UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`______________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`______________________
`
`INTEL CORP., CAVIUM, LLC, and DELL INC.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`ALACRITECH, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`______________________
`
`Case IPR2018-002341
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`______________________
`
`PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SEAL PAPER 71
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Cavium, LLC (formerly Cavium, Inc.) which filed a Petition in Case IPR2018-
`
`00403, and Dell Inc., which filed a Petition in Case IPR2018-01307, have been
`
`joined as petitioners in this proceeding.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`______________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`______________________
`
`INTEL CORP., CAVIUM, LLC, and DELL INC.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`ALACRITECH, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`______________________
`
`Case IPR2018-002341
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`______________________
`
`PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SEAL PAPER 71
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Cavium, LLC (formerly Cavium, Inc.) which filed a Petition in Case IPR2018-
`
`00403, and Dell Inc., which filed a Petition in Case IPR2018-01307, have been
`
`joined as petitioners in this proceeding.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Petitioner Intel Corporation (“Petitioner”) hereby moves to seal certain
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`
`
`portions of the Board’s August 28, 2019 Order (“Paper 71”) that reference highly
`
`confidential information of the Petitioner. Good cause exists for granting this
`
`motion, as set forth below, including because Paper 71 references confidential,
`
`highly sensitive commercial information. Attached to this Motion as Exhibit A is a
`
`redacted version of Paper 71 for filing onto the Public Record.
`
`I. MOTION TO SEAL
`
`The record of an inter partes review proceeding, including documents and
`
`things, is made available to the public, except as otherwise ordered. 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 2.14. But despite the default rule of public availability, the Board will seal
`
`confidential information for “good cause,” because it is necessary to “strike a
`
`balance between the public’s interest in maintaining a complete and understandable
`
`file history and the parties’ interest in protecting truly sensitive information.” 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.54(a); 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48760 (Aug. 14, 2012). As set forth in the
`
`Office Trial Practice Guide, the Board treats confidential information “consistent
`
`with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)(G), which provides for protective
`
`orders for trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
`
`information.” Id. at 48760.
`
`In accordance with rules and procedures, Petitioner moves to seal portions of
`
`Paper 71.
`
`2
`
`
`
`The redacted version of Paper 71 is redacted to protect confidential highly
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`
`
`sensitive, commercial information related to the relationship between Intel and its
`
`customers and other internal Intel business practices. For example, Paper 71
`
`includes specific details about and quotes from commercially sensitive agreements
`
`with Intel’s customer Dell. As such, portions of Paper 71 are designated Petitioner’s
`
`Restricted – Attorneys’ Eyes Only under the Protective Order in this IPR. This
`
`Protective Order was specifically negotiated to cover documents and information
`
`such as at issue here, following Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery. The
`
`details of the agreements have been treated as confidential and highly sensitive
`
`throughout the proceeding. Petitioner submits narrowly tailored redactions to
`
`balance the public interest and the need to protect highly sensitive business
`
`information of Petitioner. PO did not previously oppose a motion to seal the
`
`underlying exhibits relied upon by the Board in the rehearing decision (see Paper
`
`36), which are also under seal in the related District Court litigations.
`
`Paper 71 contains certain confidential business information as indicated
`
`above, the public disclosure of which could cause Petitioner irreparable harm, as
`
`further explained in Exhibit 1506 (Declaration of P. Schmisseur). Similarly, Cavium
`
`was joined in the IPR, and Petitioner has taken great pains to prevent disclosure of
`
`its confidential customer information to its competitor, which would immediately
`
`result should the information no longer be sealed.
`
`3
`
`
`
`The information that Petitioner requests to be sealed was submitted only to
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`
`
`rebut Patent Owner’s arguments regarding real party in interest, and was only
`
`produced in this proceeding as a result of PO’s motion for additional discovery. The
`
`information is otherwise unimportant to the merits of this proceeding, and therefore
`
`the public’s interest in having access to this information is minimal. See Google v.
`
`Seven Networks, IPR2018-01047 Paper 34 (granting motion to seal and noting the
`
`“public’s interest in the confidential information is minimal because it relates to real
`
`party in interest and privy issues and otherwise is not relevant to the merits of the
`
`case.”). Nothing about the redactions will prevent the public from understanding the
`
`Board’s decision. The PTAB routinely seals institution decisions that contain
`
`sensitive business information that is only relevant to procedural issues such as RPI
`
`and privy. See, e.g., Google v. Seven Networks, IPR2018-01047, Ex. 1056
`
`(Redacted decision instituting IPR); ARRIS International PLC v. ChanBond, LLC,
`
`IPR2018-00570, Paper No. 25 (PTAB July 20, 2018) (Redacted decision denying
`
`institution); Ventex Co., Ltd., v. Columbia Sportswear North America, Inc.,
`
`IPR2017-00651 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (Redacted decision vacating institution).
