UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`APPLE, INC.
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`Petitioner
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`v.
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`UNILOC LUXEMBOURG, S.A.
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`Patent Owner
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`IPR2018-01028
`PATENT 7,881,902
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`PATENT OWNER PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PETITION
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`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. §42.107(a)
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`APPLE, INC.
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`Petitioner
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`v.
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`UNILOC LUXEMBOURG, S.A.
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`Patent Owner
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`IPR2018-01028
`PATENT 7,881,902
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`PATENT OWNER PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PETITION
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`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. §42.107(a)
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`IPR2018-01028
`U.S. Patent 7,881,902
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`Table of Contents
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`
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`I.
`II.
`III.
`IV.
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`V.
`VI.
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`INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 1
`THE ’902 PATENT ............................................................................... 1
`RELATED PROCEEDINGS ................................................................. 2
`THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED UNDER 35 U.S.C. §
`325(D) .................................................................................................... 2
`A.
`Tsuji Is One Of Five Listed “References Cited” On The
`Face Of Petitioner’s Fabio Reference, Filed With
`IPR2018-00424 ............................................................................ 3
`Petitioner Had The Benefit Of Patent Owner’s
`Preliminary Response In IPR2018-00389 ..................................... 6
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ..................................... 7
`PETITIONER DOES NOT PROVE A REASONABLE
`LIKELIHOOD OF UNPATENTABILITY FOR ANY
`CHALLENGED CLAIM ....................................................................... 8
`A.
`Claim Construction ...................................................................... 8
`B.
`A POSITA Would Not Have Made The Hypothetical
`Combination of Fabio, Pasolini, and Tsuji (Claim 8) ................... 9
`The Petition Fails To Show Claim 5 Is Unpatentable ................. 13
`1.
`No Prima Facie Obviousness For “using a default
`step cadence window to identify a time frame
`within which to monitor for a next step” .......................... 13
`No Prima Facie Obviousness For “when the step
`count is at or above the step count threshold,
`determining a dynamic step cadence window” ................. 14
`No Prima Facie Obviousness For “using the
`dynamic step cadence window to identify the time
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`2.
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`3.
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`ii
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`U.S. Patent 7,881,902
`frame within which to monitor for the next step” ............. 16
`CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 17
`
`VII.
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`
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`List of Exhibits
`
`Exhibit No.
`2001
`
`Description
`Declaration of William C. Easttom
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`iii
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`IPR2018-01028
`U.S. Patent 7,881,902
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Uniloc Luxembourg S.A. (the “Uniloc” or “Patent Owner”) submits this
`Preliminary Response to Petition IPR2018-01028 for Inter Partes Review (“Pet.” or
`“Petition”) of United States Patent No. 7,881,902 (“the ’902 Patent” or “EX1001”)
`filed by Apple, Inc. (“Petitioner”). The instant Petition is procedurally and
`substantively defective for at least the reasons set forth herein.
`
`II. THE ’902 PATENT
`The ’902 patent is titled “Human activity monitoring device.” The ʼ902 patent
`issued February 1, 2011, from U.S. Patent Application No. 12/694,135 filed January
`26, 2010, and is a continuation of U.S. Patent Application No. 11/644,455 filed
`December 22, 2006.
`The inventors of the ’902 patent observed that at the time, step counting
`devices that utilize an inertial sensor to measure motion to detect steps generally
`required the user to first position the device in a limited set of orientations. In some
`devices, the required orientations are dictated to the user by the device. In other
`devices, the beginning orientation is not critical, so long as this orientation can be
`maintained. EX1001, 1:23-30. Further, the inventors observed that devices at the
`time were often confused by motion noise experienced by the device throughout a
`user's daily routine. The noise would cause false steps to be measured and actual
`steps to be missed in conventional step counting devices. Conventional step counting
`devices also failed to accurately measure steps for individuals who walk at a slow
`pace. Id., 1:31-38.
`According to the invention of the ’902 Patent, a device to monitor human
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`activity using an inertial sensor assigns a dominant axis after determining the
`orientation of an inertial sensor. he orientation of the inertial sensor is continuously
`determined, and the dominant axis is updated as the orientation of the inertial sensor
`changes. Id., 2:10-17.
`
`III. RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`The following proceedings are currently pending cases concerning U.S. Pat.
`No. 7,881,902 (EX1001).
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`Case Caption
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`Case Number
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`District Case Filed
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`2-17-cv-00522
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`TXED
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`June 30, 2017
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`2-17-cv-00650
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`TXED
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`September
`15, 2017
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`Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple
`Inc.
`Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v.
`Samsung Electronics America,
`Inc. et al
`Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. LG
`Electronics USA, Inc. et al
`Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. HTC
`America, Inc.
`Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v.
`Huawei Device USA, Inc. et al
`Apple Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc.
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`4-17-cv-00832
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`2-17-cv-00737
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`TXND October 13,
`2017
`2-17-cv-01629 WAWD November 1,
`2017
`TXED November 9,
`2017
`Jan. 5, 2018
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`IPR2018-00424
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`PTAB
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`Uniloc USA, Inc. et al v. Apple
`Inc.
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`4-18-cv-00364
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`CAND
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`January 17,
`2018
`
`IV. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
`As the Petition admits, on January 5, 2018, Petitioner filed IPR2018-00424,
`challenging claims 1-6 and 9-10 of the same patent that is the subject of the instant
`Petition (the ’902 Patent). Further, Petitioner also acknowledges that Patent Owner
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`had already filed its preliminary response to the Petition in IPR2018-003891 before
`Petitioner filed the instant Petition.
`However, the Petition argues, without support, that the instant Petition is not
`redundant to IPR2018-00424 because: (1) “the prior art teaching the limitations of
`claim 8 was not located by Petitioner until after the ’424 petition was filed”, (Pet. 3
`(emphasis added)), and (2) because allegedly “the analysis in this petition directed
`to claim 5 is identical to the original petition and remains unchanged, and, thus, no
`arguments or statements have been presented in consideration of Patent Owner’s
`preliminary response or its expert’s declaration.” Pet. 3-4 (emphasis removed).
`Petitioner’s unsupported attorney argument should not be given any weight, and at
`least in one instance, the facts show Petitioner’s contentions to be not credible.
`The Board should exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and deny
`the Petition because Petitioner knew, or should have known, of the additional
`reference (Tsuji) at the time of filing its IPR2018-00424 and because Petitioner had
`the benefit of Patent Owner’s preliminary response to Petitioner’s IPR2018-00389.
`
`A.
`
`Tsuji Is One Of Five Listed “References Cited” On The Face Of
`Petitioner’s Fabio Reference, Filed With IPR2018-00424
`Petitioner claims that “the prior art relied upon in this petition (i.e., Tsuji,
`Ex.1010)” “was not located by Petitioner until after the ’424 petition was filed.”
`Pet. 3. However, Petitioner’s contention that Petitioner had not Tsuji, or EX1010,
`was not “located” by Petitioner until after the ’424 petition was filed strains
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` 1
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` IPR2018-00389 is directed to U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723, which is a continuation
`of the ’902 Patent.
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`credibility and is difficult to believe. Tsuji was one of just five references listed on
`the face of one of the prior art references relied upon, and analyzed by Petitioner in
`IPR2018-00424:
`First, Tsuji, or EX1010 of the instant Petition, is U.S. Patent No. 7,297,088:
`
`See Pet. iv (highlighting added).
`Second, Petitioner filed IPR2018-00424 on January 5, 2018, and one of the
`primary prior art references used in and filed with IPR2018-00424 is Petitioner’s
`exhibit 1006, which Petitioner refers to as Fabio, or U.S. Patent No. 7,698,097:
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`See IPR2018-00424, Pet. at v (highlighting added).
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`See PTAB E2E (ptab.uspto.gov) (emphasis added);
`Third, Tsuji, or U.S. Patent No. 7,297,088 is one of only five “cited
`references” listed on the face of Petitioner’s exhibit 1006 (U.S. Patent No.
`7,698,097):
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`See EX1006 (highlighting added).
`Therefore, Petitioner’s contention that Petitioner had not “located” Tsuji
`“until after the ’424 petition was filed” (Pet. 3), is difficult to believe, and strains
`credibility, as Fabio is Petitioner’s primary reference against Claim 5 in
`IPR2018-00424 (the independent claim from which the challenged claim here
`depends):
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`5
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`See IPR2018-00424, Pet. at 8 (highlighting added).
`At the very least, Petitioner should have known or “located” Tsuji when
`IPR2018-00424 was filed, and Petitioner should not be rewarded for its failure,
`either negligently or willfully, to “locate” a reference that is plainly listed on the
`face of its own primary reference (EX1006).
`
`B.
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`Petitioner Had The Benefit Of Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`Response In IPR2018-00389
`At the time of filing of the instant Petition, the Petitioner had the benefit of
`Patent Owner’s preliminary response to IPR2018-00389. While the patent-at-issue
`in IPR2018-00389 is U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723 (“the ’723 Patent”), as Petitioner
`points out, the ’723 Patent is a continuation of the ’902 Patent. Pet. 4 n.2. Thus
`Petitioner tacitly admits that the Patent Owner’s preliminary response in the
`IPR2018-00389 is relevant to the filing of the instant Petition.
`Petitioner merely asserts that allegedly “the analysis in this petition directed
`to claim 5 is identical to the original petition and remains unchanged, and, thus, no
`arguments or statements have been presented in consideration of Patent Owner’s
`preliminary response or its expert’s declaration.” Pet. 4 (emphasis removed).
`Petitioner does not deny that it had reviewed Patent Owner’s preliminary
`response in IPR2018-00389 prior to filing the current follow-on petition. Further,
`Petitioner’s choice of words is tellingly narrow. For example, Petitioner does not
`state that Petitioner did not choose to file the instant follow-on petition based in
`part on having the benefit of Patent Owner’s preliminary response in IPR2018-
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`00389. Nor does Petitioner affirm that its arguments and statements against the
`newly challenged dependent claims were not formulated based in part on having
`the benefit of Patent Owner’s preliminary response in IPR2018-00389. Petitioner
`can only contend that the Petition’s discussion of the independent claims from
`which the newly challenged dependent claims depend from are identical to the
`original petition. Or put differently, Petitioner merely states that part of the instant
`follow-on Petition is copy-and-pasted, while other parts of the Petition are new,
`and Petitioner makes no affirmative statement regarding the new parts of the
`instant Petition. In short, Petitioner did have the benefit of Patent Owner’s
`preliminary response in IPR2018-00389.
`Thus, the instant follow-on Petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. §
`325(d).
`V. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`The Petition alleges that “a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)
`would include someone who had, at the priority date of the ’902 Patent (i) a
`Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, and/or
`Computer Science, or equivalent training, and (ii) approximately two years of
`experience working in hardware and/or software design and development related to
`MEMS (micro-electro-mechanical) devices and body motion sensing systems.” Pet.
`5. Given that Petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in establishing prima facie
`obviousness when applying its own definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art
`(“POSITA”), Patent Owner does not offer a competing definition for POSITA at this
`preliminary stage, though it reserves the right to do so in the event that trial is
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`instituted.
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`VI. PETITIONER DOES NOT PROVE A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
`OF UNPATENTABILITY FOR ANY CHALLENGED CLAIM
`Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish entitlement to relief. 37 C.F.R.
`§42.108(c) (“review shall not be instituted for a ground of unpatentability unless
`. . . there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the claims challenged . . . is
`unpatentable”). The Petition should be denied as failing to meet this burden.
`The raises the following obviousness challenges under 35 U.S.C. § 103:
`Ground
`Claims
`Reference(s)
`1
`Fabio2 and Pasolini3
`2
`Fabio, Pasolini, and Tsuji4
`
`5
`8
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`A. Claim Construction
`Patent Owner submits that the Board need not construe any claim term in a
`particular manner in order to arrive at the conclusion that the Petition is
`substantively deficient. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361
`(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy”).
`At this preliminary stage, Patent Owner submits that the Board need not
`construe any claim term, including the term “cadence window”, in a particular
`manner in order to arrive at the conclusion that the Petition is substantively deficient.
`
`8
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` 2
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` EX1006, U.S. Patent No. 7,698,097
`3 EX1005, U.S. Patent No. 7,463,997
`4 EX1010, U.S. Patent No. 7,297,088
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`Wellman, 642 F.3d at 1361. Therefore at this preliminary stage, Patent Owner does
`not submit a competing definition, however, in the event that trial is instituted,
`Patent Owner reserves the right to object to Petitioner’s proposed construction and
`provide Patent Owner’s proposed construction.
`
`B. A POSITA Would Not Have Made The Hypothetical
`Combination of Fabio, Pasolini, and Tsuji (Claim 8)
`Although the Petition simply states that Tsuji discloses “computing a rolling
`average of stepping periods of previously counted steps”, because the Petition does
`not allege, much less show that Tsuji anticipates Claim 8, the Petition therefore relies
`on the combination of Fabio, Pasolini, and Tsuji for the claim element of
`“computing a rolling average of stepping periods of previously counted steps”. See
`Pet. 35-41.
`Furthermore, the Petition specifically argues that Tsuji would be combined
`with a specific feature of Fabio. See Pet. 38 (“A POSITA would have recognized
`that implementing Tsuji’s method of using a moving average of previous walk
`cycles (i.e., stepping periods) would be a simple substitution in Fabios’s method that
`utilizes the immediate preceding step in its validation algorithm.”) However, a
`POSITA would not have been motivated to make the hypothetical combination
`because, despite Petitioner’s allegations of a “simple substitution”, the Petition fails
`to show that simple substitution, and because there is no mention of averaging of
`acceleration signals in Fabio.
`An obviousness determination cannot be reached where the record lacks
`“explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the
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`claimed invention.” TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir.
`2016). This
`requisite explanation avoids an
`impermissible “hindsight
`reconstruction,” using “the patent in suit as a guide through the maze of prior art
`references, combining the right references in the right way so as to achieve . . . The
`claims in suit.” Id.; In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`The Petition is quick to point out that Fabio discloses its specific formula that
`defines its “validation window”. See Pet. 37. A direct recitation from Fabio is
`reproduced below:
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`EX1006, 4:28-55.
`As shown above, Fabio relies on a specific and precise mathematical formula
`to determine its “validation interval TV” 5, which in turn is required for the entire
`device of Fabio to function.
`
`
`
` 5
`
` Although Fabio’s “validation interval TV” does not disclose the required
`dynamic step/updating cadence window of the claims, that will not be directly
`addressed here for the purposes of this narrow discussion. Instead, Patent Owner
`leaves that discussion to later sections of this preliminary response.
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`However, despite the Petition’s bare allegation that it would have been a
`“simple substitution in Fabio’s method” (Pet. 38), and despite Fabio’s precise and
`clear recitation of its “method”, or mathematical formula, Petitioner makes no
`attempt to show its alleged “simple substitution”, much less, once such hypothetical
`substitution is made, how the device of Fabio would be modified to take into
`account the modified mathematical relationship that defines Fabio’s “validation
`interval”. Instead, Petitioner engages in impermissible hindsight reconstruction.
`Finally, as also shown above in the passage from Fabio, there is no disclosure
`whatsoever in Fabio’s “validation interval TV” of averaging of acceleration signals.
`And the Petition expressly recognizes this fact in its emphasis of the Petition’s
`description of Fabio’s “validation interval TV”:
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`
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`Pet. 37 (emphasis in original).
`As the Petition itself admits, the only disclosure in Fabio is regarding the
`immediately preceding step. There is no disclosure anywhere in Fabio of averaging
`of acceleration signals.
`Thus, a POSITA would not have looked to Tsuji and made the hypothetical
`combination of Fabio, Pasolini, and Tsuji because: (1) despite Petitioner’s
`unsupported allegation that it would have been a “simple substitution”, the Petition
`fails to show how such a “simple substitution” would be made and how to further
`account for that “simple substitution” when Fabio relies on and discloses a precise
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`mathematical relationship; and (2) nowhere in Fabio is there even a mention of
`averaging acceleration signals, instead express disclosure of its precise “validation
`interval TV” is as to the “immediately preceding step”.
`For these additional reasons, the Petition should be denied in its entirety.
`
`C. The Petition Fails To Show Claim 5 Is Unpatentable
`No Prima Facie Obviousness For “using a default step
`1.
`cadence window to identify a time frame within which to
`monitor for a next step”
`The Petition relies on a combination of Fabio and Pasolini for this limitation,
`however, the Petition relies solely on Fabio for the requirement of “using a default
`step cadence window”. Specifically, the Petition relies on Fabio’s “validation
`interval” as allegedly meeting the “cadence window” requirement of the claim
`language. Petitioners are wrong because as the claim language states, the “cadence
`window” is to “monitor for a next step”, and this is further acknowledged by the
`Petition in its claim construction section: “The specification specifically defines
`[cadence window] as ‘a window of time since a last step was counted that is looked
`at to detect a new step.’” Pet. 7.
`However, as the Petition itself acknowledges, Fabio’s “validation interval” is
`merely “when the duration ΔTK of a current step K is substantially homogenous
`with respect to the duration of ΔTK-1 of an immediately preceding step K-1”.
`EX1006, 4:28-31 (emphasis added). In other words, the device of Fabio does not
`look to detect a new step within a window of time since the last step was counted,
`instead, the device of Fabio waits for a step is detected then looks to determine how
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`long it has been since the previous step was detected. In other words, the “validation
`interval” of Fabio cannot “monitor for the next step” as required by the claim
`language because the “validation interval” is reactive and merely waits for the next
`step to occur before making its calculations.
`The Petition seeks to gloss over this important distinction by making the
`irrelevant argument that Fabio’s “validation interval” is in part “based on the
`immediately preceding step.” Pet. 51. But Petitioner misses the point, the fact that
`both things might look to the time of the “immediately preceding step” does not
`make the “validation interval” a “cadence window”. As discussed above, Fabio’s
`“validation interval” only looks to the duration of the interval after waiting for a
`step to be detected. Whereas the claim language requires that the device be
`proactive and “monitor for the next step”, and not passively wait for a step once
`the “cadence window” has expired.
`Therefore, Ground 4 should be denied because Fabio alone and Fabio in
`combination with Pasolini does not disclose “using a default step cadence window
`to identify a time frame within which to monitor for a next step”.
`
`2.
`
`No Prima Facie Obviousness For “when the step count is at or
`above the step count threshold, determining a dynamic step
`cadence window”
`The Petition relies solely on Fabio for this limitation. However, Fabio does
`not disclose “a dynamic step cadence window” as required by the claim language.
`The Petition wrongly conflates Fabio’s “second counting procedure” and
`“second validation test” for the required “determining a dynamic step cadence
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`window.” The Petition agrees that in Fabio’s “first counting procedure” and “second
`counting procedure” steps are validated “when
`the duration ΔTK of a
`current step K is substantially homogeneous with respect to the duration ΔTK-1 of
`an immediately preceding step K-1”. Pet. 56. But the Petition then argues that
`“Based on this, a POSITA would have understood that defining the validation
`interval in this way compensates for changes in each step.” Id. (relying solely on its
`declarant).
`But a review of Fabio proves Petitioner is wrong. Contrary to Petitioner’s
`arguments and speculation, Fabio does not disclose “determining a dynamic step
`cadence window” as required by the claim language. The disclosure of Fabio uses
`the previous validated step to validate the current step. If the current step does not
`conform with the previous steps, the current step is not validated and does not count
`as a step. This is confirmed by Fabio itself.
`First, as the Petition admits, Fabio’s “second validation test ‘is altogether
`similar to the first validation test carried out in block 230 of FIG. 3.’” Pet. 55-56;
`EX1006, 6:31-32 (emphasis added).
`Second, Fabio describes the validation tests as such: “[i]f the verification
`yields a negative result (output NO from block 230), the number of invalid steps
`NINV is incremented by one (block 235)”. EX1006., 4:56-57.
`The result is that in Fabio, “it is verified that the last step recognized is
`compatible with the frequency of the last steps made previously.” Id., 4:54-55
`(emphasis added). In other words, the last recognized step in Fabio comes at the
`same frequency as steps made previously. Accordingly, Fabio does not disclose
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`“determining a dynamic step cadence window”, as the claim language requires.
`Petitioner, recognizing that Fabio fails to disclose the required limitation, also
`resorts to speculating through its declarant that “a POSITA would have understood
`that defining the validation interval in this way compensates for changes in each
`step.” Pet. 56. However, as shown above, that is factually incorrect. Fabio does not
`determine a dynamic cadence window. Furthermore, the declaration relied upon for
`the Petitioner’s erroneous conclusion merely repeats exactly the same speculative
`and conclusory statement, without providing any of the analysis or explanation
`required. Compare Pet. 56 with EX1003 at p. 79; see also Cutsforth, 636 Fed. Appx.
`at 577–78; In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1371; In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1359.
`Thus, Ground 4 should be denied because Fabio does not disclose “when the
`step count is at or above the step count threshold, determining a dynamic step
`cadence window”, as the claim language requires, and because the Petition merely
`and improperly speculates through its declarant without providing any of the
`required analysis or explanation, in direct contradiction to the express disclosure of
`Fabio itself.
`
`3.
`
`No Prima Facie Obviousness For “using the dynamic step
`cadence window to identify the time frame within which to
`monitor for the next step”
`The Petition relies solely on Fabio for this limitation. First, as discussed
`above in Section V.C.2, Fabio does not disclose a “dynamic step cadence window”
`as the claim language requires. Second, as discussed above in Section V.C.1,
`Fabio’s “validation interval” is reactive and backwards-looking, waiting for a step
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`to be detected before calculating whether the event occurred within its “validation
`interval”. Whereas the required “cadence window”, and the requirement to “identify
`the time frame within which to monitor for the next step”, is proactive, or forward-
`looking, so the invention of the ’902 Patent knows ahead of time how much time it
`will allow when monitoring for the next step.
`Therefore, as more fully discussed above in Sections V.C.1 and V.C.2,
`Ground 4 should be denied because Fabio does not disclose a “dynamic step
`cadence window” and because Fabio does not disclose “identify[ing] the time frame
`within which to monitor for the next step”, as the claim language requires.
`
`VII. CONCLUSION
`For at least the reasons set forth above, Uniloc respectfully requests that the
`Board deny all challenges in the instant Petition.6
`
`Date: August 17, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /s/ Brett A. Mangrum
`Brett A. Mangrum; Reg. No. 64,783
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`
`
`
` 6
`
` Patent Owner does not concede, and specifically denies, that there is any legitimacy
`to any arguments in the instant Petition that are not specifically addressed herein.
`
`17
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01028
`U.S. Patent 7,881,902
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
`
`
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d), we certify that this Preliminary Response
`
`to Petition complies with the type-volume limitation of 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(b)(1)
`
`because it contains fewer than the limit of 14,000 words, as determined by the
`
`word-processing program used to prepare the brief, excluding the parts of the
`
`brief exempted by 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1).
`
`Date: August 17, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /s/ Brett A. Mangrum
`Brett A. Mangrum; Reg. No. 64,783
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`IPR2018-01028
`U.S. Patent 7,881,902
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(e), we certify that we served an electronic copy
`of the foregoing PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE PURSUANT
`TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a) along with any accompanying exhibits via the Patent
`Review Processing System (PRPS) to Petitioner’s counsel at the following
`addresses identified in the Petition’s consent to electronic service:
`Lead Counsel: Andrew S. Ehmke, Reg. No. 50,271
`andy.ehmke.ipr@haynesboone.com
`michael.parsons.ipr@haynesboone.com
`dina.blikshteyn.ipr@haynesboone.com
`
`
`
`
`Date: August 17, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /s/ Brett A. Mangrum
`Brett A. Mangrum; Reg. No. 64,783
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
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