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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
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`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`KEYNETIK, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
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`Case IPR2018-00985
`Patent 7,966,146 B2
`____________
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`Oral Hearing Held: August 6, 2019
`____________
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`Before LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and
`STACEY G. WHITE, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`Case IPR2018-00985
`Patent 7,966,146 B2
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`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`PHILLIP W. CITROEN, ESQUIRE
`CHETHAN BANSAL, ESQUIRE
`ARVIND JAIRAM, ESQUIRE
`Paul Hastings, LLP
`875 15th Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`202-551-1991
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`
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
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`
`EDWARD F. BEHM, ESQUIRE
`MARK W. HALDERMAN, ESQUIRE
`Armstrong Teasdale, LLP
`2005 Market Street, 29th Floor
`One Commerce Square
`Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
`267-780-2000
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`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Tuesday, August 6,
`2019, commencing at 10:00 a.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
`600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
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`THE USHER: All rise.
`JUDGE PETTIGREW: Please be seated. Good morning. This is a
`hearing for IPR2018-00985, Samsung v. Keynetik.
`Judges White and Branch are participating remotely, so please
`identify particular slide numbers as you move through your demonstratives
`so they can follow along.
`We remind the parties that demonstratives are not evidence, but
`instead are aids to assist the Panel in understanding your arguments
`presented today at the hearing.
`We are aware that each party has filed objections to certain of the
`other side's demonstratives. At this time we will allow the parties to use any
`of the demonstratives, but we caution you that ultimately we will not
`consider any evidence or arguments that we determine are newly made if
`they were not presented in the papers.
`For this case this morning each party has 45 minutes to argue. And
`Petitioner will argue first, and may save no more than half of its total time
`for rebuttal. Patent Owner will argue second and may reserve no more than
`half of the total time for sur-rebuttal.
`Counsel, when you begin your argument please identify yourself and
`the party you represent, for the record, and also indicate how much time you
`would like to reserve for rebuttal. Petitioner, you may begin when you're
`ready.
`MR. CITROEN: Good morning. May it please the Board? My name
`is Phillip Citroen, on behalf of Petitioner, Samsung. And with me here
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`today is Arvind Jairam and Chetan Bansal, also with Petitioner, Samsung.
`I'd like to reserve roughly 15 minutes for rebuttal, and I --
`JUDGE PETTIGREW: The clock will show your total time, but I'll
`let you know when you're getting close to rebuttal time.
`MR. CITROEN: Thank you. Your Honor, I do have hard copy of our
`slides, if you would like?
`JUDGE PETTIGREW: Yes, please.
`MR. CITROEN: May we approach?
`JUDGE PETTIGREW: Yes. Thank you.
`MR. CITROEN: If we can look at slide 2: Your Honors, just quickly,
`slide 2 presents the grounds that are at issue in this proceeding. There are
`two here, one is anticipation based on Liberty, the second ground is a
`combination of the 103 ground based on Noguera and Liberty. Based on the
`evidence relied upon to institute these proceedings as well as the additional
`evidence that is now on the record, we believe these claims should be found
`unpatentable based on both grounds and cancelled in the final written
`decision.
`If we can go to slide 3: I want to begin first by just looking at the
`challenged claims quickly. In this proceeding Keynetik faults Samsung for
`reading these claims as broadly as they were written.
`According to Keynetik these incredibly broad claims are actually
`incredibly narrow, although not recited in any of the limitations, Keynetik
`argues that these claims require ignoring return motion, require ignoring
`intentional and unintentional motion, require reactivating motion input
`algorithm only after the elapse of a defined period of time, require seeing the
`sleep command as a direct cause of the executing of prior command, require
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`sleep command to be sent each and every time a sense motion is translated
`into a command.
`I could keep going, but at the end of the day these claims recite none
`of these limitations, instead Keynetik pursued and was awarded a much
`broader claim which is what you see here in claim 22 on slide 3. Keynetik
`cannot now ask the Board to redraft the claims to avoid the prior art. The
`law doesn’t allow it, and the Board shouldn’t allow it.