`
`II. CERTIFICATION OF NON-PUBLICATION
`
`On behalf of Petitioner, the undersigned counsel certifies that the information
`
`sought to be sealed by this Motion has not, to their knowledge, been published or
`
`otherwise made public.
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Board grant
`
`the motion to seal certain portions of the Board’s August 28, 2019 Order that
`
`reference highly confidential information of the Petitioner.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`Dated: September 10, 2019
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Garland T. Stephens
`Garland T. Stephens, Reg. No. 37,242
`Melissa L. Hotze, Reg. No. 55,279
`Justin L. Constant, Reg. No. 66,883
`Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
`700 Louisiana, Suite 1700
`Houston, TX 77002
`Tel: (713) 546-5000
`Fax: (713) 224-9511
`garland.stephens@weil.com
`melissa.hotze@weil.com
`justin.constant@weil.com
`Anne M. Cappella, Reg. No. 43,217
`Adrian Percer, Reg. No. 46,986
`Amanda Branch (admitted pro hac vice)
`Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
`201 Redwood Shores Parkway
`Redwood Shores, CA 94065
`Tel: (650) 802-3000
`Fax: (650) 802-3100
`anne.cappella@weil.com
`adrian.percer@weil.com
`amanda.branch@weil.com
`William S. Ansley, Reg. No. 67,828
`Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
`2001 M Street, N.W, Suite 600
`Washington, DC 20036
`Tel: (202) 682-7000
`Fax: (202) 857-0940
`sutton.ansley@weil.com
`
`Attorneys for Petitioner Intel Corporation
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`U.S. Patent No. 8,805,948
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`I hereby certify that on September 10, 2019, a copy of PETITIONER’S
`
`MOTION TO SEAL was served by filing this document through the PTAB’s E2E
`
`Filing System as well as delivering a copy via electronic mail upon the following:
`
`James M. Glass
`Registration No. 46,729
`Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP
`51 Madison Ave., 22nd Fl.
`New York, NY 10010
`Tel.: (212) 849-7000
`Email: jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`Joseph M. Paunovich
`Registration No. 59,033
`Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP
`865 S. Figueroa Street, 10th Fl.
`Los Angeles, CA 90017
`Tel.: (213) 443-3000
`Email: joepaunovich@quinnemanuel.com
`Brian E. Mack
`Registration No. 57,189
`Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP
`50 California Street, 22nd Fl.
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Tel.: (415) 875-6600
`Email: brianmack@quinnemanuel.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Melissa L. Hotze
`Melissa L. Hotze
`Reg. No. 55,279
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: September 10, 2019
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`EXHIBIT A
`
`EXHIBIT A
`
`
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper 71
`Entered: August 28, 2019
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`INTEL CORP., CAVIUM, LLC, and
`DELL INC.,1
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ALACRITECH, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before STEPHEN C. SIU, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
`CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge FISHMAN.
`
`Opinion Dissenting filed by Administrative Patent Judge SIU.
`
`FISHMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`ORDER
`Granting-In-Part and Denying-In-Part Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`1 Cavium, Inc., which filed a petition in Case IPR2018-00403, and Dell Inc.,
`which filed a petition in IPR2018-01307, were joined as petitioners in
`IPR2018-00234. According to an updated mandatory notice filed in the
`captioned proceeding, Cavium, Inc. has now been converted to Cavium,
`LLC. See Paper 23.
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Intel Corporation (“Petitioner”) requests rehearing (Paper 69, “Req.”)
`of our Order Dismissing the Petition, Vacating Institution of Inter Partes
`Review, and Terminating Inter Partes Review (Paper 66, “Termination
`Order”). For the reasons below, the request is granted-in-part and denied-
`in-part.
`
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`II.
`In accordance with our rules, in a request for rehearing, “[t]he burden
`of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the
`decision,” and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party
`believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each
`matter was previously addressed” in the record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
`
`
`III. DISCUSSION
`Petitioner argues our Termination Order misapplied the Federal
`Circuit’s holding in Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897
`F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”) and failed to consider the Court’s
`holdings in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 887 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
`2018) (“Wi-Fi Remand”). Req. 1–2.
