`WASHINGTON, D.C. 20436
`
`Before The Honorable Thomas B. Pender
`Administrative Law Judge
`
`Investigation No. 337-TA-1057
`
`))
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`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`
`In the Matter of
`
`CERTAIN ROBOTIC VACUUM
`CLEANING DEVICES AND
`COMPONENTS THEREOF SUCH AS
`SPARE PARTS
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`RESPONDENTS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`RELEVANT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES .................................................. 2
`
`A.
`B.
`
`GENERAL PRINCIPLES .............................................................................................. 2
`MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION LIMITATIONS .................................................................... 4
`
`III.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF THE DISPUTED TERMS .............................................. 5
`
`A.
`
`’308 PATENT ............................................................................................................ 5
`
`1.
`2.
`3.
`
`’308 brief summary ..................................................................................... 5
`’308 level of skill in the art ......................................................................... 7
`’308 disputed terms ..................................................................................... 8
`
`a.
`
`“Sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot” ........................... 8
`
`B.
`
`’090 PATENT ............................................................................................................ 9
`
`1.
`2.
`3.
`
`’090 brief summary ..................................................................................... 9
`’090 level of skill in the art ....................................................................... 10
`’090 disputed terms ................................................................................... 10
`
`a.
`
`“Housing” .................................................................................... 10
`
`C.
`
`’233 PATENT .......................................................................................................... 13
`
`1.
`2.
`3.
`
`’233 brief summary ................................................................................... 13
`’233 patent level of skill in the art ............................................................ 15
`’233 disputed terms ................................................................................... 15
`
`a.
`
`“Pass between” ............................................................................ 15
`
`D.
`
`’490 PATENT .......................................................................................................... 18
`
`1.
`2.
`3.
`
`’490 brief summary ................................................................................... 18
`’490 level of skill in the art ....................................................................... 19
`’490 disputed terms ................................................................................... 21
`
`a.
`b.
`c.
`
`“Bounce mode”............................................................................ 21
`“Isolated area” ............................................................................ 26
`“Control system” ......................................................................... 30
`
`E.
`
`’553 PATENT .......................................................................................................... 39
`
`1.
`2.
`
`’553 brief summary ................................................................................... 39
`’553 level of skill in the art ....................................................................... 42
`
`ii
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 2
`
`
`
`3.
`
`’553 disputed terms ................................................................................... 42
`
`a.
`b.
`c.
`
`“Speed setting” ............................................................................ 42
`“Heading setting” ........................................................................ 43
`“While continuing toward the object” ...................................... 44
`
`F.
`
`’924 PATENT .......................................................................................................... 50
`
`1.
`2.
`3.
`
`’924 brief summary ................................................................................... 50
`’924 level of skill in the art ....................................................................... 51
`’924 disputed terms ................................................................................... 51
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 56
`
`
`
`iii
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 3
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State University,
`212 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2000)............................................................................................2, 50
`
`Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................34
`
`Advanced Ground Info. Sys. v. Life360, Inc.,
`No. 2015-1732, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13707 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 28, 2016)..................................5
`
`Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
`314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................30
`
`Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg.,
`73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996)..................................................................................................58
`
`B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
`124 F.3d 1419 (Fed.Cir. 1997).................................................................................................35
`
`Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
`922 F.2d 792. (1990) ................................................................................................................55
`
`Becton, Dickinson and Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group,
`616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................11
`
`CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG,
`224 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000)................................................................................................48
`
`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..................................................................................................4
`
`Certain Computing or Graphics Systems,
`Inv. No. 337-TA-984, Order No. 42, at 12 (Jul. 15, 2016) ........................................................5
`
`Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................4
`
`Engel Indus. Inc. v. Lockformer Co.,
`96 F.3d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996)..................................................................................................11
`
`Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc.,
`209 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000)..................................................................................................5
`
`iv
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 4
`
`
`
`Gaus v. Conair Corp.,
`363 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................11
`
`Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
`514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................48
`
`Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
`256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..........................................................................................11, 47
`
`IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.Com, Inc.,
`430 F.32d 1377, 1384 (2005) ...................................................................................................40
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) .........................................2
`
`Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc.,
`156 F.3d 1206, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1998)......................................................................................34
`
`Massachusetts Instit. of Tech. v. Abacus Software,
`462 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................34
`
`Media Rights Techs, Inc. v. Capital One Financial Corp.,
`800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................34
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.,
`357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................49
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................46
`
`Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Intern., Inc.,
`778 F. 3d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2015).............................................................................................8, 9
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) .......................................................................2, 3, 16
`
`Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc.,
`451 F.3d 841 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................11
`
`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni,
`158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................3
`
`Rheox, Inc. v. Entact, Inc.,
`276 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..................................................................................................4
`
`Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc.,
`769 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................5, 34
`
`v
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 5
`
`
`
`SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................25
`
`Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993)................................................................................................48
`
`Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. v. Symantec Corp.,
`811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................50
`
`Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown,
`939 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991)................................................................................................48
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)..............................................................................................3, 30
`
`In re Wertheim,
`541 F.2d 257 (CCPA 1976) .......................................................................................................8
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) ....................................................................... passim
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 6
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Complainant asserts six patents and 50 claims in this investigation. The six asserted
`
`patents are: U.S. Patent No. 7,155,308 (the “’308 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 8,474,090 (the “’090
`
`patent”); U.S. Patent No. 9,038,233 (the “’233 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 6,809,490 (the “’490
`
`patent”); U.S. Patent No. 8,600,553 (the “’553 patent”); and U.S. Patent No. 9,486,924 (the
`
`“’924 patent”).
