throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper No. 15
`
` Entered: September 12, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`MODERNA THERAPEUTICS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PROTIVA BIOTHERAPEUTICS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before SHERIDAN K. SNEDDEN, SUSAN L.C. MITCHELL, and
`RICHARD J. SMITH, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`MITCHELL, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`
` INTRODUCTION
`Moderna Therapeutics, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition to institute
`an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of U.S. Patent 9,364,435 B2 (the “’435
`patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Protiva Biotherapeutics, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)1
`filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 12 (“Prelim. Resp.”).
`We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to determine whether to
`institute an inter partes review. To institute an inter partes review, we must
`determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
`claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). On April 24, 2018,
`the Supreme Court held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)
`may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition.
`SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Also, in
`accordance with USPTO Guidance, “if the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB
`will institute on all challenges raised in the petition.” See Guidance on the
`Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings (April 26, 2018) (available at
`https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-
`board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial).
`
`
`
`1 According to Patent Owner, Protiva Biotherapeutics, Inc. (“Protiva”)
`existed as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Arbutus Biopharma Corporation
`and was amalgamated into Arbutus Biopharma Corporation in January 2018.
`Paper 14, 2. Patent Owner identifies Arbutus Biopharma Corporation (fka
`“Tekmira”), Genevant Sciences, Ltd., and its fully owned subsidiaries:
`Genevant Sciences Holding, Ltd., Genevant Sciences Corporation, Genevant
`Sciences, Inc., and Genevant Sciences, GmbH, as the real parties in interest.
`Id.
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`Applying those standards, and upon consideration of the information
`presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we conclude that
`Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in
`showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’435
`patent. Therefore, we institute an inter partes review for claims 1–20 of the
`’435 patent.
`
`
`Related Proceedings
`A.
`Patent Owner identifies the following related matters:
`Moderna Therapeutics, Inc. v. Protiva Biotherapeutics, Inc.,
`IPR2018-00680 regarding U.S. Patent No. 9,404,127 B2; and European
`Patent Office Opposition proceedings regarding EP 2 279 254. Paper 14, 2.
`
`The ’435 Patent (Ex. 1001)
`B.
`The ’435 patent relates to “stable nucleic acid-lipid particles (SNALP)
`comprising a nucleic acid (such as one or more interfering RNA), methods
`of making the SNALP, and methods of delivering and/or administering the
`SNALP.” Ex. 1001, Abstract. The ’435 patent states that “[t]he present
`invention is based, in part, upon the surprising discovery that lipid particles
`comprising from about 50 mol % to about 85 mol % of a cationic lipid, from
`about 13 mol% to about 49.5 mol % of a non-cationic lipid, and from about
`0.5 mol % to about 2 mol % of a lipid conjugate provide advantages when
`used for the in vitro or in vivo delivery of an active agent, such as a
`therapeutic nucleic acid (e.g., an interfering RNA).” Id. at 5:55-62. The
`’435 patent further states that
`the present invention provides stable nucleic acid-lipid particles
`(SNALP) that advantageously impart increased activity of the
`encapsulated nucleic acid (e.g., an interfering RNA such as
`siRNA) and improved tolerability of the formulations in vivo,
`resulting in a significant increase in the therapeutic index as
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`compared to nucleic acid-lipid particle compositions previously
`described. Additionally, the SNALP of the invention are stable
`in circulation, e.g., resistant to degradation by nucleases in
`serum and are substantially non-toxic to mammals such as
`humans.
`Id. at 5:62–6:5.
`
` The ’435 patent identifies specific SNALP formulations that
`encapsulate siRNA as the nucleic acid, such as the 1:57 SNALP and the 1:62
`SNALP, and states that “the Examples herein illustrate that the improved
`lipid particle formulations of the invention are highly effective in
`downregulating the mRNA and/or protein levels of target genes.” Id. at 6:5–
`30.
`
`Illustrative Claim
`C.