`A. Application of AIT
`Petitioner argues our Termination Order “failed to consider the full set
`of factors that AIT held are applicable to the RPI inquiry” and “failed to
`apply AIT’s holdings.” Req. 3. In particular, Petitioner argues our
`Termination Order improperly considered only whether Dell was a “clear
`beneficiary” of Intel’s actions and had a “preexisting, established
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`relationship with” Intel. Id. at 4 (citing Termination Order 8, 10–19).
`Petitioner argues that, in AIT, the relationship between RPX (the petitioner)
`and Salesforce (a client of RPX and a time-barred entity under § 315(b)) is
`very different than the vendor/customer relationship between Intel and Dell
`such that “analogizing AIT to the typical supplier/customer relationship
`would lead to inequitable results and create undesirable incentives for patent
`owners.” Id. at 7. Petitioner further argues that, because
`suppliers frequently indemnify their customers against patent
`infringement claims, applying customer time-bars to suppliers
`would place an immense burden on suppliers to monitor when
`customers are sued and what components are at issue or else run
`the risk of having a truncated time frame to prepare an IPR
`petition or even being time-barred.
`
` Id.; see also Paper 53, 6.
`We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. Initially, we
`disagree that our Termination Order “failed to apply AIT’s holdings.” See
`Req. 3. AIT held principally that “both equitable and practical
`considerations” may be taken into account but the final determination is
`“with an eye toward determining whether the non-party is a clear beneficiary
`that has a preexisting, established relationship with petitioner.” AIT, 897
`F.3d at 1351 (emphasis added). Initially, it cannot be disputed that Intel and
`Dell have a preexisting relationship, existing at the time of filing this
`Petition. Our Termination Order determined that their relationship as a
`vendor (Intel) to a customer (Dell) relates back to at least
` See
`Termination Order 10; see also Ex. 1422. Our Termination Order further
`considered that (1) Dell benefitted from Intel’s intervention in the
`underlying litigation—a practical consideration (Termination Order 10–15);
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`(2) Dell benefitted from Intel’s decision to file petitions seeking cancellation
`of claims of the ’948 patent—a practical consideration (id. at 15–16); and
`(3) Intel adequately represented Dell’s interest in this proceeding—an
`equitable consideration (id. at 16–17). Thus, our Termination Order
`addressed practical considerations and equitable considerations related to the
`relationship between Intel and Dell, and determined from those
`considerations that Dell is a clear beneficiary that has a preexisting,
`established relationship with Intel.
`Furthermore, we remain unpersuaded by Petitioner’s argument that
`our decision imposes an undue burden on a vendor providing
`indemnification to customers such that a vendor would have to monitor
`when customers are sued. Req. 7. Initially, we note that Petitioner had
`sufficient time to prepare and file a first petition challenging the ’948 patent
`(IPR2017-01395)—but (allegedly) did not have sufficient time to file this
`second Petition intended to correct deficiencies of the first petition identified
`in the panel’s denial of institution. See Case IPR2017-01395 (PTAB Nov.
`22, 2017) (Paper 8). But for the deficiencies in Intel’s first petition, there
`would have been no need to file this second petition. Petitioner does not
`persuade us that it would be inequitable to require Intel to observe the one
`year time bar when filing a second petition to correct deficiencies in the first
`petition.
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Ex. 1422, 2; Ex. 1423, 2. The primary
`purpose of such notification requirements in indemnification agreements is
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`to provide a vendor sufficient time to evaluate the lawsuit or proceeding and
`take action if necessary. Here, Dell was served on July 5, 2016. Paper 18,
`58 n.5. The precise date on which Dell notified Intel regarding the lawsuit,
`in accordance with the indemnification provisions, is not clear in the record
`before us. However, Intel and Dell attorneys began
`
`, as evidenced by Intel’s
`privilege log identifying privileged communications regarding
`indemnification. See Ex. 2501, 2 (privilege log “Doc. # 7”). Intel filed its
`motion to intervene in the underlying litigation and its complaint in
`intervention on October 31, 2016. Exs. 1415, 2051, 2505. Intel filed its first
`petition (IPR2017-01395) on May 9, 2017 (two months before the one year
`bar date for Dell). IPR2017-01395, Paper 2. Intel clearly had ample time
`after notification from Dell of the lawsuit to prepare and file its papers in
`intervention in the litigation as well as its first petition. Therefore, in view
`of the facts present here, we are not persuaded that our Termination Order
`imposes an undue burden on Intel or similarly situated entities.
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded our Termination Order
`misapprehended or improperly applied the holdings of AIT.
