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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_____________
`
`Case IPR2018-01079
`Patent 8,213,970 B2
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held September 5, 2019
`_____________
`
`
`
`Before TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, CHRISTA P. ZADO, and
`KEVIN C. TROCK, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`Case IPR2018-01079
`Patent 8,213,970 B2
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`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`JONATHAN TUMINARO, ESQ.
`KAREN A. WONG-CHAN, ESQ.
`Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox
`1100 New York Avenue NW
`Suite 600
`Washington, DC 20005
`202-772-8967
`
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`VINCENT RUBINO III, ESQ.
`Brown Rudnick LLP
`7 Times Square
`New York, NY 10036
`212-209-4974
`
`
`ALSO PRESENT: Mike Burda and Jim Sherwood
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday,
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`September 5, 2019, commencing at 10:01 a.m., at the Silicon Valley U.S.
`Patent and Trademark Office, 26 South 4th Street, San Jose, California
`95112.
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`Case IPR2018-01079
`Patent 8,213,970 B2
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
` (Proceedings begin at 10:01 a.m.)
` JUDGE ZADO: All right. Good morning everyone.
`This is the oral hearing in IPR2018-01079 between Petitioner,
`Google LLC, and Patent Owner, AGIS Software Development, LLC;
`involving challenges of claims of U.S. Patent 8,213,970.
` I'm Judge Zado in Silicon Valley, and here with me
`today is Judge Trock. Judge Jefferson joins us remotely. For
`clarity of the transcript and for the benefit of the judge
`participating remotely, please speak into the microphone at
`the podium and identify any exhibits and demonstratives,
`including by page number or slide, that you are using so that
`any remote judges can pull them up.
` Also, please bear in mind that the demonstratives
`are not evidence and they may not introduce new evidence or
`arguments. Each party will have 30 minutes of total argument
`time. Petitioner will go first and present its case with
`regard to the instituted claims. Thereafter, Patent Owner
`will argue its opposition to Petitioner's case. And if
`there's any rebuttal from Petitioner we'll hear it after
`Patent Owner's opposition.
` So let's go ahead and get the parties appearances.
`Who do we have appearing on behalf of Petitioner?
` MR. TUMINARO: Good morning, Your Honor. Jonathan
`Tuminaro on behalf of Petitioner. Here with me is Karen Wong-
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`Chan, Mike Burda, and also, Jim Sherwood, who is the client.
` JUDGE ZADO: Thank you. And would Petitioner like
`to reserve time for rebuttal?
` MR. TUMINARO: Yes, Your Honor.
` JUDGE ZADO: How much time?
` MR. TUMINARO: Ten minutes for rebuttal.
` JUDGE ZADO: Okay. Thank you.
` And who do we have appearing on Patent Owner's
`behalf?
` MR. RUBINO: Good morning, Your Honor. Vincent
`Rubino from the law firm of Brown Rudnick, on behalf of Patent
`Owner, AGIS Software Development, LLC.
` JUDGE ZADO: And will Patent Owner reserve time for
`Sur-rebuttal today?
` MR. RUBINO: If -- yes, five minutes.
` JUDGE ZADO: Okay. So before we -- thank you.
` MR. RUBINO: Thank you.
` JUDGE ZADO: So before we get started, I just wanted
`to do a little bit of housekeeping, and this is directed
`toward Petitioner. You filed two replies to Patent Owner's
`response, Papers 21 and 22, and so we just wanted to clear
`that up and ask what that is about? If you're ready to
`discuss it today?
` MR. TUMINARO: I believe it may have been a clerical
`error on Paper 21, and that's why we filed 22. I'm not sure
`as I sit here right now, though. I don't know.
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` JUDGE ZADO: Okay. Well, we can follow up after the
`hearing then.
` MR. TUMINARO: In terms of housekeeping, also, I
`have hard copies of our demonstratives if Your Honors would
`like hard copies?
` JUDGE ZADO: Yes, please. You may bring them up.
` JUDGE TROCK: Thank you.
` MR. TUMINARO: You're welcome.
` JUDGE ZADO: Okay. And I'll also ask Patent Owner's
`Counsel, were there any other housekeeping issues you wanted
`to raise before we get started?
` MR. RUBINO: Yes, Your Honor. We also have slides
`for The Court.