`
`The six asserted patents all relate to robot vacuums for autonomously cleaning rooms and
`
`homes. No asserted patent was filed before the year 2000—a time when robotics and
`
`automation, including in the vacuum space, was already robust. Although all asserted patents
`
`survived prosecution, it was not without concessions and narrowing claim elements. Critically
`
`for the Complainant, the accused products do not practice many of these narrowing claim
`
`elements when they are interpreted under their plain meaning. In this regard, the parties’ claim
`
`construction disputes largely stem from Complainant’s refusal to accept the plain meaning of its
`
`own claims.
`
`For example, the ’490 patent requires “a bounce mode whereby the robot travels
`
`substantially in a direction away from an obstacle after encountering the obstacle.” Respondents
`
`have proposed nothing more than this term take on its plain meaning. But, Complainant has
`
`refused. Instead, Complainant muddies the term asking the court that instead of plain meaning
`
`the “bounce mode” should encompass “whereby the robot turns to a new heading or turns to a
`
`new heading accompanied by a movement forward, and then continues to travel away from an
`
`obstacle after encountering the obstacle.” This re-writing of the claim to preserve some
`
`infringement argument is improper.
`
`Likewise, the ’553 patent requires a reduced speed operation “while continuing towards
`
`the object.” The plain meaning dictates that in the reduced speed state the robot keeps a steady
`1
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 7
`
`
`
`heading and does not change directions. Complainant apparently abandons this plain meaning
`
`and, instead, advances an argument where “continuing towards the object” includes evading the
`
`object. Continuing its trend, for the ’924 patent, Complainant refuses to accept that the plain
`
`meaning of “instructions configured to cause a processor . . .” is a software program or machine
`
`executable code, as is well-known in the art. Instead, Complainant attempts to expand the plain
`
`meaning of the computing term “instructions” to be “information.” The list goes on as explained
`
`below.
`
`Respondents’ proposed constructions consistently stay
`
`true
`
`to
`
`the claims,
`
`the
`
`specifications, and the plain meaning. Complainant’s, on the other hand, do not. For this reason,
`
`it is Respondents’ proposed constructions that are the right ones.
`
`II.
`
`RELEVANT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES
`
`A.
`
`GENERAL PRINCIPLES
`
`Claim construction is a matter of law for the court. Markman v. Westview Instruments,
`
`Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). In this regard,
`
`claim construction focuses on the intrinsic evidence, including the claims themselves, the patent
`
`specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Because patent specifications may incorporate materials by
`
`reference—including other patent publications and provisional patent applications—those
`
`materials which are incorporated by reference are considered part of the intrinsic record
`
`themselves. See Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State University, 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2000) (holding that materials incorporated by reference are “effectively part of the host
`
`document as if [they] were explicitly contained therein.”).
`
`“It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to
`
`which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quotations
`
`2
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 8
`
`
`
`omitted). The claims, however, “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a
`
`part.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quotations omitted). In fact, “the specification ‘is always
`
`highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best
`
`guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
`
`Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). As a result, “[t]he construction that
`
`stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the
`
`invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per
`
`Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`In addition to the specification, the prosecution history should be considered in
`
`determining the proper claim construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. In fact, “the prosecution
`
`history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor
`
`understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of
`
`prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`
`1317.
