`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`UNIVERSAL SECURE REGISTRY, LLC,
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`Patent Owner.
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`_________________________________________
`
`Case IPR2018-00812
`U.S. Patent No. 8,856,539
`_________________________________________
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`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S
`CONDITIONAL MOTION TO AMEND
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,856,539
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`Table of Contents
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`Page
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`I.
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................ 1
`A. USR Disclaimed Claims 1-3, 5-8, 16-24, 26-30, And 37-38 Of The
`’539 Patent To Avoid A CBM Petition. ................................................ 1
`USR Reintroduces The Subject Matter It Disclaimed. ......................... 2
`B.
`III. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 2
`A. USR’s Presentation of Substitute Claim 47 Is Improper For Multiple
`Reasons. ................................................................................................. 2
`1.
`USR Failed To Meet Its Duty Of Candor Under 37 C.F.R. §
`42.11. ........................................................................................... 2
`USR Is Estopped From Reintroducing The Financial Subject
`Matter From Disclaimed Claims 5-8, 17-20, And 26-30. .......... 3
`Substitute Claims 39-47 Are Obvious Over Reber In View Of
`Franklin And Schutzer. ......................................................................... 4
`1.
`Substitute Claims 39, 44, 46, and 47 .......................................... 4
`2.
`Substitute Claims 40-43 and 45 ................................................ 18
`The Substitute Claims 39-47 Are Ineligible Under 35 U.S.C. § 101.. 18
`1.
`Alice Step 1: The Substitute Claims Are Directed To An
`Abstract Idea ............................................................................. 19
`Alice Step 2: The Remaining Limitations Of The Substitute
`Claims Add Nothing Inventive To The Abstract Idea. ............. 23
`Substitute Limitations 39[h], 44[b], And 47[c] Do Not Satisfy 35
`U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................ 25
`IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 25
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`2.
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`2.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`i
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,856,539
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`INTRODUCTION
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`I.
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`USR’s proposed amendments seek to cover methods and systems that Reber
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`and/or Franklin expressly disclose, or that would have been obvious over Schutzer.
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`USR’s motion also tries to game the patent system by reintroducing claim elements
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`relating to financial services that it previously disclaimed to avoid institution of a
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`CBM proceeding. In doing so, USR fails to comply with 37 C.F.R. §
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`42.121(a)(2)(i) and the Board’s precedential ruling in Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom,
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`Inc., which require amendments to be consistent with USR’s duty of candor to the
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`Board. Furthermore, USR’s motion fails because USR’s substitute claims recite
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`subject matter that is patent ineligible under § 101 as demonstrated in CBM2018-
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`00023 (-023 CBM). Thus, USR’s CMTA should be denied.
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`II.
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`PROCEDURAL HISTORY
`A. USR Disclaimed Claims 5-8, 17-20, And 26-30 Of The ’539 Patent
`To Avoid A CBM Petition.
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`The present Petition, filed on April 12, 2018, challenged claims 1-3, 5-8, 16-
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`24, 26-30, and 37-38 of the ’539 patent as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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`Concurrently therewith, Petitioner filed the -023 CBM demonstrating the invalidity
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`of claims 1-38 of the ’539 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Apple Inc. v. USR,
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`LLC., CBM2018-00023, Paper 3, Petition (PTAB Apr. 12, 2018). USR disclaimed
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`claims 5-8, 17-20, and 26-30 on August 17, 2018 (Ex-2201), and argued in its
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`POPR that its disclaimer rendered moot Petitioner’s arguments related to these
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`1
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`claims. Apple Inc. v. USR, LLC., CBM2018-00023, Paper 9, POPR (PTAB Aug.
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`21, 2018). This panel did not consider claims 5-8, 17-20, and 26-30 in either the
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`institution decision in this proceeding or in denying institution of the -023 CBM.
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`B. USR Reintroduces The Subject Matter It Disclaimed.
