Hacking
`
`the Patent System
`
`A Guide to
`Alternative Patent Licensing
`for Innovators
`
`By Marta Belcher and John Casey
`Juelsgaard Intellectual Property & Innovation Clinic
`Stanford Law School
`
`May 2014
`
`
`
` Patents v. Uniloc,
`
`PR2018-00199
`
`Uniloc's Exhibit 2002
`
`openinventionnetwork
`
`Engine
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`

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`Table of Contents
`
`Introduction to Alternative Patent Licensing…………………………………….1
`
`The Patent System Is Broken…………………………………………………………1
`Innovators Are Hacking the System to Use Patents for Good………………...1
`Opting Out of the Patent System May Not Solve the Problem…………..……2
`
`Defensive Patent Aggregators………………………………………………..………3
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`Unified Patents………………………………………………......……………………..4
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`Allied Security Trust (AST)………………………………………………………….…5
`
`RPX……………………………………………………………………………………..…7
`
`Patent Pledges………………………………………………………………………………9
`
`Defensive Patent License (DPL)…………………………………..…………………9
`
`Open Invention Network (OIN) ……………………………………...……………11
`
`Twitter’s Innovator’s Patent Agreement (IPA).……………………………….…12
`
`Google’s License on Transfer (LOT) Agreement…………………………….….14
`
`Comparison Tables………………………………………………………………………16
`
`This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
`
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`Introduction to Alternative Patent Licensing
`The patent system is intended to incentivize innovation, but the current system often does the
`opposite. The traditional model of patent licensing—whereby a company pays a patent owner to
`license an invention that the company legitimately uses—has been hijacked by non-practicing
`entities (“patent trolls”) and other aggressive patent holders who assert overbroad patents that
`never should have been granted in the first place. Within this broken patent regime, companies
`are increasingly hacking the system—that is, finding alternatives to the traditional patent
`licensing model in order to both promote open innovation and protect the companies themselves.
`These patent system hacks can be organized into two broad categories: (1) defensive patent
`aggregators, which pool member companies’ resources to defensively purchase patents for the
`group and to fight patent trolls, and (2) patent pledges, whereby companies opt to openly and
`defensively license their patents to others. This paper provides a guide to these alternative patent
`licensing options for small companies and startups that care about protecting themselves and not
`making a broken patent system any worse.
`
`The Patent System Is Broken
`
`The core purpose of the patent system is to incentivize innovation. Patents give inventors
`monopolies over their inventions for a period of time in order to allow inventors to recoup the
`costs of R&D and to generate profits that reward inventors’ efforts—thereby encouraging future
`investments. In exchange, patentees dedicate their inventions to the public domain once their
`patents expire.
`
`Yet, in many high-technology industries today, the patent system is a scourge on innovation.
`Patent trolls buy overbroad patents, often from bankrupt companies, for the sole purpose of
`extorting licensing revenues from companies that are actually innovating and creating new
`products. Overworked patent examiners increasingly grant overbroad, obvious, and non-novel
`patents—particularly on software. Some companies aggressively assert their patent portfolios to
`keep legitimate competitors out of the market entirely. Small companies are particularly
`vulnerable, since the cost of fighting a lawsuit (even a flagrantly frivolous one) could easily put a
`startup out of business. Faced with the constant threat of crippling litigation, small companies
`often perceive their best—or only—option to be laying low and hoping to stay off patent
`holders’ radar.
`
`Innovators Are Hacking the System to Use Patents for Good
`
`Fed up with the patent mess left by Congress and the courts, companies are collaborating to
`formulate private solutions. These patent licensing alternatives broadly fit into two categories:
`defensive patent aggregators and patent pledges.
`
`Defensive patent aggregators use membership fees to purchase patents and give perpetual
`licenses to members so that future owners of the patents (should the organization subsequently
`sell the patents) cannot sue members for infringement. Defensive patent aggregators are different
`from trolls because they buy patents solely for defensive purposes and promise never to assert
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`the patents they own. These defensive patent aggregators include Allied Security Trust, which
`uses a bidding system to distribute the cost of purchasing each patent among the members who
`are most interested in each patent; RPX, which buys patents and patent rights on behalf of all of
`its members; and Unified Patents, which focuses its patent purchases on specific technology
`areas.
`
`Patent pledges are public commitments that companies make to license their patents in a manner
`that supports open innovation. By committing to the Defensive Patent License, for example,
`companies opt into a network in which each company has promised not to sue any other
`company in the network for patent infringement, except defensively. The Open Invention
`Network owns hundreds of patents that it licenses for free to any company that promises never to
`assert its own patents against Linux technology. Companies can also make pledges unilaterally.
`For example, in its Innovator’s Patent Agreement, Twitter makes a commitment to its employee
`inventors that it will not make offensive use of any patent without the inventor’s permission.
`Finally, through Google’s License on Transfer Agreement, participants agree to license their
`patents to all other participating companies, but each license only becomes effective if the patent
`is transferred to a third party.
`
`Each option described in this paper has tradeoffs both for individual companies and innovation
`as a whole. Patent pledges, for example, make a powerful public statement about a company’s
`values, and can attract talent and publicity. On the other hand, pledging to openly license a patent
`might lower the patent’s market value and, consequently, the company’s value for potential
`buyers and investors. Defensive patent aggregators require annual membership fees that may be
`prohibitively expensive for some companies, but the licenses and patent intelligence services that
`come with membership may be well worth the cost for others. This paper explores these options
`and analyzes some of the drawbacks and benefits of each for small companies and startups, with
`the understanding that every company must consider its own unique situation in deciding
`whether to participate in any (or all) of these alternatives to traditional patent licensing.
