UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC 2017, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`______________________________________
`
`Case IPR 2018-00282
`Patent 7,092,671 B2
`_______________________________________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: February 28, 2019
`_______________________________________
`
`Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, CHARLES BOUDREAU, GARTH D. BAER,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`__________________________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC 2017, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`______________________________________
`
`Case IPR 2018-00282
`Patent 7,092,671 B2
`_______________________________________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: February 28, 2019
`_______________________________________
`
`Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, CHARLES BOUDREAU, GARTH D. BAER,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`ANDREW S. EHMKE, ESQ.
`of: Haynes & Boone, LLP
`2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700
`Dallas, Texas 75219
`(214) 651-5116
`andy.ehmke@haynesboone.com
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`BRETT MANGRUM, ESQ.
`of: Etheridge Law Group, PLLC
`2600 E. Southlake Boulevard, Suite 120
`Southlake, Texas 76092
`(817) 470-7249
`brett@etheridgelaw.com
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday,
`February 28, 2019, commencing at 1:00 p.m. at the U.S. Patent and
`Trademark Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
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`P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
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`1:00 p.m.
`JUDGE BAER: Okay. Good afternoon, everybody. We have this
`afternoon our final hearing in IPR 2018-00282 between Petitioner, Apple
`and Patent Owner, Uniloc. I'm Judge Baer.
`And with me remotely is Judge Boudreau and Judge Quinn is there.
`Can you hear us, Judge Boudreau and Judge Quinn?
`JUDGE QUINN: Yes, I can hear you.
`JUDGE BAER: Great.
`JUDGE BOUDREAU: I can hear you.
`JUDGE BAER: Great. Let's go ahead and get the parties
`appearances please. Who do we have for Petitioner, Apple?
`MR. EHMKE: Your Honor, it's Andy Ehmke, here on behalf of
`Petitioner, Apple and with me is Marc Breverman, In-house counsel for
`Apple.
`
`JUDGE BAER: Great, thank you. And who do we have for patent
`owner, Uniloc?
`MR. MANGRUM: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Brett Mangrum
`with the Etheridge Law Group. I'll be representing Uniloc today and
`presenting today.
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`JUDGE BAER: Good afternoon. Thanks, counsel. Welcome to
`everybody. We are glad you're here. We appreciate you making the effort
`to be here. We set forth the procedure for today's hearing in our trial order.
`But just to make sure everybody knows and we're on the same page
`here is how this is going to work. The parties will each have 30 minutes of
`total time to present their arguments.
`Please keep in mind that whatever is projected on the screen will not
`be viewable by Judges Boudreau and Quinn but they do have the materials.
`So when you refer to an exhibit or a slide let us know what exhibit, what
`slide number you're referring to and that will also help us to make sure that
`the record is clear, the transcript is clear.
`We'll remind each party that under no circumstances are they to
`interrupt the other party while the other party is presenting its arguments and
`demonstratives. If a party believes that a demonstrative or oral argument,
`sorry, an argument is presented by another party is objectionable for any
`reason please only raise that objection during your argument time.
`Now we received your email earlier about the parties’ objections
`regarding new arguments. That's fine. If you want to make those arguments
`please make them during argument time, okay.
`I think with that we are ready to begin. Does counsel for Petitioner,
`Apple have any concerns or questions?
`MR. EHMKE: No questions, Your Honor.
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`JUDGE BAER: Great. And for Patent Owner, Uniloc?
`MR. MANGRUM: No, Your Honor.
`JUDGE BAER: Okay. Petitioner, you have the burden so you'll go
`first. So good afternoon, Mr. Ehmke. First of all do you want to reserve any
`rebuttal time?
`MR. EHMKE: I would like to reserve eight minutes of rebuttal
`
`time.
`
`JUDGE BAER: Great. We'll set that up. And the yellow light will
`come on when you have five minutes to go. Is that okay?
`MR. EHMKE: That's perfect, thank you.
`JUDGE BAER: Great. With that we are ready to begin.
`MR. EHMKE: Thank you, Your Honor. So again, good afternoon.
`My name is Andy Ehmke of Haynes & Boone on behalf of Petitioner,
`Apple.
`
`Moving to Slide 2 just laying out our agenda for today I really think
`there's only one substantive issue to address which is the control limitations
`and we'll touch briefly at the end with the remaining time on the real party
`interest issue question.
`So moving then to the control limitations Slide 3 and then quickly to
`Slide 4, we see the two claims in question with the limitations involved.
`We've highlighted the control limitations in yellow with respect to Claims 1
`and 9.
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`As we think about the scope of the control limitation, which is again
`the real heart of today's matter, we see that the claim language is helping us
`define what it means to control when we look at the language.
`Both in Claims 1 and Claim 9 we see it's essentially self-defining.
`What control means here is cause the telephone to dial. We have a handheld
`computing device and it's going to control, it's going to cause the telephone
`to dial the specific number.
`What's interesting when we look at this is that the telephone is doing
`the dialing. So when we think about the scope of control it's not a tyrannical
`dictatorship absolute control of the telephone because the telephone is
`handling the dialing as set forth in the claim.
`What we're looking at for this control is are we doing something to
`cause the telephone to dial? And we think that's set forth specifically in the
`claim language itself.
`What we don't see in the claim language is anything more than that.
`We don't see specific software. We don't see specific hardware and we don't
`see a specific command. There's no requirement of a specific command
`separate and apart from the telephone number.
`We just see control and configure to control such that we dial the
`telephone number. We think that's why it bears out the claim construction
`discussed in the decision on institution as I move to Slide 5 where the Board
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`recognized reading the claim broadly that there's no specific command
`required separate and apart from the telephone.
`We think this construction should be maintained. But there's nothing
`that's in this record that shows anything more specific required with respect
`to the control limitation.
`Again, as we mentioned as I move to Slide 6 are some more reasons
`why we should maintain the construction. As we discussed already the
`claims don't have anything specific requiring certain commands.
`There's nothing required in that regard with respect to the claims.
`And we don't think it's appropriate to narrow the claims to this very specific
`embodiment of specific type of command that's separate and distinct from
`the telephone number. We don't think that's --
`JUDGE BAER: Mr. Ehmke, how could you control something
`wirelessly without a command?
`MR. EHMKE: Okay. Well I want to make a distinction, Your
`Honor, between an implementation aspect versus what the claim requires,
`okay. I think implementation-wise there are many different ways that you
`can effectuate causing a telephone to dial.
`And one example that I was thinking of and that I hope is analogous
`is think of your remote control on a television. You can type two numbers.
`You can type 3 3 on your remote control and type nothing else.
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`The TV receives those numbers and then goes ahead and changes the
`channel. Alternatively you could press the two numbers, you could press 3 3
`and then press the select or the input button or the send button and you
`would effectuate and send a command.
`I think there are ways to control that doesn't necessarily require a
`specific command distinct from a telephone number to effectuate the control.
`And when we look at the claim again we see what we're trying to do is we're
`simply trying to cause a telephone number to happen.
`In the specification, I keep flipping back and forth between
` the slides and I apologize, Your Honor. When we look at the specification
`on Slide 6 we see there's an application that's running on the handheld
`device that it's controlling.
`We see there is pre-configuration. There is a pre-configuration step
`of we're going to have some protocols existing on the phone system. We're
`not saying that there's not necessarily communications occurring.
`What we're saying is the claim doesn't specifically require a
`particular type of communication to occur to cause the telephone number to
`be dialed. I don't think there's a specific command that's required.
`JUDGE BOUDREAU: In that example that you just gave isn't there
`a command either way it's just that there are two, perhaps two different
`commands, but there are still commands? Isn't that correct?
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`MR. EHMKE: Well in the example I gave we transmitted the
`necessary data to effectuate the changing of the television channel or in this
`case of sending the telephone number. There is the transmission of the data
`and the data is used.
`There is also the existence of the transmission to begin with. The
`fact that I'm sending you something may actually be viewed as a command.
`We're not saying that there's not necessarily control happening here to
`effectuate the causing of the telephone number to dial.
`We're just saying that there's a distinction between the claims
` require of what that command necessarily must be and whether or not a
`command is even recited in the claims at all. We don't believe that the
`control limitation necessarily requires a particular command being set, what
`the command must be, the timing of that command or what the date of the
`command must be.
`We just need to have a level of control sufficient to cause the
`telephone number to dial.
`JUDGE QUINN: Sorry, can you hear me now?
`MR. EHMKE: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE QUINN: But the claim expressly recites the things
`separately. It recites first a transfer and then the control and, particularly in
`claim one, it uses the claim term “configured to.” So it's more than just
`being aware that a signal is being received in order to do something with it.
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`MR. EHMKE: We don't dispute that there's two separate limitations
`here of transfer the necessary data, the telephone number versus the
`configured control limitation. We aren't disputing a distinction with those
`two things.
`What we are disputing is that the claim language as written requires
`something specifically different than the telephone number to effectuate the
`control. What we have here is we have a communication occurring.
`And then we have the data within that communication. We're
`supposed to transfer the telephone number, yes. But we also have a singular
`wireless communication. Your Honor, you were pointing to
`Claim 1 and I'm using Slide 4 as a reference for this.
`When we're looking at the wireless communication with respect to
`the telephone number being transferred we see that's a wireless
`communication. And then when we're talking about the control it's the same
`communication being referenced.
`It's the wireless communication. So there's not a distinction being
`drawn there that would necessitate reading into the limitation a command
`separate and distinct from the telephone number. There are two limitations.
`We don't dispute that. What we do dispute is that a requirement of
`any sort of timing or any sort of distinction necessarily that there has to be a
`command separate and apart from the telephone number.
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`JUDGE BAER: So assume that I have a telephone that's got all the
`programming for this auto dial in the telephone such that as soon as it
`receives a number, as soon as it receives that seven digits or ten digits it's
`programmed to dial. But all of that programming is within the telephone.
`Would that meet your claim construction?
`MR. EHMKE: I would have to look at the handheld device with
`respect to the, I'm sorry I'm not answering your question would that meet the
`claim construction. I think what the claim construction requires is looking at
`the handheld device to see if as we look at Claim 1 if it's configured to
`control.
`JUDGE BAER: But again, just assume that the only thing it does is
`send a seven or ten digit telephone number, seven or ten digits, all the
`coding is in the telephone that once it receives that phone number it does all
`dialing.
`That code is resident in the telephone. Is that sufficient under your
`reading of the claim?
`MR. EHMKE: I would say it's not, Your Honor, because we're
`required to control the telephone. There has to be something happening at
`the handheld device to meet that limitation.
`I feel like that's not going further, far enough in terms of establishing
`the control aspect to it. There has to be something happening.
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`Now in that scenario because that wireless transmission is occurring
`and it's able to talk to the telephone I would argue that's within the scope of
`the construction that we're proposing because it's doing something to
`communicate with that telephone.
`I'm not relying solely on just the programming within the telephone.
`Now the telephone as required in the claim is required to dial. So the
`programming needs to be there.
`But there needs to be something on the handheld device to effectuate
`the control aspect to it. Now in your scenario you're describing that it's
`communicating that telephone number so there's a wireless communication
`that's occurring and there's other things happening on the handheld device to
`cause the telephone number to be selected to cause that telephone number to
`be transmitted, to cause that telephone number to be transmitted wirelessly
`in a manner that the telephone can understand it.
`It is those things that we're pointing to as meeting the scope of
`control.
`JUDGE BAER: I'm not sure I see the distinction.
`MR. EHMKE: Okay.
`JUDGE BAER: Can you help me understand that? So all that the
`handheld device does is send a telephone number. But it does send it. I
`mean it transmits it wirelessly.
`MR. EHMKE: Right.
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`JUDGE BAER: How does that either meet the control or not meet
`the control limitation?
`MR. EHMKE: And I think the mismatch here, Your Honor, is when
`I'm thinking about the control and meeting the claim limitation I'm looking
`at the aspect of the way the claim is structured because it's a system claim as
`I look at Claim 1 of we're looking at how is a handheld device controlling?
`How is it configured to control? So I keep focusing and
`emphasizing on that side of it. That may be why I'm missing your question
`with respect to it.
`Because of those actions that you referenced sending the telephone
`number, selecting the telephone number, the wireless protocol to me that's
`what's meeting the claim limitation. And maybe that's where I'm not
`answering your question with respect to the claim construction.
`If we just look at the control I'm afraid that may be too narrow of a
`view with respect to what the claim is requiring. The claim is requiring that
`the handheld device control to cause the telephone to dial. And we're
`looking at it from that perspective as the entirety of the claim limitation.
`What is that requiring in the entirety of how is the handheld device
`configured to cause the telephone number to dial?
`JUDGE BAER: So I have to say that I thought you were going
`answer my question, yes. I'm a little surprised. And so maybe you can
`articulate for me the difference since you didn't agree with what I said.
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`Maybe you could articulate the difference between what you're
`saying would constitute control and what Patent Owner is saying would
`constitute control?
`MR. EHMKE: So the way I understand Patent Owner's argument is
`there has to be a particular command that is sent. There's a separate wireless
`transmission distinct from the telephone number that's being sent and that
`the claim is necessarily limited to only that embodiment.
`We disagree with that. We think the claim is written when we're
`talking about the handheld device configured to control to cause is that when
`we're looking at what control means in this context is something on a
`handheld device kick starting the process in order to have the telephone
`execute its code to do what the rest of the claim requires which is dial the
`telephone number.
`And so we think it's more focused on what's happening on the
`handheld device for this control aspect to it and less the interchange, the
`interplay between the devices. And that's where we come out on it is the
`claim is structured as what is the handheld device doing.
`The claim is not structured as what is the communication between
`the two devices. In terms of the communication from the two devices it's
`only the telephone number that recited in the claim. I'm still not sure I'm
`answering your question.
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`JUDGE BAER: No, I think that's okay. I think one of my
`colleagues has a question.
`JUDGE BOUDREAU: So going back to your analogy with the TV
`remote control then what you're essentially saying is that the claim isn't
`limited to just the embodiment where you would press 3 3 and then the enter
`key. It could be 3 3 and then just --
`MR. EHMKE: Correct.
`JUDGE BOUDREAU: And if nothing else is pressed within the
`next five seconds it automatically recognizes that's where you want to go.
`So you're not limited to any particular command. But there still may need to
`be some command.
`MR. EHMKE: Correct.
`JUDGE BOUDREAU: Correct?
`MR. EHMKE: Yes, Your Honor. And if I might paraphrase to
`make sure I'm fully answering your question. It is our position that the
`claim is not limited to a particular arrangement vis-a-vis how the control
`occurs whether it's through a command or through a pre-configured set up
`between the systems.
`We don't think that any of that is recited in the claim. When we look
`at the claim in terms of what's actually recited in the claim is you transfer
`one thing. You transfer a telephone number.
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`And then you're controlling such that telephone number is dialed.
`And so we look at that as including a situation where you're pre-configured
`in your setup, you're able to communicate, you select a telephone number,
`you transfer that telephone number and that causes the telephone to dial.
`We think that's what's in the scope of the claim as well. It's not
`limited, go back to my example as you were using, Your Honor. The claim
`is not limited only to the scenario where you press 3 3 and send. We don't
`think it's limited to just that.
`JUDGE BOUDREAU: Okay, thank you.
`JUDGE BAER: So in the controlling limitation I assume that you
`would define controlling as something to the effect of there would be no
`more, for example, human interaction whereby whatever you do on the
`handheld device assuming that the phone dials without any more human
`interaction that would constitute controlling.
`So in your analogy with the remote control pushing the two numbers
`is controlling because there's no more human interaction and certainly there's
`no human interaction on the television. There's no more interaction.
`All the interaction happens on the remote control device or in this
`case the handheld computer. Is that how you're defining controlling?
`MR. EHMKE: Not limited to that, but I think that's within the scope
`of it, Your Honor, yes. That if we are effectuating again as we look at the
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`claim such that the telephone dials, caused the telephone to dial is the
`handheld device doing something to cause it to dial.
`JUDGE BAER: And if that something is just sending over a number
`you would say that is not enough or that is enough?
`MR. EHMKE: I would say and I realize I'm parsing this very thinly
`on this, Your Honor, that when you send the number there is, I see there's
`two things within that. There's the act of sending something and there's also
`the data within the thing that I'm sending.
