`U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________
`
`CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`FINJAN, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`__________
`
`Case IPR2018-00391
`Patent 7,647,633 B2
`
`__________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: March 6, 2019
`__________
`
`Before THOMAS L. GIANNETTI, MIRIAM L. QUINN, PATRICK
`M. BOUCHER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`PATRICK D. McPHERSON, ESQ.
`PATRICK MULDOON, ESQ.
`of: Duane Morris LLP
`505 9th Street, Northwest, Suite 1000
`Washington, D.C. 20004-2166
`(202)-776-5214
`pdmcpherson@duanemorris.com
`
`JOSEPH A. POWERS, ESQ.
`of: Duane Morris LLP
` 30 South 17th Street
`Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103-4196
`(215)-979-1842
`japowers@duanemorris.com
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`JAMES HANNAH, ESQ.
`of: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, California 94025
`(650)-752-1712
`jhannah@kramerlevin.com
`
`JEFFREY H. PRICE
`of: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP
`1177 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, New York 10036
`(212)-715-7502
`jprice@kramerlevin.com
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Wednesday, March
`6, 2019, commencing at 1:00 p.m. at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
`Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
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`Patent 7,647,633 B2
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`P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
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`1:02 p.m.
`JUDGE QUINN: Hello, everyone. This is Judge Miriam
`Quinn presiding in the Texas Regional Office in Dallas, Texas. And
`with me today are Judge Patrick Boucher in the Rocky Mountain
`Office in Denver. And in the room with you is Judge Tom Giannetti
`who will be conducting the clock management for us today. This
`case is captioned Cisco Systems versus Finjan. And is IPR 2018-391
`concerning U.S. Patent No. 7, 647, 633.
`Will counsel for petitioner state your appearance for the
`record?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes, Your Honor. Patrick
`McPherson from Duane Morris for petitioner, Cisco. With me, I
`have Patrick Muldoon and Joe Powers also with Duane Morris.
`JUDGE QUINN: Thank you. And for patent owner, can
`you please make your appearance for the record?
`MR. HANNAH: Yes, Your Honor. Good
`morning/afternoon, Yours Honors. James Hannah on behalf of
`Finjan. And with me is Jeff Price.
`JUDGE QUINN: Thank you. So we have allotted 45
`minutes per side for the arguments today. Petitioner who bears the
`burden of persuasion -- or proof rather, will begin. You may reserve
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`time for rebuttal. Patent owner will also have an opportunity to
`reserve time for rebuttal. And at this time, we would like to find out
`from petitioner how much would you like to reserve?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes, Your Honor. I'd like to reserve
`15 minutes for rebuttal.
`JUDGE QUINN: So that would be 30 minutes for your main
`argument.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay, thank you. Please remember that I
`can see you and Judge Boucher can see you, but we cannot see
`anything you display on the wall. We have your slides that you filed
`-- the demonstrative slides. So if you can please call out by number
`the slides, so that we can follow along with your presentation.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes, Your Honor. I'll try to do that.
`And if I forget, please let me know immediately.
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay, will do.
`JUDGE GIANNETTI: You can go ahead, Mr. McPherson.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Okay. Thank you, Judge Giannetti.
`This afternoon or this morning, I'd like to start off with a brief
`overview. So turn to Slide 2 is an overview of the grounds of the
`petitioner. Ground 1 was a one out of three combination of Hanson,
`alone or in view of Hypponen for all challenged claims except Claim
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`12. And for Claim 12 was a separate ground based upon that same
`combination in view of a further reference to Rule 98. In the
`institution decision, the board found the petitioner met its burden on
`Claim 14. And a preliminary determined that the petitioner did not
`meet its burden for the remaining claims on the board's understanding
`of the record at that time.
`If we go now to Slide 4. Slide 4 shows an overview of the
`invention of the 633 patent with respect to Figure 3. And as a brief
`description of that, if we look at this figure on Slide 4, it shows the
`Figure 3 as annotated in color by the petitioner. And it's Petitioner
`Page 12. Reading from right to left, you'll see in the green arrow
`indicates the received information coming into the firewall. That
`received information is then sent to a server that has a protection
`engine.
