`______________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`______________________
`
`INTEL CORP., CAVIUM, LLC, and DELL INC.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`ALACRITECH, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`______________________
`
`Case IPR2018-002341
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`______________________
`
`PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SEAL PAPER 71
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Cavium, LLC (formerly Cavium, Inc.) which filed a Petition in Case IPR2018-
`
`00403, and Dell Inc., which filed a Petition in Case IPR2018-01307, have been
`
`joined as petitioners in this proceeding.
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`Petitioner Intel Corporation (“Petitioner”) hereby moves to seal certain
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`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`
`
`portions of the Board’s August 28, 2019 Order (“Paper 71”) that reference highly
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`confidential information of the Petitioner. Good cause exists for granting this
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`motion, as set forth below, including because Paper 71 references confidential,
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`highly sensitive commercial information. Attached to this Motion as Exhibit A is a
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`redacted version of Paper 71 for filing onto the Public Record.
`
`I. MOTION TO SEAL
`
`The record of an inter partes review proceeding, including documents and
`
`things, is made available to the public, except as otherwise ordered. 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 2.14. But despite the default rule of public availability, the Board will seal
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`confidential information for “good cause,” because it is necessary to “strike a
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`balance between the public’s interest in maintaining a complete and understandable
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`file history and the parties’ interest in protecting truly sensitive information.” 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.54(a); 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48760 (Aug. 14, 2012). As set forth in the
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`Office Trial Practice Guide, the Board treats confidential information “consistent
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`with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)(G), which provides for protective
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`orders for trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
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`information.” Id. at 48760.
`
`In accordance with rules and procedures, Petitioner moves to seal portions of
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`Paper 71.
`
`2
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`
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`The redacted version of Paper 71 is redacted to protect confidential highly
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`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`
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`sensitive, commercial information related to the relationship between Intel and its
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`customers and other internal Intel business practices. For example, Paper 71
`
`includes specific details about and quotes from commercially sensitive agreements
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`with Intel’s customer Dell. As such, portions of Paper 71 are designated Petitioner’s
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`Restricted – Attorneys’ Eyes Only under the Protective Order in this IPR. This
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`Protective Order was specifically negotiated to cover documents and information
`
`such as at issue here, following Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery. The
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`details of the agreements have been treated as confidential and highly sensitive
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`throughout the proceeding. Petitioner submits narrowly tailored redactions to
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`balance the public interest and the need to protect highly sensitive business
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`information of Petitioner. PO did not previously oppose a motion to seal the
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`underlying exhibits relied upon by the Board in the rehearing decision (see Paper
`
`36), which are also under seal in the related District Court litigations.
`
`Paper 71 contains certain confidential business information as indicated
`
`above, the public disclosure of which could cause Petitioner irreparable harm, as
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`further explained in Exhibit 1506 (Declaration of P. Schmisseur). Similarly, Cavium
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`was joined in the IPR, and Petitioner has taken great pains to prevent disclosure of
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`its confidential customer information to its competitor, which would immediately
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`result should the information no longer be sealed.
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`3
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`
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`The information that Petitioner requests to be sealed was submitted only to
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`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`
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`rebut Patent Owner’s arguments regarding real party in interest, and was only
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`produced in this proceeding as a result of PO’s motion for additional discovery. The
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`information is otherwise unimportant to the merits of this proceeding, and therefore
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`the public’s interest in having access to this information is minimal. See Google v.
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`Seven Networks, IPR2018-01047 Paper 34 (granting motion to seal and noting the
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`“public’s interest in the confidential information is minimal because it relates to real
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`party in interest and privy issues and otherwise is not relevant to the merits of the
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`case.”). Nothing about the redactions will prevent the public from understanding the
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`Board’s decision. The PTAB routinely seals institution decisions that contain
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`sensitive business information that is only relevant to procedural issues such as RPI
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`and privy. See, e.g., Google v. Seven Networks, IPR2018-01047, Ex. 1056
`
`(Redacted decision instituting IPR); ARRIS International PLC v. ChanBond, LLC,
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`IPR2018-00570, Paper No. 25 (PTAB July 20, 2018) (Redacted decision denying
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`institution); Ventex Co., Ltd., v. Columbia Sportswear North America, Inc.,
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`IPR2017-00651 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (Redacted decision vacating institution).
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`II. CERTIFICATION OF NON-PUBLICATION
`
`On behalf of Petitioner, the undersigned counsel certifies that the information
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`sought to be sealed by this Motion has not, to their knowledge, been published or
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`otherwise made public.
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`4
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`III. CONCLUSION
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Board grant
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`the motion to seal certain portions of the Board’s August 28, 2019 Order that
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`reference highly confidential information of the Petitioner.
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`
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`
`
`5
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`
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`Dated: September 10, 2019
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`
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`
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Garland T. Stephens
`Garland T. Stephens, Reg. No. 37,242
`Melissa L. Hotze, Reg. No. 55,279
`Justin L. Constant, Reg. No. 66,883
`Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
`700 Louisiana, Suite 1700
`Houston, TX 77002
`Tel: (713) 546-5000
`Fax: (713) 224-9511
`garland.stephens@weil.com
`melissa.hotze@weil.com
`justin.constant@weil.com
`Anne M. Cappella, Reg. No. 43,217
`Adrian Percer, Reg. No. 46,986
`Amanda Branch (admitted pro hac vice)
`Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
`201 Redwood Shores Parkway
`Redwood Shores, CA 94065
`Tel: (650) 802-3000
`Fax: (650) 802-3100
`anne.cappella@weil.com
`adrian.percer@weil.com
`amanda.branch@weil.com
`William S. Ansley, Reg. No. 67,828
`Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
`2001 M Street, N.W, Suite 600
`Washington, DC 20036
`Tel: (202) 682-7000
`Fax: (202) 857-0940
`sutton.ansley@weil.com
`
`Attorneys for Petitioner Intel Corporation
`
`6
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`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`I hereby certify that on September 10, 2019, a copy of PETITIONER’S
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`MOTION TO SEAL was served by filing this document through the PTAB’s E2E
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`Filing System as well as delivering a copy via electronic mail upon the following:
`
`James M. Glass
`Registration No. 46,729
`Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP
`51 Madison Ave., 22nd Fl.
`New York, NY 10010
`Tel.: (212) 849-7000
`Email: jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`Joseph M. Paunovich
`Registration No. 59,033
`Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP
`865 S. Figueroa Street, 10th Fl.
`Los Angeles, CA 90017
`Tel.: (213) 443-3000
`Email: joepaunovich@quinnemanuel.com
`Brian E. Mack
`Registration No. 57,189
`Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP
`50 California Street, 22nd Fl.
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Tel.: (415) 875-6600
`Email: brianmack@quinnemanuel.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Melissa L. Hotze
`Melissa L. Hotze
`Reg. No. 55,279
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: September 10, 2019
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`
`
`EXHIBIT A
`
`EXHIBIT A
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`
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper 71
`Entered: August 28, 2019
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`INTEL CORP., CAVIUM, LLC, and
`DELL INC.,1
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ALACRITECH, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before STEPHEN C. SIU, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
`CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge FISHMAN.
`
`Opinion Dissenting filed by Administrative Patent Judge SIU.
`
`FISHMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`ORDER
`Granting-In-Part and Denying-In-Part Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`1 Cavium, Inc., which filed a petition in Case IPR2018-00403, and Dell Inc.,
`which filed a petition in IPR2018-01307, were joined as petitioners in
`IPR2018-00234. According to an updated mandatory notice filed in the
`captioned proceeding, Cavium, Inc. has now been converted to Cavium,
`LLC. See Paper 23.
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Intel Corporation (“Petitioner”) requests rehearing (Paper 69, “Req.”)
`of our Order Dismissing the Petition, Vacating Institution of Inter Partes
`Review, and Terminating Inter Partes Review (Paper 66, “Termination
`Order”). For the reasons below, the request is granted-in-part and denied-
`in-part.
`
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`II.
`In accordance with our rules, in a request for rehearing, “[t]he burden
`of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the
`decision,” and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party
`believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each
`matter was previously addressed” in the record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
`
`
`III. DISCUSSION
`Petitioner argues our Termination Order misapplied the Federal
`Circuit’s holding in Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897
`F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”) and failed to consider the Court’s
`holdings in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 887 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
`2018) (“Wi-Fi Remand”). Req. 1–2.
`A. Application of AIT
`Petitioner argues our Termination Order “failed to consider the full set
`of factors that AIT held are applicable to the RPI inquiry” and “failed to
`apply AIT’s holdings.” Req. 3. In particular, Petitioner argues our
`Termination Order improperly considered only whether Dell was a “clear
`beneficiary” of Intel’s actions and had a “preexisting, established
`
`
`
`2
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`IPR2018‐00234
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`Patent 8,805,948 B2
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`relationship with” Intel. Id. at 4 (citing Termination Order 8, 10–19).