`So, if we can go to slide 4: that's where I'd like to start. I want to talk
`about what do these claims actually mean. And the three overarching issues
`are here on slide 4, and I'm just going to focus, in the interest of time, on
`issues 1 and 2. After that I want to talk about some specific issues related to
`the prior art.
`So, if go to slide 5, the first issue I'd like to discuss is, what does
`"sleep command" mean, and what does "an instruction to reactivate motion
`sensing algorithm" mean?
`If we can go to slide 8 really quickly, I just want to look at the claim
`language again. These two issues relate to the last two instructions that you
`see here in claim 22. Instructions to sending sleep command, et cetera, and
`then the last one: instructions to reactive the motion sensing algorithm, et
`cetera.
`And if you can go back to slide 6, please? As you can see here, in
`slide 6, what Keynetik argues is -- what they argue for is a very narrow
`construction, they argue that all movements must be ignored, that's what's
`required by claim 22, they also argue that all movements, including
`intentional an unintentional movements, must be ignored even though that's
`not recited in the claims.
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`JUDGE WHITE: Counselor?
`MR. CITROEN: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE WHITE: Patent Owner has put forth the argument that sleep
`has a meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art, as indicated by the use of a
`sleep command in the UNIX system or in the Windows system. How do
`you respond to that?
`MR. CITROEN: Sure, Your Honor. So, their argument is that those
`UNIX and Windows systems essentially mean that the sleep command
`pauses some process. We're not necessarily disputing that point. The
`question is: what does "pausing some process" mean? What is the extent
`that the system must be put to sleep?
`Obviously there are variations, there is some breadth to what sleep
`means, and none of the things that they point to, UNIX or Windows
`specifies that sleep means that you completely shut down some portion of
`the system, or some portion of a process so that it doesn’t operate as
`intended or as it normally would.
`So, the question then is, in the context of the claims, in the context of
`the specification, what does sleep mean? And when you look at the claims,
`they're much broader, it doesn’t define the sleep command.
`If we can actually go to slide 8 please: The claims don't define the
`sleep command, it merely states and this is the second instructions,
`"Instructions to send the sleep command to the motion input algorithm after
`the command is executed." Nothing here indicates to what extent any
`process must be put to sleep. At most, you need to -- the motion input
`algorithm, we need to stop translating sense motion, sense moving, I should
`say, to some extent, but it does not state that all sense movement whatsoever
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`must not be translated into commands, and there's certainly no mention of
`intentional and unintentional movements in the claim language.
`And if you look at the specification -- if we go to slide 10 -- again,
`there's no definition of sleep command in the specification, most of the
`specification which you can see here, deals with ignoring changes in the
`orientation, or what's sometimes called return motion, very specific types of
`movements. It doesn’t say, all movements that are sensed are ignored, it
`repeatedly refers to return motions, changes in orientation, so there's no
`support that sleep command is defined in the specification, that the standard
`for lexicography has not been met here. There's no clarity, deliberateness,
`precision that's required.
`So that's -- our position is, if you look at the claims, going back to
`slide 8, it's much, much broader, they want to narrow these claims to avoid
`the prior art, and they haven't shown that that's proper to do here.
`JUDGE WHITE: Well, and in the section of the specification that
`you have over there on slide 10, it indicates that you're supposed to be
`ignoring or insensitive to the movements to move your device to a new more
`comfortable angle, would that not mean that you are ignoring or being
`insensitive to intentional motion in order to have that period of insensitivity
`that's called for?
`MR. CITROEN: I don't think it goes that far, Your Honor, to be
`honest. The specification talks about certain types of motion that should be
`ignored, but doesn’t say all types of motion should be ignored whether
`intentional or unintentional. It's very specific about orientation changes. So
`very specific movements of moving your device so that you can reposition it
`so you're more comfortable, it doesn’t talk about if you want to move your
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`device in some much larger motion to perform some action, it doesn’t go
`that far. And the claims, especially, don't go that far.
`So, even if you want to say that the specification is narrower in order
`to review -- in order to construe the claims that narrowly, you would have to
`import these examples from the specification, and I don't think that would be
`proper here as well, especially under the BRI Standard.
