UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
`WASHINGTON, D.C.
`
`Before The Honorable Thomas B. Pender
`Administrative Law Judge
`
`
`
`
`In the Matter of
`
`CERTAIN ROBOTIC VACUUM
`CLEANING DEVICES AND
`COMPONENTS THEREOF SUCH AS
`SPARE PARTS
`
`
`Investigation No. 337-TA-1057
`
`
`
`
`
`
`COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022
`
`

`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`’308 Patent .............................................................................................................. 2
`
`i.
`
`“A sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot which rides on a surface”
`(Claim 1) / “A sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot” (Claim 19) .... 2
`
`B.
`
`’090 Patent .............................................................................................................. 4
`
`i.
`
`“housing” .................................................................................................... 4
`
`C.
`
`’233 Patent .............................................................................................................. 9
`
`i.
`
`“the side brush having bundles of bristles and being positioned such that
`the bundles of bristles pass between the cliff detector and the floor surface
`during a rotation of the side brush around the axis, the bundles of bristles
`being separated by a gap, the gap being configured to prevent occlusion of
`the cliff detector beam during at least part of the rotation of the side brush
`around the axis” .......................................................................................... 9
`
`D.
`
`’490 Patent ............................................................................................................ 10
`
`i.
`
`ii.
`
`iii.
`
`“a bounce mode whereby the robot travels substantially in a direction
`away from an obstacle after encountering the obstacle” .......................... 10
`
`“isolated area” ........................................................................................... 13
`
`“control system configured to operate the robot in a plurality of
`operational modes and to select from among the plurality of modes in real
`time in response to signals generated by the obstacle detection sensor” .. 15
`
`E.
`
`’553 Patent ............................................................................................................ 28
`
`i.
`
`ii.
`
`“speed setting” and “heading setting”....................................................... 28
`
`“while continuing towards the object” ...................................................... 30
`
`F.
`
`’924 Patent ............................................................................................................ 34
`
`i.
`
`“instructions configured to cause a processor of the cleaning robot to
`execute a cleaning operation” (Claim 1) / “instructions configured to cause
`a processor of the cleaning robot to perform operations including
`executing a cleaning operation” (Claim 12) ............................................. 34
`
`III.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 39
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(INV. NO. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - ii
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 2
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc.,
`618 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..............................................................................................2, 3
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`2014 WL 252045 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) ..............................................................................7
`
`Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc.,
`672 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................2
`
`Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group,
`616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................5
`
`Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc.,
`749 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................31
`
`Cannon Rubber Ltd. v. The First Years, Inc.,
`163 F. App’x 870 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ........................................................................................5, 6
`
`Card-Monroe Corp. v. Tuftco Corp.,
`No. 1:14-cv-292, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141597 (E.D. Tenn. Sept 1, 2017) ...................18, 19
`
`Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
`289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002)....................................................................................................4
`
`Emblaze Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,
`38 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2014) .....................................................................................38
`
`Fontem Ventures, B. V. v. NJOY, Inc.,
`No. CV 14-1645, 2015 WL 12731939 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015) .............................................6
`
`Gaus v. Conair Corp.,
`363 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................6
`
`Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P.,
`No. 2016-2297, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15345 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2017) .................................3
`
`Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc.,
`37 Fed. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2002)...........................................................................................8
`
`Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
`256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................9
`
`(INV. NO. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - iii
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 3
`
`

`

`
`
`Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................17
`
`Kenall Mfg. Co. v. H.E. Williams, Inc.,
`No. 09 C 1284, 2013 WL 427119 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2013) ........................................................2
`
`Linear Tech. Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`566 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................6
`
`Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co.,
`No. 14-CV-3103, 2016 WL 706190 (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2016) .................................................6
`
`Mattox v. Infotopia, Inc.,
`136 F. App’x 366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..........................................................................................38
`
`Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
`800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..........................................................................................16, 20
`
`Northeastern Univ. v. Google, Inc.,
`No. 2:07-CV-486, 2010 WL 4511010 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2010) ..............................................7
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................1, 17, 36, 38
`
`Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
`663 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..............................................................................................5, 6
`
`Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................6
`
`Rowe v. Dror,
`112 F.3d 473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)....................................................................................................3
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am., LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................29
`
`Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
`659 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011)................................................................................................26
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)..................................................................................................33
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................19
`
`
`
`(INV. NO. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - iv
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 4
`
`