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`USR now tries to take back its assertions to the Board by reintroducing
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`subject matter plainly directed to covered business methods that it previously
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`disclaimed in the -023 CBM proceeding. USR’s substitute claim limitations 47[f]
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`and 47[g] recite a “public ID code that identifies a financial account” and that can
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`be used “to obtain the financial account number associated with the entity.”
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`Despite reintroducing financial subject matter, USR’s CMTA makes no reference
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`to its disclaimer of claims 5-8, 17-20, and 26-30.
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`III. ARGUMENT
`A. USR’s Presentation of Substitute Claim 47 Is Improper For
`Multiple Reasons.
`1.
`USR Failed To Meet Its Duty Of Candor Under 37 C.F.R. §
`42.11.
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`As discussed above, USR’s substitute limitations 47[f] and 47[g] recite a
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`2
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,856,539
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`“public ID code”1 for a “financial account number.” These limitations reintroduce
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`financial subject matter that USR disclaimed to avoid CBM review of patent
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`eligibility under § 101. By reintroducing these limitations now, USR has effected
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`an end-run around the CBM review process. Though USR owed a duty of candor
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`in its POR and CMTA, see 37 C.F.R. § 42.11; Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc.,
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`IPR2018-01129, -01130, Order, Paper No. 15, 5-6 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2019), USR
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`failed to disclose that it planned to seek or had sought inconsistent positions before
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`the Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) (“[A] party must serve relevant
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`information that is inconsistent with a position advanced by the party during the
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`proceeding concurrent with the filing of the documents or things that contains the
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`inconsistency.”). Accordingly, the Board should dismiss USR’s CMTA because
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`USR violated its duty of candor.
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`2.
`USR Is Estopped From Reintroducing The Financial
`Subject Matter From Disclaimed Claims 5-8, 17-20, And 26-30.
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`“[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and
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`1 USR disclaimed a nearly identical “public ID code” limitation in the parallel IPR
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`and CBM proceedings relating to U.S. Patent No. 9,530,137 (“’137 patent”) in
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`order to avoid CBM review and to moot one of the obviousness grounds cited in
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`the IPR. See IPR-2018-00809, Ex-1001, ’137 Patent, cl. 8; see also Apple Inc. v.
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`USR, LLC., IPR2018-00809, Exhibit-2003, Disclaimer (PTAB July 10, 2018).
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`3
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his
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`interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the
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`prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.”
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`New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (citation omitted). USR is
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`estopped from amending its claims to incorporate the subject matter of disclaimed
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`claims 5-8, 17-20, and 26-30 because its current position is clearly inconsistent
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`with its earlier position in the -023 CBM proceeding. See id., 750. USR would
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`also derive unfair advantage (to Petitioner’s detriment) if not estopped because it
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`avoided institution of the -023 CBM altogether. See id., 751. The Board should
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`not permit USR to reap the benefit of its inconsistent and misleading positions.
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`B.
`Substitute Claims 39-47 Are Obvious Over Reber In View Of
`Franklin And Schutzer.
`1.
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`Substitute Claims 39, 44, 46, and 47
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`a)
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`Limitations 39[b], 44[a], and 47[b]
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`Reber alone or in view of Franklin renders obvious substitute limitations
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`39[b], 44[a], and 47[b] that recite a “transaction request” or a “time-varying
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`multicharacter code” received “from [a/the] provider.”
