throbber
Case 6:11-cv-00287-MHS-KNM Document 493 Filed 01/21/14 Page 1 of 31 PageID #: 6302
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
`
`MACROSOLVE, INC.,
`
`v.
`
`ANTENNA SOFTWARE, INC., et al,
`
`MACROSOLVE, INC.,
`
`v.
`
`NEWEGG, INC.
`
`MACROSOLVE, INC.,
`
`v.
`
`GEICO INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.,
`et al,
`

`§ NO. 6:11-cv-287 MHS-KNM



`
`LEAD CASE
`

`§ NO. 6:12-cv-46 MHS-KNM



`
`MEMBER CASE
`

`§ NO. 6:12-cv-74 MHS-KNM



`
`MEMBER CASE
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`This Memorandum Opinion construes the disputed claim terms in U.S. Patent No.
`
`7,822,816 (“the „816 Patent”). For the reasons stated herein, the Court adopts the constructions
`
`set forth below.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiff MacroSolve, Inc. alleges that Defendants Newegg Inc. and GEICO Insurance
`
`Agency, Inc. et al, (collectively “GEICO”) infringe the „816 patent. The „816 Patent discloses a
`
`“System and Method for Data Management.” The prior art involved gathering data away from a
`
`computer, traditionally on paper forms, and then later entering it into a computer. The invention
`
`taught in the „816 Patent allows information to be gathered by a handheld device and transmitted
`
`1
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 1
`
`

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`to the second computer through a loosely connected network. This combination eliminates extra
`
`steps and cuts down on delays and inaccuracies.
`
`APPLICABLE LAW
`
`
`
`“It is a „bedrock principle‟ of patent law that „the claims of a patent define the invention
`
`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`
`1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381
`
`F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Court examines a patent‟s intrinsic evidence to define
`
`the patented invention‟s scope. Id. at 1313–1314; Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad
`
`Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Intrinsic evidence includes the
`
`claims, the rest of the specification and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13;
`
`Bell Atl. Network Servs., 262 F.3d at 1267. The Court gives claim terms their ordinary and
`
`customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
`
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2003).
`
`
`
`Claim language guides the Court‟s construction of claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`
`1314. “[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id.
`
`Other claims, asserted and unasserted, can provide additional instruction because “terms are
`
`normally used consistently throughout the patent.” Id. Differences among claims, such as
`
`additional limitations in dependent claims, can provide further guidance. Id.
`
`
`
`“[C]laims „must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.‟” Id.
`
`(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “[T]he
`
`specification „is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
`
`dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.‟” Id. (quoting Vitronics
`
`2
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 2
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`

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`Case 6:11-cv-00287-MHS-KNM Document 493 Filed 01/21/14 Page 3 of 31 PageID #: 6304
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`Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex. Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.
`
`Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In the specification, a patentee may define his own
`
`terms, give a claim term a different meaning that it would otherwise possess, or disclaim or
`
`disavow some claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Although the Court generally presumes
`
`terms possess their ordinary meaning, this presumption can be overcome by statements of clear
`
`disclaimer. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
`
`1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This presumption does not arise when the patentee acts as his own
`
`lexicographer. See Irdeto Access, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2004).
`
`
`
`The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and
`
`accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of
`
`the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. For
`
`example, “[a] claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the
`
`claim „is rarely, if ever, correct.” Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elam Computer Group Inc., 362
`
`F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583). But, “[a]lthough
`
`the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed language in the
`
`claims, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be
`
`read into the claims.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1988); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
`
`
`
`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
`
`construction because a patentee may define a term during prosecution of the patent. Home
`
`Diagnostics Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the
`
`specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent”). The well-
`
`3
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`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 3
`
`

`

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`established doctrine of prosecution disclaimer “preclud[es] patentees from recapturing through
`
`claim interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g Inc. v.
`
`Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The prosecution history must show that the
`
`patentee clearly and unambiguously disclaimed or disavowed the proposed interpretation during
`
`prosecution to obtain claim allowance. Middleton Inc. v. 3M Co., 311 F.3d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2002); see also Springs Window, 323 F.3d at 994 (“The disclaimer . . . must be effected with
`
`„reasonable clarity and deliberateness.‟”) (citations omitted)). “Indeed, by distinguishing the
`
`claimed invention over the prior art, an applicant is indicating what the claims do not cover.”
`
`Spectrum Int’l v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted).
`
`“As a basic principle of claim interpretation, prosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice
`
`function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public‟s reliance on definitive statements made
`
`during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1324.
`
`
`
`Although, “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative
`
`meaning of claim language,” the Court may rely on extrinsic evidence to “shed useful light on
`
`the relevant art.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quotation omitted). Technical dictionaries and
`
`treatises may help the Court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one
`
`skilled in the art might use claim terms, but such sources may also provide overly broad
`
`definitions or may not be indicative of how terms are used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly,
`
`expert testimony may aid the Court in determining the particular meaning of a term in the
`
`pertinent field, but “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim
`
`term are not useful.” Id. Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its
`
`prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id.
`
`4
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 4
`
`