` JUDGE ZADO: All right. Please approach.
` MR. RUBINO: And nothing further from Patent Owner,
`thank you.
` JUDGE ZADO: Thank you.
` Okay. Petitioner, when you're ready, please begin.
` MR. TUMINARO: May I please the Board. Jonathan
`Tuminaro on behalf of Petitioner, Google. As I said, I'd like
`to reserve 10 minutes of my time for rebuttal.
` There are a limited number of issues that are still
`in dispute based on what's in the papers. So as we'll see, as
`I go through the presentation here today, AGIS' arguments all
`follow a common theme. They ignore the evidence and the
`arguments that Petitioner makes in the petition and in the
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`petitioner reply. They ignore the prior art teachings
`themselves, and they ignore what our expert actually had to
`say.
` So moving on to the presentation, I'm on Slide 2
`now. This -- these are just the instituted claims. Slide 3
`of our presentation shows the issues that are still in dispute
`here, and we'll file through these if Your Honors have
`questions about them. So now, on Slide 4 starting with the
`forced message alert, we had shown in our petition how Kubala
`teaches the forced message alert. And we've relied on the
`e-mail message with the mandatory response flag 216, and the
`combination of those two things satisfy the forced message
`alert as required by the claims.
` Now, on Slide 5, AGIS' argument, essentially, is
`that we haven't shown forced. And they argue that Kubala does
`not disclose that a conventional e-mail message are forced to
`display without any action on the part of the recipient. And
`that language, without any action on the part of the
`recipient, is language that, essentially, AGIS is trying to
`read into the claims. So there's two flaws with this argument
`that AGIS makes.
` Number one, it reads in limitation into the claims.
`And number 2, the prior art teaches forced; and I'll show you
`how in just a minute. So now, on Slide 6, to understand what
`the claims are, these are means plus function claim
`limitations. So the best place to look for what the function
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`is, is the claim language itself. And looking at the means
`for attaching a forced message alert software packet -- this
`is on Slide 6 -- there's no limitation anywhere in this claim
`that the message has to be forced to the display without any
`action on the part of the recipient.
` All that it says is that the forced message alert
`software on said recipient PDA phone transmits an automatic
`acknowledgement. It doesn't say anywhere -- anything in this
`claim language that the message is forced without any action
`on the part of the recipient. So essentially, AGIS is trying
`to read in limitation into the word forced. And since this is
`a means plus function limitation, we also look at the
`specification to understand what the specification has to say.
` Now I'm on Slide 7; this is a portion of the
`specification that AGIS itself relied on for the means for
`attaching limitation. And here, again, there's nothing in the
`specification that says that the message must be forced to the
`display without any action on the part of the recipient. All
`that it says is that after the acknowledgement of the receipt
`is transmitted, the forced voice alert software application
`program effectively takes control of the recipient PC or
`PDA/cell phone.
` But it's not entirely clear what takes control
`means. And the understanding of what that means comes from
`the next sentence in this specification. It says that if a
`text message was received, then the forced voice alert
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`software application program, the program itself, is the thing
`that causes the text message to be displayed. And what's
`important here is that it causes the message to be display
`until a manual response is selected from the response list.
` So what it means to be forced is that the message
`remains on the display until a recipient -- until a manual
`response is selected. There's no requirement in either the
`claim language or the specification for this means plus
`function claim language that says that the message must be
`forced to the display without any action on the part of the
`recipient.
` But even if -- but even still, the prior art that we
`rely on does teach this limitation. And so first of all --
`now I'm on Slide 8, this is the -- a quote from Kubala at
`Paragraph 9, and it says that what's required is that the
`recipient is alerted to the this message and actions are
`required by the recipient. And what's even more telling,
`Paragraph 54 -- now I'm on Slide 9 of our presentation -- this
`is a quote from Paragraph 54 of the Kubala reference. And in
`the petition it's true that we rely on Figure 11C to show a
`listing of the possible responses.
` But that's not the entirety of the disclosure from
`Kubala that we're relying on. We also rely on Paragraph 54,
`which explicitly says that other scenarios could be handled in
`different ways that are not illustrated within Figures 11A
`through 11D, and these other processes are considered within
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`Kubala's invention. It goes on to say that the important part
`of Kubala's invention is that the sender of the original
`message requests that the recipient must provide a reply
`message in response to the original message. So that's the
`purpose of Kubala, the broader teaching of Kubala, that we're
`relying on.
