` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 1 of 36 PageID 3069
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`DALLAS DIVISION
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-1495
`
`PATENT CASE
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`SEVEN NETWORKS, LLC,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`ZTE (USA) INC. AND
`ZTE CORPORATION,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`________________________________________________________________
`
`Defendants.
`
`SEVEN Networks, LLC’s
`Responsive Claim-Construction Brief
`________________________________________________________________
`
`
`
`
`Page 1 of 36
`
`GOOGLE EXHIBIT 1027
`
`

`

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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 2 of 36 PageID 3070
`
`Table of Contents
`
`
`iii
`Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`List of Exhibits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
`Arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
`A. ’600 Patent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
`• Terms in Dispute: “common channel” / “non-
`common channel” (claim 7)
`. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
`a. The terms are not indefinite. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
`b. The claimed channels are not necessarily “push”
`channels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
`B. ’127 Patent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`12
`• Terms in Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`12
`a. “wakelock[s]” (claims 10, 17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`12
`b. “alarms” (claims 11, 18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`15
`c. “to enter and exit the power save mode based on a
`charging status of the mobile device” (claims 16, 21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`d. “optimize background traffic” / “receive a
`selection from a user whether to optimize traffic”
`18
`(claims 33, 42) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`C. ’129 Patent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
`• Term in Dispute: “battery charge status” (claims 6, 22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
`a. “Battery charge status” is not indefinite. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
`b. “Battery charge status” refers to the amount of
`charge in a battery, not to whether it is in the
`process of being charged. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
`D. ’254 Patent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
`• Term in Dispute: “system wakelock” (claims 1, 8, 10,
`14, 15, 28) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
`Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
`Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`31
`
`
`
`16
`
`
`
`– ii –
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`Page 2 of 36
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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 3 of 36 PageID 3071
`
` TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`11
`
`Cases
`Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
`359 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2
`BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc.,
`875 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2
`Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
`156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
`CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc.,
`No. 3:16-cv-477, 2017 WL 6549933 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
`Curtiss–Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc.,
`438 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
`Cybergym Research LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.,
`No. 2:05-cv-527, 2007 WL 5688735 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
`Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`435 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4
`Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp.,
`599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3
`Good Sportsman Mktg. LLC v. Non Typical, Inc.,
`No. 6:07-cv-177, 2009 WL 2460991 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
`GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc.,
`108 F. Supp. 3d 839 (N.D. Cal. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
`Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
`607 F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig.,
`639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
`InfoGation Corp. v. ZTE Corp.,
`No. 16–cv-1901, 2017 WL 1821402 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P.,
`424 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`Kaneka Corp. v. JBS Hair, Inc.,
`No. 3-10-cv-1430-P-BD, 2012 WL 5364705 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
`
`18
`
`19, 20
`
`– iii –
`
`Page 3 of 36
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`

`

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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 4 of 36 PageID 3072
`
`14
`
`11
`
`Kistler Instrumente AG v. U.S.,
`628 F.2d 1303 (Ct. Cl. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
`Largan Precision Co. v. Genius Elec. Optical Co.,
`No. 13-cv-02502, 2014 WL 5358426 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu,
`618 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
`Nystrom v. TREX Co.,
`424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
`Omega Eng’g, Inc., v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6
`Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc.,
`438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6
`SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc.,
`415 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6
`S-Line LLC v. B2B Supply,
`No. 3:14-cv-02284-M, 2015 WL 10568907 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . 29
`SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,
`403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 17, 20, 23
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp.,
`587 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3
`
`1, 2, 3, 23
`
`18, 19
`
`
`
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 282 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
`
`
`Other Authorities
`Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`– iv –
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`Page 4 of 36
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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 5 of 36 PageID 3073
`
` LIST OF EXHIBITS
`
`Appendix Page
`
`
`Opening Appendix
`Exhibit A: List of Disputed Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
`Exhibit A-1: ’600 Patent, Claim 7 (Disputed Terms in Bold). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
`Exhibit A-2: ’127 Patent, Claims 10, 11, & 16 (Disputed Terms in Bold) . . . . . . . . . . . 8
`Exhibit A-3: ’127 Patent, Claim 33 (Disputed Terms in Bold) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
`Exhibit A-4: ’129 Patent, Claims 1 & 6 (Disputed Term in Bold) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`10
`Exhibit A-5: ’254 Patent, Claim 1 (Disputed Term in Bold) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`11
`Exhibit B: U.S. Patent No. 9,325,600 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`12
`Exhibit C: U.S. Patent No. 9,516,127 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
`Exhibit D: U.S. Patent No. 9,516,129 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
`Exhibit E: U.S. Patent No. 9,351,254 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 04
`Exhibit F: Amendments to the Claims (June 22, 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
`Exhibit G: Notice of Allowance (Nov. 15, 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
`Exhibit H: Declaration of Michael T. Goodrich, Ph.D. Regarding Claim Construction . . . . 159
`Exhibit I: Declaration of Michael T. Goodrich, Ph.D. Rebuttal Opinions Regarding
`Claim Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 218
`Exhibit J: Declaration of Jim Kardach in Support of Claim Construction . . . . . . . . . . . 253
`Exhibit K: Paul Deitel, et al., Android for Programmers: An App-Driven Approach (2012) . . . . 293
`Exhibit L: PowerManager.WakeLock, https://developer.android.com[ ]html . . . . . . . . . 297
`Exhibit M: W. Frank Ableson, et al., Unlocking Android: A Developer’s Guide (2009) . . . . . 303
`Exhibit N: Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
`Exhibit O: Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Modern American Usage (3d ed. 2009) . . . . . . . . . 314
`
`Response Appendix
`Exhibit P: Application (Sept. 2, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
`Exhibit Q: Office Action (Nov. 5, 2015)
`. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
`18
`Exhibit R: Amendment and Response to Non-Final Office Action (Feb. 5, 2016) . . . . . . . 28
`Exhibit S: PowerManager.WakeLock, archived at http://web.archive.org[]html . . . . . . . 39
`
`– v –
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`Page 5 of 36
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`

`

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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 6 of 36 PageID 3074
`
`SEVEN offers the following arguments in further support of its claim constructions.
`
`A. ’600 Patent
`
` ARGUMENTS
`
`• Terms in Dispute: “common channel” / “non-common channel” (claim 7)
`
`SEVEN’s Construction
`
`ZTE’s Construction
`
`“common channel”
`
`“data channel shared by multiple applications”
`
`Indefinite
`If the Court finds the term is not indefinite,
`ZTE alternatively proposes that the term
`should be construed as “shared push channel.”
`
`
`
`“non-common channel”
`SEVEN’s Construction
`ZTE’s Construction
`
`“application-specific data channel to an
`application server”
`
`Indefinite
`If the Court finds the term is not indefinite,
`ZTE alternatively proposes that the term
`should be construed as “application specific
`push channel.”
`
`a. The terms are not indefinite.
`
`ZTE first contends these terms are indefinite. Although this Court has held that
`
`indefiniteness is better considered in a motion for summary judgment, CommScope Techs. LLC v.
`
`Dali Wireless, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-477, 2017 WL 6549933, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2017), since
`
`ZTE has laid out its arguments here, SEVEN will respond.
`
`i. Indefiniteness Standard
`
`A claim is definite if, “viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, [it]
`
`inform[s] those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). A party challenging the
`
`definiteness of a claim must therefore “demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that one of
`
`– 1 –
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`Page 6 of 36
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`