`JUDGE QUINN: Counsel, there is some argument in the
`papers about the source of the received information, whether or not it
`can be -- or it has to be from an external network. What are your
`responses to that?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Well I think the limitation you're
`discussing then is the recommunicator where they -- the patent owner
`wants to add the limitation that it has to be from an external network.
`And that language is being imported from an embodiment of the 633
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`patent. Not all embodiments show where the information is coming
`from. And in certain circumstances for the recommunicator
`limitation, it would not be received from an external network. So
`that limitation of from an external network we believe is just a
`limitation being added to avoid the prior art. And it's a classic case
`of trying to add a limitation from an embodiment showing the 633
`patent. JUDGE QUINN: What specific embodiment can you direct
`us to today that more broadly describes the received information as
`not limited to the source being an external network?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Well just to be clear, the received
`information, the limitation they want to add there is it has to be from a
`source computer. And if you look at Claim -- just to make sure we're
`talking the same -- If you go to Slide -- If you go to Slide 18, these are
`the -- these are the claim limitations proposed by the patent owner in
`the patent owner response. And for downloadable information, they
`don't have the limitation that it needs to be from an external network.
`The requirement they want to add is it's downloaded from a source
`computer. It's only when you talk about the information
`recommunicator that they add the limitation that it's from the -- the
`downloaded information is from an external network.
`JUDGE QUINN: So following this for Claim 1, which does
`not recite the recommunicator, then according to this contention of
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`where it's coming from, the source computer would be the only
`source. Whereas for other claims that do recite the recommunicator,
`patent owner is complaining that it should come not just from a source
`computer, but also an external network.
`MR. MCPHERSON: I think that's right, ma'am.
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay. So for the external network issue,
`can you point me to an embodiment in which the information is more
`broadly described as coming from something other than an external
`network?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes, I think if you look at Figure 1C
`from the 633 patent. Do Your Honors have Figure 1C before you of
`633? In Figure 1C, I think the specification describes that the user
`device shown as 145 can be the server or firewall or recommunicator.
`And that recommunicator can be for communicating between devices
`or between processes. And that would include processes resident on
`the user device such as a web server, which would be your client then.
`But in any event, the user device is not communicating directly with
`an external network. So we're leaving that embodiment that does not
`show a recommunicator receiving downloadable information from an
`external network.
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`JUDGE QUINN: How do you read the user device can be
`our recommunicator because the patent describes the recommunicator
`consistently as a server?
`MR. MCPHERSON: In the specification, it describes the
`user device can be a server or a firewall.
`JUDGE QUINN: Where is that? This is in Column 7, Line
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`50?
`
`MR. MCPHERSON: Column 7. Yes, Your Honor.
`Column 7, Line 50. "A user device operating as a firewall or
`server." And that meets the definition of a recommunicating device.
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay. But it says for servicing one or
`more further interconnected devices or processes.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes. So that could be connected
`through the internal network shown in 1C or it can be between the
`processes residing on that user device.
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay. So you're reading it as saying that
`the user device on Figure 1C would be acting as a server. And then
`other user devices will be connected to that user device acting as a
`server?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes. For example in Figure 1C, you
`see a user device could be connected -- user device 145 on the left-
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`hand side could be connected through the internal network to user
`device on the right-hand side.
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay. Because I thought what that
`paragraph was saying is that instead of using a server, you can use the
`user device to work as a server, instead of the server that is shown on
`Figure 1C.
`MR. MCPHERSON: I think that's correct, but it's a broad
`enough disclosure that the user device can act as a recommunicator
`and have the protection engine in that user device. So that any
`downloadable information sent from the user device on the left-hand
`side through the internal network can be processed by the server of the
`user device on the right-hand side. That's what that paragraph says.
`JUDGE QUINN: All right. So you read it broadly to mean
`one or the other?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: Can I just ask a question about
`downloadable information? If information's being downloaded from
`a server to a client, is there anything about the terminology that
`suggests or requires which of those devices is responsible for
`initiating the download?
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`MR. MCPHERSON: No, Your Honor. And that's one of
`the issues -- When you talk about, as I understand, the patent owner's
`definition, there are circumstances when they want to say a Java
`applet is an executable download of information. And in other
`circumstances, the Java applet is not an executable and downloadable
`information. And that doesn't seem to make sense to me. When
`you talk about the description that Hanson provides with the examples
`it uses as a Java applet or ActiveX. Then you have the 633 patent,
`which provides the exact same examples. And the patent owner
`wants to argue on the 633, that's a downloadable containing an
`executable. But it's not a downloadable containing an executable
`when you're talking about it with respect to Hanson. That doesn't
`seem to make sense to me.
`And there's some argument where they're talking about, you
`know, whether it's from a source computer or not. Whatever that
`means. Because that's not clear with how that informs the
`infringement analysis or the invalidity analysis of whether it comes
`from a source computer or not. Whether that's the original source, like
`I think what you're asking or some later source that's just transferring
`that applet along the way. It's unclear. And that distinction is not
`made by the 633 patent owner.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: Right. So regardless of whether the
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`server pushes the information to the client or the client requests
`information from the server, does not impact whether or not the
`information is downloadable information.
`MR. MCPHERSON: I think that's absolutely correct. And
`I think Hanson talks about on processing an applet, whether it's
`coming from the client to the server or the server to the client and
`processing it in the exact same way. It's a bidirectional security
`program.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: Okay, thanks.
`JUDGE QUINN: How about the argument that the
`downloadable information, whatever it may be, it cannot be just a
`simple request or something to that effect?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Well I think the example they use is a
`request. And to the extent that request may or may not include an
`executable code. We did not use a simple request as the example for
`invalidity. We used the example of a reply packet, which can be
`unsolicited. Meaning it's not really a reply packet because it's
`unsolicited. But that can include Java applet or an ActiveX.
`Whether the request packet does or doesn't, we didn't do an analysis of
`that. But we know that if the request was a Java applet or an
`ActiveX, then the bastion server would operate that on the same way
`and uses rules checks, the same way.
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`JUDGE QUINN: So to be clear here, so your assertion of
`Hanson meeting the downloadable information, as recited, is the
`traffic flow from the server 20 within the company back to the client,
`which is outside of the firewall.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Outside of the firewall, but maybe
`still within the company. It doesn't have to be -- It doesn't have to be
`external out of the company either. And Hanson makes that clear as
`well.
`
`JUDGE QUINN: Well I didn't put the line of demarcation as
`the company or not; it's just that what is disclosed is there is a firewall
`and it's on the other side of the firewall.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay.
`JUDGE GIANNETTI: Counsel, I have a general question
`for you and I think this is the thread that runs through this whole case.
`And that is, hasn't the Federal Circuit made it very clear that in
`construing claims, we must look at not only language of the claims,
`but the specification. I’m thinking of cases like Microsoft v.
`Proxyconn, and I'm sure there are others, where the importance of the
`specification in claim construction is stressed. Where do you draw
`the line between following that instruction from the Federal Circuit
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`and impermissibly importing some limitation from the specification
`into the claim?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Well I mean I think the law is clear
`where it's very clear that the invention must have a limitation that is
`described in the specification, but may not be recited. And the stress
`is on that it was described as the invention -- this is the invention.
`Then the federal circuit in those circumstances decided it may be
`appropriate. Whereas it's described as the invention to import a
`limitation from the specification into the claims. And in this case,
`we just don't have that here. And if you look at the information that
`the patent owner's trying to rely on from their own slides -- for the
`intrinsic information or whether he's going to become a source
`computer. The word source computer is not used in any of the
`intrinsic information they use. It's not included in any of the
`information from extrinsic except the testimony of the expert, which
`is not supported by any factual basis for them. And with respect to
`external network, it's only pulling it from some embodiments that are
`shown in the specification. And what is shown for some
`embodiments in the specification and even here when it shows those
`external, it's from the pictures. And those pictures are all described
`as embodiments.
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`JUDGE GIANNETTI: I think we'll have a chance to revisit
`this issue as we go on.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
`Okay, so going back to Slide 4, I think I was describing that as the
`633 shows the downloadable information going into the protection
`engine. The protection engine is responsible for selecting a mobile
`protection code, which it describes as the mobile protection code as it
`intercepts the malicious operations of the downloadable. It finds the
`downloadable. And that mobile protection code is sent to the client.
`And an embodiment is shown in Figure 3. It shows them as a
`sandbox environment that the mobile protection code and the
`executable are sent to a client together. But other embodiments talk
`about the mobile protection code can be sent in advance of the
`executable. Only to the extent that the mobile protection code
`provides the protection at the time that the executable grows. And
`the 633 patent describes ActiveX and Java applets as examples of
`executables. But it does not provide an example of a mobile
`protection code that you can actually use for a Java applet because it
`talks about it at a high enough level.
`If we turn to Slide 5 now, it shows an overview of Hanson
`using Figure 2 of Hanson. The same convention from right to left.
`There's a green line there and in the Hanson patent, it's been there
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`referred to as data packets that are to include programs. And it
`provides a specific example of Java applets and ActiveX control.
`And Hanson also says that teaching can be extended to various levels
`of protection and security against the various types of data being
`transmitted. Those would include other types of executables in the
`data packets. And the bastion server distinguishes between
`executables. It has a rules file that we've highlighted in yellow there.
`And those rules file are specific to Java applets and ActiveX controls
`in this embodiments. And the rules include security programs. A
`security program for -- and it's highlighted in yellow is a
`Security.OCX for ActiveX and security classification -- a
`Security.class for Java applets. In order to select the right rules to
`apply, there's no dispute that the server needs to distinguish between
`whether it's an ActiveX or a Java. And it treats the executable the
`same way, whether it's sent from the server to the client or the client
`to the server.
`JUDGE GIANNETTI: But where does Hanson determine --
` I'm going to the language of Claim 1 -- where does Hanson
`determine whether the downloadable information includes executable
`code? Where is that feature in Hanson?
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`MR. MCPHERSON: That feature would be performed in the
`bastion server. The description of the exact method being used to
`perform that is not described in any detail.
`JUDGE GIANNETTI: So how do we know it's there?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Because Hanson describes that it uses
`a rule set for applets and a rule set for ActiveX.
`JUDGE GIANNETTI: But those are both downloadable --
`those are both executable codes, correct?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Well there's executable code residing
`in the server. Correct.
`JUDGE GIANNETTI: Where does it make the choice
`between something that's executable and something that's not
`executable? Where do you find that in Hanson?
`MR. MCPHERSON: I think that's the determination of
`whether to apply my rules for my ActiveX or my rules for my -- rules
`for my Java applet.
`JUDGE GIANNETTI: But they're both executable.
`MR. MCPHERSON: They're both executable, but the rules -
`- the rules are specific to Item 1.
`JUDGE GIANNETTI: I understand that, but I'm looking for
`something in Hanson where the decision is made whether something
`is executable or not. That's the distinction that I'm looking at. And
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`that's certainly one, I believe, a reasonable construction of this term.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Right. Under that construction,
`Hanson doesn't show -- if you're looking for a positive step that the
`executable is not included, that would not be disclosed in Hanson.
`And that was the petitioner's alternative argument that if the claim
`limitation is read to be whether or not there are two alternatives, then
`it's a combination of Hanson and Hypponen. And Hypponen does
`disclose expressly whether or not an executable is included. So that's
`what we use that for.
`JUDGE GIANNETTI: Thank you.
`MR. MCPHERSON: And then continuing, if the executable
`code is included --
`JUDGE QUINN: So let me ask you about that alternative.
`Did you argue claim construction of that whether determination in
`your briefs? Because you're taking two different positions as to how
`the prior art might disclose the limitation, but you haven't asserted any
`particular construction of them.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Well we have two arguments. One, if
`it's giving us plain and ordinary meaning. And we can look at Slide -
`- If you look at Slide 10. Slide 10 shows how the petitioner's
`arguments of either construction show the limitations of Claim 1.