`So, I'd like to talk -- if we can go to slide 9 -- unless Your Honor has
`any more questions on that specific issue -- about the reactivation portion of
`this issue. Here, for the reactivation portion. Keynetik argues that the
`limitation means you cannot have additional instructions that reactivate the
`motion input algorithm for some reason, other than the elapse of time, and
`still meet this limitation.
`Again, nothing in the claims precludes instructions that are not
`specifically recited in these claims. And if you look at these claims, claim
`22 is a comprising claim, and it appears twice in the claim, at the very
`beginning, an article comprising, and again, the step motion algorithm
`including instructions comprising. So, twice it mentions comprising, and the
`law of comprising means that you were not limited to the specific steps that
`are recited in the claim.
`That means the algorithm may include instructions other than the
`three that are recited here. Also, I'd just like to point out, the claims also
`don't recite that the motion input algorithm is reactivated from the sleep
`command only after the elapse of a defined period of time. So, as written
`another instruction in the prior art could exist as long as this instruction
`reactivates after the elapse of a defined period of time also exists, it's still
`met.
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`JUDGE WHITE: Counselor, Patent Owner seems to be arguing that
`your view of the usage of the word "comprising" in this context causes
`comprising to, I guess, overwhelm or the language that is specified here,
`because they're saying that if comprising means that you can awaken with
`other means, then you have basically removed the instruction to reactivate,
`that it no longer has a real purpose if you can reactivate due to the motion, or
`whatever have you, instruction. What is your response to that?
`MR. CITROEN: Sure, Your Honor, and that's -- if we can go to slide
`12, please, Arvind? Their argument -- actually let's go to slide 13 -- their
`argument, and they focus a lot on this Liberty Ammunition case, is that, we're
`construing in the claims -- we're construing in the claims in a way that would
`essentially nullify this last instruction to reactivate, but if you look at this,
`this Federal Circuit, this case, just as an example to illustrate why we believe
`his point is wrong.
`If we can go to slide 13 -- I'm sorry -- 14. The Federal Circuit in this
`case rejected the construction of intermediate opposite ends, and it was all
`about whether the interface, which is on the figures in the left-hand side, the
`vertical line where -- I'm sorry -- the highlighted purple portions, whether
`those fell within the intermediate opposite ends.
`The Federal Circuit -- excuse me -- the Federal Circuit rejected the
`construction for this term, because the construction would cover an interface
`that is not only between the opposing ends, but also outside of that position,
`so the bottom left picture there where the purple goes all the way around,
`which would render that limitation, intermediate opposite ends, a nullity.
`In other words, the construction broadened the term itself so that it
`could be met based on something that didn’t actually fall within an
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`intermediate opposite end. That's not the situation that we have here.
`Samsung isn't arguing if the limitation instructions to reactivate the motion
`sensing algorithm from the sleep command after elapsed at a defined period
`of time, also covers instructions to reactivate after some other event.
`As Keynetik contends, all we're arguing is that this limitation would
`still be met even if there are other instructions that could reactivate the
`motion sensing algorithm in addition to an instruction that reactivates after
`the elapse of the defined period of time, which we argue is still required by
`the claims. So, the point is, if there's an additional instruction. I'm going to
`give an example. If you have a claim for a razor blade comprising a first,
`second, and third razor, and the prior art discloses a razor blade that has four
`razors, it still meets the limitation because it has three razors, and that's
`actually the Gillette case, the facts from the Gillette case which is discussed
`in the Liberty Ammunition case,
`Our example here, or our claim here is similar, we have three
`instructions. All we're arguing is, you could have a fourth instruction and
`the claims can still be met, as long as the three instructions that are explicitly
`recited in the claims are still satisfied. That's our point, and that's what we
`believe the prior art discloses, Liberty in particular, which I'll get to.
`And one other thing, just on this slide I want to point out, one of the
`reasons, the Federal Circuit rejected this construction is because it would
`have encompassed a prior art projectile within the construction of the claim,
`it would have encompassed that prior art projectile, and that couldn’t be
`right. So, there's that basis as well, I was relying on, and it was an important
`part of the Federal Circuit's decision, that scenario doesn’t exist here either.