`
`
`B. Termination Order Overlooked Wi-Fi Remand2
`Petitioner argues our Termination Order failed to consider the
`holdings of Wi-Fi Remand based on similar facts. Req. 8–10. Specifically,
`Petitioner argues our Termination Order “did not cite Wi-Fi Remand, much
`less apply it.” Id. at 8. In particular, Petitioner argues the Court in Wi-Fi
`
`
`2 Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 887 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`Remand was clear that “the existence of an indemnification agreement is not
`enough to make the indemnitee an RPI or privy of the indemnitor’s IPR—
`even if those entities also coordinated with respect to the indemnitee’s
`underlying district court litigation and had a ‘generally aligned’ interest in
`invalidating the challenged patent(s).” Id. at 10 (citing Wi-Fi Remand, 887
`F.3d at 1341).
`We agree with Petitioner that our Termination Order did not cite or
`apply Wi-Fi Remand, and, to the extent we address that case here, we grant
`Petitioner’s request for rehearing and modify our Termination Order to
`incorporate the following discussion. However, as discussed below, our
`consideration of Wi-Fi Remand does not change the ultimate decision in our
`Termination Order.
`In the inter partes review petition in dispute in Wi-Fi Remand, the
`patent owner (“Wi-Fi”) argued that the petitioner (“Broadcom”) was in
`privity with some litigation defendants in related litigation because of, at
`least, indemnity agreements between Broadcom and those litigants. See,
`e.g., Case IPR2013-00602 (PTAB June 1, 2016) (Paper 65). The litigation
`defendants would have been time-barred from filing an inter partes review
`petition under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) and, thus, under the same statutory
`provision, Wi-Fi argued that Broadcom would also be time-barred in view of
`the privity relationship. See Wi-Fi Remand, 887 F.3d at 1334. The Court in
`Wi-Fi Remand specifically agreed with the Board’s finding that “the inquiry
`[(regarding privity)] typically requires proof that the party in question had
`sufficient control over the prior proceeding that it could be bound by the
`results of that proceeding.” Wi-Fi Remand, 887 F.3d at 1340 (citing Aruze
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`Gaming Mac., Ltd. v. MGT Gaming, Inc., 2015 WL 780607, at *4–8 (PTAB
`Feb. 20, 2015)). The Court further held:
`There was no such showing of control in this case. Wi-Fi’s
`evidence showed that Broadcom’s interests as to the issue of
`infringement were generally aligned with those of its customers,
`and that Broadcom had indemnity agreements with at least two
`of the D-Link defendants. But the evidence did not show that
`Broadcom had the right to control that litigation or otherwise
`participated in that litigation to the extent that it should be bound
`by the results. Nor did any evidence suggest that the D-Link
`defendants were the real parties in interest in Broadcom’s inter
`partes review petition.
`Wi-Fi Remand, 887 F.3d at 1341 (emphasis added). Thus, in Wi-Fi Remand,
`the record had no evidence that Broadcom was an active participant in the
`underlying litigation or took any action based on the indemnification
`agreement such that Broadcom should be bound to the results of that
`litigation.
`By contrast, here, not only was there an indemnification agreement
`between Intel and Dell, but Intel took action, pursuant to that agreement, to
`intervene in the underlying District Court litigation. As noted supra, Intel
`filed its motion to intervene in the underlying litigation and a complaint in
`intervention. Exs. 1415, 2051, 2505. Intel admits in its motion to intervene
`that it did so, at least in part, to defend its customer Dell in response to
`Dell’s tender of a claim for indemnification. Ex. 2051, 4–5 (“Dell tendered
`a contractual claim that Intel indemnify and hold it harmless against
`Alacritech’s claims based on an indemnity agreement involving the purchase
`of Intel products . . . Intel has agreed to defend and partially indemnify
`Dell.”). Thus, beyond the mere existence of an indemnification agreement,
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`Intel was and is actively participating in the underlying litigation and should
`be bound to the results therein.