`

`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Respondents’ Opening Claim Construction Brief confirms that Respondents seek to
`
`improperly narrow and rewrite the claims. Not only do many of Respondents’ proposed
`
`constructions ignore the generally dispositive language of the specification (in violation of
`
`Phillips), they also read out preferred embodiments, create redundancies and logical
`
`inconsistencies, and seek unduly narrow limitations without any disclaimer or explicit re-
`
`definition to be found in the intrinsic record.
`
`Respondents also overstate and misapply claim construction precedent, and present some
`
`arguments that are simply irrelevant to the dispute at hand. For example, Respondents spent
`
`several pages of their Opening Brief critiquing Complainant’s treatment of the phrase “bounce
`
`mode” even though the disputed claim language does not include the phrase “bounce mode.”
`
`Similarly, Respondents speculate about Complainant’s intent in substituting “advancing” for
`
`“continuing” in an alternate proposal despite the actual dispute focusing on the narrowing
`
`limitation that Respondents propose to add. Respondents also included a lengthy expert
`
`declaration that ultimately yielded little more than a handful of conclusory opinions. Yet,
`
`Respondents did not even consistently adopt their own expert’s opinion on issues of
`
`corresponding structure, as will be explained below.
`
`In Reply, Complainant cuts through this misdirection to simplify and clarify the disputes
`
`for the ALJ. Complainant’s proposed constructions stay true to the words of the claims chosen
`
`by the patentee and are consistent with the patent specifications and prosecution histories.
`
`Accordingly, the ALJ should adopt Complainant’s proposed constructions.
`
`(INV. NO. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 1
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 5
`
`

`

`II.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`’308 Patent
`
`i.
`
`“A sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot which rides on a
`surface” (Claim 1) / “A sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot”
`
`(Claim 19)
`
`Claim(s)
`
`Complainant’s Construction
`
`Respondents’ Construction
`
`“obstacle detection sensor”
`
`Preamble is not limiting
`
`Preamble is limiting
`
`Ifthe preamble is limiting,
`“sensor subsystem” means
`
`“Sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot” is preamble language that is merely a
`
`descriptive name for what is recited in claims 1 and 19 of the ’308 patent. It adds nothing
`
`substantive to the body of these claims, which fully describe the elements of the sensor
`
`subsystem. Where, as here, “‘the preamble merely gives a descriptive name to the set of
`”’ (C
`
`limitations in the body of the claim that completely set forth the invention,
`
`[t]he preamble has
`
`no separate limiting effect.” Kenall Mfg. Co. v. HE. Williams, Inc, No. 09 C 1284, 2013 WL
`
`427119, at *3 (ND. 111. Feb. 1, 2013) (quoting Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc, 618 F.3d
`
`1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (attached as Exhibit 3); see also Aspar Evewear, Inc. v. Marchon
`
`EVewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1347-48 0:ed. Cir. 2012) (preamble not limiting when it “is not
`
`needed to give meaning to the claims, which recite structurally complete inventions without the
`
`preamble language” and “nothing in the prosecution history suggests that the preamble language
`
`was considered necessary to the patentability of the claims”). Accordingly, Respondents’
`
`proposed construction should be rejected.
`
`Respondents make two arguments to the contrary. First, they argue that the preamble
`
`“breathes life and meaning into the claim” solely because it delimits the intended use of the
`
`(DIV. N0. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 2
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 6
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 6
`
`

`

`
`
`claim. [See Respondents’ Opening Br. at 8 (“…only once the preamble is taken into account
`
`does it become clear that [the three claim elements] are for something less than an entire
`
`robot…”).] This argument fails as a matter of well-settled Federal Circuit law: preamble
`
`language that states only a purpose or intended use of an invention is not limiting. Georgetown
`
`Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P., No. 2016-2297, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15345, at *9 (Fed. Cir.
`
`Aug. 1, 2017) (“A preamble is not a claim limitation if the claim body ‘defines a structurally
`
`complete invention . . . and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the
`
`invention.’”) (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (attached as Exhibit
`
`10). Indeed, the preamble language that Respondents emphasize in their brief—“for an
`
`autonomous robot”—was recognized in the prosecution history for the ’308 patent’s
`
`continuation-in-part parent as “the intended use of the sensor system and imparts no patentable
`
`significance.”1 Because this language merely states the purpose or intended use of the invention,
`
`and is not essential to understand the claimed invention’s limitations, it does not constitute a
`
`claim limitation. Id. at *9-14.
`
`Respondents’ second argument is that because the body of the claims refers back to
`
`preamble language such as “sensor subsystem” and “the autonomous robot,” the preamble must
`
`be limiting because it supplies the claim bodies with an antecedent basis. Not so. As noted,
`
`“sensor subsystem for an autonomous robot” is a descriptive name for what is claimed and fully
`
`set forth in the body of the invention. See Am. Med. Sys., 618 F.3d at 1359. Respondents do not
`
`even suggest that this language adds anything of substance beyond what the claim limitations
`
`themselves cover. Although “dependence on a particular disputed preamble phrase for
`
`
`1 See 11/05/2002 Non-Final Rejection at pg. 2, ¶ 6, in Prosecution History for U.S. Patent
`Application No. 09/768,773, of which the ’308 patent is a continuation-in-part (attached as
`Exhibit 9).
`
`(INV. NO. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 3
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 7
`
`

`

`antecedent basis may limit claim scope because it indicates a reliance on both the preamble and
`
`claim body to define the claimed invention,” that is not the case here because the preamble
`
`language is not relied upon to define the invention.2 Catalina Alktg. Int 7 v. Coolsavings. com,
`
`Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). This is made clear in the prosecution
`
`history, where the Examiner explicitly noted that whether the sensor subsystem was “for an
`
`autonomous robot” “imparts no patentable significance” to the claimed invention.3 If this
`
`preamble language “imparts no patentable significance” to the claim, it cannot define the scope
`
`of the claim, and should not therefore be held limiting.
`
`B.
`
`’09!) Patent
`
`i.
`
`“housing”
`
`Claim(s)
`
`Complainant’s Construction
`
`Respondents’ Construction
`
`chassis”
`
`13, 14, 16
`
`“structural periphery of the
`floor cleaning robot”
`
`“a structure, distinct from the
`chassis, providing protection of
`and access to components
`attached or integrated to the
`
`The ALJ should reject Respondents’ construction because it is inconsistent with the
`
`intrinsic record and based on an improper application of precedent. Respondents incorrectly
`
`contend that when a claim uses two different words there can be no integration of the
`
`2 Even the case cited by Respondents, Pacing Technologies, LLC v. Garmin International, 1110.,
`states the rule that more than just antecedent basis is required to make a preamble limiting:
`“Because the preamble terms ‘user’ and ‘repetitive motion pacing system’ provide antecedent
`basis for and are necessary to understandpositive limitations in the body of claims in the ’843
`patent, we hold that the preamble to claim 25 is limiting.” 778 F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
`(emphasis added).
`
`3 See 11/05/2002 Non-Final Rejection at pg. 2, fl 6, in Prosecution History for US. Patent
`Application No. 09/768,773, of which the ’308 patent is a continuation-in-part (attached as
`Exhibit 9) (emphasis added).
`
`(M. NO. 337-TA—1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 4
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 8
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 8
`
`

`

`
`
`corresponding structures covered by those terms. [Respondents’ Opening Br. at 11 (“the
`
`separately listed ‘housing’ and ‘chassis’ must be separate and distinct structures”).] The Federal
`
`Circuit and other courts have repeatedly recognized that this proposition—which is the
`
`underpinning for Respondents’ entire position—is flawed.
`
`In Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., a jury decided Home Depot literally infringed
`
`several asserted claims. 663 F.3d 1221, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The district court denied Home
`
`Depot’s JMOL of noninfringement. Id. On appeal, “[c]iting Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco
`
`Healthcare Group, 616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010), Home Depot contend[ed] that when a claim
`
`lists elements separately, the accused device cannot infringe if it does not also contain separate
`
`elements corresponding to the claimed elements.” Id. The Federal Circuit disagreed. It
`
`explained that in Becton, “based on the intrinsic record, the terms ‘hinged arm’ and ‘spring
`
`means’ were construed to require separate structures—a requirement which carried through to
`
`the infringement analysis.” Id. (emphasis in original).
`
`However, in Powell, “the disclosure in the specification cut[] against Home Depot’s
`
`argument that the ‘cutting box’ and ‘dust collection structure’ must be separate components for
`
`purposes of the infringement analysis.” Id. The specification of the patent at issue in Powell
`
`disclosed that the “[c]utting box . . . defines an internal chamber wherein the rotating saw blade
`
`meets the work piece during the cutting process and functions to contain the sawdust and wood
`
`chips generated as the blade cuts through the wood.” Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 7,044,039).
`
`Thus, although the claim recited a cutting box and a dust collection structure, the Federal Circuit
`
`reasoned that one element could contain the other element. Id. at 1231-32. Tellingly,
`
`Respondents do “not cite any case law prohibiting a claim from reciting two limitations
`
`embodied by the same structural component.” Cannon Rubber Ltd. v. The First Years, Inc., 163
`
`(INV. NO. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 5
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 9
`
`

`

`
`
`F. App’x 870, 877 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (distinguishing TFY’s reliance on Gaus v. Conair Corp., 363
`
`F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
`
`
`
`Here, as in Powell, the patent’s disclosure cuts against the argument that there can be no
`
`integration of the “housing” and “chassis.”4 Complainant identified numerous instances of the
`
`specification teaching that the chassis is a composite part of the housing. [See Complainant’s
`
`Opening Br. at 15-16.] Courts have repeatedly held that terms should not be construed to require
`
`completely disassociated structures in such a situation. See Powell, 663 F.3d at 1231-32; Linear
`
`Tech. Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1049, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming the
`
`Commission’s modification of “the ALJ’s initial construction because the ALJ ‘too narrowly
`
`construed the asserted claims as requiring that the “second” and “third” circuits be entirely
`
`distinct without common circuit elements’”); Cannon, 163 F. App’x at 877 (“there is nothing in
`
`the ’850 patent specification or the claims that require the ‘deformable diaphragm’ and ‘valve
`
`means’ limitations to be embodied as two separate structural components”); Retractable Techs.,
`
`Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“the specifications and
`
`the claims indicate that the ‘retainer member’ and the ‘needle holder’ need not be two separate
`
`pieces”); Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., No. 14-CV-3103, 2016 WL 706190, at
`
`*14 (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2016) (“Becton is distinguishable from the present facts. Unlike the
`
`plaintiff in that case, Luminara does not contend that the separately-listed ‘body’ and ‘flame
`
`silhouette’ elements are ‘one and the same,’ but rather that they are distinct components that can
`
`be integrated.”) (attached as Exhibit 4); Fontem Ventures, B. V. v. NJOY, Inc., No. CV 14-1645,
`
`2015 WL 12731939, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015) (“In Becton, the specification confirmed that
`
`
`4 Complainant does not contend that the “chassis” structure is identical to the “housing”
`structure, but rather that the “chassis” can be a sub-component of the “housing.”
`
`(INV. NO. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 6
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 10
`
`

`

`
`
`the two claim elements were separate structures. In contrast, the intrinsic evidence of ’805 Patent
`
`and the ‘752 Patent suggest that the atomizing core/atomizer can be within the channel/flow
`
`passageway, not that they are separate.”) (attached as Exhibit 5); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.
`
`Co., 2014 WL 252045, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (rejecting Samsung’s contention that the
`
`claimed “portable electronic device with a keyboard and a touch screen display” could not
`
`include a virtual keyboard) (emphasis in original) (attached as Exhibit 6); Northeastern Univ. v.
`
`Google, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-486, 2010 WL 4511010, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2010) (noting that
`
`absent an explicit indication in the patent or prosecution history, claim terms should not be
`
`construed to require distinct structures) (attached as Exhibit 7).
`
`
`
`Respondents’ argument that “the specification’s ‘housing infrastructure’ is not the
`
`claimed ‘housing’” must also be rejected because it is simply Respondents’ claim term
`
`differentiation argument repeated in disguise. [Respondents’ Opening Br. at 11-12.]
`
`Specifically, Respondents’ argue that the disclosed “‘housing infrastructure’ is not the claimed
`
`‘housing’ because—contrary to the claim language—the ‘housing infrastructure’ is a broader
`
`term that includes (rather than being distinct from) the chassis.” [Id. at 11.] As discussed above,
`
`courts have flatly rejected the proposition that a claim cannot cite two limitations embodied by
`
`integrated structural components. In short, Respondents’ argument must be rejected because it is
`
`at odds with precedent.
`
`
`
`In addition, Respondents’ argument that “‘housing’ in Claims 1 and 10 means what the
`
`specification calls a ‘cover’” must also be rejected. [Id. at 12.] It is borderline preposterous that
`
`the claimed “housing” is more likely to be the “cover” than the “housing infrastructure.”
`
`Respondents’ only justification for rejecting “housing infrastructure” is infirm.
`
`(INV. NO. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 7
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 11
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`

`

`
`
`But even if it were not, Respondents give no basis to choose “cover,” which appears to be
`
`the source of Respondents’ construction. [Respondents’ Ex. A, Joint Claim Construction Chart
`
`at 2 (“a structure, distinct from the chassis, providing protection of and access to components
`
`attached or integrated to the chassis”).] For one thing, Figure 2 of the ’090 patent illustrates
`
`more than just the “the housing infrastructure 20, the chassis 21, and the cover 22.”
`
`[Respondents’ Opening Br. at 12.] It also, illustrates a bumper 23, carrying handle 25, and
`
`carrying handle ends 25E. ’090 Patent at Fig. 2. Respondents give no justification for equating
`
`“housing” with “cover” over any of the other items illustrated by Figure 2. Similarly,
`
`Respondents argue but fail to explain why or where the ’090 patent defines the combination of
`
`the chassis 21 and displaceable bumper 23 as the “structural periphery of the floor cleaning
`
`robot.” [Compare Respondents’ Opening Br. at 13 with ’090 Patent at Fig. 2, 2:23-29
`
`(“periphery of the housing infrastructure”); see also Complainant’s Opening Br. at 16.]
`
`Further, by construing “housing” as “cover,” Respondents appear to be trying to
`
`introduce additional, unsupported limitations into the claims. Namely, that the alleged housing
`
`(i.e., cover) is on the top of the robot and must provide protection of and access to components.
`
`[Respondents’ Opening Br. at 12 (“‘housing’ in Claims 1 and 10 means what the specification
`
`calls a ‘cover,’ which is explicitly defined as providing protection of and access to components
`
`attached or integrated to the chassis”).] Such unsupported additional limitations are not proper.
`
`Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 37 Fed. App’x 516, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that a
`
`claim construction which found no support in the intrinsic evidence was not proper).
`
`In view of the foregoing, the ALJ should reject Respondents’ attempt to disregard the law
`
`and the specification, and adopt Complainant’s position.
`
`(INV. NO. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 8
`
`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 12
`
`

`

`C.
`
`’233 Patent
`
`i.
`
`“the side brush having bundles of bristles and being positioned such
`that the bundles of bristles ass between the cIi detector and the oor
`
`surtace during a rotation of the side brush around the axis, the
`bundles of bristles being separated by a gap, the gap being configured
`
`to prevent occlusion of the cliff detector beam during at least part of
`the rotation of the side brush around the axis”
`
`Claim(s)
`
`Complainant’s Construction
`
`Respondents’ Construction No construction necessary
`
`“pass through the cliff detector
`beam”
`
`The ALJ should reject Respondents’ proposed construction because it needlessly rewrites
`
`the claim in terms that patentee did not choose. See Interactive Gift Erp., Inc. v. Compuserve
`
`Inc, 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In construing claims, the analytical focus must
`
`begin and remain centered on the language of the claims themselves, for it is that language that
`
`the patentee chose to use to ‘particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter
`
`which the patentee regards as his invention.”’) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112) (alterations in original).
`
`Nothing in Respondents’ briefjustifies their proposal to replace the patentee’s readily
`
`understandable claim language. Respondents incorrectly conclude that “[t]he only way a ‘gap’
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`separating the ‘bundles of bristles’ would ‘prevent occlusion of the cliff detector beam’ is if the
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`bristles would occlude (i.e., pass through and block) the cliff detector absent having that ‘gap’
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`between them, i.e., as would be the case with a fully circular set of bristles.” [Respondents’
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`Opening Br. at 16 (emphasis added).] Respondents’ construction requiring the bundles of
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`bristles to “pass through the cliff detector beam” precludes other ways to make use of the gap
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`between the bristles to prevent occlusion.
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`For example, the cliff detectors could be timed such that they are turned off when the
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`bristles pass underneath them (i. e., the cliff detector would be turned on only during the periods
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`(INV. N0. 337-TA-1057) — COMPLAINANT‘S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 9
`Silver Star Exhibit 1 022 - 1 3
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`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 13
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`of rotation where the gap regions pass underneath the detector). The synchronized timing of the
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`detector would make use of the gap region to prevent occlusion of the cliff detector. Further, by
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`timing the operation of the detector, the bundles of bristles would pass between the detector and
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`floor, but would never pass through the detector beam. Thus, Respondents’ construction must
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`also be rejected because it imports an extraneous limitation that the cliff detector beam must be
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`broken.
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`Finally, Respondents’ resort to the intrinsic record does not change the outcome.5
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`Respondents merely repeat through a summary of the claim drafiing their argument that the gap
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`between the bundles of bristles must not occlude the cliff detector beam somehow requires the
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`bundles of bristles to pass through the beam. As discussed above, a gap could prevent occlusion
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`even if the bundles of bristles never “pass[ed] through the cliff detector beam.”
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`Because the claim language is plain on its face and should not be loaded with fabricated
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`limitations, the ALJ should disregard Respondents’ needless rewriting of the claim and hold that
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`the term needs no construction.
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`D.
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`’49!) Patent
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`i.
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`“a bounce mode whereby the robot travels substantially in a direction
`away from an obstacle after encountering the obstacle”
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`Claim(s)
`
`Complainant’s Construction
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`“a bounce mode whereby the
`robot turns to a new heading or
`turns to a new heading
`accompanied by a movement
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`forward, and then continues to
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`Respondents’ Construction
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`Plain and ordinary meaning.
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`5 In referencing the prosecution history, Respondents incorrectly assert that “a prior template
`with an old date [December 14, 2012] in the header was used.” [Respondents’ Opening Br. at 17
`n.4.] A thorough review of the prosecution history—or a cursory glance at the first page of
`the’233 Patent—reveals that the patent application was filed on December 14, 2012, as reflected
`in the header of the Amendment.
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`(nw. N0. 337-TA—1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 10
`Silver Star Exhibit 1 022 - 1 4
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`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 14
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`Claim(s)
`
`Complainant’s Construction
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`Respondents’ Construction
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`obstacle”
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`travel away from an obstacle
`afier encountering the
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`Respondents support their construction primarily by mischaracterizing the parties’
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`dispute and Complainant’s position. As an initial matter, and despite several pages devoted
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`otherwise by Respondents, “bounce mode” is not the disputed term the parties submitted to the
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`ALJ. Indeed, the disputed term is actually “a bounce mode whereby the robot travels
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`substantially in a direction away from an obstacle afier encountering the obstacle.”
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`[Respondents’ Ex. A, Joint Claim Construction Chart at 3.] Setting aside Respondents’
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`inexplicable focus on “bounce mode,” the parties dispute centers around the effect of the phrase
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`“travels substantially in a direction away from” in the disputed term. Specifically, does the
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`phrase cause the disputed term to cover the disclosed bounce mode embodiment where a robot
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`bumps into an obstacle, scoots forward, and then turns to a new heading and travels away from
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`the obstacle. [See ’490 Patent at 13:9-10 (“In other embodiments, the tum is accompanied by
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`movement forward in order to increase the robot’s coverage efficiency”); see also
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`Complainant’s Opening Brief at 26-27.]
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`An illustration of Complainant’s construction at work makes it abundantly clear that the
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`operative dispute is the effect of the phrase “travels substantially in a direction away from” on
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`the disputed term rather than a construction of “bounce mode” in isolation:
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`’490 Patent Claim 1
`
`’490 Patent Claim 1, With Complainant’s
`Construction
`
`adjacent to an obstacle, and a bounce mode
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`“said plurality of operational modes
`comprising: a spot coverage mode whereby
`the robot operates in an isolated area, an
`obstacle following mode whereby said robot
`travels adjacent to an obstacle, and a bounce
`
`“said plurality of operational modes
`comprising: a spot coverage mode whereby the
`robot operates in an isolated area, an obstacle
`following mode whereby said robot travels
`
`(INv. N0. 337-TA—1057) — COMPLAINANT’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF - 1 1
`Silver Star Exhibit 1 022 - 1 5
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`Silver Star Exhibit 1022 - 15
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`’490 Patent Claim 1
`
`’490 Patent Claim 1, With Complainant’s
`Construction
`
`mode whereby the robot travels substantially whereby the robot [turns to a new heading or
`in a direction awayfrom an obstacle after
`turns to a new heading accompanied by a
`encountering the obstacle”
`movementforward, and then continues to
`travel awayfrom] an obstacle after
`
`encountering the obstacle”
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`In the course of their argument, Respondents have conceded that the disputed term
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`covers both the embodiment where the robot turns to a new heading and the embodiment where
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`“the turn is accompanied by movement forward.” [Respondents’ Opening Br. at 24
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`(“Respondents do not dispute” the embodiments disclosed in ’490 patent at 13:6—11) are
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`covered] Accordingly, little dispute should remain and the ALJ should adopt Complai