`
`After considering the intrinsic evidence, extrinsic evidence may “shed useful light on the
`
`relevant art,” however, it is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally
`
`operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quotations omitted). Further,
`
`extrinsic evidence cannot be used to contradict the intrinsic record. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at
`
`1584 (holding that extrinsic evidence can be used to inform the Court, but not to contradict the
`
`intrinsic evidence) (citations omitted).
`
`The claim terms should only deviate from their plain meaning when read in view of the
`
`specification when: (1) “the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished that term
`
`from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or
`
`3
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 9
`
`
`
`described a particular embodiment as important to the invention;” or (2) “the patentee acted as
`
`his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the
`
`specification or prosecution history.” Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322,
`
`1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Rheox, Inc. v. Entact, Inc., 276 F.3d 1319, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
`
`(“The prosecution history limits the interpretation of claim terms so as to exclude any
`
`interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.”) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, there is
`
`a “heavy presumption” that the plain meaning to one of skill in the art in view of the
`
`specification controls. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2002) (citations omitted).
`
`B. MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION LIMITATIONS
`
`Claim terms may be construed as “means-plus-function” limitations. Means-plus-
`
`function limitations are defined by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 61 which states:
`
`An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
`means or step for performing a specified function without the
`recital of structure, materials, or acts in support thereof, and such
`claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
`material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
`thereof.
`
`Claims that include the word “means” are presumed to be interpreted under § 112, ¶ 6.
`
`Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “[T]he failure
`
`to use the word ‘means’ also creates a rebuttable presumption—this time that § 112, para. 6 does
`
`not apply.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
`
`Particularly, in Williamson, the Federal Circuit found that claim terms should be construed as
`
`
`
`1 This has been recodified as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) by the America Invents Act (“AIA’), but
`because all the patents at issue have pre-AIA priority dates respondents refer to the older version
`of the statute.
`
`4
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 10
`
`
`
`means-plus-function terms when “the claim term…recites function without reciting sufficient
`
`structure for performing that function.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. As the presiding ALJ has
`
`correctly pointed out, in Williamson, the Court lowered the bar for finding a claim term to be a
`
`means-plus-function term in instances where the word “means” is not used. See Certain
`
`Computing or Graphics Systems, Inv. No. 337-TA-984, Order No. 42, at 12 (Jul. 15, 2016). The
`
`Federal Circuit recently upheld the lower bar for rebutting the presumption; finding that “[i]in
`
`determining whether this presumption has been rebutted, the challenger must establish by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence that the claims are to be governed by § 112, ¶ 6.” Advanced
`
`Ground Info. Sys. v. Life360, Inc., No. 2015-1732, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13707, at *9 (Fed.
`
`Cir. Jul. 28, 2016).
`
`Construing means-plus-function limitations is a two-step process: (1) determine if the
`
`claim should be interpreted under § 112, ¶ 6 and (2) the term is construed by limiting the claim to
`
`the “corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification.” Robert Bosch,
`
`LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF THE DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A.
`
`1.
`
` ’308 PATENT
`
`’308 brief summary
`
`The ’308 patent describes a robot system comprising a micro processor 302, a drive
`
`subsystem 304 and one or more sensor subsystems 308. ’308 patent at 11:5-17. Each sensor
`
`subsystem has “a defined relationship with respect to the housing and aimed at the surface for
`
`detecting the surface.” Id. at Abstract. There may be “a plurality of sensor subsystems spaced
`
`from each other on the housing of the robot.” Id. at 3:3-6. For example, Fig. 25 excerpted below
`
`shows “four cliff detector subsystems 342, 344, 346, and 348.” Id. at 11:24-32.
`
`5
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 11
`
`
`
`
`
`The ’308 patent describes a sensor subsystem as shown in Fig. 7 excerpted below. The
`
`sensor subsystem comprises an emitter 52’ and a detector 56’. Id. at 6:15-22. The emitter 52’
`
`and the detector 56’ are collimated such that the region where “the field of emission of emitter
`
`52’ as shown at 72 and the field of view of detector of 56’ as shown at 74 intersect is finite.” Id.
`
`(emphasis added). Therefore, the detected energy “decreases rapidly as the sensor-to-floor
`
`distance increases,” i.e., as the floor moves away from the region 70. Id. at 6:24-27. When a
`
`signal is not output by the detector, the expected floor is not present, i.e., the robot encounters a
`
`cliff. Id. at 8:15-23. In this case, an avoidance algorithm causes the robot to move away from
`
`the cliff. Id.
`
`6
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 12
`
`
`
`2.
`
`’308 level of skill in the art
`
`
`
`The ’308 patent relates to the field of robotics, which is a multidisciplinary field that
`
`encompasses mechanical, electrical, and computer technology. A person of ordinary skill in the
`
`art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’308 patent would hold a bachelor’s degree in
`
`physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, computer science, or a related
`
`discipline, and have at least one year of experience in the design and implementation of robotics
`
`and embedded systems, or some other equivalent combination of education and experience. See
`
`Exh. B, Martens Decl. at ¶28.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 13
`
`
`
`3.
`
`’308 disputed terms
`
`a.
`
`“Sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot”
`
`Location
`
`Complainant’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`Respondents’ Proposed
`Construction
`
`Claims 1 and 19
`
`Preamble is not limiting
`If the preamble is limiting,
`“sensor subsystem” means
`“obstacle detection sensor”’
`
`Preamble is limiting
`
`The preamble of all the asserted claims of the ’308 patent requires a “sensor subsystem
`
`for an autonomous robot.” ’308 patent at claims 1, 19. It is black letter law that a claim
`
`preamble is limiting when it “breathes life and meaning into the claim.” In re Wertheim, 541
`
`F.2d 257, 269 (CCPA 1976). Here the preamble does just that. The preamble reads “A sensor
`
`subsystem for an autonomous robot which rides on a surface, the sensor subsystem comprising: .
`
`. .” The claim body then goes on to list three distinct elements: (1) an optical emitter…; (2) a
`
`photon detector…; and (3) a circuit in communication…” These three claim elements standing
`
`alone lack the life and meaning necessary to understand what is claimed. Indeed, these elements
`
`are just part of the claimed subsystem. And, only once the preamble is taken into account does it
`
`become clear that these three elements are for something less than an entire robot: “a sensor
`
`subsystem for an autonomous robot.”
`
`Further, the body of the claims refers back to the preamble, requiring that “the
`
`autonomous robot” recited in the preamble be redirected when an “object” or “surface” is not
`
`present in a specific region.2 As a result, the preamble is a limitation, because it provides
`
`antecedent basis for “the autonomous robot” that is recited in the body of the claims. Pacing
`
`
`
`2 The claims define this region as the region where the field of view of the emitter intersects the
`field of view of the detector.
`
`8
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 14
`
`
`
`Techs., LLC v. Garmin Intern., Inc., 778 F. 3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding the preamble
`
`limiting because the “term ‘user’ in the preamble of claim 25 provides antecedent basis for the
`
`term ‘user’ in the body of that claim). For claim 19, this is further confirmed by dependent
`
`claims 32 and 33, which refer back to the “sensor subsystem” recited in the preamble, requiring
`
`that “the sensor subsystem” be “located at a forward portion of the robot” (claim 32) and that it
`
`“comprise at least three emitters and at least three detectors” (claim 33). See Pacing Techs., 778
`
`F.3d at 1024 (finding that the preamble phrase “repetitive motion pacing system” was limiting
`
`because it provides antecedent basis for the same term appearing in the body of a dependent
`
`claim). Similarly, for claim 1, the fact that the preamble is limiting is confirmed by dependent
`
`claim 6, which refers back to the “sensor subsystem” of the preamble. See id.
`
`B.
`
`1.
`
`’090 PATENT
`
`’090 brief summary
`
`The asserted claims of the ’090 patent relate to the wheel assembly of a robot vacuum.
`
`Particularly, the claims describe a spring suspension configuration for a robot vacuum “wherein
`
`each wheel is biased to an extended position away from the robot chassis by a spring extending
`
`between the arm and the robot chassis, and wherein, during cleaning, the weight of the floor
`
`cleaning robot overcomes a force from the spring biasing the wheels to an extended position.”
`
`The robot housing includes a power subsystem for autonomously driving the robot
`
`around a room. ’090 patent at 2:5-7. The robot is maneuvered on two wheels which are
`
`explained to be supported by the spring suspension system described in the claim. For example,
`
`the specification explains that “a biasing spring 24BS (hidden behind a leg of the clevis-shaped
`
`arm member 24CM in Fig. 3C) is disposed in combination with the clevis-shaped arm mounting
`
`shaft 24 and operative to bias the nose-wheel subassembly 24 to an ‘extended’ position whenever
`
`the nose-wheel subassembly loses contact with the surface.” ’090 patent at 4:48-54. In other
`9
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 15
`
`
`
`words, the robot traverses a floor with its wheels compressed inwards. If a wheel inadvertently
`
`drives off a ledge, the wheel springs to an extended position.
`
`2.
`
`’090 level of skill in the art
`
`The ’090 patent relates to the field of robotics, which is a multidisciplinary field that
`
`encompasses mechanical, electrical, and computer technology. A person of ordinary skill in the
`
`art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’090 patent would hold a bachelor’s degree in
`
`physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, computer science, or a related
`
`discipline, and have at least one year of experience in the design and implementation of robotics
`
`and embedded systems, or some other equivalent combination of education and experience. See
`
`Exh. B, Martens Decl. at ¶28.
`
`3.
`
`’090 disputed terms
`
`a.
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`“Housing”
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`Location
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`Complainant’s Proposed
`Construction
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`Respondents’ Proposed
`Construction
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`Claims 1, 5, 7, 10, 13, 14,
`16
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`“structural periphery of the floor
`cleaning robot”
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`“a structure, distinct from the
`chassis, providing protection of
`and access to components
`attached or integrated to the
`chassis”
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`The plain meaning of the claims and the specification of the ’090 patent support
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`Respondents’ construction of “housing” as “a structure, distinct from the chassis, providing
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`protection of and access to components attached or integrated to the chassis.” Claims 1 and 10 of
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`the ’090 patent each recite: “A floor cleaning robot comprising: a housing and a chassis . . ..” As
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`a matter of plain meaning, this claim language indicates that the housing must be distinct from the
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`chassis.
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`10
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`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 16
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`“Where a claim lists elements separately, ‘the clear implication of the claim language’ is
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`that those elements are ‘distinct component[s]’ of the patented invention.” Becton, Dickinson and
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`Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, 616 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Gaus v. Conair
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`Corp., 363 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In Becton, the claim recited “a hinged arm . . . and
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`spring means.” The Federal Circuit held that the separately listed “hinged arm” and “spring
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`means” are separate and distinct structures. Id. at 1254-55. Here, similarly, the separately listed
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`“housing” and “chassis” must be separate and distinct structures. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v.
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`Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that an “authorization code”
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`is separate and distinct from a “request reproduction code” when “these codes are separately
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`recited in claim 1.”); Engel Indus. Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1404-05 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
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`(concluding that where a claim provides for two separate elements, a “second portion” and a
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`“return portion,” these two elements “logically cannot be one and the same”); see also Primos,
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`Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., 451 F.3d 841, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he terms ‘engaging’ and
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`‘sealing’ are both expressly recited in the claim and therefore ‘engaging’ cannot mean the same
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`thing as ‘sealing’; if it did, one of the terms would be superfluous.”).
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`A point of confusion is that the specification does not use the term “housing,” instead
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`referring to a “housing infrastructure.” But the specification’s “housing infrastructure” is not the
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`claimed “housing” because—contrary to the claim language—the “housing infrastructure” is a
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`broader term that includes (rather than being distinct from) the chassis and further includes a
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`“cover” that corresponds to the claimed housing. The specification of the ’090 patent states that
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`“the housing infrastructure 20 of the robot 10 comprises a chassis 21, a cover 22, a displaceable
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`bumper 23 . . .. The chassis 21 and the cover 22 are detachably integrated in combination by any
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`suitable means, e.g., screws, and in combination, the chassis 21 and cover 22 form a structural
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`11
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`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 17
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`
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`envelope of minimal height having a generally cylindrical configuration . . ..” ’090 patent, at
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`3:30-50 (emphasis added). Fig. 2 of the ’090 patent, excerpted below, illustrates the housing
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`infrastructure 20, the chassis 21, and the cover 22:
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`’090 patent, Fig. 2.
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`Accordingly, the claim requirement of “a housing and a chassis” refers to the cover 22 and
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`the chassis 21, respectively. In other words, “housing” in Claims 1 and 10 means what the
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`specification calls a “cover,” which is explicitly defined as providing protection of and access to
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`components attached or integrated to the chassis.3 Id. at 3:40-45 (“The cover 22 is preferably
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`molded from a material such as plastic as a unitary element that is complementary in
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`configuration with the chassis 21 and provides protection of and access to elements/components
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`mounted to the chassis 21 and/or comprising the self-adjusting cleaning head subsystem 80.”).
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`Because the claim language is “a housing and a chassis,” not “a housing comprising a chassis,” it
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`3 The parties agree that “chassis” should be construed as “the frame of the floor cleaning robot to
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`which components are attached or integrated.”
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`12
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`Silver Star Exhibit 1021 - 18
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`would be improper to equate the “housing” in Claims 1 and 10 with the “housing infrastructure
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`20” in the ’090 patent s