throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 17
`
` Entered: October 1, 2018
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`ZTE (USA) INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`
` FUNDAMENTAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, JON B. TORNQUIST, and
`ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judge
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`ZTE (USA) Inc. (“Petitioner”), filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”)
`requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–3, 6–8, 12, and 14–18 of U.S.
`Patent 7,239,111 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’111 Patent”).1 Petitioner supports its
`Petition with the Declaration of Mr. James Geier. Ex. 1009. Fundamental
`Innovation Systems International LLC (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a
`Preliminary Response (Paper 8, “Prelim. Resp.”). Patent Owner supports its
`Preliminary Response with the Declaration of Robert Baranowski and the
`Declaration of Dr. Kenneth Fernald. Exs. 2001, 2002.
`We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes
`review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an
`inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in
`the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
`prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”
`Taking into account the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition
`and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not
`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any
`challenged claim of the ’111 Patent. Therefore, we do not institute an inter
`partes review.
`
`A. Related Matters
`The parties identify Civil Actions No. 2:17-cv-00145, No. 2:16-cv-
`01424, and No. 2:16-cv-01425 in the Eastern District of Texas and Civil
`Action No. 3:17-cv-01827 in the Northern District of Texas as involving the
`
`
`1 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
`were dismissed from this proceeding by Order entered July 18, 2018. Paper
`12.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`’111 Patent. Pet. 1, Paper 6, 1. The parties also identify IPR2018-00487
`and IPR2018-00495 as having been filed against the ’111 Patent. Pet. 1,
`Paper 6, 3.
`
`B. Technology Background
`An overview of USB cables is helpful in understanding the
`technology involved in the ’111 Patent which relates to charging a mobile
`device through a USB connector. See Ex. 1001, Fig. 3. Cables compliant
`with the USB 2.0 standard have four conductors: VBUS, D+, D-, and GND.
`Ex. 1008, 17–18, 86. The VBUS and GND conductors of the USB cable are
`used to deliver power to devices and the D+ and D- conductors carry
`communication signals between a USB host and a connected device. Id. at
`17–18; Ex. 1001, 7:4–11. Figure 4–2 of the USB 2.0 specification,
`reproduced below, depicts these four conductors within a USB cable:
`
`
`Ex. 1008, 17. Figure 4–2 illustrates the arrangement of conductors in a USB
`cable.
`
`C. The ’111 Patent
`The ’111 Patent is directed to a Universal Serial Bus Adapter for a
`Mobile Device. Ex. 1001, at [54]. The ’111 Patent discloses “a USB
`adapter for providing a source of power to a mobile device through a USB
`port.” Id. at 2:19–21. The ’111 Patent explains that although it was
`understood in the art that a USB interface could be used as a power
`interface, it was typically not used for that purpose by mobile devices. Id. at
`1:52–54. This is because USB hubs and hosts require USB devices to
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`“participate in a host-initiated process called enumeration in order to be
`compliant” with the USB specification in drawing power from the USB
`interface, and “alternate power sources such as conventional AC outlets and
`DC car sockets” were “not capable of participating in enumeration.” Id. at
`1:56–66. Additionally, “the power limits imposed by the USB
`specification” limit the amount of power available to charge a battery. Id. at
`2:63–64.
`
`In order to, inter alia, avoid the power limits imposed by the USB
`Specification, the ’111 Patent discloses a USB adapter that is capable of
`providing power to a mobile device without first participating in USB
`enumeration. Id. at 9:15–41. Figure 2 of the ’111 Patent, reproduced below,
`is a schematic diagram of the disclosed USB adapter coupled to an
`exemplary mobile device (id. at 3:23–24):
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`As shown in Figure 2, USB adapter 100 comprises primary USB
`connector 102, power converter 104, plug unit 106, identification
`subsystem 108, and auxiliary USB connector 112. Id. at 6:57–7:1. The ’111
`Patent discloses that when USB adapter 100 is connected to mobile
`device 10 via USB connector 54 of mobile device 10 and USB
`connector 102 of USB adapter 100, identification subsystem 108 provides an
`identification signal to mobile device 10 indicating that the power source is
`not a USB limited source. Id. at 6:57–7:1, 8:23–25. The identification
`signal “could be the communication of a single voltage on one or more of
`the USB data lines, different voltages on the two data lines, a series of pulses
`or voltage level changes, or other types of electrical signals.” Id. at 8:25–29.