`JUDGE QUINN: But you didn't argue this as a claim
`construction argument. You interjected this into your analysis, so. . .
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`from what I read in the briefs. Did you include anywhere in your
`briefing what your contention is regarding the proper construction of
`the term?
`MR. MCPHERSON: The proper construction is the plain
`and ordinary meaning of the term. That's what we argued. And
`under any reasonable definition of plain and ordinary meaning, our
`petition sets forth a basis for why that claim term would be found.
`JUDGE QUINN: But if you have alternative positions as to
`what the plain and ordinary meaning is and there is a dispute as to
`what it can or can't be?
`MR. MCPHERSON: And for the basis under the plain and
`ordinary meaning or the two alternative meanings, whether or not is
`required. Whether there needs to be a positive step of finding that is
`not there. And we put forth --
`JUDGE QUINN: What is your position -- What is your
`position as to which alternative is correct?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Based upon the claim language and the
`writing in the 633, the plain and ordinary meaning should not include
`the whether or not. Just whether -- where the language says whether
`the downloadable includes an executable, I don't believe the intrinsic
`record supports that it has to have a positive step of not determining
`that. I think the 633 is clear and when you use that language, it
`means likely. But be that as it may, we've put forward in our
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`petition, both under the plain and ordinary where there wouldn't be a
`suitable alternative. And we also put forward, to the extent the board
`adopts, saying whether or not that would be the combination of
`Hanson and Hypponen together would show the two alternative basis.
`JUDGE QUINN: So do you -- Go ahead.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: I was just going to say I would have to
`look at the reexamination appeal decision more closely. But am I
`correct that the majority in that decision found that the plain and
`ordinary meaning of that term is what you're describing as the two
`alternative possibilities meaning?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes, Judge Boucher. That's correct.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: Okay.
`MR. MCPHERSON: And the minority -- the minority in that
`decision took the position that it's not required. But yes, you're
`correct, Your Honor.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: Right. But the majority found that,
`that was in fact the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: Okay.
`JUDGE QUINN: Well I mean the problem I see here is that
`you have not advanced any claim construction arguments for us to
`determine whether one of the alternatives, according to your
`contentions is proper versus the other. So I mean you're saying that
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`in your view one of them is more appropriate than the other, but we
`have no briefing on it for this.
`MR. MCPHERSON: My position that I just gave you today
`was my opinion. I don't think the board needs to construe this term.
`Because the petitioner has shown under either construction that the
`prior art discloses that claim term. So the board doesn't need to
`disclose it. And that was our point in our petition that under the
`plain
`and ordinary meaning, as long as it's given a reasonable interpretation,
`then we have put forward two different ways to deal with it. One is
`Hanson alone discloses that when it's determining whether to apply
`the rules checks for an applet or whether to apply the rules checks for
`an ActiveX. That meets the plain language of whether it includes an
`executable, not the two alternative one. And if the construction is
`whether or not the two alternative limitation, then we use the
`combination of Hanson and Hypponen where Hypponen expressly
`says the whether or not. It's based upon the architecture of
`Hypponen of using a file detector and content analysis, which is the
`same architecture used by the 633 patent. So that what's in our
`petition with respect to the invalidity. So the board doesn't need to
`construe that language because the art before does it on the either
`construction.
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`JUDGE QUINN: How do you contend Hypponen discloses
`the two alternatives of executable code found or executable code not
`found?
`MR. MCPHERSON: Well on Slide 10, the language that
`Hypponen uses is Hypponen discloses scanning said file -- that's the
`downloadable file -- to determine whether or not the file contains a
`macro. That's the exact language that the McHardy used in
`determining whether or not. And the architecture that's used and
`disclosed in Hypponen is shown on Slide 14. I'm sorry, it's
`Hypponen -- It's on Slide 15. Hypponen discloses a file type
`detector and a content detector to determine whether or not a
`downloadable includes an executable program. And it's the same
`architecture. It's looking for file type extensions and it's looking for
`content analysis.
