UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
` ____________
`GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND GARMIN USA, INC.
`Petitioners
`v.
`
`LOGANTREE, LP
`Patent Owner
`____________
`
`Case No. IPR2018-00565
`Patent No. 6,059,576
` ____________
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
`
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
`II. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................... 1
`A. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION .................................................................................. 1
`B. GROUND 1: STEWART IN VIEW OF RUSH RENDERS CLAIMS 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10 AND
`12 OBVIOUS .................................................................................................. 3
`1. Stewart teaches “measuring unrestrained movement in any direction
`and generating signals indicative of said movement” ........................... 3
`2. Stewart and Rush teach “a microprocessor capable of receiving,
`interpreting, storing and responding to movement data based on user-
`defined operational parameters” ........................................................... 7
`3. Stewart teaches “memory for storing said movement data” ............... 13
`4. Stewart and Rush teach “a microprocessor . . . detecting a first user-
`defined event based on the movement data and at least one of the user-
`defined operational parameters regarding the movement data” ......... 15
`5. Stewart and Rush teach “storing first event information related to the
`detected first user-defined event along with first time stamp information
`reflecting a time at which the movement data causing the first user-
`defined event occurred” ....................................................................... 16
`C. GROUND 3: RICHARDSON IN VIEW OF STEWART RENDERS CLAIMS 1, 7, 8, 13,
`14, 56-58, 140, 144, AND 146 OBVIOUS ...................................................... 17
`1. Richardson teaches “a microprocessor capable of receiving,
`interpreting, storing and responding to said movement data based on
`user-defined operational parameters” ................................................. 17
`2. Richardson teaches “memory for storing said movement data” ......... 21
`3. Richardson teaches “detecting a first user-defined event based on the
`movement data and at least one of the user-defined operational
`parameters regarding the movement data” ......................................... 22
`4. Richardson teaches “storing first event information related to the
`detected first user-defined event along with first time stamp information
`reflecting a time at which the movement data causing the first user-
`defined event occurred” ....................................................................... 23
`D. PO’S CONSTITUTIONALITY ARGUMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED ................... 24
`
`III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 25
`
`

`

`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`Patent Owner’s (“PO”) arguments in the Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 13,
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`“POR”) are largely not supported by any factual basis and in some instances, they
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`are not legally supported. PO ignores the express teachings in the prior art as well
`
`as Petitioners’ reliance on specific teachings from the art. Instead, PO’s expert
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`created “high-level simplified” demonstratives, which he admits are not true and
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`accurate depictions of the prior art as they omit key disclosures of the prior art. Then
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`PO relies on those demonstratives, not the prior art, to save its claims. Additionally,
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`many of PO’s arguments for patentability run contrary to the disclosures of the ’576
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`patent, prosecution history and Petitioners’ actual grounds of rejection. When PO’s
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`rhetoric is rubbed away, Petitioners’ arguments for invalidity should be upheld by
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`the Board.
`
`II. ARGUMENT
`A. Claim Construction
`Claims 1 and 13 recite the limitation “storing . . . first event information
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`related to the detected first user-defined event along with first time stamp
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`information reflecting a time at which the movement data causing the first user-
`
`defined event occurred.” In the Institution Decision (Paper 9), the Board invited the
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`parties “to brief the meaning of the term ‘reflecting’ during the trial.” Decision, 24.
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`Petitioners believe the “reflecting” term is best understood in the context of claimed
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`phrase “first time stamp information reflecting a time.”
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`
`
`1
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`

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`The ’576 patent does not include the words “reflect,” “reflecting,” or the
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`phrase “first time stamp information reflecting a time” in the specification. This
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`limitation was added during a reexamination proceeding to distinguish over the prior
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`art. Pet., 6-7. To support amendments to the claims, PO cited 5:59-6:9. EX1003,
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`73. This portion of the ’576 specification discloses after “angle movement
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`information received from the movement sensor 30 indicates that the wearer has
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`exceeded any of the pre-set notice levels . . . the microprocessor 32 will obtain the
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`date/time stamp from the clock 46 and store that information along with the notice
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`level that was exceeded into memory 50 for later analysis and reporting.” EX1001,
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`6:1-9.
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`In the reexamination, the prior art was found to teach associating a timestamp
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`with movement data when it is stored in a database. EX1003, 84-85. In response,
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`PO argued, “[the] proposed combination of [Flentov/Vock] and Burdea would
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`reflect the time at which the data captured during the skier’s run down the hill (i.e.,
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`at the end of the session) is updated to a database, not a time at which the
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`movement data causing the end of the run (alleged event) occurred.” Id., 84
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`(emphasis in original). And, “[s]ince the time stamp in the proposed modification
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`reflects the time at which the ski data was downloaded, this could occur shortly after
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`the skier pushes the button or a day or two later.” Id., 85. Based on the specification
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`and file history, the claimed phrase “first time stamp information reflecting a time”
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`
`
`2
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`

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`must indicate a time when the movement data causing the first user-defined event
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`occurred—not just a time when the first event information is stored.
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`B. Ground 1: Stewart in view of Rush Renders Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10
`and 12 Obvious
`1.
`Stewart teaches “measuring unrestrained movement in any
`direction and generating signals indicative of said movement”
`Claim 1 recites “a movement sensor capable of measuring data associated
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`with unrestrained movement in any direction and generating signals indicative of
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`said movement.” PO alleges “a POSITA would understand that Stewart does not
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`teach or suggest measuring data associated with physical movement because the
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`sensor in Stewart does not measure unrestrained movement of the body part.” POR,
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`17 (emphasis in original). PO also contends Stewart’s disclosure of “a helmet that
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`includes three sets of three orthogonally-placed accelerometers that can be used to
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`measure uniquely the translational, angular and normal components of acceleration
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`of the head” is insufficient disclosure for measuring unrestrained movement. Id.,
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`17-18.
`
`PO’s arguments are perplexing given Stewart’s teachings. Stewart teaches
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`movement sensors comprising three to nine accelerometers, and Dr. Madisetti
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`admitted accelerometers measure body movement. EX1004, 6:29-35; EX1021,
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`26:9-12. Stewart’s accelerometers “provide data which corresponds directly to
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`motion of the head in three-dimensional space,” and Dr. Madisetti confirmed the
`
`
`
`3
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`

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`head is a body part. EX1004, 6:13-16; EX1021, 17:5-7. Stewart’s system “provides
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`the ability to measure an individual’s cumulative exposure to translational and
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`angular accelerations while allowing unaffected performance of everyday sports and
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`activities.” EX1004, 4:40-44. Stewart further explains the device allows “the sports
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`person to wear in the relevant everyday sports activity without hindering, inhibiting
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`or otherwise affecting the ability of the user to perform the sport.” Id., 6:24-28.
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`Despite Stewart’s disclosure, PO contends “Garmin is not believed to have
`
`provided evidence in its petition or in Dr. Singer’s declaration of Stewart measuring
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`unrestrained movement.” POR, 18 (emphasis added). First, PO provides no factual
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`basis for its position, who believes this, or why the movement measured by Stewart
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`is not unrestrained. Id. PO does not explain why Stewart’s accelerometers allegedly
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`measure “restrained” movement instead of “unrestrained” movement. Instead, PO
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`appears to be implicitly applying a narrow interpretation of the term without
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`providing any factual basis for such an interpretation.
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`Nothing in the ’576 patent or the prosecution history supports PO’s narrow
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`interpretation. The ’576 patent does not include the word “unrestrained” in the
`
`specification. And the Applicant added the term “unrestrained” to the claim to
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`distinguish over prior art cited during the original prosecution of the ’576 patent.
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`Pet., 4. Applicant added the requirement to distinguish over U.S. Patent No.
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`5,052,375 to Stark et al. (“Stark”). EX1002, 110. Applicant argued Stark discloses
`
`
`
`4
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`

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`“an orthopedic restraining device used to immobilize and rehabilitate injured human
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`limbs by providing controlled resistance to movement of the limb” and therefore
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`fails to describe a device used to measure movement “without any restraint to the
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`movement.” Id. (emphasis in original).
`
`In contrast to Stark, Stewart’s device is incorporated into a piece of
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`conventional sporting gear (e.g., a helmet) so it may be worn “in the relevant
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`everyday sports activity without hindering, inhibiting or otherwise affecting the
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`ability of the user to perform the sport.” EX1004, 6:24-28 (emphasis added); Pet.,
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`15-16. Like Stewart, the device described in the ’576 patent is attached to a user
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`performing everyday activities including sports activities. EX1001, 10:62-11:6.
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`The ’576 patent device similarly includes one or more accelerometers measuring
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`“movement in multiple planes” exactly like Stewart’s accelerometers. Compare id.,
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`4:42-48 with EX1004, 4:46-59, 6:3-16, 6:21-57. Thus, Stewart’s monitoring device
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`measures unrestrained movement in any direction in the same manner as the
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`monitoring device described in the ’576 patent.
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`Second, Dr. Madisetti only cites to Stewart’s discussion of accelerometers, his
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`belief Petitioners did not meet their burden, and a demonstrative he created allegedly
`
`characterizing Stewart’s architecture as support for his opinions. EX2001, ¶¶ 45,
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`58. But, Dr. Madisetti’s declaration never addresses the portions of Stewart cited in
`
`the Petition. Pet., 15-16. Stewart expressly discloses the invention is utilized
`
`
`
`5
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`

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`without hindering, inhibiting or otherwise affecting the ability of the user to perform
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`the sport. Id., 15-16 (citing EX1004, 6:24-28). Dr. Madisetti fails to explain why
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`this disclosure is not sufficient or why sportspersons through normal game play
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`would have restrained body movements. When asked about this disclosure in his
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`deposition, Dr. Madisetti agreed Stewart’s device is “comfortable enough without
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`hindering, inhibiting, or otherwise affecting the ability of the user to perform the
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`sport,” but refused to explain how or if Stewart’s device restrains movement.
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`EX1021, 18:5-20, 20:10-21:13. Dr. Madisetti lack of factual basis means his
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`testimony is entitled to no weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).
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`Instead, Dr. Madisetti’s opinion seems to be based on the lack of the word
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`“unrestrained” in the reference. Id. However, a prior art reference need not use
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`identical terminology to render a claim invalid. ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm
`
`Inc., 621 Fed. App’x 1009, 1018–19 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We have held, however, that
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`the failure of a reference to disclose a claim limitation in the same words used by the
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`patentee is not fatal to a claim of invalidity”); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832–33
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`(Fed. Cir. 1990). And given the express disclosure of this limitation in Stewart, PO’s
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`argument has no merit.
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`Third, Dr. Madisetti’s demonstratives are not evidence. Kranos Corp. v.
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`Riddell, Inc., IPR2016-01650, Decision, Paper 27 at 30 (PTAB Feb. 21, 2018)
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`(Noting “[a] labelled drawing with an arrow pointing to unidentified dark spots is
`
`
`
`6
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`

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`attorney argument. It is not persuasive evidence. Without persuasive evidence, we
`
`cannot find that [the prior art] discloses the [] limitations of claims 41 and 62.”). In
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`his deposition, Dr. Madisetti agreed his diagram is only a “high-level simplified view
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`of Stewart,” which should not be viewed “as a full disclosure and – of Stewart’s
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`contents and its substitution.” EX1021, 28:20-24. Dr. Madisetti also contends the
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`diagram “is not meant to be replacing any description of Stewart that otherwise
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`appears in my declaration.” Id., 29:14-16.
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`This is problematic because Dr. Madisetti’s declaration provides no other
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`citations to Stewart on this issue or any explanation why, in his view, Stewart’s
`
`device restrains movement. There is simply no factual basis for Dr. Madisetti’s
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`opinions, and they should be rejected. Kranos, Paper 27 at 30; Telebrands Corp. v.
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`Tinnus Enters., LLC, PGR2017-00024, Decision, Paper 15 at 19 (PTAB Nov. 30,
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`2017) (noting “neither the Petitioner nor Dr. Kamrin explain how the image is an
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`array of holes extending through an end of a housing, thus it is unclear at best how
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`the annotated image shows an ‘array’”).
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`2.
`Stewart and Rush teach “a microprocessor capable of receiving,
`interpreting, storing and responding to movement data based on user-
`defined operational parameters”
`
`Claim 1 recites “a microprocessor capable of receiving, interpreting, storing
`
`and responding to movement data based on user-defined operational parameters.”
`
`PO’s primary argument regarding this limitation appears to be based on an imported
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`7
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`

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`requirement for the microprocessor to interpret the “movement data measured by the
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`sensor using the user-programmed operational parameters and the real-time clock.”
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`POR, 18-19 (emphasis in original, citing EX1001, 5:40-47), id., 20 (“Stewart does
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`not teach or suggest a microprocessor interpreting physical movement data based on
`
`user-defined operational parameters and a real-time clock, as recited by the
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`Challenged Claims.”) (emphasis added). However, claim 1 does not recite this
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`limitation, and PO’s argument is not relevant to this ground of rejection.
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`To the extent PO contends that this limitation should be read into the claim,
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`PO fails to explain any factual or legal basis for its imported requirement for the
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`microprocessor to interpret the movement data “based on . . . a real-time clock.” The
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`claim construction inquiry begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the
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`claim. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
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`language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim
`
`interpretation.”). The plain language of claim 1 does not require “receiving,
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`interpreting, storing and responding” based on a real-time clock (RTC). And,
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`reading this requirement into the claim is improper.
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`Additionally, PO cites to Dr. Madisetti’s declaration to support its allegation
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`that “a POSITA would not understand that the processor in Stewart is interpreting
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`measured data.” POR, 19 (citing EX2001, ¶¶45, 60). However, these portions of
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`Dr. Madisetti’s declaration are factually flawed. For instance, Dr. Madisetti’s
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`
`
`8
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`

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`opinion is based on the imported requirement for the microprocessor to interpret
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`movement data “based on . . . the real-time clock” (EX2001, ¶45) and should
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`therefore be disregarded. Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d
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`1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we must disregard the testimony of an
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`expert that is . . . based on an incorrect understanding of the claim[s]” (citations and
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`internal quotation marks omitted)).
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`Dr. Madisetti also incorrectly opines “[t]here is also no evidence on the record
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`that claimed limitations 1ci is present since there is no microprocessor disclosed,”
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`(EX2001, ¶45), and his demonstrative characterizing Stewart’s architecture (Figure
`
`A2), which he relies on for his opinions, omits Stewart’s microprocessor:
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`EX2001, ¶ 44.
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`
`
`9
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`

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`Conversely, PO admits Stewart discloses a microprocessor that receives user-
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`defined commands that “set the general parameters of the data storage operation of
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`the HAT.” POR, 19 (citing EX1004, 11:53-54). PO contends Stewart’s
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`microprocessor “is not interpreting the measured data based on the commands
`
`because the processor is merely controlling storage of the measured data.” Id., 20.
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`PO’s argument is not relevant to Petitioners’ ground of rejection. The Petition does
`
`not map Stewart’s user-defined commands to the claimed “interpreting . . . based on
`
`user-defined operational parameters” requirement. Rather, Petitioners rely on the
`
`combination of Stewart and Rush for this limitation. Pet., 22-23.
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`Stewart’s processor “record[s] in real-time detailed data only when the
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`accelerations exceed a defined threshold” and correlates “certain responses of the
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`accelerometers 10-12 with desirable punches exceeding a predetermined threshold”.
`
`EX1004, 5:5-7, 14:6-11; Pet., 21-22. Stewart’s “processer interprets the received
`
`acceleration data to determine if the accelerations exceed the defined/predetermined
`
`thresholds.” Pet., 22. Stewart does not disclose the thresholds are user-defined, but
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`“it would have been obvious to a PHOSITA to enable the user to define/adjust
`
`Stewart’s acceleration thresholds” based on Rush’s teaching of adjusting a sensor
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`used to detect spearing movements in football “so that the magnitude of the axial
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`impact experienced may be varied to accommodate players of different ages and
`
`
`
`10
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`

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`sizes and to minimize the accidental actuation of the signal.” Pet., 22-23 (citing
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`EX1006, 9:54-58, EX1010, ¶¶54-55).
`
`Regarding the combination with Rush, PO contends Rush teaches “a
`
`mechanical adjustment of the accelerometer” and “a POSITA would therefore
`
`recognize that a combination of Stewart and Rush would merely result in Stewart’s
`
`accelerometers being adjustable.” POR, 23. PO’s argument presumes the proposed
`
`combination would require bodily incorporation of Rush’s sensor in Stewart’s
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`system. Bodily incorporation is not the standard for obviousness analysis. In re
`
`Mouttet, 686 F.3 d 1322, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2012); MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-
`
`Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[t]he test for obviousness is
`
`not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into
`
`the structure of the primary reference” (citation omitted)). It would have been
`
`obvious to enable the user to define the Stewart’s acceleration thresholds in order to
`
`accommodate different players as taught by Rush. Pet., 23 (citing EX1010, ¶54).
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`“Since Stewart’s data collection operations performed by the processor are based on
`
`user-defined commands, it would have been obvious to enable the user to enter
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`commands defining and/or adjusting the acceleration thresholds.” Id. (citing
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`EX1010, ¶55).
`
`PO’s position regarding Stewart’s inherent disclosure of an RTC is confusing
`
`given this claim limitation does not recite an RTC. Also, Dr. Madisetti includes an
`
`
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`11
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`

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`RTC in his Figure A2 characterizing Stewart. EX2001, ¶44. Nonetheless, PO
`
`contends a PHOSITA would understand that “any inherent real-time clock
`
`(assuming, arguendo, a real-time clock would be inherent, which LoganTree does
`
`not concede is correct) would be directly coupled to the sensor.” POR, 20. Apart
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`from citing to Dr. Madisetti’s conclusory testimony, PO does not provide any factual
`
`basis or explain why it matters with respect to this claim limitation. Id.
`
`To the extent PO is challenging limitation 1(e), which requires “a real-time
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`clock connected to said microprocessor,” Petitioners provided evidence showing a
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`PHOSITA would recognize that Stewart’s disclosure of the time-based commands,
`
`such as the user programming the processor would start and stop data collection at
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`specific times, inherently discloses an RTC connected to the processor. Pet., 28-29;
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`EX1010, ¶44, ¶¶46-49. Dr. Madisetti alleges Stewart’s “data is being measured at
`
`the sensor and stored based on the commands” and then concludes “any inherent
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`real-time clock would be directly coupled to the sensor.” EX2001, ¶64. This
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`argument is contrary to Stewart’s disclosure that the “processor 52 controls data
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`sampling and storage operations” and executes the user-defined commands, which
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`are received over serial control interface 42. EX1004, 5:56-60, 11:29-12:12. It is
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`the processor – not the sensor – that executes the time-based commands, and there
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`is no factual basis for PO and Dr. Madisetti’s contention that “a real-time clock . . .
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`would be directly coupled to the sensor.” POR, 20 (citing EX2001, ¶45, ¶64).
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`12
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`Neither PO nor Dr. Madisetti rebutted Petitioners’ alternative argument this
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`limitation is obvious over Stewart. Pet., 29-30; EX1010, ¶50. This point is
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`undisputed.
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`Finally, PO attempts to discredit Dr. Singer by alleging that he “appeared to
`
`not understand what the clamed [sic] limitation ‘interpreting, using a microprocessor
`
`. . .’ meant. POR, 23-24 (citing EX2002, 6:2-9:2). First, this testimony is related to
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`claim 20 – not claim 1 – and is therefore irrelevant to this claim limitation. EX2002,
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`6:2-9:2. Even if it were relevant, Dr. Singer confirmed he understood the limitation.
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`EX2002, 6:2-22. In the portion of the transcript cited by PO, Dr. Singer indicated
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`he had not offered a claim construction for this limitation and was not comfortable
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`doing so on the fly. Id., 8:17-9:2. Dr. Madisetti similarly opined that he did not
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`offer a construction of the “interpreting” limitation because “interpreting means
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`interpreting to one of ordinary skill in the art, and it’s pretty clear that way.”
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`EX1021, 36:22-38:17. The Board should disregard PO’s unfair attempts to discredit
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`Dr. Singer’s testimony.
`
`3.
`Stewart teaches “memory for storing said movement data”
`PO does not dispute that Stewart teaches data storage 51, which is “memory
`
`for storing said movement data” per claim 1. POR, 24; Pet., 30-31. Instead, PO’s
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`arguments are related to two different limitations of claim 1, including “storing . . .
`
`said movement data based on user-defined operational parameters” (limitation
`
`
`
`13
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`

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`1(c)(i)) and “storing first event information related to the detected first user defined
`
`event along with first time stamp information . . .” (limitation 1(c)(iii)). Id. PO
`
`alleges “Garmin does not provide evidence in either its Petition or Dr. Singer’s
`
`Declaration of two storing limitations in Stewart.” POR, 24-25. PO’s argument is
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`plainly wrong. Page 21 of the Petition describes how Stewart meets the first
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`“storing” limitation, and pages 25-27 describe how the second “storing” limitation
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`would have been obvious over Stewart and Rush. Pet., 21, 25-27.
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`PO and Dr. Madisetti also allege “a POSITA would understand based on the
`
`disclosure of Stewart, that Stewart provides for only one instance of storing.”1 POR,
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`25 (citing EX2001, ¶70). This is not accurate. Stewart’s processor can store
`
`movement data based on “user-defined commands that ‘set the general parameters
`
`of the data storage operation of the HAT.’” Pet., 21 (citing EX1004, 11:53-54);
`
`EX1004, 11:51-63. This disclosure meets the first “storing” limitation requiring “a
`
`microprocessor capable of . . . storing . . . said movement data based on user-defined
`
`operational parameters.” The Petition also shows how Stewart’s disclosure of
`
`
`
`
`
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`1 To the extent PO and Dr. Madisetti are alleging “two instances of storage”
`
`require two separate memories, Petitioners disagree because claim 1 separately
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`recites “a memory for storing said movement data.”
`
`
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`14
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`storing “detailed data only when the accelerations exceed a defined threshold”
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`(EX1004, 5:4-7) in combination with Rush’s disclosure of storing “the time and
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`date of each instance in which the potentially injurious activity occurs” (EX1006,
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`10:26-28) meets the “storing first event information related to the detected first user
`
`defined event along with first time stamp information . . .” limitation. Pet., 25-27
`
`(citing EX1010, ¶¶62-65).
`
`4.
`Stewart and Rush teach “a microprocessor . . . detecting a first
`user-defined event based on the movement data and at least one of the
`user-defined operational parameters regarding the movement data”
`PO again ignores Stewart’s express disclosures regarding the microprocessor
`
`by alleging that “a POSITA would understand that any detection, if any, is being
`
`performed at the sensor.” POR, 25. It is Stewart’s microprocessor – not the
`
`accelerometers – that “controls the operation of the HAT system.” EX1004, 8:58-
`
`62.
`
`Stewart’s processor detects an event, such as an illegal spearing move in
`
`football,
`
`by
`
`determining whether
`
`the movement
`
`data
`
`exceeds
`
`a
`
`defined/predetermined threshold. Pet., 25 (citing EX1004, 5:4-7, 14:6-11). And, it
`
`would have been obvious to enable the user to define Stewart’s acceleration
`
`thresholds as taught by Rush. Id. In response, PO again contends “a POSITA would
`
`therefore recognize that a combination of Stewart and Rush would merely result in
`
`
`
`15
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`

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`Stewart’s accelerometers being adjustable” (POR, 26-27), which is improper for the
`
`reasons discussed above. Supra, Section II.B.2.
`
`5.
`Stewart and Rush teach “storing first event information related to
`the detected first user-defined event along with first time stamp
`information reflecting a time at which the movement data causing the
`first user-defined event occurred”
`PO contends the combination of Stewart and Rush do not teach the “storing
`
`first event information related to the detected first user-defined event along with first
`
`time stamp information reflecting a time at which the movement data causing the
`
`first user-defined event occurred” limitation because neither “teaches storing time-
`
`stamped movement data.” POR, 28. PO misapprehends the combination with
`
`Stewart and Rush.
`
`The Petition relies on Stewart’s teaching of storing “real-time detailed data
`
`only when the accelerations exceed a defined threshold” (EX1004, 5:4-7) in
`
`combination with Rush’s teaching of associating a timestamp with the recorded data
`
`at the time the user-defined event occurred. Pet., 25-27. Specifically, Rush teaches
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`a “recording means may record the time and date of each instance in which the
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`potentially injurious activity occurs.” Pet., 26; EX1006, 10:26-28. And “[i]t would
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`have been obvious to a PHOSITA to similarly enable Stewart’s processor to store
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`time and date information reflecting a time at which the acceleration data exceeded
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`the user-defined threshold” based on Rush’s teachings. Pet., 26-27 (citing EX1010,
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`¶¶62-66). PO’s argument that Rush does not “store time-stamped movement data”
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`
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`16
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`

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`is irrelevant because Petitioners rely on Stewart’s movement data in combination
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`with Rush’s timestamp. POR, 28-29.
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`C. Ground 3: Richardson in view of Stewart Renders Claims 1, 7, 8, 13,
`14, 56-58, 140, 144, and 146 Obvious
`1.
`Richardson teaches “a microprocessor capable of receiving,
`interpreting, storing and responding to said movement data based on
`user-defined operational parameters”
`Claims 1 and 13 require a “microprocessor capable of receiving, interpreting,
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`storing and responding to said movement data based on user-defined operational
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`parameters.” Richardson teaches a microprocessor that receives acceleration data
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`while executing a “monitor sensors process 154.” Pet., 47 (citing EX1009, 16:8-14,
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`28:28-32, Fig. 12). The processor stores each acceleration sample in memory with
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`a timestamp, and process 154 interprets the stored acceleration data to determine
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`each locomotor step. Id., 47-48 (citing EX1009, 6:26-32, 28:36-45, Figs. 12, 13a).
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`Once each step is found, the microprocessor further interprets the movement data
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`based on the user’s personal data to calculate and store values such as the user’s
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`velocity and other “locomotion parameters,” such as distance travelled. Id., 48-49
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`(citing EX1009, 28:63-64, 29:10-11, 4:20-27). The user’s personal data includes
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`values such as the user’s weight, age, height, leg length, etc.” Id., 48 (citing EX1009,
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`13:11-36). The personal data is entered by the user and stored in a database. Id., 49
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`(citing EX1009, Fig. 11).
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`
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`17
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`

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`The calculated locomotion parameters such as speed and distance are further
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`monitored by the microprocessor to detect “alarm conditions,” such as a cruise
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`control alarm that detects and alerts the user when the user’s speed is out of a user-
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`defined band and a milepost alarm that detects and alerts the user when the distance
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`travel exceeds a user-defined milepost increment. Pet., 50-51 (citing EX1009,
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`30:12-23, 18:30-33, Table 1). Richardson’s user-defined milepost and cruise control
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`alarm conditions are “user-defined operational parameters used by
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`the
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`microprocessor to respond to the acceleration data.” Pet., 52.
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`The Board found that Richardson teaches this limitation except for “storage
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`of movement data based on user-defined operational parameters.” Decision, 22-23.
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`And, the Board found “Richardson’s microprocessor stores each acceleration sample
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`with a timestamp in memory,” but that “Petitioner does not explain how storage
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`would be based on user-defined operational parameters” and how “personal
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`information constitutes ‘operational parameters.’” Id. PO raises similar arguments.
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`POR, 33-34.
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`There is no question that Richardson’s personal data is “user-defined.”
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`Richardson’s microprocessor requires entry of the personal data for operation:
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`No further action is taken until the control button is pressed for
`the first time. The system checks the user database 166 to see if
`it is missing any personal data 005 from the set of the user’s body
`weight, body height, leg length, age in years, and sex. If any are
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`
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`18
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`

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`missing then a state, ‘main personal not’ is added to the state
`queue 191 by an add q states routine, and the state/menu loop
`192 is entered. The effect of this is to engage the user in a menu-
`driven dialogue to obtain the missing items. The state/menu loop
`192 is described later in discussing FIG. 12, and the dialogue is
`described later in discussing Table 1. Once all personal data
`005 are available, the system starts the monitor sensors
`process 154. Without the personal data 005, the monitor
`sensors process 154 would not be able to analyze locomotor
`steps or track energy expenditure 228.
`
`EX1009, 19:28-42 (emphasis added); see also, id., Fig. 11.
`The ability of Richardson’s microprocessor to perform the “monitor sensors
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`process”, “track user status process”, generate alarm triggers, etc. is dependent on
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`entry of the user’s personal data. Id., Fig. 10. But for entry of the user’s personal
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`data, Richardson’s processor does not perform any activity monitoring operations
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`including storing the acceleration samples with timestamps, interpreting the
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`acceleration data to calculate the locomotion parameters, detecting alarm conditions,
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`etc. By necessity, Richardson’s personal data qualifies as “user-defined operational
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`parameters” because the microprocessor is unable to perform its intended operations
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`without it.
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`Richardson’s disclosure is similar to the ’576 patent which similarly requires
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`the user to enter “user-defined configuration information” that “can encompass an
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`array of information including, but not limited to, a series of notice levels
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`
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`19
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`

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`corresponding to increasing angles of movement, an event threshold, a reset range
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`for tilt determination, and a time period for entering idle mode.” EX1001, 5:59-66
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`(emphasis added). As with Richardson, the microprocessor described in the ’576
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`patent requires this information to perform the activity monitoring process. Id., Figs.
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`5A-D, 8:56-10:2