`“The preferred identification signal,” however, “results from the application
`of voltage signals greater than 2 volts to both the D+ and D- lines in the
`USB connector.” Id. at 9:21–23.
`D. Illustrative Claim
`Independent claim 1 is illustrative of the challenged claims and is
`reproduced below:
`1. A Universal Serial Bus (“USB”) adapter for providing
`power to a mobile device through a USB port comprising:
`
`a plug unit configured to receive energy from a power socket;
`
`a power converter coupled to the plug unit, the power converter
`being configured to regulate the received energy from the power
`socket to generate a power output;
`
`an identification subsystem configured to generate an
`identification signal, wherein the identification signal is configured to
`indicate to the mobile device that the power socket is not a USB host
`or hub; and
`
`a USB connector coupled to the power converter and the
`identification subsystem, the USB connector being configured to
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`
`couple the power output and the identification signal to the mobile
`device.
`Ex. 1001, 11:60–12:8.
`E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner challenges claims 1–3, 6–8, 12, and 14–18 of the ’111
`Patent as upatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on the grounds set
`forth in the following table. Pet. 3–4.
`
`References
`Theobald2 and Shiga3
`
`Basis
`§ 103
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1–3, 6–8, and 16–18
`
`Theobald, Shiga, and Kfoury4
`
`§ 103
`
`15
`
`Dougherty,5 Hahn,6 and Amoni7 § 103
`
`12 and 14
`
`
`
`I. ANALYSIS
`A. Overview
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject
`matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was
`made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
`pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
`
`2 U.S. Patent No. 5,925,942, issued July 20, 1999 (Ex. 1005, “Theobald”).
`3 U.S. Patent No. 6,625,738 B1, issued Sept. 23, 2003 (Ex. 1006, “Shiga”).
`4 U.S. Patent No. 6,049,192, issued Apr. 11, 2000 (Ex. 1016, “Kfoury”).
`5 U.S. Patent No. 7,360,004 B2, issued Apr. 15, 2008 (Ex. 1013,
`“Dougherty”).
`6 U.S. Patent No. 5,973,948, issued Oct. 16, 1999 (Ex. 1014, “Hahn”).
`7 U.S. Patent No. 5,884,086, issued Mar. 16, 1999 (Ex. 1015, “Amoni”).
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`determinations, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level
`of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective indicia of non-
`obviousness (i.e., secondary considerations). Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). We analyze the asserted grounds based on
`obviousness with these principles in mind.
`B. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are
`construed according to their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b);
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016)
`(upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard). We
`construe claim terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent
`necessary to resolve the controversy.” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan
`Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting
`Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
`1999)).
`The Board previously construed the claim term “identification
`signal . . . configured to indicate to the mobile device that the power socket
`is not a USB host or hub” in independent claims 1, 17, and 18. Ex. 1001,
`12:2–4, 13:7–9, 14:7–9; see Huawei Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Fund. Innov. Sys. Intl.
`LLC, IPR2018-00487, slip op. at 9–11 (Aug. 10, 2018) (Paper 11). In that
`case, the Board determined that “a person of ordinary skill in the art at the
`time of invention would have understood that ‘the power socket’ and ‘the
`USB adapter’ are distinct elements in claims 1, 17, and 18, and would not
`have interpreted ‘the power socket’ to mean ‘the USB adapter.’” Huawei,
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`slip op. at 11. In support of this construction, the Board relied on intrinsic
`evidence from the ’111 Patent. Id. at 10. In particular the Board found that
`the ’111 patent consistently discloses USB adapters that are distinct
`from associated power sockets. Claim 1 itself is directed to a USB
`adapter, which comprises a plug unit configured to receive energy
`from a power socket. See Ex. 1001, 11:60–63. The power socket,
`therefore, is something other than the claimed USB adapter itself. In
`Figure 2, “power sockets” 110N, 110D, 110B, and 110 are depicted
`outside the box identified as USB adapter 100. See id., Fig. 2, 6:64–
`67. Likewise, passages in the specification consistently treat USB
`adapters and power sockets as distinct. See, e.g., id. at 2:38–40 (“The
`plug unit is operative to couple the USB adapter to a power socket.”),
`7:46–47 (“[T]he USB adapter . . . can be adapted to receive energy
`from various types of power sockets.”), 7:63–65 (plug adapters
`“allow[] the USB power adapter . . . to connect to a local power
`supply via the local power socket”).