`So there's the pipe. There's the active communicating of being able
`to communicate, of having the necessary protocols in place to communicate.
`And then there's the transfer of the telephone number, of the
`necessary data to cause the telephone to dial because I can communicate
`with the telephone but if I don't communicate more than that right, I would
`have to transfer the telephone number.
`But I have to be able to communicate. I have to know what
`telephone number to send. I have to be able to send that telephone number
`in a manner that the system can understand it and then extract that telephone
`number in order for the telephone to dial.
`We are saying that those actions would be within the scope of the
`control of selecting the telephone number, putting it in the proper format,
`putting it on the proper channel and sending it out, that those are the things
`that are causing the telephone number to dial.
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`And we're saying that because we agree we don't want to conflate
`across the two limitations. But there is the act required of transferring the
`specific data, the telephone number as required in the claim notation.
`But there are other things that are happening that are part and parcel
`with being able to transfer that telephone number that meet the control
`limitation.
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`JUDGE BAER: That makes more sense. That's helpful, thank you.
`MR. EHMKE: We've touched on the heart of the matter already on
`this so I'll go briefly through the Yun reference. I don't know, which would
`start on this week Slide 9. So we have the prior reference with the Yun
`reference and we have the electronic pocketbook.
`We have the handheld, we have the telephone. The electronic
`pocketbook is the handheld device. It's communicating wirelessly and one
`embodiment it's using an infrared signal to communicate with the telephone.
`In specific detail with respect to the claim limitation as I move to
`Slide 10 the way Yun works is the electronic pocketbook has what's called a
`control unit within it. That control unit can put the pocketbook into a phone
`mode.
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`In that phone mode the user can select the telephone number. That
`telephone number is then put into the protocol for the infrared transmission
`and then transmitted wirelessly to the telephone. On Slide 11 when it
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`receives this telephone number it then commences its automatic dialing
`process.
`It extracts the telephone number out and then dials the telephone
`number.
`JUDGE BAER: I want to make sure we get to the new argument.
`So could you give, I was, I didn't see this in your reply brief.
`Could you give me your best argument that passage in Yun that we
`cited in our decision in Column 4 that's got the electronic dial, after receipt
`of an electronic dial request, could you give me your best argument that, no,
`this isn't a new argument this is something we addressed in our petition?
`MR. EHMKE: Absolutely, Your Honor. So what we did in our
`petition is there is two references in our petition to the electronic dial
`request. We provided a summary of the Yun reference where we reference
`and discuss that the wireless communication includes the dial request as well
`as the telephone.
`That's on Page 12 of petition where we cite to a portion of Yun
`where infrared signal containing electronic dial requests and telephone
`number. This is on Slide 12 of our demonstratives.
`We first discuss it in the overall teachings of Yun. And then with
`respect to Claim 1.5 we cite Column 4, Lines 20 through 30 of Yun which
`contains another reference to the dial request.
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`The Patent Owner's argument with respect to this is that we didn't
`fully quote all ten lines, 20 through 30 that we had an ellipsis that removed
`the dial request. But we have a citation in our petition with respect to it.
`Now we didn't believe that the dial request was necessary to meet the
`control limitation. Again, as we've mentioned, our focus is on the handheld
`device because we felt the claim was with respect to configure to control.
`And the handheld device has to do the controlling. The focus is on
`the handheld device not the transmission of particular information. And so
`we didn't specifically set forth the dial request within our quote because we
`didn't think that was necessary to meet the limitation as we set forth with the
`construction for that claim.
`When Patent Owner made the argument with respect to narrowing
`the claim scope to a particular embodiment requiring a command we
`referenced in our reply at Pages 10 through 13 the exact citations that we
`had used in the original petition to show why that's not a distinction over the
`prior art.
`And so we don't believe the original petition required the dial
`request. We ellipsised it out but we nevertheless cited to the location. And
`then in our rebuttal when we have the full record in front of us to answer the
`court's questions with respect to the decision on institution on this limitation.
`We cited to elements that were set forth in the petition originally.
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`JUDGE BAER: So would it be fair to say or fair to characterize
`your position as, yes, the dial request is a new argument. But it's not a new
`argument because it's just a response to the Patent Owner's claim
`construction.
`It's true that we didn't consider the dial request in the petition. But
`it's really not a new argument because it's just a response to Patent Owner's
`claim construction?
`MR. EHMKE: That's absolutely the case, Your Honor. Again, we
`didn't feel that the dial request was necessary to meet the prima facie case.
`We nevertheless cited it and referenced it in our petition.
`But it wasn't necessary to carry the case forward. Federal Services
`was very clear that other evidence can come to light throughout the course of
`the proceeding to further buttress arguments or respond to Patent Owner's
`positions.
`We didn't change our arguments. We still maintained that the dial
`request is not a necessary component to show that these claims are
`unpatentable. But even then to the extent that we were responding to the
`issue of a command being a separate requirement we rebutted in our reply
`with evidence already in the record that's not a patentable distinction.
`JUDGE BAER: And I'll note you've got a minute left. If my
`colleagues have any questions or if there's anything else you would like to
`address before going to your rebuttal time.
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`JUDGE QUINN: I have one question as to Column 5, Lines 5, 6, 7.
`MR. EHMKE: Of the patent, Your Honor?
`JUDGE QUINN: No, Yun. That language has been relied on by
`Patent Owner to argue that whatever Yun does, it is only sending the
`telephone number. That line says however, for automatic dialing purposes
`only telephone number of an interested person need to be transmitted.
`So can you explain that passage vis-a-vis your contention of how
`Yun also sends a request?
`MR. EHMKE: Absolutely, Your Honor. I think that dovetails
`nicely with our discussion with respect to the claim construction. What Yun
`is saying all that's needed in a scenario where devices are configured already
`is to send the telephone number.
`That's all the data that's necessary to effectuate the dialing of the
`telephone number. But Yun also specifically says that as part of the infrared
`signal you could also include a specific dial request as well.
`I think that again, as I use my example again that's Yun saying
`there's the 3 3 and press enter or you can just press 3 3 and that is sufficient.
`So Yun is just saying it's sufficient to send the dial number because of all the
`other accouterment with respect to the transmission. I think my time is up if
`there weren't any further questions.
`JUDGE BAER: Great, thank you. Okay, Mr. Mangrum, you have
`30 minutes. Let me set the clock.
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`MR. MANGRUM: Yes, Judge Baer, if I can reserve five for
`rebuttal.
`JUDGE BAER: Sure. And we'll give you the same warning with
`five minutes to go if that's okay.
`MR. MANGRUM: Excellent.
`JUDGE BAER: Whenever you're ready.
`MR. MANGRUM: I'd like to start with what should have been the
`answer to Judge Baer's question reading straight from the reply. This is
`from Petitioner's reply brief, page 7. And this is how Petitioner frames the
`dispute in the reply.
`Quoting here, "Claims 1 and 9 simply require configuration in which
`the telephone is controlled by the handheld computer system to dial the
`specific telephone number even if the transfer of the telephone number
`accomplishes as much".
`That's really, that's the theory of the petition. And they rely on that
`because as Judge Quinn pointed out in Yun there is a transfer of a number.
`And Yun says nothing else needs to be transferred.
`Harris is the same. Harris repeatedly states that it transfers a number
`and to use Judge Baer's terminology the smarts or everything the processing
`is gone telephone side. And that, Uniloc pointed out in its response why
`that's a problem.
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`It's not a claim construction position that Uniloc is offering. It's a
`plain reading of the claim language. And it's interesting that in arguments
`today there was no reference whatsoever to the prosecution history.
`And we made those arguments in our papers. But I want to point it
`out to Your Honors. Referring specifically to Slide 5. In Slide 5 what we
`have, incidentally this argument is repeated several times and distinguished
`in several references throughout prosecution where Applicant consistently
`goes to Figure 8 of the specification.
`And the Applicant here distinguishes the control limitations from a
`cite of references and says, and I want to emphasize this quotation, "the
`phone number to be dialed is transferred before the receiving wireless
`telephone is controlled or instructed to dial the telephone number".
`Accordingly, Claim 19 recites that data exchange and control
`elements as separate limitations. So here what the Applicant i
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