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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 7 of 36 PageID 3075
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`ordinary skill in the relevant art could not discern the boundaries of the claim based on the claim
`
`language, the specification, the prosecution history, and the knowledge in the relevant art.”
`
`Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 607 F.3d 776, 783 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “The
`
`definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute
`
`precision is unattainable.” Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129; see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford
`
`Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]f the meaning of the claim is discernible,
`
`even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable
`
`persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on
`
`indefiniteness grounds.”) (quotation marks omitted). “The burden of establishing invalidity of a
`
`patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.” 35 U.S.C. § 282.
`
`ZTE has not met that burden.
`
`ii. A person of ordinary skill in the art would understand both the meaning and
`the scope of the “channel” terms.
`
`ZTE argues that “common channel” and “non-common channel” are indefinite because
`
`they “do[] not have a clear and established meaning in the art and convey[] different meanings to
`
`different POSITAs under different circumstances.” ZTE’s Opening Brief (ZTE Br.) at 6, 9.
`
`Specifically, ZTE claims that “channel” “could refer to any number of physical, logical,
`
`multiplexed, or radio communications paths.” Id. ZTE’s indefiniteness argument fails for four
`
`reasons.
`
`First, ZTE is essentially arguing that the terms are indefinite because they could be read to
`
`cover different kinds of channels. But claim terms are not indefinite simply because they are
`
`broad. BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
`
`inference of indefiniteness simply from the scope finding is legally incorrect: ‘breadth is not
`
`– 2 –
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`Page 7 of 36
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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 8 of 36 PageID 3076
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`indefiniteness.’”) (quoting SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005)).1 And although these terms cover multiple types of channels—e.g., push, pull, and
`
`hybrid push channels—they are not as broad as ZTE alleges.2
`
`Second, the standard for determining indefiniteness is not whether a term “conveys
`
`different meanings to different POSITAs under different circumstances,” as ZTE asserts. ZTE
`
`Br. at 6. The standard is whether a term, “read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and
`
`the prosecution history, fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the
`
`scope of the invention.” Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124 (emphasis added). What matters, therefore,
`
`is how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the “channel” terms in light of the
`
`’600 Patent’s specification and prosecution history, not how the terms might be understood
`
`under undefined “different circumstances.”
`
`Third, ZTE’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the
`
`terms is belied by its own expert, who admits that the specification defines “common channel”
`
`and “non-common channel.” As to “common channel,” Mr. Kardach states: “[S]uch a person
`
`[i.e., a person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand that the specification defines
`
`‘common channel’ as a ‘shared channel’”3; and “I agree with Dr. Goodrich [SEVEN’s expert]
`
`
`1 See also, e.g., Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1353
`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[m]erely claiming broadly” does not “prevent the public from understanding
`the scope of the patent”); GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 839, 874 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
`(“A broad claim can be definite even where there is no precise numerical boundary so long as a
`person of skill in the art can determine the scope with reasonable certainty.”) (citing Enzo
`Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124)).
`2 See SEVEN Br. at 5–10.
`3 Ex. J: Kardach Dec. ¶ 55 (App’x 279 (“App’x” refers to the appendix submitted with
`SEVEN’s Opening Brief. “Resp. App’x” refers to the appendix submitted with this response
`brief.)).
`
`– 3 –
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`Page 8 of 36
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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 9 of 36 PageID 3077
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`that a person of ordinary skill in the art reviewing the specification would understand that the
`
`“common channel” is shared.” 4 Likewise, with respect to “non-common channel,” Mr.
`
`Kardach states: “[S]uch a person [i.e., a person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand that
`
`the specification defines ‘non-common channel’ as an application specific channel’”5; and “I
`
`agree with Dr. Goodrich that a person of ordinary skill in the art reviewing the specification
`
`would understand that the non-common channel is application-specific.”6
`
`Fourth, as explained in SEVEN’s Opening Brief, “common channel” and “non-common
`
`channel” can be construed. A person of ordinary skill in the art would understand, in view of the
`
`specification, that the claimed “common channel” is a “data channel shared by multiple
`
`applications,” and the “non-common channel” is an “application-specific data channel to an
`
`application server.”7 Because the terms can be construed, they are not indefinite. See Energizer
`
`Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A claim that is
`
`amenable to construction is not invalid on the ground of indefiniteness.”); Kaneka Corp. v. JBS
`
`Hair, Inc., No. 3-10-cv-1430-P-BD, 2012 WL 5364705, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2012), report and
`
`recommendation adopted, No. 3:10-cv-01430-P, 2012 WL 5364699 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2012) (“If
`
`the disputed term can be construed at all, then it is not indefinite, no matter how many steps are
`
`required to arrive at a construction.”). 8
`
`
`4
`Id. ¶ 56 (App’x 280).
`5
`Id. ¶ 46 (App’x 276).
`6
`Id. ¶ 47 (App’x 276).
`7 See SEVEN Br. at 5–10.
`8 See, e.g., SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-0937-JRG, 2015 WL 1906016, at
`*28-29 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2015) (holding the term “data channel,” viewed in context of the
`claims and the specification, was “reasonably certain and thus definite under the Nautilus
`standard”).
`
`– 4 –
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`Page 9 of 36
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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 10 of 36 PageID 3078
`
`In sum, a person of ordinary skill in the art, reading the claimed “channel” terms in light of
`
`the specification, would understand their meanings and the scope of the claims. “Common
`
`channel” and “non-common channel” are not indefinite.
`
`b. The claimed channels are not necessarily “push” channels.
`
`The parties agree that a “common channel” is a shared channel and a “non-common
`
`channel” is an application-specific channel. But they disagree about what else the terms require.
`
`SEVEN contends that a “common channel” is a data channel shared by multiple applications and a
`
`“non-common channel” is an application-specific data channel to an application server. ZTE’s
`
`Opening Brief does not address, much less challenge, these portions of SEVEN’s proposed
`
`constructions. 9
`
`ZTE contends, however, that the claimed common and non-common channels must be
`
`push channels. Its supports that contention with comments made by the applicant during
`
`prosecution that are taken out of context and that ignore the claim language, the specification,
`
`and amendments to the claims made during prosecution. Although ZTE does not say so openly,
`
`it is essentially trying to invoke the doctrine of prosecution-history disclaimer. But as shown
`
`below, when read in context and in light of the entire intrinsic record, the comments ZTE relies
`
`on do not justify limiting the claims to push channels.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9 ZTE acknowledges, however, that in the context of the ’600 Patent, a non-common
`channel is an application-specific channel, which simply means that the channel is dedicated to a
`specific application (i.e., not shared by multiple applications). See ZTE Br. at 8 (“The
`specification repeatedly refers to the ‘non-common channel’ as an ‘application specific
`channel.’”). The natural corollary is that a common channel is a channel that is shared by
`multiple applications.
`
`– 5 –
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`Page 10 of 36
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`

`

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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 11 of 36 PageID 3079
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`i. Prosecution-History-Disclaimer Standard
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`To limit claims based on prosecution-history disclaimer, the applicant must have made “a
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`clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo
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`Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Omega Eng’g, Inc. v.
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`Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[F]or prosecution disclaimer to attach,
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`our precedent requires that the alleged disavowing actions or statements made during prosecution be
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`both clear and unmistakable.”) (emphasis added). Ambiguous statements in the prosecution
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`history will not support a finding of disclaimer. See SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415
`
`F.3d 1278, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“There is no ‘clear and unmistakable’ disclaimer if a
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`prosecution argument is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, one of which is
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`consistent with a proffered meaning of the disputed term.”); Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1325
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`(“[W]e have . . . consistently rejected prosecution statements too vague or ambiguous to qualify
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`as a disavowal of claim scope.”).
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`The statements by the applicant that ZTE relies on do not meet this standard.
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`ii. The applicant did not clearly and unmistakably disavow coverage for all
`channels except push channels.
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`Because the applicant’s comments cited by ZTE are properly understood in view of the
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`entire file history, the following background provides necessary context.
`
`Claim as Originally Filed
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`As originally filed (on September 2, 2014), claim 7 recited, in pertinent part:
`
`Non-transitory computer readable media . . . comprising: recognizing multiple
`overlapping push channels at an application; determining that a first push
`channel of said multiple overlapping push channels can be blocked with minimal
`user experience impact; blocking the first push channel such that network
`signaling and battery consumption are reduced; monitoring application traffic over
`a second push channel of said multiple overlapping push channels; unblocking
`
`– 6 –
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`Page 11 of 36
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`

`

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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 12 of 36 PageID 3080
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`the first push channel based on application traffic over the second push channel
`to enable servicing application traffic . . . . 10
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`Thus, the originally claimed first and second channels were limited to push channels.
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`First Amendment
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`The applicant amended claim 7 (on June 22, 2015) by, among other things, striking the
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`limitations requiring that the first and second channels must be push channels.11
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`Non-transitory computer readable media . . . comprising: recognizing multiple
`overlapping push channels at an application; determining that a first push channel
`of said multiple overlapping push channels can be blocked with minimal user
`experience impact; blocking [[the]] a first push channel such that network
`signaling and battery consumption are reduced; monitoring application traffic of
`an application over a second push channel of said multiple overlapping push
`channels; unblocking the first push channel based on application traffic over the
`second push channel to enable servicing application traffic . . . . 12
`
`The applicant also amended dependent claim 8 to add the additional limitation “wherein the first
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`channel is a first push channel and the second channel is a second push channel.13
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`Rejection
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`On November 5, 2015, the examiner rejected claim 7 as obvious, primarily in view of a
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`prior-art reference “Annan” that met the blocking and unblocking limitations of the claim.
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`Specifically, the examiner noted that Annan disclosed “blocking a first traffic transmission . . . ;
`
`
`10 Ex. P: Application (Sept. 2, 2014), at 44 (Resp. App’x 14) (emphasis added).
`11 ZTE completely ignores this amendment, undoubtedly because it refutes ZTE’s
`disavowal argument. See, e.g., Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu, 618 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
`2010) (“‘[I]nsistence upon this court’s reading back into the claims limitations which were
`originally there and were removed during prosecution of the application through the Patent
`Office cannot be permitted’”) (quoting Kistler Instrumente AG v. U.S., 628 F.2d 1303, 1308 (Ct.
`Cl. 1980) (internal brackets omitted)).
`12 Ex. F: Amendments to the Claims (June 22, 2015) (App’x 139). The applicant also
`amended claims 1 and 13, which are not being asserted.
`13 See id.
`
`– 7 –
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`Page 12 of 36
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`

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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 13 of 36 PageID 3081
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`monitoring the first traffic based on monitored application traffic . . . ; unblocking the first
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`traffic . . . based on the monitored application traffic to service application traffic . . . ; and re-
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`blocking the first channel after the application has serviced application traffic . . . .” 14
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`Response to Rejection
`
`In responding to the rejection, the applicant amended claim 7 by adding the limitations
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`requiring common and non-common channels.
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`Non-transitory computer readable media . . . comprising: blocking a first channel
`such that network signaling and battery consumption are reduced, wherein the
`first channel includes a non-common channel; offloading application traffic of an
`application onto a second channel, wherein the second channel includes a non-
`common channel; monitoring application traffic of [[an]] the application over [[a]]
`the second channel; unblocking the first channel based on the monitored
`application traffic over the second channel to enable servicing application traffic
`so that the application can perform an action . . . . 15
`
`The applicant successfully argued that Annan did not disclose the amended common and non-
`
`common channel limitations:
`
`Annan does not unblock traffic for a particular application on a first, non-common
`channel based on traffic monitored on a second, common channel onto which the
`monitored application’s traffic has been offloaded. Nor does the
`whitelist/blacklist firewalling described in Annan teach re-blocking the first, non-
`common channel once the application has completed its action because Annan
`instead teaches simply unblocking and re-blocking traffic based on things like
`utilization thresholds.16
`
`What’s important here is that the presence or absence of push channels in Annan had
`
`nothing to do with the examiner’s rejection, nor was the claim amended to address any perceived
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`push-channel references in the prior art. In fact, in rejecting dependent claim 8, the examiner
`
`
`14 Ex. Q: Office Action (Nov. 5, 2015), at 3 (Resp. App’x 22).
`15 Ex. R: Amendment and Response to Non-Final Office Action (Feb. 5, 2016), at 3 (Resp.
`App’x 31).
`16 Id. at 9 (App’x 37).
`
`– 8 –
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`Page 13 of 36
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`