`Petitioner argues that, in AIT, the relationship between RPX (the petitioner)
`and Salesforce (a client of RPX and a time-barred entity under § 315(b)) is
`very different than the vendor/customer relationship between Intel and Dell
`such that “analogizing AIT to the typical supplier/customer relationship
`would lead to inequitable results and create undesirable incentives for patent
`owners.” Id. at 7. Petitioner further argues that, because
`suppliers frequently indemnify their customers against patent
`infringement claims, applying customer time-bars to suppliers
`would place an immense burden on suppliers to monitor when
`customers are sued and what components are at issue or else run
`the risk of having a truncated time frame to prepare an IPR
`petition or even being time-barred.
`
` Id.; see also Paper 53, 6.
`We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. Initially, we
`disagree that our Termination Order “failed to apply AIT’s holdings.” See
`Req. 3. AIT held principally that “both equitable and practical
`considerations” may be taken into account but the final determination is
`“with an eye toward determining whether the non-party is a clear beneficiary
`that has a preexisting, established relationship with petitioner.” AIT, 897
`F.3d at 1351 (emphasis added). Initially, it cannot be disputed that Intel and
`Dell have a preexisting relationship, existing at the time of filing this
`Petition. Our Termination Order determined that their relationship as a
`vendor (Intel) to a customer (Dell) relates back to at least
` See
`Termination Order 10; see also Ex. 1422. Our Termination Order further
`considered that (1) Dell benefitted from Intel’s intervention in the
`underlying litigation—a practical consideration (Termination Order 10–15);
`
`
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`3
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`IPR2018‐00234
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`Patent 8,805,948 B2
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`(2) Dell benefitted from Intel’s decision to file petitions seeking cancellation
`of claims of the ’948 patent—a practical consideration (id. at 15–16); and
`(3) Intel adequately represented Dell’s interest in this proceeding—an
`equitable consideration (id. at 16–17). Thus, our Termination Order
`addressed practical considerations and equitable considerations related to the
`relationship between Intel and Dell, and determined from those
`considerations that Dell is a clear beneficiary that has a preexisting,
`established relationship with Intel.
`Furthermore, we remain unpersuaded by Petitioner’s argument that
`our decision imposes an undue burden on a vendor providing
`indemnification to customers such that a vendor would have to monitor
`when customers are sued. Req. 7. Initially, we note that Petitioner had
`sufficient time to prepare and file a first petition challenging the ’948 patent
`(IPR2017-01395)—but (allegedly) did not have sufficient time to file this
`second Petition intended to correct deficiencies of the first petition identified
`in the panel’s denial of institution. See Case IPR2017-01395 (PTAB Nov.
`22, 2017) (Paper 8). But for the deficiencies in Intel’s first petition, there
`would have been no need to file this second petition. Petitioner does not
`persuade us that it would be inequitable to require Intel to observe the one
`year time bar when filing a second petition to correct deficiencies in the first
`petition.
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Ex. 1422, 2; Ex. 1423, 2. The primary
`purpose of such notification requirements in indemnification agreements is
`
`
`
`4
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`IPR2018‐00234
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`Patent 8,805,948 B2
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`to provide a vendor sufficient time to evaluate the lawsuit or proceeding and
`take action if necessary. Here, Dell was served on July 5, 2016. Paper 18,
`58 n.5. The precise date on which Dell notified Intel regarding the lawsuit,
`in accordance with the indemnification provisions, is not clear in the record
`before us. However, Intel and Dell attorneys began
`
`, as evidenced by Intel’s
`privilege log identifying privileged communications regarding
`indemnification. See Ex. 2501, 2 (privilege log “Doc. # 7”). Intel filed its
`motion to intervene in the underlying litigation and its complaint in
`intervention on October 31, 2016. Exs. 1415, 2051, 2505. Intel filed its first
`petition (IPR2017-01395) on May 9, 2017 (two months before the one year
`bar date for Dell). IPR2017-01395, Paper 2. Intel clearly had ample time
`after notification from Dell of the lawsuit to prepare and file its papers in
`intervention in the litigation as well as its first petition. Therefore, in view
`of the facts present here, we are not persuaded that our Termination Order
`imposes an undue burden on Intel or similarly situated entities.
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded our Termination Order
`misapprehended or improperly applied the holdings of AIT.
`
`
`B. Termination Order Overlooked Wi-Fi Remand2
`Petitioner argues our Termination Order failed to consider the
`holdings of Wi-Fi Remand based on similar facts. Req. 8–10. Specifically,
`Petitioner argues our Termination Order “did not cite Wi-Fi Remand, much
`less apply it.” Id. at 8. In particular, Petitioner argues the Court in Wi-Fi
`
`
`2 Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 887 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`5
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`IPR2018‐00234
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`Patent 8,805,948 B2
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`Remand was clear that “the existence of an indemnification agreement is not
`enough to make the indemnitee an RPI or privy of the indemnitor’s IPR—
`even if those entities also coordinated with respect to the indemnitee’s
`underlying district court litigation and had a ‘generally aligned’ interest in
`invalidating the challenged patent(s).” Id. at 10 (citing Wi-Fi Remand, 887
`F.3d at 1341).
`We agree with Petitioner that our Termination Order did not cite or
`apply Wi-Fi Remand, and, to the extent we address that case here, we grant
`Petitioner’s request for rehearing and modify our Termination Order to
`incorporate the following discussion. However, as discussed below, our
`consideration of Wi-Fi Remand does not change the ultimate decision in our
`Termination Order.
`In the inter partes review petition in dispute in Wi-Fi Remand, the
`patent owner (“Wi-Fi”) argued that the petitioner (“Broadcom”) was in
`privity with some litigation defendants in related litigation because of, at
`least, indemnity agreements between Broadcom and those litigants. See,
`e.g., Case IPR2013-00602 (PTAB June 1, 2016) (Paper 65). The litigation
`defendants would have been time-barred from filing an inter partes review
`petition under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) and, thus, under the same statutory
`provision, Wi-Fi argued that Broadcom would also be time-barred in view of
`the privity relationship. See Wi-Fi Remand, 887 F.3d at 1334. The Court in
`Wi-Fi Remand specifically agreed with the Board’s finding that “the inquiry
`[(regarding privity)] typically requires proof that the party in question had
`sufficient control over the prior proceeding that it could be bound by the
`results of that proceeding.” Wi-Fi Remand, 887 F.3d at 1340 (citing Aruze
`
`
`
`6
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`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`Gaming Mac., Ltd. v. MGT Gaming, Inc., 2015 WL 780607, at *4–8 (PTAB
`Feb. 20, 2015)). The Court further held:
`There was no such showing of control in this case. Wi-Fi’s
`evidence showed that Broadcom’s interests as to the issue of
`infringement were generally aligned with those of its customers,
`and that Broadcom had indemnity agreements with at least two
`of the D-Link defendants. But the evidence did not show that
`Broadcom had the right to control that litigation or otherwise
`participated in that litigation to the extent that it should be bound
`by the results. Nor did any evidence suggest that the D-Link
`defendants were the real parties in interest in Broadcom’s inter
`partes review petition.
`Wi-Fi Remand, 887 F.3d at 1341 (emphasis added). Thus, in Wi-Fi Remand,
`the record had no evidence that Broadcom was an active participant in the
`underlying litigation or took any action based on the indemnification
`agreement such that Broadcom should be bound to the results of that
`litigation.
`By contrast, here, not only was there an indemnification agreement
`between Intel and Dell, but Intel took action, pursuant to that agreement, to
`intervene in the underlying District Court litigation. As noted supra, Intel
`filed its motion to intervene in the underlying litigation and a complaint in
`intervention. Exs. 1415, 2051, 2505. Intel admits in its motion to intervene
`that it did so, at least in part, to defend its customer Dell in response to
`Dell’s tender of a claim for indemnification. Ex. 2051, 4–5 (“Dell tendered
`a contractual claim that Intel indemnify and hold it harmless against
`Alacritech’s claims based on an indemnity agreement involving the purchase
`of Intel products . . . Intel has agreed to defend and partially indemnify
`Dell.”). Thus, beyond the mere existence of an indemnification agreement,
`
`
`
`7
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`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`Intel was and is actively participating in the underlying litigation and should
`be bound to the results therein.
`The parties disagree as to the extent of Intel’s control over the
`underlying litigation. Intel argues it is not in control of the litigation and that
`Dell has its own attorneys, independent of Intel, representing it in certain
`issues in the underlying litigation. See, e.g., Paper 53, 2 (“There was no
`involvement at any level by the Defendants in the filing or control of these
`IPRs.”), 4–5 (“Dell has its own counsel which has handled all Dell-specific
`issues in the litigation, including filing a motion to dismiss (Ex. 1457),
`performing discovery (Ex. 1458), addressing PO’s Dell infringement
`allegations (Ex. 1459, 1460), and preparing expert reports on Dell products
`(Ex. 1447).”). Intel further provides testimony of Garland Stephens (Intel’s
`lead counsel in this matter), swearing that Intel has no obligation to
`indemnify or defend Dell in this matter (Ex. 1414 ¶ 5), Intel does not
`exercise control over Dell’s counsel (id. ¶ 9), and Intel filed this petition
`“without consultation or input from” Dell (id. ¶ 11). However, other
`evidence of record would suggest that Intel has some degree of control over
`the underlying litigation. For example, the indemnification clause of the
`agreement between Intel and Dell provides that Intel, in response to notice
`from Dell of an infringement lawsuit:
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Ex. 1423, 2 (subsection “(e)”); see also Paper 49, 1–2. By
`intervening, it appears that Intel
`
`
`
` Further, under the terms of the
`
`indemnification,
`
`
`
`8
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`IPR2018‐00234
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`Patent 8,805,948 B2
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`
`
`Ex. 1423, 2.
`In addition, Intel’s complaint in intervention, filed before Intel was
`directly sued by Alacritech, seeks declaratory judgment of non-infringement
`of this patent. See Ex. 2505, 6. Because this complaint in intervention seeks
`declaratory judgment before Intel was directly sued for infringement, it
`suggests Intel pursued this action for the benefit of its customer (Dell) rather
`than its own proprietary interests. Intel did not produce persuasive evidence
`that it was not in control of the underlying litigation to benefit its customer
`Dell but, instead, produced a privilege log identifying a number of
`documents relating to discussions between Intel and Dell regarding
`indemnification. See Ex. 2501. Thus, we are persuaded by the record before
`us that Intel, as an intervenor in the litigation against its customer Dell, not
`only was an active participant in the litigation but also likely substantially
`controlled most of the litigation.
`Regardless, we need not determine the degree of Intel’s versus Dell’s
`control in the underlying litigation. Unlike the facts in Wi-Fi Remand, Intel
`clearly was, and remains, an active participant in the underlying litigation
`against Dell in response to the indemnification clause in its contractual
`agreements with Dell.
`
`
`
`9
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`IPR2018‐00234
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`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded our Termination Order is
`inconsistent with the Court’s holdings in Wi-Fi Remand. We are not
`persuaded to modify our ultimate decision in the Termination Order.
`
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`We have reviewed all of the arguments in the Request for Rehearing
`and find them to be persuasive only as to the contention that we erred in
`neglecting to cite or apply holdings of the Court in Wi-Fi Remand.
`Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and modify our
`Termination Order to incorporate the above discussion of Wi-Fi Remand.
`However, our ultimate determination to vacate our Decision to Institute,
`dismiss the Petition, and terminate this proceeding for all parties remains
`unchanged.
`
`
`V. ORDERS
`In view of the foregoing discussion, it is hereby:
`ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is granted to the
`extent that we herein address the holdings of Wi-Fi Remand and incorporate
`that discussion in our Termination Order; and
`FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is
`denied with respect to its request that we find that Dell is neither a real party
`in interest to Intel’s Petition nor in privity with Intel, reinstitute Intel’s
`Petition (and the joinder petitions), and consider the Petition on its merits.
`
`
`
`
`
`10
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`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`PETITIONER:
`Garland T. Stephens
`Anne Cappella
`Justin L. Constant
`William S. Ansley
`Melissa Hotze
`WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
`garland.stephens@weil.com
`anne.cappella@weil.com
`justin.constant@weil.com
`sutton.ansley@weil.com
`melissa.hotze@weil.com
`
`
`David T. Xue
`Karineh Khachatourian
`RIMÔN, LAW
`david.xue@rimonlaw.com
`karinehk@rimonlaw.com
`
`Brady Cox
`ALSTON & BIRD LLP
`brady.cox@alston.com
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Jim Glass
`Joseph Paunovich
`Brian Mack
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
`& SULLIVAN LLP
`jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`joepaunovich@quinnemanuel.com
`brianmack@quinnemanuel.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper 71
`Entered: August 28, 2019
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`INTEL CORP., CAVIUM, LLC, and
`DELL INC.,3
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ALACRITECH, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before STEPHEN C. SIU, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
`CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`SIU, Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting.
`
`
`I respectfully dissent from the Majority decision for at least the
`previously discussed reasons. See Paper 66, dissent.
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`3 Cavium, Inc., which filed a petition in Case IPR2018-00403, and Dell Inc.,
`which filed a petition in IPR2018-01307, were joined as petitioners in
`IPR2018-00234. According to an updated mandatory notice filed in the
`captioned proceeding, Cavium, Inc. has now been converted to Cavium,
`LLC. See Paper 23.
`
`