`

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`
`
`The patent in suit may contain means-plus-function limitations that require construction.
`
`Where a claim limitation is expressed in means-plus-function language and does not recite
`
`definite structure in support of its function, the limitation is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.
`
`Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In relevant part, § 112
`
`mandates that “such a claim limitation be construed to cover the corresponding structure . . .
`
`described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.).
`
`Accordingly, when faced with means-plus-function limitations, courts “must turn to the written
`
`description of the patent to find the structure that corresponds to the means recited in the
`
`[limitations].” Id.
`
`
`
`Construing a means-plus-function limitation involves two inquiries. The first step
`
`requires “a determination of the function of the means-plus-function limitation.” Medtronic, Inc.
`
`v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Once a court has
`
`determined the limitation‟s function, “the next step is to determine the corresponding structure
`
`disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Medtronic, 248 F.3d at 1311. A
`
`structure is corresponding “only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or
`
`associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Id. Moreover, the focus of the
`
`corresponding structure inquiry is not merely whether a structure is capable of performing the
`
`recited function, but rather whether the corresponding structure is “clearly linked or associated
`
`with the [recited] function.” Id.
`
`A. Agreed Terms
`
`CLAIM TERMS
`
`The parties have agreed to the construction of several terms. 4-5d Chart at 3 [Doc. No.
`
`445-1 at 3].
`
`5
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 5
`
`

`

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`Claim Terms
`Tokenizing said questionnaire
`Executing at
`least a portion of
`representing said questionnaire
`
`tokens
`
`Series of questions
`
`
`Agreed Claim Construction
`Assigning tokens to the questionnaire
`Executing at least some of the tokens so as to
`present a question or a statement requesting
`information
`No construction required
`
`In view of the parties‟ agreements on the proper construction of each of the identified terms,
`
`the Court ADOPTS AND APPROVES these constructions.
`
`B. Disputed Terms
`
`1. “questionnaire”
`
`MacroSolve’s Proposed Construction Defendant Newegg’s Proposed Construction
`A request for information, whether collected
`A complete form or program that includes
`automatically or manually
`questions and internal branching logic, i.e.,
`instructions that provide a path from one
`question to another based upon a user‟s
`response.
`
`
`
`Defendant GEICO argues that “questionnaire” should be given its plain meaning and that
`
`MacroSolve‟s construction is not the plain meaning of “questionnaire.” Doc. No. 438 at 4 n. 1.
`
`MacroSolve and Defendant Newegg contend that the term “questionnaire” requires construction
`
`and offer competing proposals. Based on the parties‟ arguments, there is an actual dispute over
`
`the proper scope of the claim language. Therefore it must be resolved by the Court. O2 Micro
`
`Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`The parties dispute four key issues: (1) whether the “questionnaire” must be a form or
`
`program; (2) whether the “questionnaire” must include internal branching logic; (3) whether the
`
`“questionnaire” must be a “complete” form or program as Defendant Newegg proposes; and
`
`(4) whether the “questions” in the questionnaire can be statements.
`
`
`
`6
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 6
`
`

`

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`Program or Form
`
`
`
`MacroSolve contends that “questionnaire” is a broad term and can be any request for
`
`information. Doc. No. 433 at 4. MacroSolve argues that the specification defines a
`
`questionnaire as a series of questions or statements that calls for a response. Doc. No. 441 at 2.
`
`MacroSolve points to patent language stating that “the series of questions/statements will
`
`collectively be referred to as a questionnaire.” „816 Patent at 8:18–19. MacroSolve argues that
`
`while a questionnaire is inclusive of forms or programs, it is not a requirement. Doc. No. 441 at
`
`3. According to MacroSolve, the defining characteristic is a request for information. Id.
`
`
`
`Defendant Newegg argues that a questionnaire is more than simply a request for
`
`information. Doc. No. 438 at 4. Newegg relies on language in the specification that analogizes a
`
`“questionnaire” with a “program” or “form”. Id. The specification states that “questionnaire,”
`
`form”, and “program” can be used interchangeably. „816 Patent at 8:19–24. Newegg contends
`
`that by analogizing the questionnaire to a form or program, the applicant made it clear that a
`
`questionnaire is more than just a request for information. Doc. No. 438 at 5.
`
`
`
`The phrase “program or form” should be included in the construction based on the
`
`specification language. The specification states that “program” and “form” are used
`
`interchangeably with “questionnaire.” „816 Patent at 8:22–24. Additionally, the specification
`
`refers to the “questionnaire” as a program several times. Id. at 5:40–41 (“[T]he program and
`
`user responses are coded in such a fashion as to substantially reduce the bandwidth
`
`requirements . . . .”); Id. at 5:47–48 (“In practice, a program is created by entering a series of
`
`prompts . . . .”). The claim language also references the “questionnaire” being created by a
`
`computer. Id. at 14:43. Based on this language a questionnaire is something more than a
`
`“request for information.”
`
`7
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 7
`
`

`

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`In addition, MacroSolve‟s construction is too broad because it potentially encompasses
`
`the prior art. The Background of the Invention section details the disadvantages of the prior art
`
`and how the „816 invention avoids these drawbacks. Id. at 1:21–28. One problem with the prior
`
`art was the use of paper forms and the inherent inaccuracies caused by needing to reenter
`
`information. Id. The „816 Invention fixes this issue by eliminating the extra steps. Id. at 2:44–
`
`46. This is possible because the “form may be entered on-line.” Id. at 10:12–13. Based on this
`
`language, the patentee intended for a “questionnaire” to be more than a paper form. Thus a
`
`“questionnaire” is a “program or form.”
`
`Internal Branching Logic
`
`
`
`The second issue is whether the program must include “internal branching logic.”
`
`Internal branching logic would be instructions that provide a path through the questionnaire
`
`based on the user responses. MacroSolve argues that this is an unwarranted limitation on the
`
`invention. Doc. No. 441 at 4. MacroSolve contends that while a questionnaire can contain
`
`branching logic, it is not a requirement. Id. MacroSolve disputes Newegg‟s assertion that the
`
`patent “consistently” describes a questionnaire as containing branching logic. Id. MacroSolve
`
`argues that the portions of the patent Newegg relies on are referring to an optional feature. Id. at
`
`5. In support, MacroSolve points to an example in the specification that contains no branching
`
`logic. Id. Finally MacroSolve argues that Newegg‟s construction ignores the doctrine of claim
`
`differentiation. Doc. No. 433 at 6. MacroSolve points to Claim 3, which contains the
`
`requirement that a branching path be included. „816 Patent 14:1–4. MacroSolve argues that
`
`reading a “branching logic” requirement into the construction of questionnaire would render this
`
`portion of claim 3 redundant. Doc. No. 433 at 6.
`
`8
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 8
`
`

`

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`
`
`Newegg contends that the „816 Patent consistently refers to a questionnaire as presenting
`
`questions and being controlled by operating logic. Doc. No. 438 at 4. For the branching logic
`
`requirement, Newegg points to patent language that states “the questionnaire is actually designed
`
`to include internal branching logic that is implemented by the OIS.” „816 Patent at 8:19–24.
`
`Newegg argues that this, along with repeated references to “programs”, shows that a
`
`questionnaire contains operating logic. Doc. No. 438 at 5. In support, Newegg quotes portions
`
`of the patent describing adaptive functionalities that would require internal branching logic. Id.
`
`at 7. Newegg argues that MacroSolve‟s claim differentiation argument is misplaced because the
`
`focus of claim 3 is not branching logic, but rather on adding extra requirements to the
`
`questionnaire creation process. Id. at 8. Newegg cites to steps within Claim 3 that reference
`
`“using a design computer” and “entering a series of questions into a questionnaire design
`
`computer program.” Id. Newegg contends these are additional limitations and therefore claim
`
`differentiation is not applicable. Id.
`
`
`
`“Internal branching logic” is only a preferred embodiment and not a requirement.
`
`Branching logic is not mentioned in the method steps for Claim 1. In contrast, Claim 3 requires
`
`the questionnaire to have a “branching path” for each question. „816 Patent at 14:1–4. Since
`
`Claim 3 recites this requirement and is dependent on Claim 1, claim differentiation is applicable.
`
`See, e.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Where the
`
`limitation that is sought to be „read into‟ an independent claim already appears in a dependent
`
`claim, the doctrine of claim differentiation is at its strongest”). Newegg relies on language in the
`
`specification stating that “the questionnaire is actually designed to include internal branching
`
`logic . . . .” „816 Patent at 8:20–21. But that paragraph begins with a modifier that makes it
`
`clear the specification is referring to a preferred embodiment. Id. at 8:12 (“According to the
`
`9
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 9
`
`

`

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`preferred arrangement . . . .”) Two paragraphs later the specification describes a client creating a
`
`questionnaire and states “symbols . . . may be used to control conditional branching.” Id. at
`
`8:38–40. This makes it clear that conditional branching is an optional feature.
`
`Newegg argues that claim differentiation does not apply because Claim 3‟s focus is
`
`instead on other limitations like using a “design computer program” to create the questionnaire.
`
`But the next two steps in Claim 3 show the “design computer” is there because it is needed to
`
`create the branching logic. Step (a)(ii) involves identifying the possible answers, and step (a)(iii)
`
`creates the branching path using the design computer. Id. at 13:65–14:4. Thus, the design
`
`computer is not a new limitation but rather the antecedent basis that allows the branching path to
`
`be created using “said questionnaire design computer program.” Id. at 13:67; 14:3–4.
`
`The specification also gives an example of a practical use for the invention. A “mystery
`
`shopper” application is detailed that involves the shopper entering information as she moves
`
`through the drive-thru and receives her food. Id. at 10:38–11:8. The questions given in this
`
`example follow a linear path rather than branching based on the shopper‟s answers. If the
`
`questionnaire was required to contain branching logic this example would be read out of the
`
`specification. Newegg argues that the shopper example does contain logic because the questions
`
`still follow a logical order that begins at pulling into the drive-through and ends when the
`
`customer receives her food. Markman T.R. at 18:13–19. But this is a linear logical order, not a
`
`path with conditional branching.
`
`There is a difference between operating logic and branching logic. Branching logic
`
`would mean the questionnaire adapts and presents different questions depending on the
`
`responses. Operating logic would not require this adaptability, but it would be needed just to
`
`present any questionnaire. While the ability to branch is not necessary, some form of operating
`
`10
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 10
`
`

`

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`logic is inherent in the idea of a program. Even the linear mystery-shopper example was
`
`controlled by operating logic. „816 Patent at 11:9–11. In the Markman hearing, counsel for
`
`MacroSolve agreed with the idea of questionnaires having some basic level of operating logic.
`
`Markman T.R. at 29:12–15 (“[T]here may be one agreement. . . . [A] series of questions is going
`
`to have operating logic in some sense because they‟re going to be presented in order . . . .”). But
`
`since the “program or form” construction already captures the idea of operating logic, including
`
`it in the construction is unnecessary.
`
`Based on the specification and claim language the questionnaire can branch but it is not
`
`required. Accordingly, the construction of “questionnaire” will not contain a branching logic
`
`requirement.
`
`Complete Questionnaire
`
`The third issue is whether the “questionnaire” must be “complete.” MacroSolve‟s
`
`position is that the inclusion of “complete” in the construction is vague and circular. Markman
`
`TR at 16:1–2. MacroSolve argues that the use of “comprising” in the claim language makes it
`
`clear that other elements may be present. Doc. No. 433 at 5. An example is given in the patent
`
`involving a questionnaire that is capable of being incrementally updated. „816 Patent at 9:1–8.
`
`MacroSolve contends that this shows a questionnaire can be “incomplete” and yet still covered
`
`by the patent claims. Doc. No. 433 at 5.
`
`
`
`Newegg‟s position is that the word complete is not being used to denote a “consisting of”
`
`transition. Instead, Newegg argues that the word “complete” would be included to make clear
`
`that the questionnaire being transmitted to the remote device includes everything Newegg
`
`believes is required. Doc. No. 438 at 9. Newegg contends that this is consistent with the
`
`specification because the patent states the questionnaire is only sent “when [it] is complete.” Id.
`
`11
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 11
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00287-MHS-KNM Document 493 Filed 01/21/14 Page 12 of 31 PageID #: 6313
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`(citing „816 Patent at 8:57–58). Newegg agrees that the questionnaire can be updated, but argues
`
`that it still must be complete when sent. Doc. No. 438 at 9.
`
`
`
`The claim language does not indicate that a questionnaire must be “complete.” Including
`
`“complete” in the construction is unnecessary and could lead to confusion. Adding “complete”
`
`to the definition could imply there are certain features, like branching logic, that must be
`
`included before the questionnaire can be sent. As previously discussed, optional features like
`
`branching logic are not required. Accordingly the questionnaire does not need to be “complete.”
`
`
`
`
`
`Statements or Questions
`
`The fourth issue is whether the questionnaire can contain statements instead of questions.
`
`MacroSolve argues that based on the patent language, the questionnaire can contain “questions
`
`or statements.” Doc. No. 441 at 3 (citing „816 Patent at 8:12–19). MacroSolve contends that a
`
`blank field with a label like “Name:” is still requesting a response from the user and could be
`
`part of a “questionnaire.”
`
`
`
`Newegg appears to have conceded that the questionnaire can contain statements. During
`
`the Markman hearing Newegg‟s counsel represented that the definition for questionnaire could
`
`include the phrase “questions or statements requesting information.” Markman TR 22:6–10.
`
`
`
`In case there is still a dispute, the questionnaire can include either questions or
`
`statements. The specification states that “[f]or purposes of the instant disclosure, the series of
`
`questions/statements will collectively be referred to as a questionnaire.” Col 8:17–19. Based on
`
`this language the “questionnaire” can include questions or statements.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 12
`
`

`

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`Court’s Construction
`
`In light of the claim language and intrinsic evidence, “questionnaire” is construed to
`
`mean “a program or form that includes a question or statement, which calls for a
`
`response.”
`
`
`
`2. “tokens”
`
`MacroSolve’s Proposed Construction
`Any non-reducible textual element in data that
`is being parsed
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Non-reducible computer code that is being
`parsed
`
`
`
`Both parties agree that a token is non-reducible and that it is something being parsed.
`
`The only disagreement is whether tokens should be “textual elements in data” or “computer
`
`code.” MacroSolve argues that “token” is a term of art in computer science and proposes a
`
`definition from the Microsoft Computer Dictionary, 5th Edition. Doc. No. 433 at 10. Defendants
`
`contend that “textual element in data” is vague and not found in the specification. Doc. No. 438
`
`at 10. Defendants believe that replacing “textual element in data” with „computer code‟ is
`
`appropriate because the specification and claims indicate the tokens must be understandable by a
`
`computer. Id. MacroSolve agrees that tokens are “computer code” but contends that it is only
`
`individual atomic elements, not the entire code, that must be non-reducible. Doc. No. 441 at 7.
`
`At the hearing, the Court proposed that tokens be construed as “any non-reducible
`
`element of the computer code that is being parsed.” Markman T.R. at 37:24–25. The parties
`
`generally agreed with this definition. Id. at 39:21–23; Id. at 41:19–21. The inclusion of
`
`“element” addresses MacroSolve‟s concern that it is not the entire computer code that must be
`
`non-reducible. Id. at 38:21–24. But both parties did have concerns with how “computer code”
`
`could be interpreted. Defendants wanted it to be clear that a token has to represent something
`
`13
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 13
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00287-MHS-KNM Document 493 Filed 01/21/14 Page 14 of 31 PageID #: 6315
`
`else. MacroSolve agreed that this was inherent to the idea of a token. Id. at 38:11–12.
`
`MacroSolve‟s key concern was that Defendants may later argue that “computer code” means a
`
`specific programming language or type of code. Id. at 39:1–4. But Defendants made it clear that
`
`“computer code” was suggested to clarify that the code is understandable by a computer. Id. at
`
`37:11–13.
`
`
`
`Court’s Construction
`
`Based on this understanding of “computer code,” “tokens” is construed to mean “any
`
`non-reducible element of the computer code that is being parsed.”
`
`
`
`3. “terminating said first wireless modem or wireless LAN network connection [Clam 1] /
`
`taking said handheld remote computing device out of electronic communication [Claim
`
`11]”
`
`MacroSolve’s Proposed Construction
`No construction required
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Causing the network connection to become
`unavailable
`
`
`
`
`
`The parties agree that terminating the network ends the connection. Markman T.R. at
`
`52:2–3. The dispute is whether the connection is still “available” after being terminated.
`
`MacroSolve‟s position is that terminating the network does not mean it is unavailable, only that
`
`there is no longer a network connection. Id. at 52:18–21. MacroSolve likens it to putting a
`
`phone in airplane mode; there is no network connection on the phone, but the network is still
`
`“available” if the user chooses to reconnect. Id. at 52:13–15. Newegg contends that the network
`
`still being available would go against the plain meaning of “terminating the network.” Id. at
`
`51:2–3. Newegg argues that the Patent never references the network being terminated yet still
`
`being available. Id. at 51:16–18.
`
`14
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 14
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00287-MHS-KNM Document 493 Filed 01/21/14 Page 15 of 31 PageID #: 6316
`
`No construction
`
`is needed
`
`for “terminating said . . . network connection” or
`
`“taking . . . out of electronic communication.” The plain language of the claim should control.
`
`The plain language of the claim recites “terminating said first wireless . . . network connection.”
`
`„816 Patent at 13:37–38 (emphasis added). Requiring the network to also be “unavailable” is an
`
`unwarranted limitation. The only requirement is that the device is no longer connected to the
`
`network.
`
`Court’s Construction
`
`Because the plain language of the claim states that the connection only has to be
`
`terminated, no further construction is required for this term.
`
`
`
`4. “after said first wireless modem or wireless LAN connection is terminated [Claim 1] /
`
`after said handheld remote device has been taken out of electronic communication with
`
`said first computer [Claim 11]”
`
`MacroSolve’s Proposed Construction
`No construction required
`
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`After
`the network
`connection becomes
`unavailable and before another network
`connection becomes available.
`
`The issue for the “after said first wireless modem” term is whether the tokens must be
`
`executed before a new connection is established. MacroSolve‟s believes that the terms are clear
`
`and do not need to be construed. Doc. No. 433 at 15. MacroSolve argues that since the claim
`
`language only imposes an “after” requirement; the tokens only have to be executed after the first
`
`connection is terminated. Id. MacroSolve‟s position is that while the invention can operate
`
`without a network connection, it is not a requirement. Markman T.R. at 43:23–44:1.
`
`15
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 15
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00287-MHS-KNM Document 493 Filed 01/21/14 Page 16 of 31 PageID #: 6317
`
`MacroSolve contends that the numerous references to operating without a network connection
`
`are only referring to the first network connection. Id. at 48:10–14.
`
`Defendants believe that the tokens must be executed while there is no network
`
`connection. Doc. No. 438 at 19. Defendants contend that this is consistent with the specification
`
`and prosecution history. Doc. No. 438 at 24. The specification references a “loosely networked”
`
`computer system that is tolerant of intermittent connections and capable of temporarily storing
`
`information if a network connection is unavailable. „816 Patent at 4:61–5:3. Defendants also
`
`cite to a 2009 Amendment where the applicant stated that the invention is “designed to operate
`
`without a network connection.” Feb. 4, 2009 Amendment at 14. Defendants argue that the
`
`ability to operate without a network connection is a key feature of the invention and the applicant
`
`essentially narrowed the scope by repeatedly referring to it in the Feb. 2009 Amendment.
`
`Defendants‟ additional language would essentially limit when step (g) of Claim 1 and
`
`step (h) of Claim 11 could occur. The claim language explicitly requires the “executing” step to
`
`occur after the network connection is terminated in Claim 1, and after the remote computing
`
`device is taken out of electrical communication with the first computer in Claim 11. But the
`
`claims do not contain a similar temporal requirement regarding when the second connection
`
`must be established. In other words, the claim language does not require the “executing” step to
`
`occur before the device is in communication with a second wireless modem or wireless LAN
`
`network (Claim 1) or a second computer (Claim 11), as Defendants‟ proposed construction
`
`would require. Instead, the steps could occur in the following order:
`
`Claim 1:
`
`(e) terminating said first wireless modem or wireless LAN network connection
`with said remote computing device;
`(g) establishing a second wireless modem or wireless LAN network connection
`between said remote computing device and a server;
`
`16
`
`Petitioners – Exhibit 1013, p. 16
`
`

`

`Case 6:11-cv-00287-MHS-KNM Document 493 Filed 01/21/14 Page 17 of 31 PageID #: 6318
`
`(f) after said first wireless modem or wireless LAN network connection is
`terminated, executing at least a portion of said plurality of tokens representing
`said questionnaire at said remote computing device to collect a response from
`a user;
` (h)

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