`And as our expert explained if we go to Slide 12 -- our expert
`in the petition explained that the file type detector and the content
`detector that are disclosed both in 633 and Hypponen were well
`known. And he provides examples of a file type detector -- and this
`is on Slide 12 -- the Rx PC describes the prior art system that scan
`carded files for viruses. And upon detection of a virus, it deleted the
`file or ignored the virus.
`JUDGE QUINN: Where did you make this argument about
`the whether or not in Hypponen?
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`MR. MCPHERSON: Under the construction of -- under the
`analysis under Claim 1.
`JUDGE QUINN: Yes, where in the petition? Because I'm
`looking at it and I don't see your citations to this language.
`MR. MCPHERSON: Yes, so on Page 51 of the petition.
`Excuse me. On Page 51 of the petition, the second to last paragraph.
`It says, "A POSA would have understood that Hanson's disclosure of
`applying Java checks and ActiveX checks or other security programs
`includes a determination of whether the data packet is or includes a
`Java applet, ActiveX program, or other executable." It goes on to
`say, "To the extent the patent owner asserts Hanson does not disclose
`this limitation, it would have been obvious to modify the bastion
`server of Hanson to determine whether an executable code, other than
`Java applets and ActiveX was in the data packet using conventional
`prior art techniques in order to extend the capabilities as envisioned
`by Hanson."
`And it goes on to talk about the state of the art section. And
`it goes on that Hypponen describes what was in the state of the art that
`our expert said. And it's the last paragraph on Page 52. For
`example Hypponen describes setting conventional computer virus
`detection software. The first step was to determine which files
`contained executable codes. And it talks about using file extension
`there.
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`JUDGE QUINN: Yes, I've read all of that. And you're
`reading to us the petition. I haven't seen any of the citation that you
`just said on Column 2, Lines 35 through 36. And I've looked
`through your expert’s declaration and it doesn't explain that area
`either. So why are you coming in and relying on that now since you
`didn't rely on that before?
`MR. MCPHERSON: I'm relying on it in response to
`questions that Hypponen -- I think our disclosure of petition shows
`that Hypponen discloses a content detector, a file detector, and our
`expert in our petition in the state of the art describes that those were
`known methods for performing. And so if you look at -- If you look
`at Hanson and you say well Hanson doesn't describe the specific
`methods, which I think Judge Giannetti said. There are no specific
`methods there about how to do it. And a person with skill in the art
`looking at that, would look at what was known at the time of the art.
`And our expert puts forward what was known at the time of the art:
`use a file detector and use a content detector. And then we show that
`in the alternative, you would combine Hanson with Hypponen for that
`exact reason. To use a content detector and to use a file detector.
`That's the same architecture as the 633.
` So if I use a file detector and a content detector as describing
`the prior art, then I will necessarily meet the limitation of whether or
`not a downloadable includes an executable because it's the same
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`architecture in the 633. And so when challenged and on response
`saying well Hypponen -- I shouldn't say -- the patent owner didn't
`challenge. The board raised the question as to whether Hypponen
`discloses that. And in response to that, we identify that Hypponen is
`much broader than the board read it in its institution decision.
`JUDGE QUINN: But it's got to be more than just “it has to
`follow a content detector” because the 633 patent also describes that
`the content detector and the file detector pass to another component of
`the invention an indicator that tells the system what to do when it does
`not have executable code. And none of that has been shown in
`Hypponen. In fact, how I read your petition here is that in case more
`is needed to be detected, other than Java applets and Active X, then
`Hypponen provides additional types of executables that can be
`detected. But it doesn't say anything about what this does vis-a-vis
`not having an executable code.
`MR. MCPHERSON: I see my time has run out. If I could
`finish the question. I think if it does not have an executable code,
`then it just passes it forward. The way Hanson -- the way Hanson is
`set right now, Hypponen determines whether or not it has a macro.
`If it does not, it doesn't perform any function described there. The
`exclosure is the same as a 633. The 633 doesn't say what happens if
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