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`So, one other point I'd like to make on this reactivation limitation, and
`if we can go back to slide 11, Arvind? I just want to go to the specification,
`we've already talked about the claim language, well, what does the
`specification say? If you look at Figure 12, in the corresponding course and
`specification which is column 14, line 27 to 29, it broadly describes sending
`a wakeup command without reference to what actually triggers that
`command. It's much broader. Only later in the specification does it state
`that the command maybe sent after a certain amount of time, but that portion
`of the specification explicitly states that it's an example, and that portion is
`column 14, line 29 to 43.
`So with that, I want to go to the next claim construction issue. So, if
`we can jump to slide 19. So, the last issue here with claim construction I
`want to talk about is the time, it relates to the time in the sleep command.
`Our position is that the command need only be sent after the prior command
`is executed, because that's all the claims require.
`Keynetik argues that the sleep command cannot just be after the prior
`command, but instead must also have some direct result, there must be a
`cause and effect type relationship, and that's if we look at slide 20 that
`summarizes their position.
`But if we can go to slide 21: If you look at the intrinsic record, the
`specification, the claims, the figure, they all support Samsung's position
`here, the claims at the very top, it merely states, after. If you look at the
`specification it recites, following the execution of the command. If you look
`at the figures, it merely states that the wakeup command be sent after the
`sleep command. That's the sequence.
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`So, the specification is pretty clear, there is no requirement that there
`has to be a cause and effect relationship, this is just another example of
`Keynetik trying to narrow the claims as much as possible to avoid the prior
`art here.
`If we can go to slide 22: So what Keynetik tries to do to narrow the
`claims is they point to, what is the purpose? They pull out a purpose from
`the specification of the 146 Patent, and their point is that the purpose of that
`invention relates to ignoring returning motions, so the claims must return --
`ignore return motion, in order to do that there must be a cause and effect
`relationship.
`The problem with that is it's improper to import these embodiments,
`these examples from the specification in this way. The claims say nothing
`about ignoring return motion. They just state: sending a sleep command and
`after the sleep command -- sorry -- sending the sleep command after the
`prior command is executed. That's all the claim recites, it's a very broad
`claim.
`So, I'd like to go ahead and go to some of the prior art issues, so if we
`can go to slide 24 -- let's go to 25 actually. Here, we have a summary of the
`issues. I'm going to start with Liberty, and a lot of the issues with Liberty
`come back to these claim construction disputes.
`So the first one deals with the sleep command and to reactivate -- the
`issue is whether Liberty discloses these particular instructions. And our
`position is that it does, under either construction, whether we go to
`Samsung's constructions or Keynetik's construction.
`So first, if you go to slide 26: Under Samsung's construction I think
`the issue here, the argument is pretty straightforward, and it's undisputed.
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`Liberty discloses the command to start the suppressing movement, and stop
`suppressing after an elapse of time. That's enough to meet these limitations
`under Samsung's constructions.
`I think where the bigger dispute lies, if you can go to slide 27, is under
`Keynetik's construction, is this limitation met? And our position is, is that it
`is. If you look at Liberty it explains that the point of movement output is
`suppressed, either -- until either the distance exceeds the distance threshold,
`or the amount of lapse time exceeds a time threshold.
`So, if the distance threshold is never reached, as recited in claim 22,
`all these limitations are met, because all movement would be ignored, and
`reactivation would occur after the elapse of a defined period of time. That's
`exactly what the claims require. So, in that particular scenario Liberty meets
`the limitations of claim 22.
`Now, if we can go to slide 28. There're a couple of cases I think are
`just good examples that help us understand the -- or we can analogize to help
`us understand the issue here and the position of why Liberty disclosed these
`limitations.
`The first is Exergen, and this case generally relates to thermometers,
`and the question here was whether the prior art discloses detecting
`temperature from two portions of biological tissues, so skin, your eardrum,
`two portions of biological tissue. Exergen, the plaintiff here, argued that that
`this limitation was not met by the prior art because the art detected radiation
`from a thermostat itself, in addition to the two portions of biological tissue.
`The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, because the claim does not
`recite the radiation must only, or the temperature must only be detected from
`biological tissue, relying on the fact that these claims are comprising claims,
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`just like 22 here. The fact that the prior art detected radiation from
`biological tissue was sufficient because that's all the claim required.