` And I'll point out that AGIS, in its papers, never
`addresses this portion of Kubala's teaching; which we're
`relying on. Now, AGIS does say that we haven't shown, sort
`of, a motivation to combine the teachings, but as we pointed
`out in petition, Kubala, itself, provides that motivation. It
`says that right there at the top of the screen on Slide 9,
`that these other scenarios are considered within the scope of
`his inventions, and that's the disclosure that we're relying
`on in Kubala.
` And Kubala -- there are other portions of Kubala on
`Slide 10, this is Paragraph 55, they also provide additional
`disclosure.
` JUDGE ZADO: Counsel, you have about 14 more minutes
`of your primary case and I don't know if you want to continue
`discussing this issue, or it may be more beneficial to move on
`to some other issues?
` MR. TUMINARO: Sure, Your Honor. Happy to.
` So just to summarize though, the prior art does
`teach us forced. The other issue that was raised was with
`respect to this forced message alert software packet; now I'm
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`on Slide 14. So moving on to Slide 15, again, we showed in
`the petition how the Hammond and Johnson both show -- or
`disclose the forced message alert, as required by the claims.
`And we have these citations from our petition, including
`citations to Hammond and Johnson, that provide this -- the
`teachings. We note that they --
` JUDGE ZADO: Well, actually I want to pause right
`there and talk about it because it's specifically Page 60 of
`the petition that's being cited, and we look at -- it --
`that's correct, right? You're talking about Page 60?
` MR. TUMINARO: Yes, Page 60, which we have an
`excerpt of here on Slide 15.
` JUDGE ZADO: Yeah, and looking at Page 60 and what
`we're trying to -- what I'm trying to figure out is how it is
`that, from looking at this, that we were supposed to be able
`to discern what it was that Petitioner was saying is the
`packet? Because the sentence here, all it says is Hammond and
`Johnson each disclose the transmission of forced message
`alerts to recipient computers, and then there's a cite -- the
`string cite; and we've got literally columns here. Columns of
`text to go through and, you know, if you read the claim it
`says the forced message alert is created by attaching a packet
`to a message.
` So how are we supposed to read this and understand
`what Petitioner says is the message, what Petitioner says is
`the packet, how it's shown to be attached based on this?
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`Because all you have is a sentence here that says Johnson and
`Hammond disclose the forced message alert, so -- but you don't
`tell us what the packet is here.
` MR. TUMINARO: So we tried to make it clear in our
`petition that these are the portions of Hammond and Johnson
`that disclose where the packet is. It became clear to us
`after the institution decision from Your Honors that -- on
`Slide 16, for example, that packet should be construed, and
`that Your Honors had a question about where the forced message
`alert packet was taught in the prior art.
` JUDGE ZADO: Well, even if we hadn't asked for
`packets to be construed, I mean, it's part of the claim. The
`claim says you have a packet and you're attaching it to a
`message; and I just don't see that here in the petition.
` MR. TUMINARO: So here in the petition what we cited
`to was that Hammond and Johnson alone, that they teach this
`limitation. And we cited to the portions of Hammond and
`Johnson where the message -- Hammond's message, delivery
`information for example, is the packet, and that's cited at
`Column 3, Line 31 through 43; which is included in the
`citation that we have in -- on Page 60 of the petition.
` And we showed in our Petitioner reply, for example,
`in response to Your Honors questions, and in response to AGIS
`adopting Your Honors analysis. With respect to this portion,
`we showed that Johnson at Columns 4, Line 3 through 6, and 25
`through 32, teaches these persistent reply attributes. And we
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`showed how Hammond's message delivery information, and
`Johnson's persistent reply attributes meet the claimed term
`packet when it's properly construed, as Your Honors asked us
`to construe it. So just -- we had this in our --
` JUDGE ZADO: Well, even without construing it
`though, wouldn't you agree that you still need identify in the
`petition what the packet is so that we understand what
`Petitioner's assertions and contentions are?
