`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`In re: OXYCONTIN ANTITRUST LITIGATION
`
`
`PURDUE PHARMA L.P., et al.,
`Plaintiffs,
`
`‐against‐
`TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS, USA, INC.,
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`04 Md. 1603 (SHS)
`
`This document relates to:
`
`
`11 Civ. 2037 (SHS)
`12 Civ. 5083 (SHS)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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`KASHIV1009
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`CONTENTS
`
`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................... v
`PART 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1
`I. The Record and Relevant Proceedings ..................................................... 2
`A.
`The Asserted Patent Claims ................................................................. 2
`B.
`The 2012 Ranbaxy Trial ........................................................................ 3
`C.
`Claim Construction ............................................................................... 4
`D.
`The 2013 Trial ......................................................................................... 4
`E.
`This Opinion .......................................................................................... 4
`II. Legal Standards ............................................................................................ 5
`A.
`Procedural Context and the Hatch‐Waxman Act ............................. 5
`B.
`Claims of Patent Infringement ............................................................ 6
`C.
`The Affirmative Defense of Patent Invalidity ................................... 7
`1. Novelty and Anticipation ................................................................. 8
`2.
`Obviousness and Nonobviousness ................................................. 9
`3. Written Description and Enablement ........................................... 10
`4.
`Definiteness ...................................................................................... 12
`D.
`Product‐by‐Process Claims ................................................................ 13
`E.
`Attorneys Fees ..................................................................................... 14
`PART 2. THE LOW‐ABUK PATENTS ............................................................ 15
`I.
`Findings of Fact .......................................................................................... 15
`A.
`Purdue’s development of low‐ABUK oxycodone .......................... 15
`B.
`Purdue obtains the ‘799, ‘800, and ‘072 Patents .............................. 20
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`The Chapman Application ............................................................. 21
`1.
`Further proceedings before the PTO............................................. 22
`2.
`The low‐ABUK patents‐in‐suit ...................................................... 24
`3.
`The Noramco process ......................................................................... 26
`C.
`Teva plans to sell tablets containing oxycodone hydrochloride
`1.
`API and a sustained release carrier. ........................................................ 27
`2.
`Teva’s tablets contain a non‐zero amount of 14‐hydroxy. ......... 27
`3.
`8α forms during the Noramco process. ........................................ 29
`4.
`8α converts to 14‐hydroxy during the Noramco process. ......... 30
`D.
`Facts pertinent to obviousness .......................................................... 32
`1.
`The ordinary skill in the art is impressive. .................................. 32
`2.
`The prior art disclosed the fact that 8β converted to 14‐hydroxy
`and it disclosed methods of using hydrogenation to reduce 14‐
`hydroxy levels in free base and salt compositions. ............................... 33
`3.
`Differences between the prior art and the claims. ...................... 37
`4.
`The objective indicia of nonobviousness. ..................................... 39
`II. Conclusions of Law ................................................................................... 45
`A.
`Infringement ......................................................................................... 45
`1.
`Teva’s ANDA infringes claims 30‐34 and 76‐79 of the ‘800
`Patent. .......................................................................................................... 45
`2.
`Teva’s ANDA infringes claims 1, 4, and 5 of the ‘072 Patent. ... 46
`3.
`Teva’s ANDA infringes claims 3 and 19 of the ‘799 Patent. ...... 47
`4.
`Teva’s use of the Noramco API constitutes an act of
`infringement. .............................................................................................. 47
`B.
`Obviousness pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 103 ........................................ 48
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`The invention would have been obvious to a skilled artisan. ... 48
`1.
`The asserted claims are invalid pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 103. .... 55
`2.
`Invalidity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112. ............................................. 57
`C.
`The written description of the ‘799, ‘800, and ‘072 Patents
`1.
`satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 112.............................................................................. 57
`2.
`The patents meet the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112. 60
`D.
`Collateral estoppel does not apply. .................................................. 62
`III. Conclusion ............................................................................................... 64
`PART 3. THE ABUSE‐PROOF PATENTS ...................................................... 66
`I.
`Factual Background: Abuse of OxyContin became tragically rampant,
`generating a public health crisis and responses. ........................................... 66
`II. The ‘383 Patent: Thermoforming Technology ....................................... 70
`A.
`Teva’s ANDA infringes the ‘383 Patent ........................................... 71
`1.
`Grunenthal’s search for abuse‐deterrent formulations led it to a
`thermoformed, PEO‐based tablet. ........................................................... 71
`2.
`Teva compresses and then cures its tablets, making them
`extremely hard. ........................................................................................... 74
`3.
`Comparing Teva’s process to that of the ‘383 Patent, the
`asserted claims read on Teva’s tablets. ................................................... 75
`B.
`The ‘383 Patent is invalid as anticipated and obvious. .................. 78
`1.
`The McGinity Application anticipates the ‘383 Patent. .............. 78
`2.
`At the time of the ‘383 Patent’s development, the prior art made
`the process obvious. ................................................................................... 86
`C.
`Conclusion ............................................................................................ 90
`III.
`The ‘314 Patent: Gel Test Technology .................................................. 90
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`Teva’s ANDA does not infringe the ‘314 Patent, because Purdue
`A.
`has not put forward reliable and relevant evidence of infringement. ... 91
`1.
`Purdue’s evidence of infringement is based on a gel test that is
`not designed to replicate the ‘314 Patent’s gel test. ............................... 92
`2.
`Purdue’s evidence of infringement is based on a gel test
`conducted in an unreliable manner. ........................................................ 94
`3.
`To the extent that any experimental evidence is probative, it
`suggests that Teva’s tablets do not infringe. .......................................... 96
`B.
`The ‘314 Patent is invalid as indefinite. ............................................ 98
`1.
`The “gel test” gives a skilled artisan insufficient guidance to
`conduct a replicable experiment. ............................................................. 98
`2.
`The ‘314 Patent is both novel and nonobvious. ......................... 103
`C.
`Conclusion .......................................................................................... 106
`PART 4. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF ........................................................ 107
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`‘072 Patent
`‘314 Patent
`‘383 Patent
`‘799 Patent
`‘800 Patent
`‘963 Patent
`14‐hydroxy
`2013 Stip.
`
`2012 Stip.
`
`8,14‐dihydroxy
`8α
`8β
`8‐acetoxy
`ABUK
`ANDA
`API
`Bastin
`Casner
`Chiu
`COB
`Da
`DMF
`FDA
`HCl
`Hoffmeister
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`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,683,072
`U.S. Patent No. 7,776,314
`U.S. Patent No. 8,114,383
`U.S. Patent No. 7,674,799
`U.S. Patent No. 7,674,800
`U.S. Patent No. 6,488,963
`14‐hydroxycodeinone
`Stipulations or Agreed Statements of Fact or Law,
`Joint Pretrial Order, Case No. 04 Md. 1603, Dkt.
`No. 572, filed Aug. 28, 2013
`Stipulations or Agreed Statements of Fact or Law,
`Joint Pretrial Order, Case No. 10 Civ. 3734, Dkt.
`No. 168, filed Oct. 12, 2012
`8,14‐dihydroxy‐7,8‐dihydrocodeinone
`8α, 14‐dihydroxy‐7,8‐dihydrocodeinone
`8β, 14‐dihydroxy‐7,8‐dihydrocodeinone
`8‐acetoxy‐14‐hydroxydihydrothebaine
`α,β‐unsaturated ketone
`
`Abbreviated New Drug Application
`active pharmaceutical ingredient
`International Application No. WO 95/20947
`U.S. Patent No. 7,153,966
`U.S. Patent No. 6,177,567
`crude oxycodone base
`Daltons
`Drug Master File
`U.S. Food and Drug Administration
`hydrochloride
`U.S. Patent No. 4,070,494
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`HPLC
`N
`NDA
`OROS
`ppm
`PEO
`POB
`PTO
`Teva Mem.
`Wright‐Oshlack
`
`high‐performance liquid chromatography
`Newtons
`New Drug Application
`osmotically controlled‐release oral delivery system
`parts per million
`polyethylene oxide
`purified oxycodone base
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`Defs.’ Post‐Trial Mem. dated Nov. 6, 2013
`U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60/310,534
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`SIDNEY H. STEIN, U.S. District Judge.
`
`
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`PART 1. INTRODUCTION
`
`This consolidated trial concerns six patents associated with the pain
`reliever OxyContin. Plaintiffs, led by the OxyContin manufacturer Purdue,
`allege that Teva, which manufactures generic pharmaceutical products, has
`infringed these patents by seeking approval from the U.S. Food and Drug
`Administration (“FDA”) to sell bioequivalents of OxyContin. In response,
`Teva argues that its proposed products do not infringe plaintiffs’ patents and
`that, in any event, the asserted patents are invalid. These arguments played
`out over the course of extensive litigation, culminating in a twenty‐day‐long
`bench trial before this Court. These findings of fact and conclusions of law are
`the results of that litigation.
`
`Three patents‐in‐suit—United States Patent Nos. 7,674,799 (“the ‘799
`Patent”), 7,647,800 (“the 800 Patent”), and 7,683,072 (“the ‘072 Patent”)
`(collectively, “the low‐ABUK patents”)—recite an improved formulation of
`oxycodone, the active pharmaceutical ingredient in OxyContin. Those patents
`describe an oxycodone salt with extremely low levels of a particular impurity,
`14‐hydroxycodeinone (“14‐hydroxy”), which belongs to a class of potentially
`dangerous compounds known as α,β‐unsaturated ketones (“ABUKs”).
`Purdue was the first to succeed in developing a low‐ABUK oxycodone salt as
`an active pharmaceutical ingredient (“API”). Its low‐ABUK patents reflect
`that work.
`
`Also in suit are two patents—United States Patent Nos. 7,776,314 (“the
`‘314 Patent”) and 8,114,383 (“the ‘383 Patent”) (collectively, “the abuse‐proof
`patents”)—that claim technology making tablets resistant to abuse. The
`technology disclosed in these patents is intended to hinder would‐be abusers
`from crushing tablets into powder, converting the powder into a liquid, and
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`then injecting the solution intravenously in order to experience an opioid
`“high.”
`
`The parties in these actions play various roles in the scientific and
`pharmaceutical communities. Universities provide the infrastructure for the
`advancement of human knowledge; pharmaceutical manufacturers seeking
`patents and marketing branded drugs discover new frontiers of medication
`and health; and generic pharmaceutical companies make those frontiers
`available to the public. This circle of invention, medicine, health, and profit
`depends on principles of intellectual property—the law’s allocation of
`restrictions and liberties.
`
`Applying those principles and the evidence presented at trial, the Court
`concludes that Teva has not infringed any valid patent asserted by plaintiffs.
`As explained below, plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proving
`infringement of the ‘314 Patent. Although plaintiffs have proved by a
`preponderance of the evidence that Teva’s proposed products infringe the
`‘799, ‘800, ‘072, and ‘383 Patents, Teva has proved by clear and convincing
`evidence that the asserted claims of those patents are invalid.
`
`I.
`
`The Record and Relevant Proceedings
`
`The Asserted Patent Claims
`
`A.
`Purdue1 alleges that Teva’s proposed formulations infringe several
`claims of the patents‐in‐suit. In the low‐ABUK portion of the trial, Purdue
`accuses Teva of infringing claims 3 and 19 from the ‘799 Patent, claims 30‐34
`and 76‐79 from the ‘800 Patent, and claims 1, 4, and 5 from the ‘072 Patent.
`These claims are directed to an oxycodone salt API that contains 14‐hydroxy
`at extremely low levels, and some of the claims specifically refer to an oral
`dosage form of that API.
`
`
`1 This Opinion refers to plaintiffs collectively as “Purdue.”
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`In the abuse‐proof portion of the litigation, Purdue accuses Teva of
`infringing claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8 from the ‘383 Patent. These claims describe a
`thermoformed pharmaceutical dosage form that is so physically hard that it
`can withstand forces as strong as 500 Newtons (500N) without breaking.
`Finally, Purdue accuses Teva of infringing claims 1, 2, 6, and 9 from the ‘314
`Patent. These claims relate to a pharmaceutical dosage form that deters abuse
`by becoming viscous when dissolved in a liquid.
`
`This consolidated litigation also included Purdue’s claims against Impax
`Laboratories, Inc., and Sandoz Inc., two other generic manufacturers. Impax
`and Sandoz appeared at trial alongside Teva but have since settled their
`actions. (See Case No. 11 Civ. 2400, Dkt. No. 147; Case No. 11 Civ. 4694, Dkt.
`No. 124; Case No. 12 Civ. 5082, Dkt. No. 43.) Purdue asserted claims from one
`patent—United States Patent No. 6,488,963 (“the ‘963 Patent”)—against
`Impax and Sandoz but not against Teva. This Opinion therefore does not
`address arguments related to the infringement or invalidity of the ‘963 Patent.
`
`The 2012 Ranbaxy Trial
`
`B.
`In November and December of 2012, the Court held an eight‐day bench
`trial in Purdue Phrama, L.P., et al. v. Ranbaxy, Inc., et al., No. 10 Civ. 3734 (SHS).
`There, Purdue and its affiliates asserted claims of infringement against
`Actavis Elizabeth LLC with respect to the low‐ABUK patents. Actavis, in
`turn, presented evidence that the low‐ABUK patents were invalid. The
`parties to the 2012 trial filed a consent judgment on May 1, 2013. That consent
`judgment provided, inter alia, that “[t]he Low ABUK Patents are valid and
`enforceable with respect to the Actavis [Abbreviated New Drug
`Applications] and any products described therein” and “[t]he products
`described in the Actavis [Abbreviated New Drug Applications] infringe the
`Low ABUK Patents.” (Case No. 04 Md. 1603, Dkt. No. 546 ¶ 2.) Consequently,
`no findings of fact or conclusions of law ever emerged from that trial.
`
`The same claims and defenses presented in the 2012 trial are again at
`issue in this trial, and the parties have agreed to adopt the entire record of the
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`2012 trial as part of the factual record in this trial. (Supp. to the Joint Pretrial
`Order Relating to Ranbaxy et al. Trial Record, Case No. 04 Md. 1603, Dkt. No.
`582, filed Sept. 13, 2013, at 1 ¶ 1.)
`
`Claim Construction
`
`C.
`After extensive briefing and a claim construction hearing, this Court
`issued a Claim Construction Opinion and Order in this matter. See In re
`OxyContin Antitrust Litigation, No. 04 Md. 1603 (SHS), 2013 WL 4509633
`(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2013) (“OxyContin Claim Construction”). There, the Court
`construed the patent claims at issue in these actions to the extent the parties
`disputed the meanings of claim terms. All parties to this trial participated in
`litigating the claim constructions, so for purposes of this trial that Opinion
`and Order “define[s] the invention[s] to which the patentee is entitled the
`right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`(en banc) (quotation marks omitted).
`
`The 2013 Trial
`
`D.
`The bench trial in the above‐captioned matters began on September 23,
`2013. The Court heard testimony from 22 witnesses and admitted hundreds
`of exhibits over the course of more than three weeks. Because of the adoption
`of the 2012 trial record as part of this trial’s record, the parties focused their
`presentations on the abuse‐proof patents. That said, because Teva was not a
`party to the 2012 trial, it had (and took advantage of) the opportunity to
`present additional evidence on the low‐ABUK patents.
`
`This Opinion
`
`E.
`On the basis of the record established by the parties and the applicable
`law, the Court enters these findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant
`to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To the extent that any
`findings of fact may be deemed conclusions of law, they shall also be
`considered conclusions of law; to the extent that any conclusions of law may
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`be deemed findings of fact, they shall also be considered findings of fact. See
`Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113‐14 (1985).
`
`II.
`
`Legal Standards
`
`Procedural Context and the Hatch‐Waxman Act
`
`A.
`This litigation arises under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
`Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98‐417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
`§§ 301 et seq.) (“Hatch‐Waxman Act”). The Hatch‐Waxman Act provides a
`streamlined regulatory pathway for generic pharmaceutical companies to
`seek approval of their drugs, while giving branded pharmaceutical
`companies an opportunity to sue to defeat approval of the generic drugs.
`
`Under the Hatch‐Waxman Act, a pharmaceutical company can seek FDA
`approval for a generic drug based on an already‐approved branded drug by
`filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”). 21 U.S.C.
`§ 355(j)(2)(A), (8)(B). As the name suggests, an ANDA does not require the
`detailed showings necessary for the pioneer New Drug Application (“NDA”),
`such as proof of safety and effectiveness. See id. Where a branded
`manufacturer’s patent has not yet expired but a generic manufacturer
`nonetheless wants to enter the market, the generic must file a pre‐expiration
`challenge (known colloquially as a “Paragraph IV” certification, after the
`relevant paragraph number in the legislation). Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). A
`generic firm’s Paragraph IV certification must establish bioequivalence of the
`proposed generic version with the approved branded version of the drug. See
`21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(9). The Paragraph IV certification must also state and
`explain at least one of the following claims: that the generic product would
`not infringe the branded firm’s patent, or that the branded firm’s patent is
`invalid. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
`
`As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained, the
`mere filing of “[a]n ANDA‐IV certification . . . constitutes an act of
`infringement, triggering the branded manufacturer’s right to sue.” Ark.
`Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2010)
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`(citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)). When a branded manufacturer files suit
`pursuant to that right within 45 days of receiving notice of the Paragraph IV
`certification, the litigation automatically stays the generic’s entry to the
`market. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). At its core, then, the Hatch‐Waxman Act
`shifts risks between the patent holder and the generic manufacturer, allowing
`the generics to challenge the validity of the brands’ patents without incurring
`either high market entry costs or the risk of damages from infringement. See
`Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund, 604 F.3d at 101. More significantly for
`purposes of this trial, this structure allows the parties to try the dueling issues
`of patent infringement and patent invalidity at once.
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`Claims of Patent Infringement
`
`B.
`“Patent infringement, whether literal or by equivalence, is an issue of
`fact, which the patentee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.”
`Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint‐Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637
`F.3d 1269, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “In order to prove infringement, a patentee
`must show that every limitation of the claims asserted to be infringed is
`found in the accused device.” Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562,
`1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`The infringement inquiry has two steps: (1) “the claim must be properly
`construed to determine its scope and meaning” and (2) “the claim as properly
`construed must be compared to the accused device or process.” Absolute
`Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
`(quotation marks omitted). The Court’s Claim Construction Opinion and
`Order of August 23, 2013 represents the first step. The second step—assessing
`infringement by way of a comparison—remains. Because the allegedly
`infringing product in a Hatch‐Waxman Act case is not yet on the commercial
`market, the infringement inquiry focuses on what is likely to be sold
`following FDA approval. See Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367,
`1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`“The second step in [this two‐step] analysis is to apply the claims to the
`accused device.” Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345
`(Fed. Cir. 2002). The accused device literally infringes a claim “when each of
`the claim limitations ‘reads on,’ or in other words is found in, the accused
`device.” Id.
`
`Where the accused product does not literally infringe a claim limitation,
`the patentee may nonetheless prove infringement under the doctrine of
`equivalents. See generally Warner‐Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520
`U.S. 17 (1997). To prove infringement of a claim through the doctrine of
`equivalents the patentee must prove that the difference between a missing
`claim element and what is found in the accused product is only
`“insubstantial.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
`610 (1950); TIP Sys. LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Galdwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1376‐
`77 (Fed. Cir. 2008). More specifically, the finder of fact inquires “whether a
`substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the claimed
`element, or whether the substitute element plays a role substantially different
`from the claimed element.” Warner‐Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40. This analysis
`is known as “the function, way, and result” test.
`
`The doctrine of equivalents has important limits. “There can be no
`denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts
`with the definitional and public‐notice functions of the statutory claiming
`requirement.” Id. at 29. The Court therefore scrupulously applies the
`function‐way‐result test, remaining “specially vigilant against allowing the
`concept of equivalence to eliminate any claim limitations completely.” Allen
`Eng’g Corp., 299 F.3d at 1345.
`
`The Affirmative Defense of Patent Invalidity
`
`C.
`A defendant “in any action involving . . . infringement of a patent” may
`plead as an affirmative defense that the asserted patent is invalid. 35 U.S.C.
`§ 282 (b)(2)‐(3); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
`Because “[a] patent shall be presumed valid,” “[t]he burden of establishing
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`invalidity . . . rest[s] on the party asserting such invalidity.” 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
`A defendant asserting patent invalidity must demonstrate invalidity by clear
`and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2242.
`
`Novelty and Anticipation
`
`1.
`An invention must be novel in order to receive a valid patent. 35 U.S.C.
`§ 102. “Invalidity based on lack of novelty (often called ‘anticipation’)
`requires that the same invention, including each element and limitation of the
`claims, was known or used by others before it was invented by the patentee.”
`Hoover Grp., Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 66 F.3d 299, 302 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A
`patent is therefore invalid due to anticipation when “a single prior art
`reference . . . expressly or inherently disclose[s] each claim limitation.”
`Finisair Corp. v. DirectTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The
`doctrine’s application is encapsulated in the old chestnut: “[t]hat which
`infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.” Upsher‐Smith Labs., Inc. v.
`Pamlab, LLC, 412 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Peters v. Active Mfg.
`Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889) (quotation marks omitted)).
`
`The anticipating reference need not explicitly spell out each element of
`the anticipated patent claim, but rather can teach a claim limitation if the
`“teaching is inherent in [the] prior art reference.” Corning Glass Works v.
`Sumitomo Elec. USA, Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 1989). To show
`inherent anticipation, a defendant must demonstrate clearly and convincingly
`that a claim limitation not disclosed in the anticipating reference will always
`be present when the prior art is practiced as taught in that reference. Glaxo
`Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047‐48 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “Inherent
`anticipation requires that the missing descriptive material is ‘necessarily
`present,’ not merely probably or possibly present” in the anticipating
`reference. Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top‐USA Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir.
`2002) (quoting In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
`
`In considering whether a prior art reference anticipates a claim, courts do
`not consider whether that reference includes optional elements of the claim.
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`After all, “optional elements do not narrow the claim because they can
`always be omitted.” In re Johnston, 435 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
`Whether a device includes or excludes the optional element does not
`determine whether it is an embodiment of the claimed invention, see id., so
`optional elements do not affect an anticipation analysis. Cf. Upsher‐Smith
`Labs., Inc., 412 F.3d at 1322.
`
`Anticipation and its subsidiary issues are questions of fact. Amkor Tech.,
`Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 692 F.3d 1250, 1254 (2012) (anticipation); Telemac
`Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1328 (2001) (inherency).
`
`Obviousness and Nonobviousness
`
`2.
`“Generally, a party seeking to invalidate a patent as obvious must
`demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a skilled artisan would
`have been motivated to combine the teaching of the prior art references to
`achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a
`reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” OSRAM Sylvania, Inc. v. Am.
`Induction Techs., Inc., 701 F.3d 698, 706‐07 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quotation marks
`omitted). “The Supreme Court has warned, however, that, while an analysis
`of any teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known elements is
`useful to an obviousness analysis, the overall obviousness inquiry must be
`expansive and flexible.” Id. at 707 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S.
`398, 415, 419 (2007)).
`
`A claim must have been nonobvious “at the time the invention was
`made.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Accordingly, courts must avoid the improper use
`of hindsight in this analysis and ought not “simply retrace[] the path of the
`inventor.” See Ortho‐McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358,
`1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Therefore, unlike in an analysis of novelty, an inherent
`property of a prior art reference contributes to obviousness only to the extent
`that the inherent property was known at the time of the invention. See In re
`Newell, 891 F.2d 899, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Adams, 356 F.2d 998, 1001‐02
`(C.C.P.A. 1966).
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`“The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination.” KSR
`Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 427. That legal determination rests on “underlying factual
`inquiries including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the
`differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, (3) the level of
`ordinary skill in the art, and (4) objective indicia of nonobviousness.” Pregis
`Corp. v. Kappos, 700 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Graham v. John
`Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17‐18 (1966).
`
`The analysis of obviousness must therefore include consideration of
`secondary, objective indicia. See, e.g., Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild
`Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “Objective
`evidence of nonobviousness can include copying, long felt but unsolved
`need, failure of others, commercial success, unexpected results created by the
`claimed invention, unexpected properties of the claimed invention, licenses
`showing industry respect for the invention, and skepticism of skilled artisans
`before the invention.” Id. In order for commercial success to provide a
`secondary indication of nonobviousness, the success of the commercial
`product must arise from the patent claims at issue. See, e.g., King Pharms., Inc.
`v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Brown & Williamson
`Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A
`nexus between commercial success and the claimed features is required.”).
`And in considering whether there was “a long‐felt, unmet need” that the
`invention satisfied—another secondary indication of nonobviousness, see
`Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)—
`the starting point is “the date of an articulated identified problem and
`evidence of efforts to solve that problem.” Tex. Instruments v. U.S. Int’l Trade
`Comm’n, 998 F.2d 1165, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
`
`Written Description and Enablement
`
`3.
`A patent is invalid if it violates the “written description” or
`“enablement” clauses of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Section 112 demands both (1) that a
`patentee adequately disclose his or her invention to the public, and (2) that
`the patent enable others to replicate it. Id. § 112(a). The written description
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`requirement and the enablement requirement are distinct, and the patent
`must satisfy both. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed.
`Cir. 2010) (en banc).
`
`Written Description
`
`a)
`A patent’s “description must clearly allow