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`Reber discloses transaction data [transaction request] generated by the user
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`device [entity] that is initially transmitted to the computer 20 [provider]. Ex-
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`1131, Reber, 5:16-26, 5:45-59, 6:14-29. As explained in the Petition (Pet., 33-35),
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`a POSITA would have found it obvious to configure Reber’s transaction request to
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`4
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`include a first data element containing information about a merchant/provider
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`[indication of the provider] and a second data element containing a time-varying
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`code corresponding to an entity [time-varying multicharacter code]. Ex-1131,
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`Reber, 5:17-19, 5:45-59.2 A POSITA would have understood that Reber teaches
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`the computer 20 [provider] may receive and subsequently transmit (via the
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`electronic network 22) the transaction data [transaction request] to the computer
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`64 [secure registry]. Ex-1131, Reber, 5:46-48 (“the computer 64 receives
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`transaction data via the electronic network 22”); see also id., 5:17-19. Thereafter,
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`the computer 64 processes the received data elements (including the second data
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`element) and completes the transaction in conjunction with a third party. Id., 6:25-
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`29 (“the computer 64 directs that an account for the first party be credited by the
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`transaction amount, and an account for the second party be debited by the
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`transaction amount”) (emphasis added). Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶20
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`To the extent Reber alone does not render this limitation obvious, a POSITA
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`would have looked to Franklin, which discloses that the merchant [provider]
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`submits a request for authorization [transaction request] including a proxy
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`transaction number [time-varying multicharacter code] to the issuing bank front-
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`2 As explained previously, the cited portions of Reber would have been obvious to
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`combine. Pet., 23-31, 33-35; POR Reply II(A)(4)(b).
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`5
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`end [secure registry] for processing in conjunction with a third party. See Ex-
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`1132, Franklin, 11:33-49, 12:30-32. A POSITA would have been motivated to
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`combine the disclosures of Reber and Franklin to arrive at these claim limitations
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`for the same reasons set forth in the Petition and discussed in Apple’s reply brief.
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`Pet., 23-31, 33-35; POR Reply, § II(A)(4). Accordingly, limitations 39[b], 44[a],
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`and 47[b] are obvious over Reber in view of Franklin. Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶22.
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`b)
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`Limitations 39[c] and 46[b]
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`Reber alone or in view of Franklin renders obvious substitute limitations
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`39[c] and 46[b] that recite “the transaction request including a time value
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`representative of when the time-varying multicharacter code was generated” and
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`“extract the time value from the transaction request.”
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`First, both Reber and Franklin disclose the claimed transaction request as
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`set forth above with respect to limitations 39[b], 44[a], and 47[b]. See also Pet.,
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`33-35. Reber further discloses that the transaction data [transaction request] may
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`contain information sufficient for either the computer 20 [provider] or the
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`computer 64 [secure registry] to generate transaction records that include, for
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`instance, the date and time of the transaction. Ex-1131, Reber, 5:33-38. A
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`POSITA would have understood that to generate such a record, time information
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`could either be “extracted” from the transaction data or generated at the computer
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`20 or computer 64. Because the time-varying second data element is generated
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`6
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`concurrent with the time of the transaction, the second data element could include
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`“a time value representative of when the time-varying multicharacter code was
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`generated,” id., 3:4-8, 3:20-25, which could be “extracted” from the transaction
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`data [transaction request] for incorporation into the record generated by the
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`computer 20 or the computer 64. Id., 5:33-38. Therefore, Reber alone renders this
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`limitation obvious. Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶24.
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`To the extent Reber alone does not render this limitation obvious, a POSITA
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`would have looked to Franklin, which discloses the transmission of a request for
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`authorization [transaction request] by the merchant [provider] that includes
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`transaction-specific data, including the time and date. Ex-1132, Franklin, 11:33-
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`38. As part of processing the transaction request, Franklin discloses that “[t]he
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`account manager 60 submits the private key, the customer-related data, and the
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`transaction-specific data to the MAC coding and comparator unit 82,” which uses
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`that data to generate a “test MAC” to compare to the received MAC for validation.
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`Id., 12:11-26, see also id., 2:26-38, 5:24-39, 9:40-55, cl. 3. Because the test MAC
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`is generated based on the same data as the received MAC, a POSITA would have
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`understood that the time value is “extracted” from the transaction request for use
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`by the MAC coding and comparator unit 82 to generate its own code for
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`comparison. Without extracting a time value, the MAC coding and comparator
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`unit 82 could not accurately generate its own MAC for comparison. Ex-1136,
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`7
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
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`Shoup-Decl., ¶25.
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`A POSITA would have been motivated to combine Franklin’s known
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`technique of extracting a time value from a received code with Reber’s code-based
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`transaction system to generate a data record based on received information.
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`Incorporating the time information into Reber’s one-time code would have
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`increased efficiency since it would have eliminated the need to separately receive
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`time data with the transaction. A POSITA would have had a reasonable
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`expectation of success because both Reber and Franklin disclose that various types
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`of information can be ascertained from transmitted codes for use by the receiving
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`party. Ex-1131, Reber, 6:17-28; Ex-1132, Franklin, 7:65-8:14, Figs. 5-6; see also,
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`Pet., 23-31, 33-35. Accordingly, limitations 39[c] and 46[b] are obvious over
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`Reber in view of Franklin. Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶26-27.
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`c)
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`Limitations 39[e] and 44[d]
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`Reber alone or in view of Franklin renders obvious proposed substitute
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`limitations 39[e] and 44[d] that recite “validate an identity of the provider and then
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`execute a restriction mechanism.” (emphasis added).
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`In the DI, the Board found that merchant validation followed by subsequent
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`access to data was sufficient to meet this claim limitation. DI, 14-16. That is
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`precisely what Reber and Franklin disclose. Both references emphasize protecting
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`account identifying information and other sensitive information (including from
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`8
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,856,539
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`dishonest merchants). Ex-1131, Reber, 1:46-49, 2:29-32; Ex-1132, Franklin, 1:48-
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`54, 11:38-47. In view of this emphasis, a POSITA would have found it obvious to
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`use the received transaction data of Reber to ensure both that the merchant is
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`trustworthy [validate an identity of the provider] and is entitled to access the
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`data needed to conduct the transaction [restriction mechanism/access
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`restrictions]. A POSITA would have understood, based on both Reber’s and
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`Franklin’s repeated teachings to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive data (Ex-
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`1131, Reber, 1:46-48, 2:29-31; Ex-1132, Franklin, 1:39-49) that such access
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`should not be provided absent some determination that the merchant was entitled
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`to access that data. Because the only data the computer 64 receives about the
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`transaction is the transaction data (i.e., Reber’s first data element [indication of
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`the provider] and second data element [time-varying multicharacter code]), a
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`POSITA would have further understood that the determination of compliance
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`could be made based on only that received transaction data. Id. A POSITA would
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`have been motivated to combine these disclosures for the reasons set forth in the
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`petition. Pet., 36-39; see also POR Reply, II(A)(2)(b). Accordingly, limitations
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`39[e] and 44[d] are obvious over Reber in view of Franklin. Ex-1136, Shoup-
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`Decl., ¶29-30.
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`d)
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`Limitation 39[h], 44[b], and 47[c]
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`Reber in view of Franklin and European Patent Appl. No. 1,028,401 to
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`9
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,856,539
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`Schutzer (“Schutzer”) renders obvious substitute limitations 39[h], 44[b], and 47[c]
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`that recite “wherein the identity of the entity is verified using a biometric.”
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`Although Reber and Franklin do not explicitly discuss the use of biometric
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`authentication, Reber teaches that its user device stores a secret key that a POSITA
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`would have understood needs to be protected from unauthorized access. Ex-1131,
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`Reber, 7:42-48 (incorporating by reference teachings regarding time-varying codes
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`from U.S. Patent No. 5,168,520); Ex-10XX, ’520 patent, 3:31-36 (describing a
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`“stored static value” in a user device used to generate a time-varying code).
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`Additionally, Franklin teaches the user to authenticate themselves at their device
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`prior to conducting a transaction. For instance, Franklin teaches that prior to
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`granting the user access to a proxy card number, the customer 22 must invoke the
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`software module and enter a password to gain access to the secure data, which is
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`then used to generate a proxy card number and complete the transaction. Ex-1132,
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`Franklin, 5:24-28. A POSITA would have understood that this authentication
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`procedure is designed to ensure that an authorized user is attempting to conduct the
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`transaction before involving any other parties. Ex-1131, Reber, 4:18-20, 4:25-27,
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`5:13-15; Ex-1132, Franklin, 2:22-27, 5:24-28; Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶32.
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`Schutzer discloses a system for performing transactions using proxy
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`information that closely resembles both Reber and Franklin. For instance,
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`Schutzer discloses using a time-varying, one-time “alternate card number” in place
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`10
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`of a user’s actual credit card number in a transaction. Ex-1130, Schutzer, ¶¶11, 19.
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`An issuing bank server authenticates the one-time card number and replaces it with
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`the user’s actual card number; then a transaction is processed according to
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`traditional protocols. Id., ¶19. Like Franklin, Schutzer discloses that a user must
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`be authenticated prior to accessing software used to generate proxy card
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`information needed to conduct a transaction. Id., ¶¶12 (“The transaction card user
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`can authenticate … by entering transaction card user information at a computing
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`device…coupled to the card issuer's server.”); 14. Schutzer explains that the
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`“transaction card user information” used to conduct this authentication may
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`comprise, for example, “a biometric sample.” Id., ¶13. Schutzer also explains that
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`biometric authentication may be conducted by obtaining a biometric sample at the
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`point-of-use and then transmitting that information to a remote server for
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`authentication. Id., ¶¶12-13. Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶33.
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`Because Reber and Franklin already disclose requiring authentication prior
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`to accessing sensitive data, a POSITA would have found it obvious to incorporate
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`Schutzer’s teachings of biometric authentication (either locally or remotely) into
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`the framework of Reber. Ex-1130, Schutzer, ¶¶13-14. The addition of Schutzer’s
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`technique to Reber and Franklin would have been a simple substitution (or
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`combination) of well-known prior art elements. For instance, if an additional layer
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`of security was required in a particular implementation, it would have been
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`11
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`obvious to add biometric authentication to the use of a PIN or password. Adding
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`an off-the-shelf biometric sensor would have been trivial and would not have
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`required large scale architectural changes, since Schutzer explains that a biometric
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`sample could be collected using a connected input device, which even the ’539
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`patent admits was well known in the art prior to 2001. Id., ¶35; Ex-1101, ’539
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`patent, 4:4-12, 6:34-40; Ex-1137, Jakobsson-Dep., 307:18-20, 322:5-12. A
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`POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation that the modification would be
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`successful in improving the security protocol at least because Schutzer describes its
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`approach as effective and because existing biometric scanners could already be
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`used successfully in authentication frameworks. Id.; Ex-1130, Schutzer, ¶¶8-10.
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`Likewise, if conducting biometric authentication was more convenient in a
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`particular setting, it would have been obvious to substitute biometric authentication
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`for another method. Substituting biometric information for the PIN or passcode-
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`based authentication procedures described in Reber and Franklin would have had
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`the predictable result of, where necessary, enhancing or adapting the security
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`protocol for transactions using proxy information. Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶34.
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`Accordingly, limitations 39[h], 44[b], and 47[c] are obvious over Reber in view of
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`Franklin. Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶35.
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`e)
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`Limitations 44[f] and 47[g](Third Party Limitation)
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`Both Reber and Franklin render obvious substitute limitations 44[f] and
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`12
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`47[g] that recite “the third party being a different entity from the secure registry.”
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`As discussed in the Petition, Reber and Franklin both describe systems
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`wherein an entity and a provider conduct a transaction using a time-varying
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`multicharacter code that is validated at a secure registry. Pet., 32, 41. The secure
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`registry then directs a third party (such as an issuing bank) to credit and debit
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`specific financial accounts. For instance, Reber explains that once “[t]he computer
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`64 authenticates the second data element,” the computer 64 may “direct[] that an
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`account for the first party be credited by the transaction amount, and an account for
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`the second party be debited by the transaction amount.” Ex-1131, Reber, 6:17-28.
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`Because Reber does not specify what party is “directed” by the computer 64, a
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`POSITA would have understood that the computer 64 would “direct” a third party,
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`such as an issuing institution. Indeed, Dr. Jakobsson agreed that the passage could
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`be read to include a third party. Ex-1137, Jakobsson-Dep., 432:11-15 (“Q. Well,
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`what do you interpret the word ‘directs’ to mean in that sentence? A. So it could
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`be at least two things. One could be that it sends a signal to another party to cause
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`that second party to perform this action....”). This conclusion is consistent with
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`Reber’s disclosure since a party typically “directs” another to perform an action.
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`Moreover, as a practical matter, a single party (such as the computer 64) is often
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`not in control of both the account being debited and the account being credited.
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`Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl, ¶37.
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`13
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`Franklin likewise discloses a system involving a third-party backend.
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`Specifically, Franklin discloses an issuing bank 26 that receives an external
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`transaction number from the merchant as a proxy for a user’s actual credit card
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`account number. Ex-1132, Franklin, 2:46-60, 5:59-65. Franklin further discloses
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`that the issuing bank determines that the received number is a proxy, substitutes
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`the user’s actual credit card information, and then processes the transaction using
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`its existing processing system. Id., 2:61-3:6, 5:65-6:12. Although the issuing bank
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`26 is depicted in the Figures as a single entity, Franklin is explicit that the issuing
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`bank is not limited to a single system controlled by a single party. For instance,
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`Franklin explains that although the issuing bank 26 is “labeled as a ‘bank’, the
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`issuing bank 26 may represent other types of card-issuing institutions….” Id., 4:3-
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`5. Franklin further teaches “that other participants may be involved in some
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`phases of the transaction, such as an intermediary settlement institution, but these
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`participants are not shown.” Id., 4:7-9. In addition, Franklin states that “[t]he bank
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`26 has a computing center 32 … [that] may be implemented in other forms, such as
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`a minicomputer, a PC server, a networked set of computers, and the like.” Id.,
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`4:16-20. Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶38.
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`In view of these disclosures, to the extent that Reber itself does not expressly
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`teach that a third party separate from the computer 64 [secure registry] could
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`complete the transaction, Franklin teaches that one front-end party of bank
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`14
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`computing center 32 (comprising elements 60, 62, 80, and 82) could receive and
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`process proxy information (such as a Reber’s second data element or Franklin’s
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`external card number) before passing the actual account number on to a bank
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`processing system 84 controlled by a different party on a remote networked
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`computer. Ex-1132, Franklin, 11:39-40 (“The FIG. 7 illustration is simplified for
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`discussion purposes, as other participants will most likely be involved.”)
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`(emphasis added); see also id., 11:39-12:43. Thus, because Reber in view of
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`Franklin discloses conducting transactions involving an entity, provider, secure
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`registry, and a separate third party, a POSITA would have found this limitation
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`obvious. A POSITA would have been motivated to combine these disclosures and
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`had a reasonable expectation of success for the reasons set forth in the Petition.
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`Pet., 23-31, 40-42. Accordingly, limitations 44[f] and 47[g] are obvious over
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`Reber in view of Franklin. Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶39-40.
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`f)
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`Limitation 47[f] and 47[g](Public ID Code Limitation)
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`Reber in view of Franklin and Schutzer renders obvious proposed substitute
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`limitations 47[f] and 47[g] that recite a “processor configured to ... access from the
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`database … information including account identifying information that includes a
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`public ID code that identifies a financial account number associated with the
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`entity” and “use[] the public ID code to obtain the financial account number
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`associated with the entity.”
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`15
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`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`As discussed above, Reber in view of Franklin discloses a system wherein
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`the computer 64 [secure registry] receives a one-time code that is used to approve
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`a transaction. Supra, Section III(B)(1)(a). Once the one-time code is validated, the
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`secure registry can “direct” a third party to credit and debit accounts associated
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`with a financial transaction. Id. Because the direction to credit or debit a
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`particular account is passed to a third party, a POSITA would have understood that
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`the identifying information, such as an account number, must be transmitted over a
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`network connection, such as Reber’s electronic network 22. See Ex-1131, Reber,
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`5:28-30. In Reber and Franklin, the account number that is passed to the third
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`party is the user’s actual account number. Id., 6:25-28; Ex-1132, Franklin, 12:27-
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`33; Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶42.
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`As explained above, supra III(B)(1)(d), Schutzer teaches an “alternate
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`account number” [Public ID Code] that is used in place of a user’s actual credit
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`card number in order to protect sensitive data during transmission (including
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`transmissions over encrypted payment networks). Ex-1130, Schutzer ¶¶3, 11, 27
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`(“At S6, the merchant (acquiring) bank’s server 18 receives the request for
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`authorization and sends the request with the alternate card number over the card
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`association network 20 to the card issuer’s server 14.”) (emphasis added), 30-31,
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`Figs. 3-4; Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶43.
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`A POSITA would have found it obvious to use a public ID Code, such as
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`16
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,856,539
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`Schutzer’s alternate card number, which is associated with the user’s actual
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`account number when the computer 64 [secure registry] of Reber directs the third
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`party to credit or debit user accounts [account identifying information that
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`includes a public ID code that identifies a financial account number associated
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`with the entity]. Upon receipt, a POSITA would have found it obvious for the
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`third party to match the public ID code to the user’s actual account number to
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`execute the transfer of funds [use the public ID code to obtain the financial
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`account number associated with the entity]. A POSITA would have been
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`motivated to do so based on Schutzer’s teaching that the use of proxy information
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`can provide an additional layer of protection for sensitive user data even where the
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`connection is otherwise secure. See, e.g., Ex-1130, Schutzer, ¶19 (“the merchant’s
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`bank sends the anonymous card number over the card association network to the
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`transaction card issuer.”) (emphasis added). This combination would have
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`required little more than a simple substitution of one element (the user’s actual
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`account number) with another (proxy information) to achieve predictable results
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`(ensuring that the transaction is completed without interception of the user’s actual
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`card number during transmission to the third party). A POSITA would have had a
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`reasonable expectation that the modification would be successful in preventing
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`interception of sensitive information at least because Schutzer describes its
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`approach as easy to implement (via software) and effective. Id. Ex-1130,
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`17
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,856,539
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`Schutzer, ¶¶8-10. Accordingly, limitations 47[f] and 47[g] are obvious over Reber
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`in view of Franklin. Ex-1136, Shoup-Decl., ¶44-45.
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`2.
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`Substitute Claims 40-43 and 45
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`Substitute Claims 40-43 and 45 correspond to original claims 2, 3, 16, 21,
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`and 23 respectively and contain no new limitations. As such, they are obvious for
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`the reasons set forth above and in the petition. Pet., 42-44, 48-50, 56-58, 60-61.
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`C. The Substitute Claims 39-47 Are Ineligible Under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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`The Board should also deny USR’s motion because the substitute claims
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`recite ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which is a prerequisite for a
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`CMTA. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Uniloc Luxembourg S.A., IPR2017-00948, Final
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`Written Decision, Paper No. 31, 58-59 (PTAB Aug. 1, 2018) (precedential). As
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`discussed above, Petitioner already challenged eligibility of the unamended claims
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`under § 101. See Apple Inc. v. USR, CBM2018-00022, Petition, Paper No. 3,
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`(PTAB Apr. 4, 2018) (institution denied as not directed to a covered business
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`method). For at least the reasons documented in the -023 CBM, and further below,
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`the substitute claims are also ineligible under § 101.
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`In Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, the Supreme Court invalidated claims
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`directed toward computer-based schemes to manage “settlement risk” in financial
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`transactions. 573 U.S. 208 (2004). The Court confirmed that, in light of “the
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`ubiquity of computers,” limiting a claim covering an abstract concept to a “wholly
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`18
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,856,539
`Petitioner’s Opposition to Conditional Motion to Amend
`generic computer implementation” is insufficient to transform the idea into a
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`patent-eligible invention. Id., 223-24.
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`Applying the Alice two-step framework for distinguishing patents that claim
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`ineligible abstract ideas from those that claim eligible applications of those ideas,
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`the Board, in step one, must determine whether the claims are directed to a patent-
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`ineligible abstract concept. Id. If the claims are directed to an abstract idea, the
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`analysis proceeds to step two wherein the claim elements must be searched, both
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`individually and as an “ordered combination,” for an “inventive concept”—i.e.,
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`“an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent
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`in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [