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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`UNIFIED PATENTS INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`and
`
`HULU, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-00599 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
`Case IPR2018-00864 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: June 13, 2019
`____________
`
`
`
`
`Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and
`JOHN A. HUDALLA, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2018-00599 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
`Case IPR2018-00864 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
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`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER, HULU, LLC:
`
`
`SCOTT BERTULLI, ESQUIRE
`Wilmerhale
`60 State Street
`Boston, MA 02109
`(617) 526-6767
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER, UNIFIED PATENTS, INC.:
`
`
`RAGHAV BAJAJ, ESQUIRE
`Haynes and Boone, LLP
`600 Congress Ave, Suite 1300
`Austin, TX 78701-3285
`(512) 867-8520
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`PARHAM HENDIFAR, ESQUIRE
`KEN WEATHERWAX, ESQUIRE
`Lowenstein & Weatherwax
`1880 Century Park East, Suite 815
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`(310) 307-4510
`
`
`
`
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`Case IPR2018-00599 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
`Case IPR2018-00864 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
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`Also Present:
`
`TOM TODD, IT
`DAVID L. MCCOMBS, ESQUIRE
`DAVID M. O'DELL, ESQUIRE.
`MATTHEW BECK, SUMMER ASSOCIATE
`Haynes And Boone
`
`DAVID L. CAVANAUGH, ESQUIRE
`Wilmerhale
`
`
`Also Present:
`
`ROSHAN MANSINGHANI-SENIOR PATENT COUNSEL
`Unified Patents
`
`GERARD DEBLASI--CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
`Sound View Innovations, LLC
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday, June 13,
`
`2019, commencing at 9:00 a.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
`Terminal Annex Federal Building, 207 S. Houston Street, Suite 159, Dallas,
`Texas.
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Thanks. You may be seated.
` (Whereupon, sound test for Judges was performed.)
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: All right. Good morning. Welcome
`to Dallas. This is a hearing for two cases; IPR2018-00599
`and IPR2018-00864. The Patent Owner is Sound View
`Innovations; the Petitioner in the -599 case is Unified
`Patents. The Petitioner in the -864 case is Hulu. I'm
`Administrative Patent Judge Galligan. Joining by video are
`Judges Stephens and Hudalla.
` May I have appearances for counsel in the -599 case,
`starting with Petitioner, and, please, step up to the podium,
`and make sure the light is green, as well.
` MR. BAJAJ: My name is Raghav Bajaj for Petitioner.
`I have David O'Dell, lead counsel, as well David McCombs;
`Matthew Beck who is our summer associate, and Roshan
`Mansinghani from Unified Patents.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Okay. Thank you.
` Patent Owner?
` MR. WEATHERWAX: Good morning, Your Honor. This is
`Kenneth Weatherwax, lead counsel for Patent Owner, Sound View
`Innovations; with my colleague, Parham Hendifar. And I also
`like to point out that Gerry deBlasi, Executive Chief Officer
`is here, as well.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Thank you. And the Petitioner for
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`864 case.
` MR. BERTULLI: Good morning. My name is Scott
`Bertulli. I'm here for Hulu, and with me is my colleague,
`David Cavanaugh, lead counsel.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Weatherwax?
` MR. WEATHERWAX: Just wanted to note same
`appearances.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Oh, yes. Okay. Got it. Thank
`you.
` Okay. As stated in the trial order we entered in
`both cases, each Petitioner will have one hour of total
`argument time; Patent Owner will have two hours of total
`argument time; and Petitioner is bearing the burden of proof
`to show the claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the
`evidence.
` Petitioner Unified Patents, you have the lowest
`numbered case. You will go first. Petitioner Hulu will
`then follow you, and present its case in chief. Each
`Petitioner may reserve a rebuttal time.
` Unified, how much of a rebuttal time do you want to
`reserve?
` MR. BAJAJ: 25 minutes, Your Honor.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: 25 minutes. So I'll give you a
`heads up around 40 minutes in your presentation then -- or,
`sorry. 30 minutes then.
` Hulu, how much time would you like to save for your
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`rebuttal?
` MR. BERTULLI: 20, Your Honor.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: 20 minutes. Great.
` MR. BERTULLI: Thank you.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: And then Patent Owner, for your
`sur-rebuttal, you will be allowed a sur-rebuttal, and you'll present
`your case in chief or your rebuttal case, after the
`Petitioner, Hulu, goes, and then you will be allowed a
`sur-rebuttal if you choose. How much time would you like?
` MR. WEATHERWAX: Your Honor, we will reserve 30
`minutes.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: 30 minutes. Okay.
` And the parties are reminded that arguments made
`during their rebuttal and sur-rebuttal periods must be
`responsive to arguments of the opposing party made
`immediately preceding the presentation.
` So we have remote Judges, as you can see. Please
`identify the slide numbers that you are referencing as you
`make your presentation. The judges have all the records.
`They have the slides, and they can follow along if you do
`that.
` The hearing is also open to the public, and a
`transcript will become part of the record. I don't believe
`we have any confidential information. Great.
` And, I think, everyone fit in the room; is that
`correct, that we want? Great.
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` Okay. I know there's an overflow room if the -- if
`the Fire Marshall comes, we might have to have someone take
`one for the team, but, I think, we're good to go here.
` After Hulu presents, we'll take a short break, and
`then we can reconvene for the Patent Owner's presentation.
` And just one other note. Patent Owner, I know
`you've requested in a couple of these hearings, afternoon
`settings. We do try to accommodate that. We wanted to let
`you know that we take that into consideration. We couldn't
`do that for these hearings, unfortunately. I think you did.
`Did you? Because you were traveling from the west. I forget
`if you put that in.
` MR. WEATHERWAX: Your Honor, this is actually great
`for us. It's closer than California, so no complaint.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: I see, for the Virginia stuff. Anyway, but just
`for the parties’ information, if you ever want
`to do that, the earlier the better, and if the parties can
`convene and talk about a place and a time, that's great. And
`I just want to let you know we did consider that, but it's
`hard to do it, so --
` MR. WEATHERWAX: Definitely. Appreciate it.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: With that, I think that's all I
`needed to cover.
` Petitioner, Unified. You may proceed.
` MR. BAJAJ: Thank you, Your Honor. Do you need a
`copy of the slides, Your Honor?
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` JUDGE GALLIGAN: I don't need one, but --
` MR. BAJAJ: Okay.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: -- the court reporter may need one.
` MR. BAJAJ: I've given one to the court reporter.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Okay. Great. Thank you.
` You may proceed.
` MR. BAJAJ: Thank you, Your Honor.
` So if we turn to slide 2. We've reproduced figure
`2 of the '074 patent, which helps set the stage for the
`challenged claims.
` Shown in figure 2 are a content server, three
`helper servers, and a number of clients. Clients are end
`users who might request a streaming media object like a
`movie. Those requests are sometimes fulfilled by helper
`servers if the helper servers have the requested content, and
`if not, those requests are forwarded to the content server.
` So helper servers are tasked with caching or
`storing popular movies, so they can be served to clients more
`quickly.
` So turning to slide 3. That is the focus of the
`'074 patent and as challenged claims 3 and 9. Caching or
`storing streaming media objects.
` The challenged claims described two situations.
`One, storing streaming media objects when space is available;
`or, two, when space isn't available, how space can be made
`available to later storage streaming objects.
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` And one aspect of these claims is how to handle
`that situation when space is not available. In that
`situation, the claim describes deleting a portion, but not
`the entirety of multiple streaming media objects to make
`space. And as was shown in the petition, and as we'll
`demonstrate here, deleting in that situation was obvious,
`given the prior art at the time.
` For example, we here reproduced a part of Dr.
`Reddy's analysis of one of the proposed combinations that
`shows how a part of two different movies can be deleted to
`make room for a new movie.
` And turning to slide 4. We reproduced changed
`claim 9 of the '074 patent, which we treated as
`representative in the petition.
` Claim 9 is a method for managing storage of a
`streaming media object that includes four steps. Step 1,
`receiving the streaming media object; and step 2, determining
`whether there's a disk space available on one of the
`plurality of servers. From there, the claim gives you 2
`options to meet the claim. Step 3, if they're determined to
`have space, store the object. Alternatively, step 4 if space
`is not available, delete a portion of streaming media objects
`to make space.
` So as we've discussed details how to store
`streaming media object when space is available, and what to
`do if space is not available.
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` Here, Patent Owner does not contest that the
`receiving step, step 1, and the storing of spaces available,
`Step 3, are taught by the prior art.
` On the next few slides, we've presented a quick
`overview of the prior art cited in the petition. So if we
`turn to slide 5, the Acharya dissertation is cited as the
`primary reference in the petition's grounds.
` Acharya is a Ph.D. dissertation submitted and
`presented in 1999 to the faculty of Cornell University. Just
`like the '074 patent, Acharya describes a system used for
`caching multimedia objects with a collection of proxy servers
`that store media objects for quicker access by clients. And
`like the '074 patent, Acharya discusses dividing multimedia
`objects into segments, and just like the claims, if space is
`available, storing multimedia objects.
` Acharya also describes that if space is not
`available to store, parts of media objects can be deleted to
`make space to cache others.
` And turning to slide 6. The secondary references
`of the combinations are Rejaie, Wolf, and Brubeck. All three
`references describe techniques for use in storing multimedia
`objects. In the concept of deleting portions of multimedia
`objects is well known. It's taught by Rejaie and Wolf, for
`example.
` Rejaie describes techniques for caching multimedia
`streams on the internet and like the '074 patent, divides
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`media objects into multiple segments. And, again, like the
`claims, the lead segments of media objects to make space for
`new media objects.
` Wolf is a U.S. Patent that, likewise, describes
`deleting segments of a streaming media object to make space
`for new streaming media objects.
` Brubeck is IEEE paper that describes cache
`management policies for video systems. Brubeck was cited in
`the petition as standing for the proposition that if you
`delete one segment of a media object that's taught by
`Acharya, and that doesn't create enough space, you can move
`onto delete another segment of a media object.
` So turning to slide 7. With that background, we've
`quickly reproduced the grounds of unpatentability that the
`Board instituted and that we will be discussing today.
` On slide 8, I have a brief overview of the
`arguments to be presented today.
` Your Honors, I'm happy to take these in any order
`that you'd like. But if there's no preference, I'll just
`march on as set forth in this order.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Thank you. I'd like to hear about
`the Acharya reference as being prior art and publicly accessible. And that's
`kind of a threshold issue any way.
` MR. BAJAJ: Certainly.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Go ahead and do that. Thank you.
`
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` MR. BAJAJ: Thank you, Your Honor.
` So turning to slide 9. We have a brief summary of
`the evidence presented in this trial. In the petition, we
`show that Acharya was publicly accessible and disseminated by
`the Cornell Library.
` So if we turn to slide 10. It's important here to
`note that Patent Owner does not contest that Acharya was
`indexed by the Cornell University Library and that was it
`searchable by its title and other fields.
` The title of Acharya is techniques for improving
`multimedia communication over wide area networks. Very
`similar to the title of the '074 patent itself.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Counsel, just a quick question of
`that.
` So I know Patent Owner made some arguments that
`this wasn't searchable in a particular system. The MARC
`record as entered in 1999, where was it searchable or how was
`it searchable?
` MR. BAJAJ: It was searchable at the Cornell
`Library, Your Honor.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Okay. All right. Thanks.
` MR. BAJAJ: So, again, Acharya is a doctoral
`dissertation submitted for his Ph.D. in 1999 and cataloged by
`the Cornell University library in July 1999. And the machine
`readable cataloging record generated by that Cornell
`University Library as shown here on slide 10, dated July 2nd,
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`1999.
` Dr. Hsieh-Yee also testified that a person
`interested in the subject matter of the dissertation, for
`example, multimedia over wide area networks, can search for
`that information to retrieve the dissertation, because the
`cataloging record has the title.
` And she also testified, it's customary library
`practice that soon after a work is cataloged, it's publicly
`accessible generally within a week, so July 9th, 1999.
`Again, none of this evidence is contested by Patent Owner.
` So if we turn to slide 11. Because Acharya was
`cataloged in the university library and searchable by author
`and title, it was sufficiently accessible as prior art to
`the '074 patent. That is black letter of Federal Circuit law --
`In re Hall. A single catalog theses in one university library
`constitute sufficient accessibility to those interested in
`the art exercising reasonable diligence.
` Patent Owner has not cited any contrary authority to
`In re Hall. In fact, Patent Owner’s preferred case Acceleration
`Bay acknowledges differences between the technical paper in
`that case and the theses in In re Hall.
` Acceleration Bay's technical paper was listed on
`the website, it had no searchability by title, and it was
`indexed only by author name and year. In Acceleration Bay,
`there was also no evidence that it was disseminated to the
`public.
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` By contrast, the dissertation here, much like the
`theses in In re Hall, was cataloged in the university library,
`and here, the dissertation was indexed by title, and it could
`be found by its title. The title similar to that of the
`patent itself.
` JUDGE STEPHENS: Counsel, did your expert testify
`that this record was at the Cornell Library, so even if it
`wasn't available elsewhere, you would still be able to go to
`the Cornell Library and find this record?
` MR. BAJAJ: Yes, Your Honor. She did.
` So -- and as Your Honor noted in the institution
`decision, this record is searchable at the Cornell Library,
`and then aside from that, there was other discussion about
`other databases on which it might be searchable.
` But the point is, at the Cornell Library it was
`absolutely searchable, and that is enough to make it prior
`art.
` JUDGE STEPHENS: Thank you.
` MR. BAJAJ: So turning to slide 12. Back to our
`summary slide on this argument. While the evidence in the
`petition is sufficient, there's even more evidence that
`Acharya is prior art.
` The controlling inquiry is whether the prior art
`reference was made available to the extent persons interested
`in ordinarily skilled in the subject matter could locate it.
`And, here, we have actual evidence that this requirement was
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`met, that Acharya was disseminated and publicly accessible.
` So turning to slide 13. How is it that we know --
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Before we turn to slide 13. Can
`we go back to slide 12.
` I noticed there you cited on Exhibit 1030 quite a
`bit.
` MR. BAJAJ: Yes, Your Honor.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: And that's the subject of the motion
`to exclude. And I wanted to ask you about that. I know it's
`Patent Owner's burden to show that it should be excluded, and I've
`read the briefing on that. I don't see how that isn't
`hearsay.
` It's from a different proceeding, and you're using
`it to prove the truth of the matter, which is that this was
`publicly available. So why isn't
`that hearsay?
` MR. BAJAJ: Well, certainly, Your Honor. It is in
`another proceeding, but it's merely corroborative evidence of
`what our expert said.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Does that mean that it shouldn't
`be excluded as hearsay? Where did you argue there was some
`exclusion, or that it wasn't -- that we should -- there was
`some exclusion from hearsay rule here?
` MR. BAJAJ: I don't believe we explicitly argued
`that, Your Honor, but what we argued in our opposition of the
`motion to exclude was that Patent Owner used the motion to
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`exclude for an improper purpose and arguing the weight to be
`afforded to it, not the --
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: But they also argued that it
`should be excluded, because it's hearsay.
` MR. BAJAJ: Certainly, Your Honor.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: All right. I just want to get --
`because it did seem, even in your opposition, that you said,
`because it wasn't at the current hearing then they would have
`to move for additional discovery or -- because it's not
`routine. So it seems like admitting that it's hearsay.
` MR. BAJAJ: I agree that it's out of this
`proceeding, Your Honor. Yes.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Are you using it to prove the
`truth of the matter asserted in that?
` MR. BAJAJ: I don't believe we're using it to prove
`it. I think we're using it to corroborate it, Your Honor.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: Okay. All right. Well, thanks
`for distinction.
` MR. BAJAJ: So if we turn back to slide 13. Again,
`the inventors themselves here tell us that persons interested
`and ordinarily skilled in the art, exercising reasonable
`diligence, could have reviewed Acharya. Well before the
`priority date, the inventors reviewed Acharya, and they
`thought it was so relevant to their idea that have they cited
`it and described it in their technical paper. And as one of
`the inventor's website states, their technical paper was
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`created in July 1999. Again, well before the '074 patent's
`priority date.
` The inventors confirm where they got the
`dissertation from, as well, Cornell University -- further
`supporting Dr. Hsieh-Yee's declaration testimony.
` Now, not only does that confirm that Acharya was
`sufficiently accessible to those ordinarily skilled in the
`art exercising reasonable diligence, but that also refutes
`Patent Owner's speculation that Acharya was embargoed.
` So we have the inventor's acknowledgment that if
`you were interested in the subject matter of Acharya before
`the priority date, you could find Acharya. and that confirms
`that Acharya was publicly accessible in prior art.
` So turning to slide 14. We have our summary slide
`again. And that will turn to the Schulhauser issue -- claiming
`conditional limitations.
` If we turn to slide 15. As Unified argued in the
`petition and as the board agreed in the institution decision,
`the claims are drafted in a way that makes steps 3 and 4
`mutually exclusive consistent with Schulhauser.
` So looking at the claims, once a streaming media
`object is received, and there's a determination of whether
`space is available, the claims can follow one of two paths, a
`figurative fork in the road. Spaces available, and the
`streaming media object is stored and the method ends; or,
`two, space is not available, parts of existing streaming
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`Case IPR2018-00599 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
`Case IPR2018-00864 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
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`media objects are deleted and the method ends.
` Now, the specification of the '074 patent doesn't
`provide a flowchart corresponding to these claims, the Patent
`Owner's expert in his deposition drew a flowchart for each of
`claims 3 and 9. Here on the right side, I've reproduced his
`drawing for Claim 9. Patent Owner's expert visually
`demonstrated that the Board's institution decision was
`correct. The claims recite mutually exclusive possibilities.
` So here in Patent Owner's expert's drawing, steps 1
`and 2 referred to the receiving and the determining. From
`there, either Step 3 is performed or step 4 is performed,
`depending on the evaluation at step 2.
` There's no scenario in which all four steps are
`performed, and it's not a scenario in which even expert
`testimony is needed. The plain language of the claims is
`clear on its face. This is exactly what Schulhauser is
`directed to.
` So if we turn to slide 16. The same applies to
`claim 3. Claim 3 has a slight nuance to the deletion step,
`but, again, either Step 3 is performed or step 4 is
`performed. There's no scenario in which both steps are
`performed, and that is supported by the claim language and
`logic as the Board found in Schulhauser.
` Turning to slide 17. The prosecution history
`supports this interpretation and the application of
`Schulhauser. In the immediate parent of the '074 patent,
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`Case IPR2018-00599 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
`Case IPR2018-00864 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
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`the claims were cited as a similar progression of steps.
`Determine the status of a condition precedent, and take one
`of two actions, depending on that determination.
` So determining, and then if it is determined one
`way, take one action; and if it is determined a second way,
`take an alternative action.
` The Examiner noticed that issue, the conditional
`"if" language, and reached out to the Patent Owner to see if
`they wanted to fix that issue. There, the Patent Owner did,
`and so they amended the claims to recite different language
`and changed the claims to recite when it is determined.
` But fully aware of that issue, the Patent Owner for
`the '074 patent subsequently chose to seek broader coverage
`in language that wouldn't necessarily limit the claims: "if"
`language, whereas, they knew that "when" language was
`narrower. The Patent Owner, a sophisticated party, made a
`distinct choice in possession of all the information
`necessary to make that decision. They should be held to that
`decision to seek broad claims.
` The precedential Schulhauser decision applies to
`these claims in only one of the two possibilities needs to be
`met to show unpatentability of claims 9 and 3.
` So turning to slide 18. We have a summary slide
`again, and we'll turn to our second dispute, the determining
`step. The determining step analysis is independent of
`Schulhauser.
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`Case IPR2018-00599 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
`Case IPR2018-00864 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
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` So turning to slide 19. There's no dispute that as
`the claim is written, Acharya teaches the determining step. What
`Patent Owner is trying to do here to avoid the prior art, is
`add in the limitation that is not recited. That determining
`has to be done in a specific location. But the Board found
`in the institution decision that the determining step didn't
`need to be construed so narrowly to require the helper server
`to perform the step.
` In doing so, the Board considered all of the
`intrinsic evidence available to it. As the Board noted in
`the institution decision, the claim itself doesn't specify
`which element is performing the determining step. But it
`does specify which element performs other steps, like the
`storing step. So the claim language itself supports the
`Board's determination and the specification confirms the
`Board's determination.
` The Board considered all specifications citations
`pointed to by Patent Owner in the preliminary response, which
`mirror the citations pointed to in the Patent Owner's
`response. So, for example, the Board considered column 3,
`line 6 through 12, which describes that the helper server
`serves to implement several methods designed to support
`streaming media objects, but as the Board recognized, that
`section doesn't support that the helper server determines if
`there's a disk space available and doesn't support narrowly
`construing the claims.
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`Case IPR2018-00599 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
`Case IPR2018-00864 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
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` Nothing in the specification clearly links the
`helper server to the determining. And as we pointed in the
`reply, the specification explicitly leaves open all
`modifications equivalent and alternatives. The specification
`does not limit the claims.
` So the intrinsic record, the single best guide to
`the meaning of a disputed term, supports the Board's
`construction. And in its Patent Owner's response, Patent
`Owner didn't identify any other intrinsic record to support
`its construction. Nothing in the prosecution history compels
`a different determination.
` The intrinsic evidence, Patent Owner's expert
`testimony, just parrots what Patent Owner argues in its
`response. He adds no analysis that would compel any
`different interpretation by the Board. Nor does his
`testimony support reading into the claim of limitation.
` So the Board's initial construction doesn't require
`any change. Under this correct construction, Patent Owner
`does not dispute that Acharya teaches this limitation. Even
`under Patent Owner's narrow construction, its expert admitted
`that the claim limitation would have been obvious over
`Acharya because determining was well known in the prior art,
`and changing the specific server that did the determining was
`an obvious design choice.
` So turning to slide 20. We have our summary slide
`there again. We can stop there, because Schulhauser applies
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`Case IPR2018-00599 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
`Case IPR2018-00864 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
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`to these claims, and analyzing step 4 is not necessary. But
`I'm happy to go through that analysis, if the Board would
`like.
` JUDGE GALLIGAN: It's your presentation and time,
`so use it as you see fit.
` MR. BAJAJ: Thank you, Your Honor.
` Again, Patent Owner does not dispute that Step 3 is
`taught by the prior art, but still the prior art teaches step
`4 of both claims 9 and 3.
` So turning to slide 21. We reproduced the disputed
`portion of Claim 9. The petition and Dr. Reddy
`extensively detailed how the prior art profits limitation.
`As one example, the combination of Acharya and Rejaie teaches
`deleting part of a first movie, and if enough space isn't
`made available, moving to a second movie and deleting part of
`the second movie to make enough space.
` Importantly, Patent Owner doesn't contest this
`operation of the prior art, and Patent Owner recognizes that
`the prior art teaches the requirements of this limitation,
`deleting only a portion of multiple streaming media objects.
`For example, Patent Owner recognizes, and I'll quote from
`their response, "Rejaie discloses a single object method
`that deletes successive end portions of a streaming media
`object. If necessary, to free additional space, Rejaie's
`method can be applied to a second object."
` Patent Owner also recognizes that, again, I quote,
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`Case IPR2018-00599 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
`Case IPR2018-00864 (Patent 9,462,074 B2)
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`"Rejaie suggests that the beginning sections of the base
`layer of a movie stream should be maintained in the cache.
`That is deleting only a portion, but not the entirety of a
`streaming media object."
` So Patent Owner argues that the heart of their
`invention requires what is referred to in the specification
`as an example as the second method. Round robin simultaneous
`deletions of portions of multiple streaming media objects.
`And this is Patent Owner's only argument -- narrowly limiting
`the claims to one example in the specification allegedly
`distinguishes them. But the claims aren't limited to the
`second method.
` If you'll briefly turn to slide 25, we have here
`Patent Owner's expert admitting that the second method
`doesn't limit the claims.
` Turning back to slide 21. The claims don't specify
`how much of objects are deleted or which objects must be
`deleted. The second method just provides an example of how
`the deletion can be done, but it's just that, an example.
`There are other wa
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