`Petitioner challenges claims 1–20 of the ’435 patent. Claim 1 is
`illustrative and reproduced below:
`1. A nucleic acid-lipid particle comprising:
`(a) a nucleic acid;
`(b) a cationic lipid comprising from 50 mol % to 85 mol % of the
`total lipid present in the particle;
`(c) a non-cationic lipid comprising from 13 mol % to 49.5 mol %
`of the total lipid present in the particle; and
`(d) a conjugated lipid that inhibits aggregation of particles
`comprising from 0.5 mol % to 2 mol % of the total lipid present
`in the particle.
`Ex. 1001, 89:55–63.
`
`Claim 1 is the only independent claim, and claims 2–20 are directly or
`indirectly dependent on claim 1. Id. at 89:55–92:22.
`
`The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`D.
`Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 based on the following grounds. Pet. 5.
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`Reference[s]
`WO 2005/007196 A22 and
`US 2006/0134189 A13
`’196 PCT, ’189 Publication,
`Lin,4 and Ahmad5
`US 2006/0240554 A16
`
`Basis
`§ 103
`
` § 103
`
`Claims challenged
`1–20
`
`1–20
`
`§§ 102 and 103 1–20
`
`Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of Dr. Andrew S. Janoff,
`Ph.D. (“Janoff Declaration” or “Decl.”). Ex. 1007; see generally Pet.
` ANALYSIS
`Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`A.
`Petitioner asserts that a person having ordinary skill in the art
`(“POSITA”) “would have specific experience with lipid particle formation
`and use in the context of delivering therapeutic payloads, and would have a
`Ph.D., an M.D., or a similar advanced degree in an allied field (e.g.,
`biophysics, microbiology, biochemistry) or an equivalent combination of
`education and experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 31–32). Petitioner
`
`
`2 Ian MacLachlan et al., WO 2005/007196 A2, published Jan. 27, 2005
`(“’196 PCT”). Ex. 1002.
`3 Ian MacLachlan et al., US 2006/0134189 A1, published Jun. 22, 2006
`(“’189 Publication”). Ex. 1003.
`4 Alison J. Lin et al., Three-Dimensional Imaging of Lipid Gene-Carriers:
`Membrane Charge Density Controls Universal Transfection Behavior in
`Lamellar Cationic Liposome-DNA Complexes, 84 BIOPHYSICAL J. 3307–16
`(2003) (“Lin”). Ex. 1005.
`5 Ayesha Ahmad et al., New Multivalent Cationic Lipids Reveal Bell Curve
`for Transfection Efficiency Versus Membrane Charge Density: Lipid-DNA
`Compleses for Gene Delivery, 7 J. GENE MED. 739–48 (2005) (“Ahmad”).
`Ex. 1006.
`6 Tongqian Chen et al., US 2006/0240554 A1, published Oct. 26, 2006
`(“’554 Publication”). Ex. 1004.
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`further states that “[t]his level of skill is representative of the inventors on
`the ’435 patent and authors/inventors of prior art cited herein.” Id. at 6.
`Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary
`skill should be rejected because it “equates the level of ordinary skill with
`knowledge possessed by the inventors themselves” who may possess
`exceptional skill beyond the ordinary skill requirements. Prelim. Resp. 18.
`Patent Owner also takes issue with a person of ordinary skill having a
`medical degree when the Petitioner does not address any therapeutic
`considerations, such as toxicity, in vivo aggregation, and overall systemic
`tolerance in the Petition. Id.
`On this record and at this stage of the proceeding, we agree with the
`Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art as supported by
`the testimony of Dr. Janoff. See Pet. 5–6; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 29–32. Dr. Janoff
`testifies that he is familiar with the technology at issue and the state of the
`art at the earliest priority date for the ’435 patent, and provides the definition
`of one of skill in the art as set forth above by the quoted text of Petitioner in
`light of his “review of the ’435 patent, its file history, and [his] knowledge
`of the field of the ’435 patent.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 30–31. Although Dr. Janoff
`notes that the level of skill he defines is “representative of the inventors on
`the ’435 patent and authors/inventors of prior art cited herein,” Dr. Janoff
`expressly indicates that the defined level of skill is that of an ordinary
`artisan, not one with extraordinary skill. Id. ¶ 31.
