`571-272-7822
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` Paper: 21
`Entered: October 7, 2019
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`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-00523
`Patent 6,661,203 B2
`
`____________
`
`
`
`Before, MIRIAM L. QUINN, CHARLES J. BOUDREAU,
`JOHN F. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`DENYING PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
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`IPR2018-00523
`Patent 6,661,203 B2
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`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`On August 19, 2019, the Board issued a Final Written Decision in this
`proceeding. Paper 19 (“Final Dec.”). In that Decision, we determined that
`Petitioner had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1−4,
`7−10, 15−19, 22−25, and 29 of the ’203 patent are unpatentable as obvious
`over Koenck.1 Id. at 44. We also determined that Petitioner had not shown
`by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 5, 6, 20, and 21 of the ’203
`patent are unpatentable. On September 18, 2019, Patent Owner filed a
`Request for Rehearing. Paper 20 (Req. Reh’g). Patent Owner argues two
`issues: (1) that the Final Written Decision relies on a ground that Petitioner
`did not assert, namely obviousness over Koenck alone; and (2) that the Final
`Written Decision does not explain why Patent Owner’s reliance on Doi was
`not sufficient. We address each issue in turn.
`According to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), “[t]he burden of showing a
`decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,”
`and the “request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the
`Board misapprehended or overlooked.” The burden here, therefore, lies with
`Patent Owner to show we misapprehended or overlooked the matters it
`requests that we review. We are not persuaded that Patent Owner has shown
`that we misapprehended or overlooked the matters raised in the Request for
`Rehearing.
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent No. 4,709,202, issued November 24, 1987, filed in the record
`as Exhibit 1005.
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`
`A. OBVIOUSNESS OVER KOENCK ALONE
`Patent Owner’s first argument faults the Board for addressing in the
`Final Written Decision the ground of obviousness over Koenck alone:
`The Board misapprehended the law and the Petition in
`creating its own obviousness ground in the Final Written
`Decision. All grounds raised by Petitioner include
`modifications to Koenck based on Doi, but the Board’s
`Decision eliminates Doi to avoid the problems with the
`combination noted by Patent Owner throughout its Patent
`Owner Response and Sur Reply,
`thus
`improperly
`overlooking these arguments.
`
`Req. Reh’g 2−3. Patent Owner argues that under SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu,
`138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018), “it is not proper [for the Board] to deviate
`from the grounds in the petition and raise its own obviousness theory.” Req.
`Reh’g 3. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the Board has
`raised its own obviousness theory.
`The Petition here expresses alternative argument by stating, “to the
`extent that Patent Owner may argue that Koenck does not show setting the
`charging current to zero, Doi discloses it.” Pet. 32. Similarly, for the
`discharge limitation, the Petition states, “to the extent that Patent Owner
`argues that Koenck does not set the discharge current in response to battery
`temperature, Doi also discloses it.” Id. at 47. The Decision on Institution
`acknowledged these alternative arguments and provided notice of them to
`Patent Owner. See Decision on Institution, 15 (Paper 8) (“With regard to the
`limitation of setting the ‘charging current to zero’ (recited in claims 1 and
`16), we note Petitioner’s reliance on Koenck and Doi, separately and in
`combination.”), 16 (“With regard to Koenck, we are persuaded at this
`juncture by Petitioner’s argument and evidence that cutting off the charging
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`of the battery at 70°C reasonably maps to the limitation of setting the
`‘charging current to zero.’”), 18 (“Thus, even though Petitioner has relied on
`the combination of Koenck and Doi, Koenck alone appears to sufficiently
`teach the limitation [of setting the discharging current to zero], at this
`juncture.”), 19 (“Moreover, given our determination that Koenck reasonably
`maps to the limitation, we need not rely also on the combination of Koenck
`and Doi to decide whether to institute trial.”), 19 (discussing our view that
`Petitioner mapped Koenck to the limitations of claims 8 and 23, and that
`Petitioner also mapped Doi to the same limitations). In other words, because
`the Petition cited Koenck for teaching setting charging and discharging
`currents to zero—the only limitations for which Petitioner also cited Doi—
`we made clear in our analysis in the Decision on Institution that we
`understood Petitioner to have proffered a ground based on Koenck alone and
`a ground based on Koenck in combination with Doi.
`At oral argument, Patent Owner acknowledged that Petitioner’s
`position is that Koenck alone discloses the claim limitations. Tr. 42:2−16.
`In our Final Written Decision we again noted Petitioner’s alternative
`position when introducing the ground of obviousness over Koenck and Doi
`because we stated Petitioner’s allegations that Koenck discloses all the
`limitations of claims 1, 8, 16, and 12 (the independent claims), but that for
`the zero current limitations Petitioner also relied on Doi. Final Dec. 10.
`Therefore, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that we
`overlooked that the asserted ground was limited to the combination of
`teachings from Koenck and Doi.
`Furthermore, to have not considered Petitioner’s argument that
`Koenck alone teaches all the limitations of the claims would have been error.
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`For instance, the Federal Circuit has recognized that when a petition sets
`forth a ground with multiple references, but the petitioner’s primary
`arguments rely on a single reference, the Board should consider those
`arguments irrespective of a motivation to combine references. Realtime
`Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1372−73 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (precedential).
`The Federal Circuit has also stated that such a situation does not raise any
`issue under SAS or the Federal Circuit’s cases interpreting SAS. See
`Polygroup Ltd. MCO v. Willis Elec. Co., 759 Fed. Appx. 934, 943 n.3 (Fed.
`Cir. 2019). Accordingly, we view the Final Written Decision as fulfilling
`our obligation to consider the arguments presented in the Petition, which
`include the contention of obviousness over Koenck alone.
`
`B. PATENT OWNER’S RELIANCE ON DOI
`Patent Owner argues that it relied on Doi as “evidence of a difference
`between Koenck’s statement that ‘the unit at high temperature . . . will cut
`off charging’ and the claimed requirement to ‘set said charging current to
`zero.’” Req. Reh’g 10. In particular, Patent Owner asserts, “Doi illustrates
`the error of the Board’s conclusion that Koenck’s ‘cut off charging’ and the
`claims’ ‘set said charging current to zero’ are the same.” Id. Patent Owner
`then takes issue with the Board’s analysis and concludes that “the Board
`never meaningfully explains why Doi does not evidence a difference
`between turning off charging and setting the charging current to zero, as
`argued by Patent Owner.” Id. at 11.
`We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. In the Patent
`Owner Response, Patent Owner argued that “Doi refutes Petitioner’s
`conclusory statement by disclosing that it was ‘well known’ that a circuit
`may be designed such that battery charging is deemed to be turned off while
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`a measurable current is nevertheless still provided to the battery.” PO Resp.
`11. At oral argument, Patent Owner argued that Doi is evidence that Koenck
`alone does not teach the setting the charging current to zero limitation. Tr.
`42:13−43:18 (arguing that Doi is “evidence that the –just the word off does
`not refer to a current value in terms of amps.”). The Final Written Decision
`addresses Patent Owner’s argument. Final Dec. 20. We found Koenck’s
`disclosure unambiguously teaches that cutting off would mean that charging
`stops, with no evidence in Koenck that other current would be flowing. Id.
`at 20−21. We also found the Anderman Declaration persuasive and that the
`testimony provided in that Declaration was sufficiently supported by
`Koenck. Id. at 21−22. Finally, we addressed Patent Owner’s reliance on
`Doi and found it unpersuasive given the facts and testimony presented by
`Petitioner. Id. at 22−23. We also expressed doubts as to Patent Owner’s
`characterization of Doi’s leakage current, which Petitioner persuasively
`explained as only occurring when the charging circuit was designed to be
`“on.” Id. at 22 n.3. Our analysis shows why Patent Owner’s argument
`regarding Doi are not persuasive. Our analysis also shows why Petitioner’s
`evidence and testimony meet the preponderance of the evidence threshold.
