`
`
`Case No. 2:16-CV-01425-JRG-RSP
`LEAD CASE
`
`[REDACTED]
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:16-CV-01424-JRG-RSP
`
`[REDACTED]
`
`vs.
`
`
`
`
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC., et al.
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`FUNDAMENTAL INNOVATION
`SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`HUAWEI DEVICE USA, INC. and
`HUAWEI DEVICE CO., LTD.,
`
`
`vs.
`
`Defendants.
`
`Case 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP Document 158 Filed 04/18/18 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 6746
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`
`FUNDAMENTAL INNOVATION
`SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO THE COURT’S
`APRIL 2, 2018 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`REGARDING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION (DKT. 146)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Fundamental Ex 2014-1
`LG et al. v Fundamental
`IPR2018-00493
`
`

`

`Case 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP Document 158 Filed 04/18/18 Page 2 of 10 PageID #: 6747
`
`Under L.R. CV-72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), LG and Huawei (collectively
`
`“Defendants”) respectfully object to the Court’s Opinion and Order (Dkt. 146 or “Order”).
`
`“Generate” / “Generating” - These terms appear in all of the asserted claims of the ’111
`
`patent. Defendants proposed that “generate” and “generating” be construed as “produce” and
`
`“producing.” FISI proposed plain meaning or that no construction was necessary. The
`
`Magistrate instead construed the terms as “provide” and “providing.” (Order at 40.) The
`
`Magistrate’s constructions relied solely on the observation that “the specification uses the words
`
`‘provides’ and ‘generates’ interchangeably.” (Id. at 39 (citing ’111 patent at 8:23-42).) But that
`
`observation is incorrect, and the construction is contrary to the use of the terms in claim, the
`
`prosecution history, and their plain meanings. First, the specification uses the words ‘provides’
`
`and ‘generates’ to describe two distinct – and not interchangeable – functions of the
`
`“identification subsystem 108.” (Id.) Thus, the identification system generates or produces, in
`
`addition to providing, the identification signal. Indeed, the specification’s description of the only
`
`two embodiments of the identification subsystem are consistent with components that generate –
`
`rather than merely provide – the identification signal. Further, the specification repeatedly
`
`describes an identification subsystem that “generates” +2 volt identification signal. (Dkt. 127 at
`
`15 (citing ’550 at 8:32-45, 9:26-30, 9:36-44, Fig. 2).) Second, the claims themselves clearly
`
`distinguish between “generat[ing]” and merely “providing” an identification signal. For
`
`example, claim 17 teaches a method that requires both. See CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich
`
`Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any
`
`evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims
`
`connotes different meanings.”). Indeed, the claim language requires that the act of “generating”
`
`occurs first, which supports an antecedent basis for the latter step of “providing the identification
`
`Fundamental Ex 2014-2
`LG et al. v Fundamental
`IPR2018-00493
`
`

`

`Case 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP Document 158 Filed 04/18/18 Page 3 of 10 PageID #: 6748
`
`
`signal.” Further, claims 1-3, 6-8, 12, 14, and 16 use the term “generate” instead of “provide.”
`
`Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The actual words
`
`of the claim are the controlling focus.”). Finally, the construction is contrary to the plain of the
`
`terms captured in the dictionary definitions for the terms – “produce/ing”. (Dkt. 127-24, Ex. 22
`
`and Dkt. 127-25, Ex. 23.)
`
`“Abnormal” terms - The “abnormal” terms appear in the asserted claims of the ’550 and
`
`’766 patents. Defendants propose that those terms be construed as “an invalid or illegal [data
`
`condition/data line condition/signals] specified in USB.” (Order at 22-23.) The Court construed
`
`these terms as data conditions that are not defined as valid USB data conditions. (Id. at 26.)
`
`Those constructions are erroneous in light of the claim language, specifications, and case law.
`
`Defendants’ construction is consistent with the claim language which recites an affirmative
`
`limitation, an “abnormal USB data line condition.” The Federal Circuit has stated that the
`
`claims, when read in light of the specification and the prosecution history, must provide
`
`objective boundaries for those of skill in the art. (See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766
`
`F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding a claim term indefinite for the failure to provide
`
`objective boundaries). The only objective boundary for interpreting the scope of “abnormal” in
`
`the specification is the sole embodiment in which both the D+ and D- data lines are set to over 2
`
`volts. (’550 at 9:20-30, Fig. 3; Dkt. 127-14, Ex. 12 ¶ 99). The other objective boundary is
`
`within USB 2.0, which defines a class of signals that is abnormal, or illegal, for example, an SE1
`
`– 0.8 Volts or greater on each data line. (Id. ¶ 100-102; Dkt. 127-12, Ex. 11 at 123.) Both fall
`
`within Defendants’ construction. Further, the prosecution history supports Defendants’
`
`construction because the patentees amended their claims to add the “abnormal” limitation instead
`
`2
`
`Fundamental Ex 2014-3
`LG et al. v Fundamental
`IPR2018-00493
`
`

`

`Case 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP Document 158 Filed 04/18/18 Page 4 of 10 PageID #: 6749
`
`
`of “identification signal,” arguing that the new claims were different from the related patents.
`
`(Dkt. 127-23, Ex. 21 at 6, 11-12; Dkt. 127-20, Ex. 18 at 42841.).
`
`“Reference Voltage” - This term appears in all claims of the Veselic ’655 patent.
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction for the term was “a voltage against which a voltage of
`
`interest is compared.” The term was construed to mean “a voltage level based on which a
`
`voltage of interest is determined.” (Order at 89.) The Order indicates that this construction was
`
`based on the claim construction order in Case No. 17-cv-145-JRG-RSP (“Samsung Case”), Dkt.
`
`140 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2018) (“Samsung Order”). (Order at 89.) That order, however, states
`
`that a “reference voltage” is “[not] necessarily an actual electrical voltage.” (Samsung Order at
`
`101.) The construction is incorrect because it replaces the noun “voltage” in the claims with a
`
`different noun “level”— a substitution that rewrites the claim language and is inconsistent with
`
`the intrinsic evidence. Defendants’ construction, on the other hand, which construes the
`
`reference voltage as a voltage, is consistent with the claim language and specification. The claim
`
`term itself is reference voltage. The word “reference” functions as an adjective describing the
`
`noun “voltage,” indicating that a reference voltage is a type of voltage. (Waldrop Decl.,1 Ex. A;
`
`In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“A claim must be read in accordance with the
`
`precepts of English grammar.”)). The patentee knew how to use “voltage” as an adjective to
`
`describe something not itself a voltage, reciting “voltage value” in adjacent claim language to
`
`claim a value relating to (but not itself) a voltage. (’655 Patent Claim 1.) With “reference
`
`voltage,” by contrast, the patentee chose to use “voltage” as a noun. That choice should be given
`
`effect, not written out of the claims. Bondyopadhyay v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 793, 804
`
`(2017) (rejecting construction that “would fail to give meaning to the term … as a noun”). The
`
`1 Filed concurrently herewith is the Declaration of Jonathan K. Waldrop in Support of Defendants’ Objections to the
`Court’s April 2, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Claim Construction (Dkt. 146) (“Waldrop
`Decl.”).
`
`3
`
`Fundamental Ex 2014-4
`LG et al. v Fundamental
`IPR2018-00493
`
`

`

`Case 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP Document 158 Filed 04/18/18 Page 5 of 10 PageID #: 6750
`
`
`specification confirms that the reference voltage recited in the claims is a voltage because its
`
`only description of the reference voltage is “an appropriate voltage at a pin of the device’s
`
`microprocessor” (’655 Patent at 7:50-57 (emphasis added)). Further, the reference voltage must
`
`be a voltage in order for the embodiments to operate. Finally, the reference voltage “provide[s]
`
`the voltage source 274.” (Id.) After being divided by resistor(s) R7, R8, and R10, the reference
`
`voltage and system voltage VSYS1 are fed into op amp 275. (Id. at Fig. 3.) Because an op amp
`
`operates by comparing voltages, this circuitry only functions if the inputs are actual voltages.
`
`“Battery Charge Controller” - The Court construed the term “battery charge controller”
`
`to mean “controller that manages charging of a battery.”2 In the Samsung claim construction
`
`order, the Court found that the term “battery charge controller” is a well-known term of the art
`
`and found that the term was “immediately followed by a listing of functionality that ‘such
`
`battery charge controllers offer.’” (Samsung Order at 55 (citing ’319 at 1:24-35) (emphasis
`
`added)). The Court found the opposite in the LG Claim Construction Order, finding the identical
`
`passage “exemplary rather than definitional.” (Order at 55.) LG respectfully requests that the
`
`Court construe the term “battery charge controller” consistent with the specification and file
`
`history which only identifies standard off-the-shelf battery charge controllers, and the functions
`
`and features required of such. The Court was also incorrect that there are embodiments in the
`
`specification that are not standard. (Order at 53.) The portion referenced by the Court (’319 at
`
`6:9-17, 5:30-33) identifies battery charge controller 20, which is described in Figure 4 and at
`
`5:30-33 as a “standard battery charge controller.” (See also Dkt. 127 at 16-18; Waldrop Decl.,
`
`Ex. B at slides 4-18.)
`
`
`2 FISI’s original proposed construction was “circuitry that manages charging of a battery.”
` FISI opposed Samsung’s construction,
`
`but now argues for the Samsung Construction in the LG case.
`
`
`
`4
`
`Fundamental Ex 2014-5
`LG et al. v Fundamental
`IPR2018-00493
`
`

`

`Case 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP Document 158 Filed 04/18/18 Page 6 of 10 PageID #: 6751
`
`
`“Voltage Drop Across a/the Battery Charge Controller” - The Court construed the
`
`term to mean “voltage drop between a power input of a battery charge controller and a power
`
`output of the battery charge controller.” (Order at 58.) LG agreed with the Court’s construction
`
`“a power input” and “a power output” because the ’319 and ’514 patents consistently disclose
`
`only one power input/output to the battery charge controller. Figure 4, for example, measures
`
`Vbus, the power input to the battery charge controller, and the power output to the battery charge
`
`controller. (See ’319 Patent, Figure 4.) If the Court’s construction covers any other
`
`measurement across any other terminals in the battery charge controller, LG objects and/or seeks
`
`clarification of the construction. Without the measurement across these two specific points, the
`
`voltage drop across the battery charge controller, as the term is used in the invention, cannot be
`
`measured and is not enabled. (See, Dkt. 127 at 18-21; Ex. B at slides 19-34.)
`
`“Power” - This term appears in all claims of both Veselic families. The Court construed
`
`the term to mean “electricity.” (Order at 61). The construction proposed by LG/Huawei is
`
`“product of voltage and current.” The term “electricity” is not used anywhere in the Veselic
`
`patent specifications.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`construction is inconsistent with the patent claims and specification—which require power to
`
`depend on both voltage and current—as well as the laws of physics. (Dkt. 127 at 22-24;
`
` Defendants therefore contend that the
`
`Waldrop Decl., Ex. B at slides 66-88.)
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`Fundamental Ex 2014-6
`LG et al. v Fundamental
`IPR2018-00493
`
`

`

`Case 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP Document 158 Filed 04/18/18 Page 7 of 10 PageID #: 6752
`
`
`Dated: April 16, 2018
`
`
`RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
`
` ALLEN GARDNER LAW, PLLC
`
`By: /s/ Allen F. Gardner
`
`
`
`Allen F. Gardner (TX Bar No.: 24043679)
`ALLEN GARDNER LAW, PLLC
`609 S. Fannin
`Tyler, Texas 75701
`Tel: (903) 944-7537
`Fax: (903) 944-7856
`Allen@allengardnerlaw.com
`
`
`
`Jonathan K. Waldrop
`California Bar No. 297903
`jwaldrop@kasowitz.com
`Darcy L. Jones
`California Bar No. 309474
`djones@kasowitz.com
`Marcus A. Barber
`California Bar No. 307361
`mbarber@kasowitz.com
`Heather S. Kim
`California Bar No. 277686
`hkim@kasowitz.com
`John W. Downing
`California Bar No. 252850
`jdowning@kasowitz.com
`Jack Shaw
`California Bar No. 309382
`jshaw@kasowitz.com
`KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP
`333 Twin Dolphin Drive
`Suite 200
`Redwood Shores, CA 94065
`Tel: (650) 453-5170
`Fax: (650) 453-5171
`
`Hershy Stern (pro hac vice)
`New York Bar No. 4631024
`hstern@kasowitz.com
`KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP
`1633 Broadway
`New York, NY 10019
`Tel: (212) 506-1700
`Fax: (212) 506-1800
`
`Attorneys for Defendants LG
`
`6
`
`Fundamental Ex 2014-7
`LG et al. v Fundamental
`IPR2018-00493
`
`

`

`Case 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP Document 158 Filed 04/18/18 Page 8 of 10 PageID #: 6753
`
`
`
`
`By:
`
`
`Dated: April 16, 2018
`
`
`ELECTRONICS INC., LG ELECTRONICS
`U.S.A., INC., LG ELECTRONICS
`MOBILECOMM U.S.A., INC., LG
`ELECTRONICS MOBILE RESEARCH
`U.S.A., LLC, AND LG ELECTRONICS
`ALABAMA, INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Anupum Sharma
`Michael K. Plimack (mplimack@cov.com)
`Admitted in E.D. Texas; CA Bar No. 133869
`Michael E. Bowlus (mbowlus@cov.com)
`Admitted in E.D. Texas; CA Bar No. 307277
`COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
`One Front Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 591-6000
`Facsimile: (415) 591-6091
`
`Stanley Young (syoung@cov.com)
`Admitted in E.D. Texas; CA Bar No. 121180
`Anupam Sharma (asharma@cov.com)
`Admitted in E.D. Texas; CA Bar No. 229545
`Elizabeth S. Pehrson (epehrson@cov.com)
`Admitted in E.D. Texas; CA Bar No. 197302
`COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
`333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 700
`Redwood Shores, CA 94065
`Telephone: (650) 632-4700
`Facsimile: (650) 632-4800
`
`Sinan Utku (sutku@cov.com)
`Admitted in E.D. Texas; NY Bar No. 2870780
`COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
`265 Strand
`London WC2R 1BH
`Telephone: 44 20 7067 2037
`Facsimile: 44 20 7067 2222
`
`Michael C. Smith (michaelsmith@siebman.com)
`Texas Bar No. 18650410
`SIEBMAN, BURG, PHILLIPS & SMITH, LLP
`
`7
`
`Fundamental Ex 2014-8
`LG et al. v Fundamental
`IPR2018-00493
`
`

`

`Case 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP Document 158 Filed 04/18/18 Page 9 of 10 PageID #: 6754
`
`
`113 East Austin Street
`Marshall, TX 75670
`Telephone: (903) 938-8900
`Facsimile: (972) 767-4620
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
`HUAWEI DEVICE USA, INC., AND
`HUAWEI DEVICE CO., LTD.
`
`8
`
`Fundamental Ex 2014-9
`LG et al. v Fundamental
`IPR2018-00493
`
`

`

`Case 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP Document 158 Filed 04/18/18 Page 10 of 10 PageID #: 6755
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have
`
`
`
`
`consented to electronic service are being served with a notice of the filing of this document via
`
`the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3) on April 16, 2018, and all counsel of
`
`record who have consented to electronic service are also being served with a copy of this
`
`document and exhibits via electronic mail on April 16, 2018. Any other counsel of record will
`
`be served by First Class U.S. Mail on this same date.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` /s/ Allen F. Gardner
` Allen F. Gardner
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`Fundamental Ex 2014-10
`LG et al. v Fundamental
`IPR2018-00493
`
`