`We also do not agree based on the record evidence that Patent
`Owner’s assertion that a person with a medical degree may be one of skill
`who is “detached from the actual concerns of those of ordinary skill in the
`art at the time of the invention.” See Prelim. Resp. 18. Petitioner does not
`posit that someone with a medical degree alone is one of ordinary skill, but
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`someone that also has “specific experience with lipid particle formation and
`use in the context of delivering therapeutic payloads.” Pet. 5; Ex. 1007 ¶ 31.
`We find on this record that such definition of a person with ordinary skill is
`appropriate in light of the concerns of those of ordinary skill at the time of
`the invention.
`At this stage of the proceeding based on the record before us, we find
`that one of skill in the art “would have specific experience with lipid particle
`formation and use in the context of delivering therapeutic payloads, and
`would have a Ph.D., an M.D., or a similar advanced degree in an allied field
`(e.g., biophysics, microbiology, biochemistry) or an equivalent combination
`of education and experience,” and also find on this record that Dr. Janoff is
`one of at least ordinary skill under this standard. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 8–22;
`Ex. 1018 (curriculum vitae of Dr. Janoff).
`We further note that the prior art itself demonstrates the level of skill
`in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d
`1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding
`ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an
`appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton
`Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir.
`1985)).
`
`Claim Construction
`B.
`In an inter partes review, the Board interprets claim terms in an
`unexpired patent according to the broadest reasonable construction in light
`of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142
`(2016) (affirming applicability of broadest reasonable construction
`standard to inter partes review proceedings). “Under a broadest
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`reasonable interpretation, words of the claim must be given their plain
`meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification and
`prosecution history.” Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1062
`(Fed. Cir. 2016). Any special definitions for claim terms must be set forth
`with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. See In re Paulsen,
`30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Only terms in controversy must be
`construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.
`Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
`1999).
`Petitioner provides a proposed construction of the claim terms
`“nucleic acid-lipid particle” and “cationic lipid.” Pet. 23–24. According to
`Patent Owner, “[t]he terms identified in the petition do not require
`construction in order to reach a decision denying institution,” and “[t]he
`constructions proposed in the petition . . . should be rejected as being
`unreasonably broad and largely detached from the ’435 patent
`specification.” Prelim. Resp. 15. Because Patent Owner substantively
`challenges the proposed construction of the term “nucleic acid-lipid particle”
`and relies on its narrower definition of the term in its arguments addressing
`the grounds asserted, we address the construction of that term, but find that
`we need not construe any other terms addressed by Petitioner for the purpose
`of reaching our institution decision. We do note, however, that Petitioner
`provides the same definition for “cationic lipid” as the express definition set
`forth in the specification of the ’435 patent, namely, “any of a number of
`lipid species that carry a net positive charge at a selected pH, such as
`physiological pH (e.g., pH of about 7.0).” Compare Pet. 24, with Ex. 1001,
`12:59–61.
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`nucleic acid-lipid particle
`Petitioner proposes that “nucleic acid-lipid particle” means “a
`composition of lipids and a nucleic acid for delivering a nucleic acid to a
`target site of interest.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1001, 11:14–17; Ex. 1007 ¶ 87).
`Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s proposed construction is
`unreasonably broad, and that the specification’s use of “nucleic acid-lipid
`particle” refers to “particles specifically formulated for systemic (in vivo)
`administration and having the nucleic acid component encapsulated within
`the lipid.” Prelim. Resp. 16.7
`On this record and at this stage of the proceeding, we find that neither
`Petitioner’s nor Patent Owner’s proposed constructions of “nucleic acid-
`lipid particle” are appropriate. Petitioner’s proposed construction is a
`general restatement of the composition recited in claim 1 and a use thereof
`as described in the ’435 patent. See Ex. 1001, 11:14–17, 89:55–63. Also,
`Patent Owner’s proposed construction is inconsistent with claim 1 because it
`limits the term “nucleic acid-lipid particle” as used in claim 1 to the
`definition of a stable nucleic acid-lipid particle or SNALP. Prelim. Resp.
`16–17 (citing Ex. 1001, 11:31–42 (defining SNALP), 5:62–6:2, 6:25–30,
`2:38–47, 13:38–49). Because claim 1 is drawn to the broader term “nucleic
`acid-lipid particle,” it should not be limited to the definition of SNALP.
`Compare Ex. 1001, 11:14–22 (describing “lipid particle” used to deliver an
`active or therapeutic agent such as a nucleic acid), with Ex. 1001, 11:23–46
`
`
`7 We note in the companion request for inter partes review, Patent Owner
`defined the same term “nucleic acid-lipid particle” somewhat differently as
`“non-lamellar particles formulated to fully encapsulate the nucleic acid
`component and to be stable in serum following systemic (in vivo)
`administration.” See IPR2018-00739, Prelim Resp. 4.
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`(describing SNALP” as a lipid particle that fully encapsulates the nucleic
`acid with the lipid).
`We also find on this record that “nucleic acid-lipid particle” is not
`limited to in vivo use. The specification of the ’435 patent states that
`The present invention is based, in part, upon the
`surprising discovery that lipid particles comprising from about
`50 mol % to about 85 mol % of a cationic lipid, from about 13
`mol % to about 49.5 mol % of a non-cationic lipid, and from
`about 0.5 mol % to about 2 mol % of a lipid conjugate provide
`advantages when used for the in vitro or in vivo delivery of an
`active agent, such as a therapeutic nucleic acid (e.g., an
`interfering RNA).
`. . . The lipid particles and compositions of the present
`invention may be used for a variety of purposes, including the
`delivery of associated or encapsulated therapeutic agents to
`cells, both in vitro and in vivo.
`Ex. 1001, 6:31–34. Example 2 in the ’435 patent also describes in vitro use
`of nucleic acid-lipid particles. See id. at 69:6–70:52 (stating 1:57 SNALP
`are Potent Inhibitors of Cell Growth In Vitro). Because the specification of
`the ’435 patent describes both in vitro and in vivo use of nucleic acid-lipid
`particles, we also find nucleic acid-lipid particle is not limited to in vivo use
`as Patent Owner contends.
` Our preliminary construction of “nucleic acid-lipid particle” at this
`stage of the proceeding and for purposes of this decision is derived from the
`express definition of “lipid particle” as set forth in the ’435 patent that
`generally describes use of such a lipid particle to deliver nucleic acid as an
`active or therapeutic agent where the nucleic acid may be encapsulated in
`the lipid to protect it from enzymatic degradation. At this stage of the
`proceeding, we define “nucleic acid-lipid particle” as “a particle that
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`comprises a nucleic acid and lipids, in which the nucleic acid may be
`encapsulated in the lipid portion of the particle.” See Ex. 1001, 11:14–22.
`We determine that we need not expressly construe any other terms for
`purposes of determining whether to institute an inter partes review in this
`case. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803
`
`Principles of Law
`C.
` To show anticipation, each and every claim element, arranged as in
`the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference either explicitly or
`inherently. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
`2008); see Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
`1999) (quoting In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The
`prior art need not, however, use the same words as recited in the claims in
`order to find anticipation. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
`2009). To the contrary, it is permissible to take into account not only the
`literal teachings of the prior art reference, but also the inferences the skilled
`artisan would be reasonably expected to draw from the reference. Eli Lilly v.
`Los Angeles Biomedical Res. Inst., 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (Fed. Cir.
`2017); In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968).
`“Inherency is not necessarily coterminous with the knowledge of
`those of ordinary skill in the art. . . . Artisans of ordinary skill may not
`recognize the inherent characteristics or functioning of the prior art.” Atlas
`Powder, 190 F.3d at 1347 (citing Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d
`775, 780, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
`“[T]he discovery of a previously unappreciated property of a prior art
`composition, or of a scientific explanation for the prior art’s functioning,
`does not render the old composition patentably new to the discoverer.” Id.
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`(citing Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d at 782). “It is also an elementary principle
`of patent law that when, as by a recitation of ranges or otherwise, a claim
`covers several compositions, the claim is ‘anticipated’ if one of them is in
`the prior art.” Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d at 782.
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject
`matter, as a whole, would have been obvious to the person of ordinary skill
`in the art at the time of the invention. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
`U.S. 398, 406 (2007). “If a person of ordinary skill in the art can implement
`a predictable variation [of the claimed subject matter from what is taught
`and suggested in the prior art], § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417.
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
`determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level
`of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of obviousness.
`Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). “[A] patent
`composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by
`demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the
`prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. “[I]t can be important to identify a reason
`that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to
`combine elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” Id.
` We analyze the asserted grounds of unpatentability in accordance with
`the above-stated principles.
`D. Obviousness over ’196 PCT and ’189 Publication
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–20 of the ’435 patent are unpatentable
`as obvious over the ’196 PCT and the ’189 Publication. Pet. 32–48. Patent
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`Owner advances several arguments in response to Petitioner’s assertions.
`Prelim. Resp. 22–33.
`
`1. ’196 PCT (Ex. 1002)
`The invention of the ’196 PCT is described as “compositions and
`
`methods for the therapeutic delivery of a nucleic acid by delivering a serum-
`stable lipid delivery vehicle encapsulating the nucleic acid to provide
`efficient RNA interference (RNAi) in a cell or mammal.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 2.
`More particularly, the invention of the ’196 PCT is described as “using a
`small interfering RNA (siRNA) encapsulated in a serum-stable lipid particle
`having a small diameter suitable for systemic delivery.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 10.
`
`In describing one embodiment, the ’196 PCT states that the nucleic
`acid-lipid comprises a cationic lipid, a non-cationic lipid, a conjugated lipid,
`a bilayer stabilizing component for inhibiting aggregation of particles, and a
`siRNA. Id. ¶¶ 11, 85 (describing SNALPs with same components). In
`describing how embodiments are made, the ’196 PCT also states that
`preferred embodiments are charge neutralized. Id. ¶ 15.
`
`The ’196 PCT further provides detailed descriptions of the
`components of stable nucleic acid-lipid particles. See id. ¶¶ 86–107.
`Concerning the preferred makeup of the SNALP, the ’196 PCT states the
`following about the amount of cationic lipid in the SNALP.
`The cationic lipid typically comprises from about 2% to
`about 60% of the total lipid present in said particle, preferably
`from about 5% to about 45% of the total lipid present in said
`particle. In certain preferred embodiments, the cationic lipid
`comprises from about 5% to about 15% of the total lipid present
`in said particle. In other preferred embodiments, the cationic
`lipid comprises from about 40% to about 50% of the total lipid
`present in said particle. Depending on the intended use of the
`nucleic acid-lipid particles, the proportions of the components
`are varied and the delivery efficiency of a particular
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`formulation can be measured using an endosomal release
`parameter (ERP) assay. For example, for systemic delivery, the
`cationic lipid may comprise from about 5% to about 15% of the
`total lipid present in said particle and for local or regional
`delivery, the cationic lipid comprises from about 40% to about
`50% of the total lipid present in said particle.
`Ex. 1002 ¶ 88.
`
`For the amount of non-cationic lipid content of the SNALP, the ’196
`PCT states that “[t]he non-cationic lipid typically comprises from about 5%
`to about 90% of the total lipid present in said particle, preferably from about
`20% to about 85% of the total lipid present in said particle.” Id. ¶ 91. For
`the bilayer stabilizing component such as a conjugated lipid, the ’196 patent
`states the following.
`
`Typically, the bilayer stabilizing component is present
`ranging from about 0.5% to about 50% of the total lipid present
`in the particle. In a preferred embodiment, the bilayer
`stabilizing component is present from about 0.5% to about 25%
`of the total lipid in the particle. In other preferred
`embodiments, the bilayer stabilizing component is present from
`about 1% to about 20%, or about 3% to about 15% or about 4%
`to about 10% of the total lipid in the particle. One of the
`ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the concentration of
`the bilayer stabilizing component can be varied depending on
`the bilayer stabilizing component employed and the rate at
`which the liposome is to become fusogenic [i.e. has the ability
`to fuse with membranes of a cell].