`Id. After reviewing the evidence relied on in the claim construction analysis
`in IPR2018-00487, we adopt the prior claim construction stated above for
`the purposes of this Decision.
`C. Alleged Obviousness over Theobald and Shiga
`
`Petitioner contends that claims 1–3, 6–8, and 16–18 are unpatentable
`under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Theobald and
`Shiga. Pet. 18–56. We begin our analysis with brief overviews of Theobald
`and Shiga. We then address the parties’ respective contentions with respect
`to the challenged claims.
`1. Theobald
`
`Theobald is directed to a method and apparatus for charging the
`battery in a cellular telephone using a charger coupled to the cellular
`telephone by a standard J3-type accessory connector. Ex. 1005, 1:53–57,
`3:21–27. Figure 1 of Theobald illustrates “a charging system including an
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`electronic device having a power supply control apparatus, a battery, and an
`accessory.” Id. at 1:62–64.
`
`
`As shown in Figure 1, Theobald’s system 100 comprises a cellular telephone
`102, a battery 103, and an accessory 104. Id. at 2:17–19, 28–29. Accessory
`104 is “a low cost mid rate charger or fast rate charger.” Id. at 4:31–33.
`Charger 104 is coupled to cellular telephone 102 by connector 122 which “is
`preferably the standardized eight pin J3-type accessory connector . . . but
`may be any other suitable multiple pin accessory connector having an
`external power supply pin and at least one information pin.” Id. at 2:63–64,
`3:21–27.
`Connector 122 shown in Figure 1 has “information pins 124, 125,
`127, 128, and 129 designated as AUD IN, AUD OUT, and R, C, and T
`DATA, respectively; grounding pins 126 and 131 designated ANL GND and
`LOG GND; and an external power supply pin 130.” Id. at 2:64–3:2.
`Information pin 124 “is coupled to the controller 108 via audio in line 132
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`and an identification network 150 . . . to identify accessory 104.” Id. at 3:2–
`5. The charger includes an “identification element 174 . . . to identify” the
`charger to the cellular telephone 102. Id. at 5:3–4. Identification element
`174 “is selected to have a different electrical value for each different type of
`the accessory 104.” Id. at 5:6–8. Theobald discloses that identification
`element 174 for a mid rate charger would be a 120 kΩ resistor and for a fast
`rate charger would be a 36 kΩ resistor. Id. at 5:9–12. When cellular
`telephone 102 and charger 104 are coupled through connector 122,
`identification element 174 in charger 104 is electrically connected to
`identification network 150 in cellular telephone 102 and the external supply
`voltage of charger 104 generates a voltage level on audio in line 132 of the
`cellular telephone 102 of 1.72 V for a mid rate charger or 3.91 V for a fast
`rate charger. Id. at 5:59–6:6. “[C]ontroller 108 measures the voltage on the
`audio in line 132” and from the measured voltage “identifies the accessory
`104 from the accessory look-up table” as either the mid rate charger or the
`fast rate charger. Id. at 6:19–42.
`
`Theobald discloses an alternate embodiment for identifying the mid
`rate or fast rate charger to the cellular telephone. Id. 6:55–65. In this
`embodiment, the mid rate or fast rate chargers “could be implemented with a
`logic circuit or a microcontroller that communicates predefined
`identification information to the controller 108 via the data lines 190-192
`and pins 182-184 upon attachment” of charger 104. Id. at 6:60–65.