` MR. TUMINARO: Agreed, Your Honor. And we tried to
`do that here in our petition, and it became clear to us after
`the institution decision that Your Honors and AGIS -- as AGIS
`adopted, that Your Honors felt as though a packet was not
`properly identified, although we -- so what we did in our
`Petitioner reply is show where the evidence that we originally
`cited to teaches the claimed packet. And AGIS makes two
`arguments in its surreply as to why --
` JUDGE TROCK: Counselor, let me interrupt you.
`Isn't that your obligation to do this in the petition?
` MR. TUMINARO: It is our obligation do that in --
` JUDGE TROCK: So did you do it in the petition or
`not?
` MR. TUMINARO: Yes, we did do that, Your Honors.
`We --
` JUDGE TROCK: Well, I see the string cites, but is
`it your expectation that we're supposed to go through that
`entire string cite and figure out what it is you're relying
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`upon in those citations as the packet? Because that's what it
`seems like you expected us to do.
` MR. TUMINARO: We -- your -- we believed it was
`clear, Your Honor, from the petition. It didn't --
` JUDGE TROCK: Can you point out at me on Page 60
`where it's clear?
` MR. TUMINARO: On Page 60 we explained how Johnson,
`each alone, disclosed the transmission of this forced alert --
` JUDGE TROCK: No, I'm talking about the packet.
` MR. TUMINARO: The -- in particular, the packet we
`tried to identify that. It became clear to us that that was
`something that Your Honors did not see in the petition and
`that's why we tried to address it --
` JUDGE TROCK: Well, do you see it in the petition?
`Take a look at Page 60 and point out to me where you describe
`what the packet is?
` MR. TUMINARO: The words packet do not appear on
`that slide. It includes --
` JUDGE TROCK: So you don't identify it in the
`petition on Page 60, do you?
` MR. TUMINARO: I don't agree with that, Your Honor,
`respectfully. Respectfully, we do cite to the portions of
`Hammond, and the portions of Johnson that teach that packet.
`And we cited to those portions in the -- in our petitioner
`reply --
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` JUDGE TROCK: You have a citation to Hammond at column 1, line
`66
`through column 2, line 50; column 3, line 1 through column 4, line 28;
`column 5, lines 17 through 61; and column 6,
`lines 3 through 19. And through all of that, we're supposed to go
`through there and figure out what it is you're relying upon as
`the packet, right?
` MR. TUMINARO: Your Honor, respectfully, we tried to
`point out where the information we believed taught this
`limitation. And --
` JUDGE TROCK: There's no discussion of what the
`packet is here.
` MR. TUMINARO: And when it became --
` JUDGE TROCK: Other than the citations.
` MR. TUMINARO: That's true, Your Honor. And when it
`became clear that that were an issue -- that that was an
`issue, we tried to point that out in our petitioner reply and
`note that all the cases that AGIS relies on to say that this
`is a new argument, all of those cases could be distinguished
`because there, the petitioner was -- in the petitioner reply
`was relying on new evidence; new evidence that was not cited
`in the petition.
` JUDGE TROCK: I understand that point. Whether or
`not it is a new argument. My question is did you identify for
`us, with particularity, what it is you were relying on for the
`packet in the petition on Page 60? Is it your position
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`that just providing the string cite is sufficient?
` MR. TUMINARO: That's what we provided in the
`petitioner reply. We believe that's sufficient and we tried
`to show how that was sufficient with the claimed limitation
`when it's construed.
` JUDGE TROCK: Okay. I understand your position.
` MR. TUMINARO: And just in terms -- just to be
`clear, that's with respect to Grounds 2 and 3 for Hammond and
`Johnson. We certainly showed in the petition, with respect to
`Kubala, that there was the mandatory response flag 216 that's
`the claimed packet.
` So if I may, just in the remaining time, just touch
`on the last two issues here with respect to in order to clear
`the recipient's response list. I'm on Slide 22 now. We
`showed in the petition how, again, that the -- we relied on
`Figure C of Kubala, for example. And it's true that in that
`example -- and includes a cancel button where an individual
`could cancel out, but Kubala's broader teaching talks about
`how the recipient can be prevented from closing the review.
` And we relied on, for example, Mr. Williams
`declaration at pages -- at Paragraphs 108 through 110. In
`response to these arguments -- or these showings, Petitioner
`-- now I'm on Slide 23 -- AGIS argued that those teachings
`only taught -- those disclosures only taught that the received
`message was cleared and that it didn't clear the listing. And
`in response to that what we pointed out in our petitioner
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`reply --
` JUDGE TROCK: (indiscernible). –Counsel, can
`we talk about this listing? Can we talk about displaying the
`listing?
` MR. TUMINARO: Sure.
` JUDGE TROCK: In Kubala and --
` MR. TUMINARO: Kubala and Hammond, yes.
` JUDGE TROCK: Yes.
` MR. TUMINARO: So it -- is there a particular
`question that Your Honor has?
` JUDGE TROCK: Yes. Could you show us where in Kubala
`and Hammond they disclose displaying a listing that's
`described in limitations 1-7 and 1-9?
` JUDGE ZADO: And to put a finer point on that, we
`understand Petitioner's provided arguments and analysis for
`receiving the information, but I believe my colleague is
`really wanting to hear about where there's actually displaying
`the listing; the means for displaying this.
` MR. TUMINARO: Sure. So first of all, with respect
`to -- for the displaying aspect, we rely on both Kubala and
`Hammond in Ground 1. So first, with respect to Kubala -- now
`I'm on Slide 26 of our presentation -- here's a portion of our
`petition where we talk about how Kubala meets this limitation.
` JUDGE TROCK: So what page in the petition?
` MR. TUMINARO: This is, Your Honor, Page 32 and 33
`of the petition. I believe this excerpt is from 32. I'm on
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`Slide 26 of the presentation. And what Kubala says here is --
`or what we said in our petition here, it says "A POSA would
`have known that the listing of the recorded information
`regarding the responses and automatic acknowledgements, were
`accessible." That's what our expert said, the word
`accessible.
` And a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`understand that accessible is the same thing as displayable or
`visible. The only way that a user could actually access --
` JUDGE TROCK: Does your expert testify to that
`effect?
` MR. TUMINARO: He has -- so I could show you in the
`Williams declaration in a minute, but if I just may explain
`the point here. The only way a user can actually access
`information is to actually view it; that's the only way a user
`would actually be able to access this information. So in
`terms of a user access is the same thing as viewing.
` JUDGE ZADO: Well, for a second here, I mean, what
`the claim says is we have means to receiving and displaying a
`listing. And, you know, my understanding is that the
`contention is that the means is the software on the -- it's an
`application program, right? That's the means? Is that
`correct?
` MR. TUMINARO: On Kubala's, yes, Your Honor.
` JUDGE ZADO: Right. So Kubala's software has to
`provide the means for displaying. And I hear what you're
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`saying about accessing, but if the software accesses that
`information, I don't think that's the question because it's
`talking about in the claim, displaying the listing on a
`PDA/cell phone. So we're not talking about whether the
`software can access that data, can do something with that
`data. This claim is talking about whether the recipient will
`have this displayed on their phone.
` MR. TUMINARO: Agreed, Your Honor. But -- and when
`we use the word accessible, we don't mean accessible by the
`software; it's accessible by the user. And accessible by the
`user means that the user would have to view it. The only way
`a user could access that information would be to view that
`information. So that's the sense in which we mean accessible,
`not accessible to software, but accessible to user.
`Accessible to a user is displayable.
` And in addition to Kubala though, we also rely --
`now I'm on Slide 27 of our presentation -- we also rely on
`Hammond for the display of the listing. And we talk about how
`this -- Hammond has the message tracking table that's shown in
`Figure 2, for example. And AGIS argues that -- well, skipping
`this Kubala portion -- well, first, with respect to Kubala,
`AGIS argued that we didn't rely on Kubala for this display,
`and that's just flat wrong. Now I'm on Slide 29.
` Their expert acknowledge that -- so I asked the
`question "So your statement that the Petitioner does not rely
`on Kubala to disclose the recited function, that is wrong,
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`right?" He said, so based on the paragraph that is cited, it
`is not wrong because recited the wrong paragraph. But based
`on the paragraphs that we did rely on, it probably is wrong
`because they cited -- now I'm on Slide 28 -- they cited to the
`petition at Page 11, and admittedly, we don't talk about that
`limitation -- the display limitation at Page 11 of our
`petition. Our discussion of that limitation appears at Page
`31 and 32 of the petition. So they cited to the wrong portion
`of the petition and said we didn't address it.