`The parties disagree as to the extent of Intel’s control over the
`underlying litigation. Intel argues it is not in control of the litigation and that
`Dell has its own attorneys, independent of Intel, representing it in certain
`issues in the underlying litigation. See, e.g., Paper 53, 2 (“There was no
`involvement at any level by the Defendants in the filing or control of these
`IPRs.”), 4–5 (“Dell has its own counsel which has handled all Dell-specific
`issues in the litigation, including filing a motion to dismiss (Ex. 1457),
`performing discovery (Ex. 1458), addressing PO’s Dell infringement
`allegations (Ex. 1459, 1460), and preparing expert reports on Dell products
`(Ex. 1447).”). Intel further provides testimony of Garland Stephens (Intel’s
`lead counsel in this matter), swearing that Intel has no obligation to
`indemnify or defend Dell in this matter (Ex. 1414 ¶ 5), Intel does not
`exercise control over Dell’s counsel (id. ¶ 9), and Intel filed this petition
`“without consultation or input from” Dell (id. ¶ 11). However, other
`evidence of record would suggest that Intel has some degree of control over
`the underlying litigation. For example, the indemnification clause of the
`agreement between Intel and Dell provides that Intel, in response to notice
`from Dell of an infringement lawsuit:
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Ex. 1423, 2 (subsection “(e)”); see also Paper 49, 1–2. By
`intervening, it appears that Intel
`
`
`
` Further, under the terms of the
`
`indemnification,
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Ex. 1423, 2.
`In addition, Intel’s complaint in intervention, filed before Intel was
`directly sued by Alacritech, seeks declaratory judgment of non-infringement
`of this patent. See Ex. 2505, 6. Because this complaint in intervention seeks
`declaratory judgment before Intel was directly sued for infringement, it
`suggests Intel pursued this action for the benefit of its customer (Dell) rather
`than its own proprietary interests. Intel did not produce persuasive evidence
`that it was not in control of the underlying litigation to benefit its customer
`Dell but, instead, produced a privilege log identifying a number of
`documents relating to discussions between Intel and Dell regarding
`indemnification. See Ex. 2501. Thus, we are persuaded by the record before
`us that Intel, as an intervenor in the litigation against its customer Dell, not
`only was an active participant in the litigation but also likely substantially
`controlled most of the litigation.
`Regardless, we need not determine the degree of Intel’s versus Dell’s
`control in the underlying litigation. Unlike the facts in Wi-Fi Remand, Intel
`clearly was, and remains, an active participant in the underlying litigation
`against Dell in response to the indemnification clause in its contractual
`agreements with Dell.
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded our Termination Order is
`inconsistent with the Court’s holdings in Wi-Fi Remand. We are not
`persuaded to modify our ultimate decision in the Termination Order.
`
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`We have reviewed all of the arguments in the Request for Rehearing
`and find them to be persuasive only as to the contention that we erred in
`neglecting to cite or apply holdings of the Court in Wi-Fi Remand.
`Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and modify our
`Termination Order to incorporate the above discussion of Wi-Fi Remand.
`However, our ultimate determination to vacate our Decision to Institute,
`dismiss the Petition, and terminate this proceeding for all parties remains
`unchanged.
`
`
`V. ORDERS
`In view of the foregoing discussion, it is hereby:
`ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is granted to the
`extent that we herein address the holdings of Wi-Fi Remand and incorporate
`that discussion in our Termination Order; and
`FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is
`denied with respect to its request that we find that Dell is neither a real party
`in interest to Intel’s Petition nor in privity with Intel, reinstitute Intel’s
`Petition (and the joinder petitions), and consider the Petition on its merits.
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`IPR2018‐00234
`
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`
`PETITIONER:
`Garland T. Stephens
`Anne Cappella
`Justin L. Constant
`William S. Ansley
`Melissa Hotze
`WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
`garland.stephens@weil.com
`anne.cappella@weil.com
`justin.constant@weil.com
`sutton.ansley@weil.com
`melissa.hotze@weil.com
`
`
`David T. Xue
`Karineh Khachatourian
`RIMÔN, LAW
`david.xue@rimonlaw.com
`karinehk@rimonlaw.com
`
`Brady Cox
`ALSTON & BIRD LLP
`brady.cox@alston.com
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Jim Glass
`Joseph Paunovich
`Brian Mack
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
`& SULLIVAN LLP
`jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`joepaunovich@quinnemanuel.com
`brianmack@quinnemanuel.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper 71
`Entered: August 28, 2019
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`INTEL CORP., CAVIUM, LLC, and
`DELL INC.,3
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ALACRITECH, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2018-00234
`Patent 8,805,948 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before STEPHEN C. SIU, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
`CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`SIU, Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting.
`
`
`I respectfully dissent from the Majority decision for at least the
`previously discussed reasons. See Paper 66, dissent.
`
`
`
`
`
`3 Cavium, Inc., which filed a petition in Case IPR2018-00403, and Dell Inc.,
`which filed a petition in IPR2018-01307, were joined as petitioners in
`IPR2018-00234. According to an updated mandatory notice filed in the
`captioned proceeding, Cavium, Inc. has now been converted to Cavium,
`LLC. See Paper 23.
`
`
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