`2. Shiga
`
`Shiga discloses turning on a computer power supply by means of
`signals transmitted over signal lines “of a USB chip provided in a
`keyboard.” Ex. 1006, Abstract. Shiga’s USB connected keyboard 11 starts
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`the host computer “by a key input operation at a keyboard.” Id. at 2:4–8.
`Shiga’s keyboard signals a “wake-up means” in the computer when a power-
`on key is pressed on the keyboard. Id. at 3:1–7.
`
`Shiga explains that pursuant to the USB specification, when a host
`computer is in a suspended mode there are three standard signal line states.
`Id. at 5:46–54. In the first, or low speed state, signal line D+ is in an L (Hi-
`Z or high impedance) state and D- is in an H (high level) state. Id. at 5:55–
`57. In the second, or high speed state, signal line D+ is in the H state and
`signal line D- is in the L state. Id. at 5:58–59. In the third, or unconnected
`state, both D- and D+ signal lines are in the L state. Id. at 5:59–60. In
`addition to these three standard signal line states, Shiga discloses that the
`signal lines may also be placed into a fourth, non-standard state, wherein
`both the D+ and D- signal lines are in the H state. Id. at 5:60–62, 6:48–58.
`Shiga provides this non-standard, or “fourth mode” signal, to a “wakeup
`means” in response to a user pressing the keyboard’s power-on key. Id. at
`3:1–3, 4:33–53, 6:59–65. Shiga explains that, because this line state is not a
`standard USB state and is provided as a 50 ms pulse at 3 volts, it is “easily
`distinguished from USB standard data signals.” Id. at 6:48–58.
`3. Analysis
`
`Claim 1 recites, inter alia, “an identification signal . . . configured to
`indicate to the mobile device that the power socket is not a USB host or
`hub.” Ex. 1001, 12:1–4. Independent claims 17 and 18 contain substantially
`similar limitations.
`Petitioner, relying on the Declaration testimony of Mr. Geier,
`contends that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to
`modify Theobald’s alternative embodiment for identifying the charger with
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`“a few trivial modifications.” Pet. 29.8 The “trivial modifications” are
`replacing Theobald’s J3 connector with a USB connector as disclosed in
`Shiga, using Shiga’s fourth mode signals as the “predefined identification
`information” that Theobald calls for, and implementing “routine
`programming into circuitry 170 and controller 108 in order to communicate
`the fourth-mode signals.” Id. at 29–30. Petitioner submits the following
`modified version of Theobald’s Figure 1 to illustrate the proposed
`modification to Theobald in light of Shiga:
`
`
`Id. at 30.
`Petitioner’s modified version of Theobald’s Figure 1 illustrates the
`replacement of Theobald’s J3 connector with a USB connector as well as
`other modifications to the circuitry of Theobald.
`
`
`
`
`8 Petitioner refers to Theobald’s alternative embodiment as the “controller
`embodiment.” Pet. 27.
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`Petitioner states that “[t]he Theobald/Shiga embodiment uses Shiga’a fourth-
`mode signals as the predefined identification information for a fast-rate
`charger.” Id. at 32–33.
`
`Petitioner contends that “[a]ccessory circuitry 170 constitutes the
`identification subsystem by which an identification signal is generated,” as
`required by claim 1. Id. at 44. With respect to the configuration of the
`identification signal, Petitioner argues that mobile phone 102 could be
`disconnected from fast rate charger 104 “and then connected to a USB-
`compliant host such as a computer,” which according to the USB 2.0
`Specification must never intentionally generate Shiga’s fourth mode signals.
`Id. at 43–44. Based on this, Petitioner contends that in
`the fast-rate charger situation . . . the accessory circuitry 170 (i.e.,
`identification subsystem) is configured to indicate to the mobile
`device that the power socket is not a USB host or hub through use of
`Shiga’s fourth mode identification signals. In other words, the
`accessory 104 is configured to tell the electronic device 102 that the
`accessory 104 is not a USB host or hub so that it may be allowed to
`provide power to the electronic device 102.
`Id. at 45.
`
`Patent Owner contends, for a number of reasons, that Petitioner fails
`to present competent evidence to establish this claim limitation. See Prelim.