`Id. ¶ 93. The ’196 PCT also states that “[b]y controlling the composition
`and the concentration of the bilayer stabilizing component, one can control
`the rate at which the bilayer stabilizing component exchanges out of the
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`liposome and, in turn, the rate at which the liposome becomes fusogenic.”
`Id. ¶ 94.
`
`2. ’189 Publication (Ex. 1003)
`The ’189 Publication describes “nucleic acid-lipid particles
`comprising siRNA molecules that silence [Apolipoprotein B “ApoB”]
`expression and methods of using such nucleic acid-lipid particles to silence
`ApoB expression.” Ex. 1003, Abst., ¶ 0007. In describing these nucleic
`acid-lipid particles, the ’189 Publication states that they may comprise a
`siRNA molecule that silences ApoB expression, a cationic lipid, a non-
`cationic lipid, and a conjugated lipid that inhibits aggregation of particles.
`Id. ¶ 8. In describing the relative weight percentages of the content of the
`nucleic acid-lipid particles, the ’189 Publication states:
`The cationic lipid may comprise from about 2 mol % to
`about 60 mol %, about 5 % mol % to about 45 mol %, about 5
`mol % to about 15 mol%, about 30 mol % to about 50 mol % or
`about 40 mol % to about 50 mol % of the total lipid present in
`the particle.
`. . . The non-cationic lipid comprises from about 5 mol %
`to about 90 mol % or about 20 mol % to about 85 mol % of the
`total lipid present in the particle.
`. . . The conjugated lipid that prevents aggregation of
`particles may comprise from about 0 mol % to about 20 mol %,
`about 0.5 mol % to about 20 mol %, about 1 mol % to about 15
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`mol %, about 4 mol % to about 10 mol %, or about . . . 2 mol %
`of the total lipid present in said particle.
`Id. ¶¶ 9–11; see id. ¶¶ 150–181 (describing content of SNALPs). The ’189
`Publication describes embodiments wherein the siRNA is fully encapsulated
`in the nucleic acid-lipid particle. Id. ¶ 14.
`
`3. Analysis
`a. Obviousness – claim 1
`Petitioner provides a detailed analysis of how each claim limitation of
`claim 1 is met by the disclosure of the ’196 PCT. See Pet. 32–40.8
`Petitioner concludes that:
`While the ’196 PCT does not disclose the exact same
`range of lipid components from claim 1 of the ’435 patent
`explicitly, it discloses encompassing and overlapping ranges
`that establish a prima facie case of obviousness and the testing
`in the ’435 patent does not support alleged unexpected results
`for the claimed ranges. Janoff Decl. ¶ 106.
`The ’189 publication is substantively similar to the ’196
`PCT and also discloses SNALPs comprising overlapping ranges
`of the lipid components similar to those discussed below for the
`’196 PCT. In addition, the ’189 publication discloses testing
`relating to the admitted prior art 2:40 formulation.
`Pet. 32–33.
`
`Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner cannot rely on any
`unexpected results for the claimed ranges for the components of the nucleic
`acid-lipid particle because the testing as described in the ’435 patent “dealt
`
`
`8 Petitioner also details how each additional limitation of claims 2–20 that
`depend either directly or indirectly on claim 1 is met by the disclosure of the
`’196 PCT. See Pet. 40–48. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner
`has not addressed the dependent claims individually for any of the asserted
`grounds. See Prelim. Resp. 23–45.
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`with only a few lipid species and proportions [that are] not co-extensive with
`the claim scope.” Pet. 34–38. Specifically, Petitioner asserts the following.
`In vitro testing (Example 2) showed that Sample 10 (claimed
`formulation) apparently performed worse than Sample 16
`(admitted prior art). Ex. 1001, Fig. 1; Janoff Decl. ¶¶ 81–82.
`In vivo testing (Example 3), Group 14 (claimed formulation)
`apparently performed worse than Group 7 (admitted 2:40 prior
`art). Ex. 1001, Figure 2; Janoff Decl. ¶¶ 83–84.
`
`. . . the in vivo testing in Example 3 shows that even
`minor variations in lipid percentages (and potentially changes
`to Lipid to drug ratios) appeared to impact efficacy. Janoff
`Decl. ¶ 106. Specifically, Sample 2 and Sample 12 from
`Table 4 contain the exact same lipid species in the respective
`ratios 2/40/10/48 and 1/40.4/10.1/48.5. Ex. 1001, Table 4.
`According to Figure 2, these slight variations in lipid
`proportions (and potentially changes to Lipid to drug ratios)
`lead to apparently different transfection efficiencies. Id., Fig. 2;
`Janoff Decl. ¶ 112. A POSITA would expect that similar minor
`variations in lipid proportions within the claimed range might
`lead to similar variations in transfection efficiency. Id.;
`Ex. 1006, 740 (parenthetical omitted).
`Pet. 35–36.
`
`By the same token, Petitioner asserts, the testing of only one cationic
`lipid, DLinDMA, in the ’435 patent when the claimed range of species of
`cationic lipids is much more extensive does not support the conclusion that
`other cationic lipids within the claim will behave in the same manner as the
`one tested. Id. at 37. Petitioner asserts that “[t]o the contrary, Example 5 in
`the ’435 patent shows variation of the cationic lipid impacts efficacy.” Id.
`(citing Ex. 1001, Table 6 (Samples 2 % 6 (DLin-DMA) vs. Sample 4
`(DODMA)); see also Pet. 38 (citing acknowledgement that alternative
`cationic lipids that work in essentially the same manner may have different
`efficiencies).
`
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`
`
`On this record and at this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded
`that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in
`showing that claim 1 of the ’435 patent would have been obvious over either
`the ’196 PCT or the ’189 Publication. Petitioner has shown that each of the
`’196 PCT and the ’189 Publication disclose nucleic acid-lipid particles that
`comprise a nucleic acid, and the lipid components—a cationic lipid, a non-
`cationic lipid, and a conjugated lipid—in mol percentage ranges that overlap
`with the claimed ranges. See Pet. 32–48; see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 106–118; In re
`Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“A prima facie case of
`obviousness typically exists when the ranges of the claimed composition
`overlap the ranges disclosed in the prior art”) (citations omitted).
`Specifically with regard to the claimed range for the cationic lipid
`component, which Patent Owner asserts was contrary to the conventional
`wisdom concerning “the community’s aversion to the toxicity and poor in
`vivo efficacy associated with formulations with a high level of cationic
`lipid,” see Prelim. Resp. 1, Dr. Janoff testifies as follows.
`The ’196 PCT teaches “[t]he cationic lipid typically comprises
`from about 2% to about 60% of the total lipid present in said
`particle … [i]n other preferred embodiments, the cationic lipid
`comprises from about 40% to about 50% of the total lipid
`present in said particle.” Id., [0088]. The ’196 PCT discloses
`that “[d]epending on the intended use of the nucleic acid-lipid
`particles, the proportions of the components are varied ….” Id.
`In addition, the ’196 PCT incorporates by reference the ’618
`patent, which discloses nucleic acid-lipoplex with 56% cationic
`lipid, 14% phospholipid and 30% cholesterol, as well as various
`other formulations containing over 50% cationic lipid. Ex.
`1017, 34:54-35:23. Given the explicit disclosure of overlapping
`ranges, this limitation is prima facie obvious. In addition,
`determining the optimal proportion of cationic lipid for a given
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00739
`Patent 9,364,435 B2
`lipid combination would be a simple matter of varying the
`proportion using prior art methodologies.
`Ex. 1007 ¶ 110. On the record before us, we credit Dr. Janoff’s testimony
`and agree that given the disclosure of overlapping ranges for the
`compositions in each

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket