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`———————
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`———————
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`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
`Patent Owner.
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`———————
`
`Case IPR2018-01027
`Patent 8,712,723 B1
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`———————
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`
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`PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`OF INSTITUTION DECISION UNDER 37 CFR § 42.71(d)
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`IPR2018-01027
`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723 B1
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................... 2
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`III. RATIONALE FOR REHEARING ..................................................................... 3
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`A. The Board misapprehended the Petition’s and Dr. Paradiso’s analyses
`of the Richardson and Harris references. ..................................................... 3
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`B. The Board overlooked Pasolini’s teaching of adjusting its lower
`threshold based on a mean value of acceleration data and the
`orientation of the inertial sensor. .................................................................. 7
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`1. Pasolini does in fact adjust its negative threshold based on an
`average of acceleration data. ......................................................................... 7
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`2. Pasolini does in fact adjust its negative threshold based on the
`orientation of the inertial sensor. ................................................................. 11
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`C. Institution of this proceeding should not be denied under 35 U.S.C. §
`314(a) or § 325(d). ...................................................................................... 13
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`IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 15
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`ii
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`IPR2018-01027
`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723 B1
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
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`Cases
`Brand v. Miller,
`487 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ...................................................................... 10, 13
`PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co.,
`840 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ............................................................................ 2
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`814 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................... 10, 13
`Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.,
`358 F. 3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). .......................................................................... 14
`
`
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e) ................................................................................................... 13
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) ................................................................................................... 2
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) .............................................................................................. 1, 3
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) ........................................................................... 1, 2, 10, 13, 15
`
`
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`iii
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`Petitioner Apple Inc. (“Apple”) respectfully requests rehearing under 37
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`IPR2018-01027
`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`
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`C.F.R. § 42.71(d) of the Board’s October 18, 2018 Decision denying institution of
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`IPR2018-01027 directed to claims 4 and 19 of U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723 (“the
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``723 patent”). Specifically, Petitioner requests that the Board reconsider its
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`determination that the Petition failed to establish that the combination of Pasolini
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`(Ex.1005), Fabio (Ex.1006), and Richardson (Ex.1007) renders obvious the
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`limitation of claims 4 and 19— “wherein the lower threshold is adjusted based on
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`at least one of a rolling average of accelerations and the orientation of the inertial
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`sensor.”
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`Rehearing is warranted because the Board misapprehended how Harris
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`applies to the combination of Pasolini, Fabio, and Richardson, as set forth in the
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`Petition. Harris is a textbook that provides evidence that a POSITA knew that the
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`“moving average,” as taught by Richardson, is the same as the “rolling average” as
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`recited in the claims. Ex.1011 at 243. Harris was also supplied as further evidence
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`for why a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of
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`Richardson with Pasolini and Fabio. See Petition at 45, 51. The Board, though,
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`held that other teachings of Harris contradicted Richardson’s teachings.
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`Specifically, the Board concluded that: “Petitioner’s contention that using
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`data from only the current stepping period would ‘yield a smoother acceleration
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`IPR2018-01027
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`threshold’ does not comport with Petitioner’s stated rationale or the teachings of
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`Harris upon which Petitioner and its declarant rely.” Decision at 17. However,
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`these alleged contradictions between Harris’s teachings and Richardson’s teaching
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`reflect a fundamental, technical misunderstanding of Richardson.
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`Specifically, the Board misunderstood Richardson’s “stepping period” to be
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`a single data point. However, the term “stepping/sample period” in Richardson
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`refers to the entirety of the acceleration data in Richardson’s buffer and the data in
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`the buffer represents multiple data points. The Board’s misunderstanding of the
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`contents of the data in Richardson’s buffer caused the Board to see inconsistencies
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`when considering Harris.
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`As will be explained in further detail below, a proper understanding of the
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`“stepping period” in Richardson’s buffer (which includes multiple steps) leads to a
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`different conclusion, and the record establishes that the combination of Fabio,
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`Pasolini, and Richardson renders claims 4 and 19 obvious. Petitioner respectfully
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`requests that the Board reverse its error and institute trial.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`The Board’s decision on institution is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an
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`erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear
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`error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840
`2
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`IPR2018-01027
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Further, a request for rehearing “must
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`specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or
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`overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion,
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`an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
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`III. RATIONALE FOR REHEARING
`A. The Board misapprehended the Petition’s and Dr. Paradiso’s
`analyses of the Richardson and Harris references.
`In the Decision, the Board misapprehended the Reasons to Combine set
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`forth in the Petition, and particularly the application of Harris to the proposed
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`combination of Fabio, Pasolini, and Richardson. While the Board identified the
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`Petition’s reliance on Harris as evidence of the benefits of using a moving or
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`rolling average, the Board misapprehended how the evidence within Harris is
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`applicable to the combination of Fabio, Pasolini, and Richardson. This
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`misapprehension led, in part, to the Board incorrectly denying institution.
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`The Board’s misapprehension is evident from the following passage from
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`the Decision:
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`Harris explains that “[e]ach point on a moving average curve is
`generally calculated by averaging the value for the current period plus
`a fixed number of prior periods” and “the greater the number of
`intervals, the smoother the moving average curve.” Ex. 1011, 243
`(emphasis added). Petitioner contradicts this stated rationale for using
`Richardson’s teachings by arguing that one should only use “data that
`is generated in the current sample period, rather than an average based
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`IPR2018-01027
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`on the data from both the current and previous stepping periods.” Pet.
`44–45.
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`Decision at 17. The contradiction perceived by Board is predicated on the “current
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`period” in Harris being analogous to the “stepping/sample period” in Richardson,
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`and thus Richardson’s average is only based on data from a singular sample period,
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`as opposed to current and previous stepping periods. This is incorrect. The “current
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`period” in Harris is not analogous to the “stepping/sample period” in Richardson.
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`The term “stepping/sample period” in Richardson reflects acceleration data
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`associated with multiple footfalls stored in one of Richardson’s buffers at a given
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`time. See Petition at 44.
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`In more detail, the data in Richardson’s buffer includes multiple acceleration
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`samples generated by a user engaged in stepping activity (i.e., the buffers contains
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`data for multiple steps). See Ex.1007 at 28:42-46 (“[A] loop goes through the
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`buffer, A or B, looking for peaks of positive acceleration 168 that are indicative of
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`footfalls. Each interval between footfalls is taken to be a locomotor ‘step’, and is
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`summarized and put in a step queue.”). When the Petition references Richardson’s
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`“current sample/stepping period,” it means all of the acceleration data in the buffer,
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`not just a single acceleration sample or even acceleration data for a single step.
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`Then, Richardson uses the data in the buffer, which consists of data
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`representing a series of footfalls, to calculate its moving average. See Petition at 44
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`4
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`IPR2018-01027
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`quoting Ex.1007 at 28:33-36 (“[T]he device ‘compute[s] at each sample time a
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`moving average of acceleration 168, which serves as a baseline for describing the
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`acceleration 168 waveform of a locomotor step.’”).
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`Not appreciating that Richardson’s “sample/stepping periods” contain data
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`about multiple footfalls that are used to generate a moving average, led the Board
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`to conclude incorrectly that “Petitioner’s stated rationale or the teachings of
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`Harris” do not comport with “Petitioner’s contention that using data from only the
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`current stepping period would ‘yield a smoother acceleration threshold.’” See
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`Decision at 17. The “current stepping” period within this quote is about
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`Richardson, where the “current stepping” period is data reflecting multiple
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`footfalls. Thus, Petitioner’s actual contention of using data from the current
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`stepping period is using data consisting of multiple footfalls, not just a current,
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`singular footfall. Harris’s explanation of calculating a moving average “by
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`averaging the value for the current period plus a fixed number of prior periods” is
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`entirely consistent with Richardson’s teaching of “comput[ing] at each sample time
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`a moving average of acceleration 168 ….,” where the data that is being averaged
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`includes multiple footfalls sampled over time. See Ex.1007 at 28:34-39; Ex.1011 at
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`243. Again, this is because the data in the Richardson’s buffer consists of data
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`reflecting multiple steps.
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`5
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`IPR2018-01027
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`The Board also incorrectly concluded that “there is no explicit disclosure in
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`Richardson that the moving average, or baseline, is generated based on data in only
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`the current sample period.” See Decision at 18. However, as discussed above, the
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`“current sample period” in Richardson is all the data in the buffer (which reflects
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`multiple steps), and the explicit disclosure in Richardson indicates that the data in a
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`single buffer is analyzed. Ex.1007 at 28:34-36 (“While one buffer, A or B is being
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`filled with data, the data in the other, B or A, is being analyzed.”). And, the first
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`step in this analysis is computing the moving average for the data in the buffer.
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`Ex.1007 at 28:36-39 (“The first step is to compute at each sample time a moving
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`average of acceleration 168 ….”). This supports Dr. Paradiso’s conclusion
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`reiterated in the Petition that “Richardson’s moving average is based on the data
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`that is generated in the current sample period [i.e., currently analyzed buffer],
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`rather than an average based on the data from both the current and previous
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`stepping periods.” Petition at 44-45 citing Ex.1003 at 59-60. To be clear, the
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`distinction being drawn in the Petition is calculating the moving average using the
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`samples of multiple footfalls within the current sample period versus calculating an
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`average using data previously held in the buffer.
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`Thus, the Board misapprehended the Petition’s and Dr. Paradiso’s analyses
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`of Richardson in combination with Fabio and Pasolini by applying an incorrect
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`6
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`IPR2018-01027
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`understanding of the evidence against the teachings of Harris. Petitioner therefore
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`respectfully requests that the Board reconsider its decision and institute this
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`proceeding.
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`B.
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`The Board overlooked Pasolini’s teaching of adjusting its lower
`threshold based on a mean value of acceleration data and the
`orientation of the inertial sensor.
`Claims 4 and 19 of the ’723 patent, the only claims challenged in this
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`proceeding, recite “wherein the lower threshold is adjusted based on at least one of
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`a rolling average of accelerations and the orientation of the inertial sensor.”
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`Ex.1001 at 15:31-34, 16:65-17:3. The Petition and Dr. Paradiso explained in detail
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`how Pasolini uses a mean value (i.e., an average) of acceleration data to set its
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`negative threshold used for determining a step. The Board, however, found the
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`opposite and, in doing so, misapprehended Pasolini’s teachings.
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`1.
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`Pasolini does in fact adjust its negative threshold based on
`an average of acceleration data.
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`According to the Board, “Pasolini does not use an average of the
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`acceleration data in its calculation of the threshold values.” Decision at 20. In
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`reaching this conclusion, the Board misapprehended how Pasolini calculates its
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`threshold values.
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`Specifically, as noted in the Petition, Pasolini teaches calculating its
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`threshold values (S+ and S–) “as a function of the positive envelope Env+ and
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`negative envelope Env−, respectively.” Ex. 1005 at 5:48-53; Petition at 50. In turn,
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`Env+ and Env− are calculated “for each new acceleration data CalAcc”. Ex. 1005 at
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`5:48-53; Petition at 50.
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`The CalAcc value is calculated using the equation “CalAcc=Acc−Accm.”
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`Ex.1005 at 6:3-5; Petition at 49.1 Accm is the mean value of acceleration. Ex.1005
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`at 5:55-60; Petition at 49. Thus, the CalAcc value depends on the mean value
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`Accm. Ex.1005 at 6:3-5; Petition at 49.
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`As testified by Dr. Paradiso, and as taught by the mathematical equations in
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`Pasolini, the mean value of acceleration (Accm) is used to calculate CalAcc, which
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`is used to calculate Env+ and Env−, which are used to calculate the threshold values
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`(S+ and S–). Accordingly, the threshold values (S+ and S–) are mathematically
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`1 The Petition discusses this in more detail, showing that Pasolini teaches
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`“acquir[ing] from the accelerometer 2 a new acceleration sample Acc of the
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`acceleration A.” Ex.1005 at 5:55-56; see also Petition at 48; Ex.1003 at 65. The
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`Petition then stated that the CalAcc value is calculated by subtracting the mean
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`value of the acceleration sample Accm from the acceleration sample Acc. Ex.1005
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`at 6:2-5; see also Petition at 49; Ex.1003 at 65.
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`8
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`IPR2018-01027
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`dependent on the mean (e.g., average) value of acceleration data. Thus, Pasolini
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`teaches that the threshold values are based on an average of acceleration data.
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`The Board also stated that even if Pasolini’s “acceleration datum CalAcc is
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`based on an ‘average of accelerations’” (Petition at 49), “this does not mean that
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`the lower threshold is adjusted based on the average acceleration” as required by
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`claims 4 and 19. Decision at 21. Again, as shown mathematically above, the upper
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`threshold value S+ and lower threshold value S– are mathematically dependent on
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`the mean (e.g., average) value of acceleration data.
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`The Board appears to rely on its own reasoning (despite contrary expert
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`testimony) that “because the mean value of the acceleration sample is subtracted
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`from each acceleration datum … the mean value would appear to have no material
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`effect on the difference between successive acceleration datum measurements and,
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`therefore, the adjustment of the lower threshold.” Decision at 21. The Board’s
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`conclusion that subtracting a value means the value has no material effect is
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`mathematically false. For example, consider any scenario where you subtract a
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`small value as opposed to subtracting a large value, particularly where you are re-
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`performing the subtraction repeatedly. Whether the value is large or small has a
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`significant impact on any subsequent equation using the result of the subtraction.
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`9
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`IPR2018-01027
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`The Board’s reasoning also overlooks Pasolini’s express teachings and gives
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`no credit to the testimony of Dr. Paradiso, who obtained his Ph.D. from MIT, is a
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`Chair for the International Workshop on Wearable and Implantable Body Sensors,
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`who has written papers on gait analysis using a shoe-integrated wireless sensor
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`system, and teaches classes on sensor technologies at MIT. See Ex.1004.
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`Further, the Board cited no evidence that contracts Dr. Paradiso’s conclusion
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`or the teachings of Pasolini, or to support the conclusion that subtracting a value
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`means it has no material impact on the subsequent calculations. The Board is not
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`permitted to rely on its own expertise. See Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2007) (“although the Board’s expertise appropriately plays a role in
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`interpreting record evidence,” “in the context of a contested case, it is
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`impermissible for the Board to base its factual findings on its expertise, rather than
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`on evidence in the record.”) Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d
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`1309, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“when the technology is complex and ‘beyond the
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`comprehension of laypersons,’ expert testimony is ‘sometimes essential.’”).
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`Accordingly, the Board misapprehended both Pasolini’s teachings and
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`reasoning provided by Dr. Paradiso in concluding that Pasolini does not use an
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`average of accelerations in determining the negative threshold. Petitioner therefore
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`10
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`IPR2018-01027
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`respectfully requests that the Board reconsider its decision and institute this
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`proceeding.
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`2.
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`Pasolini does in fact adjust its negative threshold based on
`the orientation of the inertial sensor.
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`The Board also incorrectly concluded that “Petitioner has not demonstrated
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`that Pasolini adjusts its lower threshold based on the orientation of the sensor.”
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`Decision at 22. This conclusion appears to be based on the Board’s own reasoning
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`that “Pasolini updates the envelope values based on the peaks of the acceleration
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`signals and updates the threshold values based on the envelope values. Pasolini
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`does not disclose or suggest using the sensor orientation as a factor in setting the
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`threshold values.” Decision at 22. This reasoning appears to rely on a
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`misapprehension of the claim term “based on” and ignores reasoning provided by
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`Dr. Paradiso.
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`First, in reaching this incorrect conclusion, the Board appears to read the
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`claim term “based on” to require adjusting the lower threshold directly due to the
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`orientation of the inertial sensor. There is no such limiting language in the claim.
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`Instead, the term “based on” in the claim allows any type of relationship between
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`the orientation of the inertial sensor and the adjustment of the lower threshold.
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`As the Board noted in its Decision, Pasolini teaches removing the d.c.
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`component from the acceleration sample, which is entirely based on the orientation
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`of the inertial sensor. See Decision at 21; see also Petition at 53; Ex.1003 at 70-71.
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`Pasolini then teaches using the acceleration sample with the d.c. component
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`removed to determine the CalAcc value. Ex.1005 at 5:56-59 (“the d.c. component
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`of said acceleration value (due substantially to the acceleration of gravity) is
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`eliminated so as to determine the acceleration datum CalAcc ….”). The CalAcc
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`value is then used to set the negative (i.e., lower) threshold. Ex.1005 at 5:49-54.
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`(“for each new acceleration datum CalAcc, of the values of the positive envelope
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`Env+ and negative envelope Env–, and modification of the value of the positive and
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`negative reference thresholds S+ and S– as a function of the positive envelope Env+
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`and negative envelope Env–, respectively.”).
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`Based on these teaching from Pasolini, Dr. Paradiso concluded that
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`“[b]ecause the negative acceleration threshold is adjusted based on the acceleration
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`samples that are adjusted to eliminate gravity, a POSITA would have therefore
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`understood that the negative acceleration threshold is based on the orientation of
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`the inertial sensor.” Petition at 53-54; Ex.1003 at 71-72. This reasoning is not
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`conclusory, as the Board found, but is based on the express teaching from Pasolini
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`as Dr. Paradiso explained would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the
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`art. See Ex.1003 at 71-72. The Board concluding otherwise represents a
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`12
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`IPR2018-01027
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`misapprehended meaning of the claim term “based on” to include some specific
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`type of relationship. The claim provides no such limiting language.
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`Second, the Board appears to have again not credited Dr. Paradiso’s
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`reasoning and instead relied on its own understanding. This again is improper. See
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`Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d at 869; Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814
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`F.3d at 1320. The Petition and Dr. Paradiso’s declaration sets forth sufficient facts
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`and evidence showing how Pasolini adjusts its negative threshold “based on” the
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`orientation of the inertial sensor by removing the d.c. component of each
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`acceleration sample. Petition at 53; Ex.1003 at 70-71. Per the Board’s own rule,
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`Dr. Paradiso’s testimonial evidence should “be viewed in the light most favorable
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`to the petitioner.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Accordingly, the Board should reconsider
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`its Decision and institute this proceeding.
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`C.
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`Institution of this proceeding should not be denied under 35
`U.S.C. § 314(a) or § 325(d).
`To the extent that the Board may consider denying this Petition under either
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`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) or § 325(d), such action is unwarranted here. First, this Petition
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`challenges claims 4 and 19 of the ’723 patent, which was not raised in IPR2018-
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`00389. Second, even though Richardson was applied in an unrelated IPR filed by
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`Petitioner five days before the ’389 IPR, the unrelated IPR uses distinctly different
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`teachings from Richardson and Petitioner was unaware that Richardson also
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`13
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`IPR2018-01027
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`disclosed teachings related to a moving average of accelerations until after the ’389
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`IPR was filed. Moreover, Petitioner was unaware of the Harris reference until well
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`after the ’389 IPR was filed. This is relevant here because Richardson teaches a
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`“moving average,” not a “rolling average” as required by the claim, and the Harris
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`reference provides the necessary evidence equating the two concepts. See Ex.1011
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`at 243. Thus, Petitioner was not aware of the requisite prior art that taught all of the
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`limitations of claims 4 and 19 when the ’389 IPR was filed. Third, Petitioner did
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`not gain the benefit of any previously filed Preliminary Response because claims 4
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`and 19 and any similarly related claims had not previously been challenged. Thus,
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`denial here based on the Board’s discretion is unwarranted.
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`Further, Federal Circuit caselaw establishes that the claim language “at least
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`one of” requires that both options be met. See Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV
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`Enterprises, Inc., 358 F. 3d 870, 886 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the Board’s
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`belief that “Petitioner relies on Richardson only with respect to one of two options
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`for satisfying the requirements of the second wherein clause of claims 4 and 19”
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`(Decision at 23) is misplaced. Claims 4 and 19 require “at least one of a rolling
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`average of accelerations and the orientation of the inertial sensor.” Thus, Board’s
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`opinion that the combination of Pasolini and Fabio alone would have been
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`sufficient for establishing obviousness is incorrect.
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`14
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`IV. CONCLUSION
`Because the Board overlooked the misapprehended the arguments in the
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`IPR2018-01027
`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petition and did not properly view Dr. Paradiso’s declaration as required by 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.108(c), Petitioner respectfully submits that rehearing is warranted.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`Dated: November 19, 2018
`HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
`2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700
`Dallas, Texas 75219
`Telephone: 214-651-5116
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`
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`/Andrew S. Ehmke/
`Andrew S. Ehmke
`Registration No. 50,271
`Lead Counsel for Petitioners
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`IPR2018-01027
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,712,723
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`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned certifies, in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), that
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`service was made on the Patent Owner as detailed below.
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`Date of service November 19, 2018
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`Manner of service Electronic Mail: ryan@etheridgelaw.com;
`brett@etheridgelaw.com; jim@etheridgelaw.com;
`jeff@etheridgelaw.com; ray.king@unilocusa.com
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`Documents served Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing of Institution Decision
`Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
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`Persons served Ryan Loveless
`Brett Mangrum
`James Etheridge
`Jeffrey Huang
`Etheridge Law Group
`2600 E. Southlake Blvd., Ste. 120-324
`Southlake, TX 76092
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`Ray A. King
`Uniloc USA, Inc.
`7160 Dallas Parkway, Ste. 380
`Plano, TX 75024
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`/Andrew S. Ehmke/
`Andrew S. Ehmke
`Registration No. 50,271
`Lead Counsel for Petitioners
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`16
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