`Resp. 24–28.
`Claim 1 requires that “the identification signal is configured to
`indicate to the mobile device that the power socket is not a USB host or
`hub.” Ex. 1001, 12:2–4 (emphasis added). Theobald discloses that
`“accessory circuitry 170” can be used to “identif[y] the accessory 104 to the
`electronic device 102.” Ex. 1005, 6:57–59. Petitioner’s proposed
`combination of Theobald and Shiga starts from the premise that the
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`combination uses “Shiga’s fourth-mode signals as the predefined
`identification information for a fast-rate charger.” Pet. 32–33. Petitioner
`does not direct us to any disclosure in Theobald where the identification
`information in Theobald is configured to indicate to the mobile device that a
`power socket, from which plug 171 of accessory 104 is configured to receive
`energy, is not a USB host or hub, nor do we discern any such disclosure.
`See id. at 18–24. Further, Petitioner, in effect, concedes that this claim
`limitation is not established in the proposed combination with the statement
`that “[i]n other words, the accessory 104 is configured to tell the electronic
`device 102 that the accessory 104 is not a USB host or hub.” Id. at 45
`(emphasis added). As discussed above in our claim construction section, the
`“power socket” in claim 1 is a separate element from the USB adapter.
`Petitioner, thus, fails to provide sufficient evidence or argument establishing
`that the combination of Theobald and Shiga teaches “the identification
`signal is configured to indicate to the mobile device that the power socket is
`not a USB host or hub,” as recited in independent claims 1, 17, and 18.
`Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable
`likelihood that it would prevail in showing that any of the challenged claims
`1–3, 6–8, or 16–18 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of
`Theobald and Shiga.
`D. Alleged Obviousness over Theobald, Shiga, and Kfoury
`
`This ground is directed only to claim 15, which depends from claim 1.
`Pet. 57; Ex. 1001, 12:56–63. Petitioner contends that claim 15 is
`unpatentable based on the same combination of Theobald and Shiga as for
`claim 1 with additional disclosure from Kfoury. Pet. 57–65. Petitioner does
`not rely on Kfoury in any way that would cure the deficiencies in the
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`combination of Theobald and Shiga discussed above. Id. Therefore, we
`determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it
`would prevail in showing that claim 15 would have been obvious over the
`combined teachings of Theobald, Shiga, and Kfoury.
`E. Alleged Obviousness over Dougherty, Hahn, and Amoni
`
`Petitioner contends that claims 12 and 14 are unpatentable based on
`the combination of Dougherty, Hahn, and Amoni. Pet. 65–86. Claim 12
`depends from claim 1 and claim 14 depends from claim 12. Ex. 1001,
`12:46–47, 52–54. Petitioner relies on Dougherty to teach the limitation in
`claim 1 of “an identification subsystem configured to generate an
`identification signal . . . configured to indicate to the mobile device that the
`power socket is not a USB host or hub.” Pet. 81–83.
`1. Dougherty
`
`Dougherty is directed to using a docking station to provide power to a
`laptop computer. Ex. 1013, Abstract. Figure 1 of Dougherty, reproduced
`below, illustrates a preferred embodiment of Dougherty’s computer system.
`Id. at 3:17–18.
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`As shown in Figure 1, Dougherty’s laptop computer 100 and docking
`station 200 are operatively coupled by USB connectors 136 and 236
`respectively. Id. 5:11–14. Laptop computer 100 utilizes docking station 200
`to provide a plurality of USB ports for attaching peripheral devices to laptop
`computer 100. See id. 1:61–67, 2:24–28. Recognizing that laptop
`computers require a source of power, which was previously provided by a
`connector separate from the docking station, Dougherty’s invention relates
`to supplying “power from the docking station to the laptop computer across
`the USB connection.” Id. 2:55–58.
`Dougherty discloses that “coupling of USB devices requires a series
`of USB handshaking protocols to identify the host . . . which would be the
`laptop computer 100, and any downstream, device, which in this exemplary
`case is the docking station 200.” Id. at 5:39–43. During the handshaking
`protocol, a “driver loaded by the operating system of the laptop computer
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`100 preferably commands the Super I/O controller 130 to issue a five volt
`shutoff command signal 148.” Id. at 5:59–61. As a result of five volt
`shutoff command signal 148, power rails 138 of laptop computer 100 “are
`no longer capable of providing power to downstream devices,” which
`Dougherty indicates “breaks with standard USB protocol.” Id. at 5:64–6:3.
`2. Analysis
`
`Petitioner, relying on the declaration testimony of Mr. Geier, contends
`that when Dougherty’s “docking station 200 is connected to a laptop 100,
`the docking station has to identify itself to the laptop in order to indicate to
`the laptop that the docking station is not a USB host or hub, but rather is
`capable of providing upstream power to the laptop.” Pet. 81 (citing Ex.
`1009 ¶ 151). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the
`art “would understand that as part of the ‘handshaking protocol’ between the
`docking station and laptop computer, an identification signal is configured
`to indicate to the mobile device (i.e. laptop) that the docking station
`connected to a power socket is not a USB host or hub.” Id.
`Petitioner’s contention is based on a theory that because Dougherty’s
`docking station 200 informs laptop 100 that it “is capable of providing
`upstream power to the laptop,” one of ordinary skill in the art would
`understand this to be equivalent to informing laptop 100 that docking station
`200 is not a USB host or hub. Id. The only evidentiary basis cited by
`Petitioner for this alleged understanding by one of ordinary skill in the art is
`Paragraph 151 of the Declaration of Mr. Geier. See id. Mr. Geier’s
`Declaration cites to Dougherty at column 5, lines 44–48. Ex. 1009 ¶ 51.
`The cited portion of Dougherty does not provide sufficient support for the
`proposition that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`ability of Dougherty’s docking station to provide power to the laptop is
`equivalent to an identification signal configured to indicate to the mobile
`device that the docking station is not a USB host or hub. Because this
`opinion by Mr. Geier is conclusory and not sufficiently supported by
`objective corroborating evidence, we accord the opinion little or no weight.
`See Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]hat the
`[PTAB] consistently did was accord little weight to broad conclusory
`statements that it determined were unsupported by corroborating references.
`It is within the discretion of the trier of fact to give each item of evidence
`such weight as it feels appropriate.” (citation omitted)); see also In re Am.
`Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
`[PTAB] is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of
`factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the
`declarations . . . .” (citations omitted)); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).
`Even if Mr. Geier’s opinion concerning the understanding of one of
`ordinary skill in the art were sufficiently supported by objective
`corroborating evidence, Petitioner’s contention is still not sufficient to
`establish that Dougherty teaches the claim limitation of “the identification
`signal is configured to indicate to the mobile device that the power socket is
`not a USB host or hub,” because Mr. Geier’s opinion would only establish
`that Dougherty discloses identification information that the docking station,
`not the power socket, is not a USB host or hub. Petitioner, thus, has not
`provided sufficient evidence or argument to establish that Dougherty teaches
`this claim limitation. Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has not
`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that either
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`claim 12 or 14 is unpatentable based on the combined teachings of
`Dougherty, Hahn, and Amoni.
`II. CONCLUSION
`Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the
`evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a
`reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that any of claims 1–
`3, 6–8, 12, or 14–18 of the ’111 Patent are unpatentable. Accordingly, we do
`not institute an inter partes review.
`III. ORDER
`
`It is hereby, ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no trial is
`instituted.
`
`
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2018-00276
`Patent 7,239,111 B2
`
`PETITIONER:
`Charles M. McMahon
`Brian A. Jones
`MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
`cmcmahon@mwe.com
`bajones@mwe.com
`
`Gregory S. Arovas
`Robert A. Appleby
`Todd M. Friedman
`Eugene Goryunov
`Alan Rabinowitz
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`greg.arovas@kirkland.com
`robert.appleby@kirkland.com
`todd.friedman@kirkland.com
`eugene.goryunov@kirkland.com
`arabinowitz@kirkland.com
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Hong Zhong
`Michael Fleming
`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`hzhong@irell.com
`mfleming@irell.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`20
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket