an input of switcher
`driver 332. Id. at 4:64–66. Vbat voltage of switcher 160a provides current
`to power amplifier 130 via inductor 162 when the switcher is ON, and
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`inductor 120 provides stored energy to power amplifier 130 during the OFF
`state of the switcher circuit. In the ON state, the switcher is joined with the
`current from the envelope amplifier 170a (Ienv) to provide a combined
`current (Ipa) to PA 130. See Id. at 3:21–27.
`The ’558 patent also discloses another embodiment for switcher
`circuit of Figure 3—specifically a switcher that uses offset current to lower
`the Isen current from the current sensor, keeping the switcher in the ON state
`for a longer time and producing a larger Iind current provided to power
`amplifier 130. Id. at 7:5–48, Figure 5.
`
`C. Illustrative Claims
`Claims 12–14 are illustrative and reproduced below (Ex. 1001, 12:51–
`13:18).1
`12. An apparatus comprising:
`a switcher operative to receive a first supply voltage
`and provide a first supply current;
`an envelope amplifier operative to receive an
`envelope signal and provide a second supply current based
`on the envelope signal; and
`a power amplifier operative to receive a total supply
`current comprising the first supply current and the second
`supply current, wherein the switcher comprises
`a current sense amplifier operative to sense the first
`supply current, or the second supply current, or the total
`supply current and provide a sensed signal,
`a driver operative to receive the sensed signal and
`provide a first control signal and a second control signal,
`
`1 Claim 12 is subject to a certificate of correction that deletes lines 57
`through 59 of column 12 of the ’558 patent, which recites “a power
`amplifier operative to receive an envelope signal and provide a second
`supply current based on the envelope signal.” Ex. 1021, Certificate of
`Correction. Pet. 46 n.4.
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`a P-channel metal oxide semiconductor (PMOS)
`transistor having a gate receiving the first control signal, a
`source receiving the first supply voltage, and a drain
`providing a switching signal for an inductor providing the
`first supply current, and
`an N-channel metal oxide semiconductor (NMOS)
`transistor having a gate receiving the second control
`signal, a drain providing the switching signal, and a source
`coupled to circuit ground.
`
`13. The apparatus of claim 12, further comprising:
`a boost converter operative to receive the first
`supply voltage and provide a boosted supply voltage
`having a higher voltage than the first supply voltage,
`wherein the envelope amplifier operates based on the first
`supply voltage or the boosted supply voltage.
`
`14. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the first supply
`current comprises direct current (DC) and low frequency
`components, and wherein the second supply current
`comprises higher frequency components.
`D. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`The information presented in the Petition sets forth proposed grounds
`of unpatentability for the challenged claims of the ’558 patent as follows
`(Pet. 39–40, 72):
`
`Reference[s]
`
`Chu2
`Chu and Blanken3
`
`Basis
`35 U.S.C. § 102
`35 U.S.C. § 103
`
`Claim[s] Challenged
`12 and 14
`14
`
`
`2 Wing-Yee Chu, et al., A 10 MHz Bandwidth, 2 mV Ripple PA Regulator for
`CDMA Transmitters, IEEE JOURNAL OF SOLID-STATE CIRCUITS 2809–2819
`(2008) (Ex. 1004, “Chu”).
`3 P.G. Blanken, et al., A 50MHz Bandwidth Multi-Mode PA Supply
`Modulator for GSM, EDGE and UMTS Application, 2008 RADIO
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`
`Basis
`Reference[s]
`35 U.S.C. § 103
`Chu and Choi 20104
`Chu, Choi 2010, and Myers5 35 U.S.C. § 103
`
`Claim[s] Challenged
`13
`13
`
`
`Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of Dr. Alyssa Apsel (Ex. 1003) in
`support of the Petition.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Interpretation
`This inter partes review is based on a petition filed before November
`13, 2018, and we construe the claims challenged in such a petition by
`applying the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification.
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2016); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). In applying a broadest reasonable
`construction, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary
`meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the
`context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d
`1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term must
`be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`
`
`FREQUENCY INTEGRATED CIRCUITS SYMPOSIUM (IEEE) 401–404 (2008) (Ex.
`1010, “Blanken”).
`4 Jinsung Choi, et al., Envelope Tracking Power Amplifier Robust to
`Battery Depletion,” Microwave Symposium Digest (MTT), 2010
`IEEE MTT-S INTERNATIONAL 1074–1077 (2010) (Ex. 1007, “Choi 2010”).
`5 Myers, et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,929,702 (Ex. 1012, “Myers”).
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`Petitioner acknowledges the broadest reasonable interpretation
`requirement but argues that “this [instant] Petition does not depend on
`whether the claims are analyzed under the broadest reasonable interpretation
`standard or the standard established by Phillips . . . .” Pet. 37. Accordingly,
`Petitioner asserts that their proposed claim constructions “are either the
`correct claim construction under Phillips or are an even narrower
`construction proposed by the Patent Owner.” Id. Petitioner argues that
`“[t]he challenged claims are invalid under those constructions and also
`would be invalid under any broader construction based on the broadest
`reasonable interpretation standard.” Id.
`Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s proposed claim
`constructions for two terms, which we adopt below from Patent Owner’s
`proposed constructions in the ITC litigation. See Prelim. Resp. 1–6.
`On the record before us, the ’558 patent is not expired, the Petition
`was filed prior to the change of our rules regarding claim construction, and
`neither party requested that the Phillips standard be applied.6 Thus, we
`apply the broadest reasonable interpretation to the terms discussed below.
`1. “current sense amplifier” (claim 12)
`Petitioner offers a claim construction for “current sense amplifier”
`(claim 12) to mean an “amplifier that produces a voltage from a current” that
`is based on the Patent Owner’s constructions in the parallel ITC litigation.
`Pet. 37–38 (citing Ex. 1023, 11–12). Petitioner argues that the ITC
`construction is consistent with the ’558 patent specification and the
`
`6 The applicable version of 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) requires that a request to
`apply the Phillips standard “must be made in the form of a motion under
`§ 42.20, within 30 days from the filing of the petition.”
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 37–38 (Ex. 1001,
`4:64–66, 5:7–10, 5:18–20). Patent Owner does not contest this construction.
`For purposes of this Institution Decision and based on this preliminary
`record, we adopt the construction of “current sense amplifier” to mean an
`“amplifier that produces a voltage from a current.”
`2. “envelope signal” (claim 12)
`Petitioner offers a claim construction for “envelope signal” (claim 12)
`to mean a “signal indicative of the upper bound of the output RF signal,”
`which is the construction proposed by Patent Owner in the ITC litigation.
`Pet. 38; Ex. 1023, 13–14. Although Petitioner argues this construction is
`narrower than the alternative offered in the ITC litigation, Petitioner does
`not argue for a broader construction. Id.
`Based on the record before us and for purposes of this Institution
`Decision, we adopt the ITC litigation construction for “envelope signal”
`(claim 12) to mean a “signal indicative of the upper bound of the output RF
`signal.”
`
`B. Principles of Law
`“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
`the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
`art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628,
`631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The principle of inherency under anticipation requires
`that any information missing from the reference would nonetheless be
`known to be present in the subject matter of the reference, when viewed by
`persons experienced in the field of the invention. However, “anticipation by
`inherent disclosure is appropriate only when the reference discloses prior art
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`that must necessarily include the unstated limitation.” Transclean Corp. v.
`Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal
`citation omitted); see also In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir.
`1999) (that a feature in the prior art reference “could” operate as claimed
`does not establish inherency).
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such
`that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness,
`i.e., secondary considerations.7 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–
`18 (1966).
`The Supreme Court has made clear that we apply “an expansive and
`flexible approach” to the question of obviousness. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415.
`Whether a patent claiming the combination of prior art elements would have
`been obvious is determined by whether the improvement is more than the
`predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.
`Id. at 417. Reaching this conclusion, however, requires more than a mere
`showing that the prior art includes separate references covering each
`
`7 Patent Owner does not present arguments or evidence of such secondary
`considerations in its Preliminary Response. Therefore, at this preliminary
`stage, we do not consider secondary considerations as part of our analysis.
`10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`separate limitation in a claim under examination. Unigene Labs., Inc. v.
`Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Rather, obviousness
`requires the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of
`the invention would have selected and combined those prior art elements in
`the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed
`invention. Id.
`
`C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art related to the
`’558 patent at the time of filing, would have a Master’s degree in electrical
`engineering, computer engineering, or computer science, and would also
`have at least two years of relevant experience, or a Bachelor’s degree in one
`of those fields and four years of relevant experience, where relevant
`experience is “refers to experience with mobile device architecture as well as
`transmission and power circuitry for radio frequency devices.” Pet. 38–39
`(citing Ex. 1001, Abstract, 1:7–9, 30–31; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–85).
`Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s level of skill. On the
`record before us and for purposes of this Decision, we are persuaded by
`Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and we find this
`definition is commensurate with the level of ordinary skill in the art as
`reflected in the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355
`(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the level of skill in
`the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects
`an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”) (internal
`quotation marks omitted); see also In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579
`(Fed. Cir. 1995). Here, as Petitioner has asserted, we discern the prior art, as
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`well as the ’558 patent, require a degree of knowledge that is specific to
`mobile device architecture as well as transmission and power circuitry for
`radio frequency devices. See Pet. 38–39; Ex. 1001, Abstract, 1:7–9, 30–31.
`
`D. Section 325(d) Discretion
`Patent Owner contends that institution should be denied under 35
`U.S.C. § 325(d). Prelim. Resp. 6–16 (citing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B.
`Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, slip op. at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15,
`2017) (Paper 8) (informative)). Patent Owner asserts that when the Becton
`Dickinson factors are considered the balance favors denying institution
`under section 325(d). Prelim. Resp. 15–16. Specifically, Patent Owner
`contends that the Chu (Ex. 1004)—asserted in each of the grounds, but
`addressed by Patent Owner with respect to ground 1 (anticipation by Chu)—
`is cumulative of Kim (Ex. 1013), which the Examiner considered in
`allowing claims 12 and 14 of the ’558 patent. Id. at 6–7. Patent Owner’s
`argument asserts the similarities between Figures 3 and 4 of Kim and Figure
`4 of Chu disclose nearly identical linear amplifier circuits, switch-mode
`supply modulators, inductors, and power amplifiers. See id. at 9–14.
`Our institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic
`Inc. v. Avid Tech, Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the PTO is
`permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”). Section
`325(d) states that “[i]n determining whether to institute . . . the Director may
`take into account whether . . . the same or substantially the same prior art or
`arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In evaluating whether
`to exercise our discretion under Section 325(d), we consider several
`nonexclusive factors (known as the Becton Dickinson factors):
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`(1) the similarities and material differences between the asserted
`art and the prior art involved during examination;
`(2) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art
`evaluated during examination;
`(3) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during
`examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for
`rejection;
`(4) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during
`examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the
`prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art;
`(5) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the
`Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and
`(6) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in
`the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments.
`See Becton, Dickinson, Case IPR2017-01586, slip op. at 17–18 (Paper 8).
`We have analyzed the foregoing factors, in view of the record in this
`case, and determined that the factors weigh against exercising our discretion
`under § 325(d) to deny institution.
`For factors 1–4, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that the
`similarities between Kim and Chu means that factors 1–4 weigh strongly in
`favor of exercising our discretion. First, we note that Petitioner has
`presented persuasive argument and evidence that the power supply elements
`Petitioner identifies as common between Chu and Kim, were well known in
`the art at the time of the ’558 patent. See Pet. 11–15 (discussing hybrid
`power supply elements). Based on present record, we are not persuaded that
`the similarity between Kim’s and Chu’s functional components, such as a
`linear amplifier or switching amplifier, does not indicate that the full Chu
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`reference was considered by the Examiner by considering Kim. See Prelim.
`Resp. 9–10 (comparing functional block in Figures).
`Furthermore, under Becton, Dickinson factor 4, Patent Owner’s
`discussion of functional components has not shown that Patent Owner’s
`arguments with respect to Chu are similar to arguments advanced during
`prosecution. Patent Owner’s arguments address only the depictions in the
`functional blocks based on the figures of Kim and Chu, but does not
`compare or contrast the Examiner’s arguments regarding Kim with the
`Petitioner’s arguments regarding Chu for ground 1 of the Petition.
`Accordingly, under Becton, Dickinson factors 1–4, we do not believe Patent
`Owner’s arguments and evidence regarding the similarities between Kim
`and Chu weigh in favor of exercising our discretion.
`For Becton, Dickinson factor 5, we find that Petitioner’s arguments
`address the limitations that the Examiner found were not disclosed in Kim
`(Pet. 28–30), and address these limitations in the consideration of the
`challenged claims (id. at 54–58). For example, with respect to Chu,
`Petitioner argues that Chu discloses “claim elements that the Examiner
`found were missing in the prior art during prosecution (operational
`amplifier, driver, and PMOS and NMOS transistors).” Pet. 30 (citing Ex.
`1003 ¶ 70).
`Finally, we find that that Becton, Dickinson factor 6 weighs in favor
`of not exercising our discretion. Petitioner presents additional argument and
`testimony in support of its contentions regarding Chu’s disclosures to a
`person of ordinary skill in the art that warrant consideration, especially in
`light of the grounds which rely on Chu in combination with other references.
`Id. at 39–40 (discussing grounds), 40–54 (discussing anticipation by Chu).
`14
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`Thus, Becton, Dickinson factors 5 and 6 do not weigh in favor of exercising
`our discretion.
`In light of the foregoing, we decline to exercise our discretion under
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny this Petition.
`
`E. Section 314(a) Discretion
`Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C.
`§ 314(a) (authorizing institution of an inter partes review under particular
`circumstances, but not requiring institution under any circumstances);
`Harmonic, 815 F.3d at 1367.
`Patent Owner argues we should exercise our discretion to deny this
`Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) because the filing of four petitions against
`the same patent is abusive and unnecessary duplication of proceedings.
`Prelim. Resp. 16–18. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that dividing the
`challenges into four Petitions which normally fit into one or two petitions is
`not in the interest of “efficient administration of the Office” nor promotes
`“the ability of the Office timely complete proceedings.” Prelim. Resp. 17
`(see, infra Section I.A. noting related petitions). Patent Owner also asserts
`that, “Petitioner has divided its challenges to the ’558 Patent claims that
`would normally fit into one or two petitions, hoping to increase its odds of
`institution.” Id. at 16–17. Petitioner did not address this issue.
`Although, in view of SAS,8 the Board exercises its discretion for each
`petition to institute all claims and grounds or no claims and grounds, Patent
`
`
`8 The Supreme Court held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314
`may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst.,
`Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (“SAS”).
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`Owner’s assertion that splitting its claims and grounds into four petitions
`when one would suffice is inapposite. This practice is not necessarily
`improper (see Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and
`Appeal Board and Judicial Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`Decisions; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,635 (Aug. 14, 2012)
`(response to Comment 91, explaining that filing multiple petitions is an
`alternative to requesting a waiver of page, now word, counts)). For
`example, there may be appropriate reasons for Petitioner to divide the claims
`and grounds into multiple petitions, such as to logically separate different
`claim sets for purposes of analysis and to avoid subjecting all claims to the
`all or nothing decision required by SAS. The SAS decision does not preclude
`this practice.
`In the present case, the four petitions are all filed on the same day.9
`Each of the four petitions challenge non-overlapping subsets of the claims of
`the ’558 patent, largely asserting different combinations of prior art. On this
`record, we discern no prejudice to Patent Owner in Petitioner’s filing
`strategy regarding the four petitions directed to the ’558 patent. Petitioner
`did not wait to review Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response or our
`institution decision in one case before filing a next petition.
`When determining whether to exercise our discretion under § 314(a),
`we consider the following non-exhaustive factors:
`1. whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed
`to the same claims of the same patent;
`
`
`9 Each of these four petitions was filed on the same day: June 28, 2018. See
`Paper 5, 1 (IPR2018-01152); Paper 54, 1 (IPR2018-01153); Papers 7, 1
`(IPR2018-01240)); Papers 7, 1 (IPR2018-01154).
`16
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`2. whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner
`knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should
`have known of it;
`3. whether at the time of filing of the second petition the
`petitioner already received the patent owner’s preliminary
`response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on
`whether to institute review in the first petition;
`4. the length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner
`learned of the prior art asserted in the second petition and the
`filing of the second petition;
`5. whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for the
`time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to
`the same claims of the same patent;
`6. the finite resources of the Board; and
`7. the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final
`determination not later than 1 year after the date on which the
`Director notices institution of review.
`Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case IPR2016-01357,
`Paper 19 at 15–16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential).10 These factors do
`not lead us to exercise our discretion to deny institution based on § 314(a).
`Based on the timing of the filing of the four petitions and their non-
`overlapping challenges to the claims of the ’558 patent, factors 1 through 5
`above do not weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny under
`§ 314(a).11 As to factor 6, we do not find that evaluating Petitioners’
`
`
`10 Citing NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Case IPR2016-00134, at 6–7
`(PTAB May 4, 2016)(Paper 9)).
`11 We are also cognizant of the estoppel provision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e),
`which estops a petitioner from asserting in a civil action that a “claim is
`invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have
`raised during that inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). This
`17
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`grounds across four petitions wastes Board resources. Indeed, the asserted
`grounds across the four petitions are similar and address distinct sets of
`claims that will allow the Board to efficiently evaluate the four petitions and
`potentially consolidate them if warranted. Finally with regard to factor 7,
`we do not find that the Board’s resources will be tasked to the degree that
`final written decisions in these proceedings will not be timely completed.
`For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a)
`to deny institution.
`
`F. Anticipation by Chu (Ex. 1004)
`1. Overview of Chu
`Chu is a 2008 paper titled, “A 10 MHz Bandwidth, 2 mV Ripple PA
`Regulator for CDMA Transmitters” that discloses a power amplifier that
`contains a master-slave linear and switch-mode supply modulator with fast
`dynamic transient response. Ex. 1004, 2809. Chu discloses “[a] combined
`class-AB [linear amplifier] and switch-mode regulator based supply
`modulator with a master–slave architecture achieving wide bandwidth and
`low ripple.” Id. Figure 4 of Chu, below, shows the block diagram of the
`master-slave linear and switch-mode combined supply modulator loaded
`with a PA. Id. at 2811.
`
`
`requirement requires a petitioner to decide the breadth of the challenge to
`bring given the risk of estoppel. Accordingly, the statute contemplates that a
`petitioner may decide that the appropriate breadth of a challenge warrants
`multiple petitions.
`
`18
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`Figure 4 depicts the proposed master-slave linear and
`switch-mode PA regulator block diagram
`Figure 4 shows a current sensing circuit, high gain transimpedance
`amplifier, and switch-mode regulator that form a feedback control loop that
`suppresses the current output from the linear amplifier within the switch-
`mode regulator bandwidth. Id. at 2810–2811.
`2. Analysis
`Petitioner argues that claims 12 and 14 are anticipated by Chu.
`Pet. 40–59 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 87–118). Patent Owner does not make any
`substantive arguments that Chu does not disclose the limitations of claims 12
`and 14.
`Petitioner provides argument and evidence that Chu discloses the
`switcher, envelope amplifier, and power amplifier limitations of claim 12.
`Pet. 41–47. Petitioner argues that the switcher of Chu, as shown in Figure 4,
`discloses the current sense amplifier as construed. Pet. 48–49. With respect
`to the metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) transistor limitations, Petitioner
`contends that Chu discloses PMOS and NMOS transistors shown in the
`19
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`circuit diagrams with known symbols for such devices. Pet. 54–58.
`Petitioner provides a detailed mapping providing argument and evidence that
`Chu discloses the limitations of claims 12 and 14. Pet. 41–58.
`For claim 14, Petitioner explains that Chu discloses DC signal that has
`zero frequency and a first supply current from the switcher that include low
`frequencies (zero frequency DC components). Pet. 58–59; Ex. 1003 ¶ 108.
`Thus, Petitioner argues Chu discloses the limitations of dependent claim 12.
`Based on a review of the present record, we are persuaded Petitioner’s
`arguments and evidence are sufficient on this preliminary record to show a
`reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claims 12 and 14 would
`have been anticipated by Chu.
`
`G. Obviousness
`1. Overview of Blanken (Ex. 1010)
`Blanken is an IEEE paper titled “A 50MHz Bandwidth Multi-Mode
`PA Supply Modulator for GSM, EDGE and UMTS Application” that
`“describes the design and measurement results of a supply modulator for a
`PA” for mobile network systems. Ex. 1010, 401 (Abstract). Blanken
`discloses a modulator that combines “a high-bandwidth class-AB linear
`regulator with an efficient DC/DC converter in a master-slave configuration”
`where “[t]he DC/DC converter is current-mode controlled and has been
`designed to operate at switching frequencies between 1MHz and 25MHz.”
`Id. Blanken states:
`High-efficiency voltage conversion can be obtained with a
`switched-mode inductive DC/DC buck converter, but its
`bandwidth is limited due to practical limits to the switching
`frequency.
` Alternatively, linear regulators enable higher
`bandwidth at the cost of efficiency. As a good compromise
`20
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01152
`Patent 8,698,558 B2
`between efficiency and bandwidth, hybrid supply
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