`Patent Owner’s arguments urging rehearing of this matter express
`disagreement with the outcome we reached. The arguments do not show
`that we misapprehended or overlooked the argument raised in Patent
`Owner’s Response.
`Patent Owner also takes issue with our discussion of Table D in
`column 57 of Koenck as evidence that Koenck is internally consistent. Req.
`Reh’g 11−12. Patent Owner characterizes this is as new evidence and
`speculates as to why this evidence might have been detrimental to
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`Petitioner’s case, contending that it “may further explain why the Petition
`does not propose a challenge based on Koenck alone.” Id. at 12. We do not
`agree with Patent Owner’s characterization of the evidence or of the
`Petition. At the oral argument Petitioner’s counsel referred to Table D and
`column 57 when asked for evidence in the pseudocode that is consistent with
`Petitioner’s argument that Koenck consistently teaches cutting off charging
`at over 70 degrees. Tr. 26:24−27:21. Petitioner’s counsel stated that “from
`a duty cycle aspect . . . [at g]reater than 70 degrees, it cuts off the charge.”
`Id. at 27:11−13. The statement of Petitioner characterizing the duty cycle
`aspect as being “a slightly different approach” does not refer to the relevant
`“cutting off charge” discussion. Rather, the statement refers to other
`operational aspects that are irrelevant to the “cutting off” disclosure, such as
`the trickle charge disclosure and the setting of ranges of temperatures like 10
`to 55 and 55 to 70. Id. at 27:13−18. Patent Owner’s characterization of the
`“duty cycle” discussion at the oral argument is unsupported by the transcript
`of the discussion.
`Furthermore, we find unpersuasive Patent Owner’s argument that,
`even in 0% duty cycle, Koenck “could still have a non-zero current.” Req.
`Reh’g 12 (emphasis added). Patent Owner supports its argument by
`pointing to a statement in Koenck regarding the “deep cycle” mode: “the
`only time the zero level charge value will be selected is during the deep
`cycle function when much larger current levels will be drained form the
`battery.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1005, 11:19−22). It is unclear
`how this statement confirms that a 0% “duty cycle” could still have non-zero
`current value. Nevertheless, Koenck’s “deep cycle” mode refers to a
`sequence of operations where the battery is completely drained and followed
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`by a normal charge cycle. See Ex. 1005, 12:51−60. The “deep cycle”
`statement pointed to by Patent Owner says nothing about how Koenck
`would “cut off” charging when the temperature protection circuitry detects
`that battery temperature has reached or exceeds 70 degrees. Accordingly,
`we find Patent Owner’s argument unpersuasive.
`In conclusion, we are not persuaded that Patent Owner has shown that
`we misapprehended or overlooked the matters raised on rehearing and we
`see no reason to disturb our Final Written Decision in this proceeding.
`
`II. ORDER
`Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.
`
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`IPR2018-00523
`Patent 6,661,203 B2
`
`For PETITIONER:
`
`Andrew S. Ehmke
`Scott J. Jarratt
`Jamie McDole
`HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
`andy.ehmke.ipr@haynesboone.com
`scott.jarratt.ipr@haynesboone.com
`jamie.mcdole@haynesboone.com
`
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`
`Brett Mangrum
`Ryan Loveless
`James Etheridge
`Jeffrey Huang
`ETHERIDGE LAW GROUP
`brett@etheridgelaw.com
`ryan@etheridgelaw.com
`jim@etheridgelaw.com
`jeff@eheridgelaw.com
`
`
`Sean D. Burdick
`UNILOC USA, INC.
`sean.burdick@unilocusa.com
`
`
`9
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`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
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` Paper 19
` Entered: August 19, 2019
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-00523
`Patent 6,661,203 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, and
`JOHN F. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318
`
`
`
`
`
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`IPR2018-00523
`Patent 6,661,203 B2
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`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`We instituted inter partes review pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314 to review
`claims 1−10, 15−25, and 29 of U.S. Patent No. 6,661,203 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the
`’203 patent”), owned by Uniloc 2017 LLC. Paper 8 (“Dec. on Inst.”). We
`have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision is
`entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the
`reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the
`evidence that claims 1−4, 7–10, 15−19, 22–25, and 29 of the ’203 patent are
`unpatentable, but Petitioner has not shown that claims 5, 6, 20, and 21 are
`unpatentable.
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`A. Related Matters
`The Petition lists several district court matters that involve the
`’203 patent. Paper 2, 3. However, Patent Owner indicates in its August 8,
`2018 Updated Mandatory Notice that all district court proceedings involving
`the ’203 patent have been terminated. Paper 7, 2.
`
`B. The ’203 Patent
`The ’203 patent relates to charging, discharging, and recharging
`rechargeable batteries under adverse thermal conditions. Ex. 1001, 1:8−12.
`The ’203 patent states that when a battery is being charged or discharged,
`internal heat is generated as current flows through the battery. Id. at
`2:13−16. The design tradeoffs when operating a battery near its maximum
`operating temperature are to maintain charge and discharge currents, which
`may compromise the battery life and reliability, or to set the charge and
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`discharge current to low levels consistent with the maximum operating
`temperature, which makes charge and discharge unacceptably slow. Id. at
`2:40−51. The ’203 patent utilizes a temperature sensor in combination with
`a battery charger, or a battery conditioner, to control charging and
`discharging current flow as a function of the battery temperature. Id. at
`3:58−61. Figure 1 is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 illustrates a functional diagram of Smart Battery 2, which
`includes lithium cells 24, thermistor 18, controller 16, current sensor 20,
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`voltage sensor 22, and fuel gauge 26. Id. at 5:15−32. Figure 1 also depicts
`SMBus 4 coupled to controller 16 to communicate parameters such as the
`battery’s terminal voltage, the rate of current flow into or out of the battery,
`the charge state, including whether the battery is fully charged or fully
`discharged, and the temperature of the battery according to the thermistor
`temperature sensor. Id. at 5:1−6, 34−36. Smart Battery 2 specification
`provides for a maximum charge current of 3 amps at 12.6 volts in the range
`of temperatures from 0°C to 45°C. Id. at 5:11−13. The discharge is rated at
`3 amps from 0°C to 50°C. Id. at 5:12−13. Host controller 16 includes a
`memory with a look up table of charging and discharging currents related to
`temperatures. Id. at 5:61−63. Table 1 is reproduced below.
`
`
`Table 1 shows illustrative charging current and temperature values.
`Id. at 5:65−6:9. Host controller 16 periodically requests the battery
`temperature from the smart battery and uses this value to access the memory
`look up table to select a charging current associated with that temperature.
`Id. at 6:10−13.
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`
`C. Illustrative Claims
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 8, 16, and 23 are independent.
`Each of challenged claims 2−7, 9, 10, 15, 17−22, 24, 25, and 29 depends
`directly or indirectly from claims 1, 8, 16, or 23.
`Claims 1 and 8 are illustrative:
`1. An apparatus for charging a battery comprising:
`a charging circuit for providing a charging current to the
`battery;
`a temperature sensor positioned to sense a temperature of said
`battery; and
`a controller coupled to said temperature sensor and said
`charging circuit and operable to control said charging circuit
`in accordance with said temperature, said controller operable
`to set said charging current to zero when said temperature is
`higher than a first predetermined threshold value.
`8. An apparatus for exercising a battery, comprising:
`a charging circuit having a charging current output coupled to
`the battery;
`a temperature sensor positioned to sense a temperature related
`to the battery temperature;
`a discharging circuit having a discharging current input coupled
`to the battery; and
`a controller coupled to said temperature sensor, said charging
`circuit, and said discharging circuit, said controller operable
`to set said charging current in accordance with said
`temperature, and operable to set said discharging current in
`accordance with said temperature, said controller being
`operable to set said discharging current to zero when said
`temperature is higher than a first predetermined threshold
`value.
`
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`Ex. 1001, 7:34−45, 8:1−15.
`
`D. Procedural History
`Petitioner, Apple Inc., filed a Petition for inter partes review
`challenging claims 1−10, 15−25, and 29 of the ’203 patent. Paper 2 (“Pet.”).
`Patent Owner, Uniloc 2017 LLC, filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6
`(“Prelim. Resp.”). We instituted trial on August 31, 2018. Dec. on Inst.
`During trial, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 10, “PO
`Resp.”), Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 11, “Reply”), and Patent Owner filed
`a Sur-Reply (Paper 12, “Sur-Reply”). Both parties requested oral argument,
`which took place on May 29, 2019, the transcript of which is filed in the
`record as Paper 18 (“Tr.”).
`
`E. Asserted Prior Art and Grounds of Unpatentability
`This proceeding relies on the following prior art references:
`
`a) Koenck: U.S. Patent No. 4,709,202, issued November 24, 1987,
`filed in the record as Exhibit 1005;
`
`b) Doi: JP Patent App. No. H11-283677, published October 15,
`1999, an English translation of which is filed in the record as
`Exhibit 1007; and
`
`c) Sakakibara: U.S. Patent No. 6,204,641 B1, issued March 20,
`2001, filed in the record as Ex. 1006.
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`
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability (Pet.
`12−13):
`
`Challenged
`Claims
`1, 5−8, 15, 16,
`20−23, and 29
`2−4, 9, 10, 17−19,
`24, and 25
`
`Basis
`
`References
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Koenck and Doi
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Koenck, Doi, and Sakakibara
`
`Petitioner also relies on a Declaration of Menahem Anderman, Ph.D.,
`filed as Exhibit 1003 (“Anderman Decl.”), and a Supplemental Declaration
`of Menahem Anderman, Ph.D., filed as Exhibit 1009 (“Second Anderman
`Decl.”). Other than demonstratives for its oral argument, Patent Owner did
`not file any exhibits in the record.
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Construction
`In our Decision on Institution we adopted Petitioner’s construction for
`one term recited in dependent claim 6: “maximum charging temperature.”
`Dec. on Inst. 7−8. That construction is “the highest battery temperature at
`which the maximum charging current can be used.” Id. (citing Pet. 9−12)
`(emphasis omitted). Patent Owner submits that the Board does not need to
`construe any claim term in this proceeding. PO Resp. 4.
`The Board interprets claim terms of an unexpired patent using the
`“broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent.”
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2018);1 see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.
`
`1 A recent amendment to this rule does not apply here because the Petition
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`Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). We presume a claim term carries its “ordinary
`and customary meaning,” which is the meaning “the term would have to a
`person of ordinary skill in the art” at the time of the invention. In re
`Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation
`omitted).
`Applying the plain and ordinary meaning to the term “maximum
`charging temperature,” we agree with Petitioner that term means “the
`highest battery temperature at which the maximum charging current can be
`used.” The specification provides support for this meaning by describing
`that the “Smart Battery specifications provide a maximum charge current to
`3 amperes at 12.6 volts in the range of temperatures from 0° C. to 45° C.”
`Ex. 1001, 5:9−12. In Table 1, the specification correlates the charging
`current of 2.0 amps for the temperature range of “Less than 45° C.” Id. at
`6:5. Thus, it flows from the specification that when the claim language
`refers to a predetermined threshold as the battery’s “maximum charging
`temperature,” it is referring to the upper limit of the range at which a
`maximum specified charging current can be applied, e.g., 45° C.
`Accordingly, we construe the term “maximum charging temperature” to
`mean “the highest battery temperature at which the maximum charging
`current can be used.”
`The parties do not raise any other claim construction issue for us to
`decide. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868
`
`
`was filed before November 13, 2018. See Changes to the Claim
`Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before
`the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018)
`(amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) effective November 13, 2018).
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`F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g,
`Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be
`construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve
`the controversy.”).
`
`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors
`may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art;
`prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are
`made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active
`workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
`(internal quotation and citation omitted). In that regard, Petitioner proffers
`that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have a Bachelor’s degree
`in Electrical Engineering, Chemistry (or similar), or Physics (or similar), or
`equivalent training, as well as approximately two to three years of
`experience working in designing and developing rechargeable battery
`systems. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003, 6). On the current record, Patent Owner
`neither challenges Petitioner’s proffered level nor proposes a competing
`level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 3.
`We find that Petitioner’s assessment is consistent with the level of
`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior
`art in the instant proceeding. For example, Koenck (Ex. 1005) describes a
`battery system capable of optimizing the performance of a rechargeable
`electrochemical storage medium while at the same time maximizing its
`useful life, which we find would be within the purview of a person having
`the background set forth by Petitioner. Ex. 1005, 1:14−18, Fig. 5.
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`Accordingly, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by
`Petitioner.
`
`C. Obviousness over Koenck and Doi
`Petitioner contends that Koenck discloses all the limitations of
`independent claims 1, 8, 16, and 23, except that for limitations reciting
`setting the charging/discharging current to zero, Petitioner also relies on Doi.
`Pet. 31−33. For dependent claims 5−7, 15, 20−23, and 29, Petitioner relies
`exclusively on Koenck as disclosing the further recited limitations. Id. at
`33−40, 51−53, 55, 56, 60. In our Decision on Institution, we determined that
`for this ground, Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing
`on its assertion that independent claims 1 and 16 and dependent claims 7, 15,
`22, and 29 would have been obvious over Koenck alone or in combination
`with Doi. Dec. on Inst. 12−23. We determined, however, that Petitioner had
`not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that claims 5, 6, 20, and 21 are
`unpatentable as asserted. After consideration of the full record before us, we
`determine that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
`claims 1, 7, 8, 15, 16, 22, and 23 would have been obvious as asserted over
`Koenck alone. We also determine, as discussed below, that Petitioner failed
`to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 5, 6, 20, and 21
`would have been obvious over Koenck and Doi.
`
`1. Overview of Koenck (Ex. 1005)
`Koenck is entitled “Battery Powered System,” and is directed to a
`battery system capable of optimizing the performance of a rechargeable
`electrochemical storage medium, while at the same time maximizing its
`useful life. Ex. 1005, [54], 1:15−18. Koenck describes that, “[f]or the sake
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`of recharging of a battery system as rapidly as possible without detriment to
`an optimum useful life span, battery parameters including battery
`temperature can be monitored during a charging cycle and the battery
`charging current can be adjusted accordingly.” Id. at 1:44−49. Figure 5,
`depicting Koenck’s battery system, is reproduced below.
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`Figure 5 illustrates an exemplary circuit diagram of the battery pack
`and associated monitoring and conditioning circuitry in accordance with one
`embodiment. Id. at 6:11−12. In particular, the battery pack includes a
`battery processor (in component 82), voltage monitor 91, current monitor 92,
`and temperature monitor 93. Id. at Fig. 5. The battery processor sends
`digital signals over line 95 to each of monitors 91–93. Id. at 6:62–67. The
`digital signals are converted to analog values and compared to analog
`measurements made by monitors 91–93 (i.e., battery voltage, current, and
`temperature). Id. at 6:62–7:5. This allows the measured analog values to be
`digitally approximated. Id. at 14:1–60, Fig. 10. “The digital measurement
`values so determined may be utilized as a basis for updating battery
`condition information in the memory of component 82.” Id. at 7:9–12. In
`this way, during a battery charging cycle, the battery processor is supplied
`with battery operating information from which an optimum battery charging
`current can be selected. Id. at 7:43−46.
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`2. Overview of Doi (Ex. 1007)
`Doi describes a battery pack with a switching circuit for stopping
`charging and discharging, and a circuit for monitoring the condition of a
`secondary battery. Ex. 1007, 2. Doi states that when discharging with an
`overcurrent exceeding the maximum permissible current, the temperature of
`lithium ion batteries rises excessively, the cycle characteristic deteriorates
`irrevocably, and the safety valve operates and the battery becomes unusable.
`Id. ¶ 4. When charging using an overcurrent, the battery temperature
`increases abnormally and battery life is shortened. Id. ¶ 5. Doi discloses a
`charge/discharge control circuit comprising a monitoring circuit for
`monitoring the condition of each lithium ion battery and the connection state
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`of the electronic devices, and a switching circuit receiving a signal from this
`monitoring circuit to turn the charge and discharge currents ON and OFF via
`charge and discharge field-effect transistors (“FETs”). Id. ¶ 8. In particular,
`the monitoring circuit includes a microcomputer and a measuring unit,
`which includes a temperature measuring circuit for measuring the heat
`generation temperature of the lithium ion battery. Id. ¶ 9. The
`microcomputer determines the heat generation condition, among other
`conditions, based on the measurement signal from the temperature
`measuring circuit. Id. ¶ 10. In the event abnormal conditions are generated
`during charging, the microcomputer turns the charging FET to OFF to stop
`charging, and when abnormal conditions occur during discharging, the
`discharge FET is turned to OFF to stop discharging. Id.
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`3. Independent Claims 1 and 8
`Claims 1 and 8 are apparatus claims and recite similar structures,
`except that claim 1 focuses on the charging circuit, while claim 8 recites
`both charging and discharging circuits. The Petition alleges that Koenck’s
`Figure 5 discloses all the structural limitations recited in the independent
`claims, as shown in the annotated Figure 5 provided in the Petition and
`reproduced below:
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`The above figure is an annotated version of Koenck’s Figure 5,
`provided by Petitioner at page 14 of the Petition. According to Petitioner,
`and we agree, Koenck’s battery charging controller 101 discloses the
`“charging circuit” of claims 1 and 8 (Pet. 21−22, 42), Koenck’s battery
`temperature monitor 93 discloses the “temperature sensor” of claims 1 and 8
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`(id. at 23−25, 42),2 Koenck’s battery deep discharge controller 110 discloses
`the recited “discharging circuit” of claim 8 (id. at 42−43), and Koenck’s
`component 82 (battery processor, timing and memory circuits) discloses the
`“controller” of claims 1 and 8 (id. at 25−27, 44−45). Patent Owner does not
`dispute any of the structural disclosures of Koenck, but focuses on the
`recited configuration of the controller. We discuss the recited controller’s
`operation in turn.
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`Controlling Charging Circuit in Accordance with Temperature
`i.
`Claim 1 recites that the controller is “operable to control said charging
`circuit in accordance with said temperature.” Ex. 1001, 7:41−42. Petitioner
`offers two arguments that Koenck teaches this limitation. Pet. 28−29. First,
`Petitioner points out Koenck’s disclosure of line 98, which the battery uses
`to send information about the battery to processor 82. Id. at 28 (citing
`Ex. 1005, 7:5−9). According to Petitioner, Koenck’s disclosure teaches a
`person of ordinary skill in the art that the battery temperature is supplied to
`the battery processor via line 98. Id. (citing Ex. 1003, 35). Second,
`Petitioner points out that the control mechanism in battery processor 82
`allows the battery processor to select an optimum battery charging current
`based on the battery temperature. Id. at 28−30 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:17−19,
`7:27−52, Fig. 5; Ex. 1003, 36). We agree with these arguments and the
`evidence provided in support that Koenck’s battery processor receives
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`2 Petitioner relies on the temperature sensor of Koenck as teaching the
`“sensing a temperature” limitations recited in claims 16 and 23, discussed
`further below. Pet. 53, 57. We agree that Koenck’s temperature sensor
`teaches the limitations of claims 16 and 23 regarding the battery temperature
`sensor.
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`battery information that includes the battery temperature and selects the
`optimum battery charging current, using that information.
`In our Decision on Institution, we did not rely on a further argument
`Petitioner made concerni