`It didn’t matter that the temperature was also detected from the
`thermometer itself. And the facts here are similar, the claims don't preclude
`reactivation for reasons other than elapsed time, so long as the prior art
`discloses reactivation due to the elapse of time, this limitation is met, and as
`we just discussed, that's what Liberty discloses.
`And just quickly, if can go to slide 29, I also want to mention the
`Boesen case, and this is probably even more on point. And this case dealt
`with touch screen displays that you actually touch to give different inputs.
`So, in this claim the question was whether the prior art disclosed the
`limitations of the required input via the touch screen display. And the
`Federal Circuit found in this case an Acura navigation system, a navigation
`system in the Acura cars discloses the limitation, and in this case they
`rejected the plaintiff's argument that this limitation was not met, because the
`Acura system included a joystick, a hard joystick that could also be used to
`provide the input, in addition to the ability to provide the input on the touch
`screen itself. In this case the Court's reasoning was that as long as the Acura
`system can and does perform the claimed input via touch screen, it's of no
`consequence that the input could also be some joystick, some other type of
`input.
`The Court explains that the claims are comprising claims, just like
`here, claim 22, and the Court also explained that there's no language in the
`claim that the input must always come from the touch screen, just like here,
`the claims all say that reactivation must be always due to elapse of the
`defined period of time. So the facts look very similar.
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`JUDGE WHITE: Counselor?
`MR. CITROEN: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE WHITE: Let's go back to the sleep command in Liberty then.
`So under -- Liberty discloses, if you have a device and you're going to define
`fine mode, while you're in that fine mode you then reorient the device as is
`discussed in the patent. Would that motion -- would that reorientation, that
`intentional movement be ignored under Liberty?
`MR. CITROEN: Under Liberty it could be, yes, because Liberty -- so
`Liberty explains that when you're in this fine mode clicking, you have set
`thresholds, and the set thresholds are adjustable, that's at Exhibit 1005,
`column 16, line 52 to 54, it also explains the techniques can be applied to
`any known device interaction that yields an undesirable movement, that's
`Exhibit 1005, column 18, line 41 to 44. What Liberty explains is that if you
`have a threshold of movement that you can change depending on the
`circumstance and what you movement you want to ignore, and you also have
`a time threshold.
`So Liberty explains that, yes, you could have a threshold that has --
`that is high enough that it would ignore those types of movements, it's a
`broad disclosure and the prior art is good for all that it teaches. So it's our
`position, yes, Liberty does explain that, or does disclose that. And of course
`that all assumes that the claims, which say nothing about return motion, say
`nothing about intentional and unintentional movement are actually required.
`Again, our position is the claims don't require any of that, they're
`much broader, they simply state a sleep command, which our position is,
`you need to ignore some sense movement, that's what Liberty discloses. But
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`if you do go that narrow with the claims based on the specification we
`believe it's still disclosed.
`So with that, Your Honor, I'd like to move to the next issue. If you
`can go to slide 30, please: So, the next issue is related -- actually let's go to -
`- whether Liberty discloses the sleep command sense after the command is
`executed, and if we could go to slide 8, really quickly, just to give us some
`contest.
`The second instruction recites, "Instruction to send the sleep
`command to the motion input algorithm after the command is executed."
`The question is, does Liberty disclose this limitation focusing specifically on
`"after"?
`So, if we can go back to -- let's go to slide 31. So, Keynetik's position
`is that, and we discussed this earlier, this limitation requires the sleep
`command to be sent as a direct result of the execution of the prior art
`command. And our position, under both interpretations, ours, which simply
`requires it to be after as the claim requires, and under Keynetik's
`construction this limitation is met.
`Let's go to slide 32. Again, our argument is pretty straightforward,
`under our construction because Liberty discloses movements, and after that
`movement you have a sleep command. I'm going to go ahead and jump to
`Keynetik's interpretation where I think there's more of a dispute here.
`So, if we go to slide 33: Even if the claims were interpreted to provide
`some direct correlation as Keynetik asked the Board to interpret these
`claims, Liberty still discloses this limitation. So, the issue deals with
`velocity, and the discussion of velocity in liberty. And if we can go back so
`we can look at some of the disclosure here.
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`So, slide 32: Liberty's system, "The sleep state is only entered if the
`velocity falls below a certain threshold, and that's shown in this bottom
`portion here, Exhibit 1005, column 18, line 25 to 34. It states, "For
`Example, if the velocity of the hand-held device is below a predetermined
`velocity threshold, then the first technique is employed, with discards
`motion data generated to subsequent to a detected event."
`Now Keynetik spends a lot of time, arguing this limitation isn't met,
`because this fine mode clicking technique, involves the user also pressing a
`button in addition to looking at the velocity, and whether it's below a certain
`threshold. So, first of all, I want to be clear that what Liberty actually
`explains, is that you look at the velocity of the -- and I'm quoting from
`Liberty, quote, "The velocity of the hand-held device at the time of button
`actuation, or at the time just before button actuation." And that's Exhibit
`1005, column 18, line 25 to 28.
`So the button press is really just used more as a reference point, it's for
`determining when to examine the velocity of the pointer movement. It's also
`worth noting that the button press is just an example in Liberty, we spend a
`lot of time -- or Keynetik spends a lot of time talking about this button press.
`Liberty applies to any time type of interaction that yields an
`undesirable movement, so some movement that you don't want to be
`reflected on the pointer. Liberty is much broader than a button press, and
`that's Exhibit 1005, column 18, line 41 to 49.
`So, either way this argument by Keynetik is just another attempt to
`narrow the claims to avoid the prior art, and in this case, instead of the sleep
`command simply being after the prior art command is executed, or even as a
`direct response to the prior execution, now Keynetik is arguing again with its
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`construction, the claim precludes any other events that may also be involved
`with triggering the sleep command in addition to some movement. The
`claims don't require this, and the spec doesn’t require that, this is just
`another attempt to avoid the prior art.
`Now I just want to, quickly, on slide 35, I just want to point out that
`even their own expert admitted during his deposition that velocity is a factor
`that you have to look at to determine whether you're going to enter into the
`sleep command as disclosed by Liberty. And that's our point. Yes, there is
`some explanation that the button presses, when you look to see what the
`velocity is, but again, the claims don't preclude, as a comprising claim, they
`don't preclude some other event, some other activity, that's also involved.
`As long as there is some movement that triggers the sleep command,
`which is the case in Liberty, this limitation is met, and their expert agrees
`that velocity is considered, which is, obviously, you're looking at the
`movement, the velocity of the pointer.
`Your Honor, how much time do I have?
`JUDGE PETTIGREW: You have about four minutes left of your
`initial.
`MR. CITROEN: Okay. Thank you.
`JUDGE PETTIGREW: But don't feel the need to use it all.
`MR. CITROEN: Okay.
`JUDGE PETTIGREW: We'll reserve what you have remaining for
`your rebuttal.
`MR. CITROEN: Okay. Thank you. So we go to slide 36, I'd like to
`talk about the combination, and there's a lot of issues that are raised with
`respect to the combination, so I'll go through some of them quickly,
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`especially given the time. The first issue is whether the combination
`discloses the limitation after, the sleep command is after again, the command
`is executed.
`If we go to slide 37, one of their arguments is Liberty doesn’t disclose
`this limitation, sending a command after the prior command is executed.
`We've already talked about that, it does.
`But the one thing I'd really like to point out here, if we can go to slide
`41, is that this is a combination and they attack the references individually
`instead. If you look here, and this is an excerpt from our expert's declaration
`at Exhibit 1002, paragraph 134, "The combination would include sending
`the sleep command at the appropriate time, which is after movement
`command is executed." So when you look at the combination, even if you
`assume Liberty doesn’t disclose this limitation, it is in the combination, it is
`disclosed.
`If we can go to slide 44, please -- and slide 45 actually? Another
`argument that Keynetik makes with respect to the combination is that
`Noguera only discloses one type of period instead of two distinct types of
`periods, which they call an awake period and a sleep period.
`If you can go to slide 46: Noguera's delay period althou