` But moving on to the Hammond point --
` JUDGE ZADO: Counsel, you're at 20 minutes right
`now. Would you like to keep going?
` MR. TUMINARO: I just want -- I'll just make this
`point and then I'll sit down, Your Honors.
` With respect to Hammond displaying the listing, AGIS
`argued that the message tracking table is not displayed and it
`wouldn't be displayed. But our expert explained this -- now
`I'm on Slide 31 of our presentation -- explained in his
`supplemental declaration that the Message Tracking Table, or
`at least portions thereof, could be displayed.
` And it goes on to explain that Hammond itself talks
`about graphically presenting information. So the full
`disclosure of Hammond that we rely on shows that the Message
`Tracking Table, or at least portions thereof, could be
`displayed. So when you look at the combination, the entirety
`of the disclosures that we're relying on in Kubala, Hammond,
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`Johnson, and the other references, these claims are obvious.
` JUDGE TROCK: I understand you're out of time, but
`we'll give you a little more here. What do you say to Patent
`Owner's argument that your expert, Mr. Williams, conceded that
`this is -- these tables are just data structure and are not
`displayed?
` MR. TUMINARO: We disagree with that, Your Honor.
`Their interpretation of our experts statements are
`misconstrued. He never said that the table itself could not
`be displayed, or that there -- it's beyond the skill of a
`person -- of ordinary skill in the art in order to display a
`table. He simply said that the table itself is a data
`structure.
` But explained in his supplemental declaration that
`the -- portions of the Message Tracking Table can be
`displayed, and he never intended to say; as he pointed out in
`his supplemental declaration which he was cross-examined on,
`he never intended to say and he didn't mean that the table
`cannot be displayed.
` JUDGE ZADO: So Counsel, before you step down,
`you've used 21 minutes of your time, and as we noted, you're
`getting some additional time because we're asking additional
`questions and we'll also give that additional time to Patent
`Owner. But I have one other question, and it's that -- it
`relates to Limitation 1.1 of Claim 1, and it's a predetermined
`network of participants wherein each participant has a
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`similarly equipped PDA/cell phone, that includes a CPU and a
`touchscreen display.
` And my question is this; what is Petitioner's
`understanding of what it means to be a "predetermined" network
`of participants? You know, what does the word predetermined
`mean?
` MR. TUMINARO: So first of all, I'll just point out
`this was not specifically addressed in the briefing, but what
`we understand that to mean is that this network would be the
`-- it would be comprised of those types of devices that are
`able to send and receive these forced message alerts. As I
`stand here right now, that's what I understand that term to
`mean. Whereas, it wouldn't include, for example, the types of
`devices that couldn't receive those -- received or send those
`forced message alerts.
` JUDGE TROCK: Well, can I follow up? The
`claim says it's a network of participants, and each of the
`participants has a cell phone. It doesn't say that the
`network is the cell phones. Do you see that? It's a network
`of participants, wherein each participant has an equipped cell
`phone. So what's this predetermined network of participants?
` MR. TUMINARO: Again, we're --
` JUDGE TROCK: Because it doesn't appear to say it's
`a predetermined network of cell phones.
` MR. TUMINARO: So again, I'll just -- I think it
`would be the collection of users that have that -- those cell
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`phones that could send and receive these messages. Again,
`this is not a point that was disputed by AGIS --
` JUDGE TROCK: Understood. But how is it
`predetermined?
` MR. TUMINARO: It would be predetermined in the
`sense, Your Honor, that it would be the collection of those
`users that have those devices, that can send and receive
`forced message alerts.
` JUDGE TROCK: So is this figured out ahead of time?
`Predetermined in some fashion?
` MR. TUMINARO: Under, I guess, the plain meaning of
`predetermined, sure.
` JUDGE TROCK: Do you have a sense of how that's
`being done here?
` MR. TUMINARO: Well, in the prior art, for example,
`it talks about --
` JUDGE TROCK: Well, now, let's just stick with this
`patent. We're trying to understand what this means, 1.1.
` MR. TUMINARO: What the limitation of predetermined
`network means in the patent itself?
` JUDGE TROCK: Yes.
` MR. TUMINARO: I'm not sure in the patent itself
`that there's a lot of
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