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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 14 of 36 PageID 3082
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`stated that Annan discloses push channels: “For claims 2, 8, 15, Annan teaches a push client
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`application and that the first channel is a first push channel (equivalent) and the second channel
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`is a push channel.”17 Since the amendment was drafted to address the examiner’s rejection in
`
`view of Annan, it is nonsensical to argue, as ZTE does, that the applicant was distinguishing his
`
`invention on grounds that it was limited to push channels. The applicant was simply describing
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`Annan, which disclosed “push.”
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`The applicant actually distinguished his invention based on actions occurring after the
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`blocking limitation taught by Annan. Annan taught blocking, unblocking, and reblocking
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`application traffic on push channels. The claim was amended to overcome those elements by
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`requiring that after the first channel is blocked, the application traffic must be offloaded
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`specifically to a common channel. Whether that common channel was a push channel, a pull
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`channel, or a hybrid channel was not the distinguishing feature of the amendment because the
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`applicant had previously deleted the push-channel limitation from the claim.
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`The applicant clarified this distinction in summarizing why the claims should be allowed:
`
`“In contrast to Annan, the claims recite offloading application traffic to a common (i.e., shared)
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`communication channel for signaling optimization in a wireless network for traffic utilizing both
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`proprietary and non-proprietary protocols. For this reason, it is respectfully submitted that
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`independent claims 1, 7, and 13 are patentable over Annan.” 18
`
`
`17 Ex. Q: Office Action at 6 (Resp. App’x 25).
`18 Ex. R: Amendment and Response to Non-Final Office Action at 9 (Resp. App’x 37) see
`also id. at 8 (“Nowhere . . . does Annan teach or suggest performing additional, subsequent
`determinations about whether to un-block or re-block a first channel based on monitored
`communications of a second channel in order for the application to complete an action.”) Resp.
`App’x 36); id. at 7 (“[T]he disclosed i[n]vention provides for offloading or redirecting
`application traffic from the application-specific channel to a shared channel . . . .”) (Resp. App’x
`
`– 9 –
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`Page 14 of 36
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`

`

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` Case 3:17-cv-01495-M Document 88 Filed 03/06/18 Page 15 of 36 PageID 3083
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`Although ZTE points to other statements from the applicant’s response that refer to push
`
`channels, those statements were not clear and unambiguous disclaimers of claim scope required
`
`to limit the claims to push channels. ZTE notes, for example, that the applicant stated:
`
`Monitoring the application traffic over the second channel and unblocking the first
`channel based on the monitored application traffic may include receiving a push
`message from an additional push channel (i.e., second channel) and unblocking the
`blocked push channel (i.e., first channel) so that the application can perform an
`action in response to the message from the additional push channel.19
`
`Stating that the claimed second channel may include a push channel is not a clear and
`
`unambiguous declaration that it must be a push channel. See, e.g., Cybergym Research LLC v. Icon
`
`Health & Fitness, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-527, 2007 WL 5688735, at *22 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2007)
`
`(holding language that states something “may” happen is permissive and does not create a
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`limitati