`
`
`Opting Out of the Patent System May Not Solve the Problem
`
`
`Many of the patent licensing alternatives described in this paper—particularly patent pledges—
`assume that participants have obtained patents of their own. However, many innovators who
`have understandably lost faith in the patent system have opted out by declining to seek patents on
`their own inventions.
`
`There are many reasons that companies may opt out of the patent system. Obtaining a single
`patent can cost $20,000 in legal fees, if not more, and the process can take years. Some
`conscientious employees may be reticent to patent their inventions and assign them to the
`company out of fear that the patents will later be abused. Once a patent is obtained, asserting it
`offensively may reflect poorly on the company, alienating current and potential employees as
`well as the public. If the company were to fail, the patents would likely be sold, and might
`ultimately fall into the hands of a troll.
`
`However, for companies that are concerned with both self-preservation and furthering
`innovation, there may be some inherent benefits of obtaining patents in the first place:
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`• First, patents can be used defensively in infringement lawsuits brought by competitors.
`Defendants in patent infringement lawsuits can countersue the plaintiff for infringing one
`of the defendant’s own patents. This, of course, assumes that the plaintiff has products of
`its own that could infringe, which is not the case with trolls or other non-practicing
`entities like universities—but it makes patents valuable for defending against litigious
`competitors as well as deterring lawsuits from competitors in the first place.
`
`• Second, patenting an invention clarifies the prior art and can help prevent future patents
`on overbroad or obvious technologies. All patented inventions must be novel and non-
`obvious. When determining whether to grant a patent, patent examiners in the U.S. Patent
`and Trademark Office look for “prior art” that evidences that the technology had been
`invented before or is obvious in light of previous inventions. Patent examiners have
`limited time to conduct their research, however, and often miss important prior
`inventions. One of the most important sources for identifying prior art is other patents.
`Patenting an invention thus helps clarify who invented what, and can help to prevent bad,
`obvious, or overbroad patents from being granted in the future.
`
`• Third, patenting an invention may help prevent others from claiming it as their own.
`Keeping an invention a secret rather than patenting it runs the risk that another company
`could independently invent and try to patent the same thing. (Patent law includes a prior
`use defense, but only if the original inventor was using the invention more than one year
`before the subsequent inventor filed its patent, and even then there are limitations to how
`the original inventor can use the technology.) Original inventors can also simply publicly
`disclose the invention without filing a patent application, which may serve as prior art to
`prevent others from patenting the disclosed invention.
`
`
`For companies that choose to obtain patents rather than opting out of the patent system entirely,
`the alternative patent licensing options described in this paper provide opportunities both to
`engage with the patent system and to use patents for good.
`
`
`Defensive Patent Aggregators
`
`Defensive patent aggregators use the pooled resources of member companies to purchase patents
`that may otherwise have been purchased by trolls or aggressive companies and asserted against
`members. After purchasing each patent, aggregators grant perpetual licenses to their members, so
`that even if the patent later falls into a troll’s hands, the patent can never be asserted against
`those members. Aggregators typically charge an annual membership fee that is calculated based
`on each company’s size. Many aggregators also offer patent intelligence and other services to
`members.
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`Unified Patents
`
`What It Is
`
`
`Unified Patents is a subscription-based patent risk management organization. Unified groups
`companies of all sizes into “Micro-Pools” or “Zones” that protect a specific technology area, and
`works to defend each Zone’s protected technology from patent trolls.
`
`Unified was founded in 2012 by former Intuit Head of IP Litigation Kevin Jakel, with founding
`members including Google and NetApp. Its first two Zones focused on protecting cloud storage
`and mobile payment technologies.
`
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`
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`How It Works
`
`
`For an annual subscription fee, companies can join a Zone that focuses on protecting a particular
`technology area from patent trolls. Subscription fees vary based on the company’s size, but start-
`ups can join for free as of the time of writing. The cost of joining for non-start-ups has not been
`made public.
`
`Unified uses each Zone’s subscription fees to monitor troll activity, investigate prior art,
`challenge troll-owned patents in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office through ex-parte
`reexamination and inter partes review, and purchase patents before trolls can (but never to
`purchase patents from trolls). When Unified purchases a patent, all Zone members receive an
`immediate, perpetual license to that patent.
`
`Unified’s model relies on the participation of start-ups, understanding that small companies are
`often the first to receive troll demand letters and the most vulnerable targets. By encouraging
`start-ups to participate with low-cost (or free) membership, Unified gains valuable insight into
`troll demand letter campaigns as soon as they begin. Furthermore, when start-ups participate in
`Unified Patent, they are (theoretically) less vulnerable to troll demands, limiting the number of
`easy troll targets.
`
`
`Pros
`
`• Unified encourages start-ups and small companies to participate by taking into account
`company size in calculating membership fees, and (as of the time of writing) offering
`membership to start-ups for free. However, information about the cost of membership for
`non-start-ups is not currently publicly available.
`
`• By partnering small companies with some of the world’s largest tech companies in each
`zone, startups can benefit from larger companies’ purchasing power, while larger
`companies benefit from early insight into troll activities.
`
`• Unified focuses its efforts on narrow technology areas, unlike defensive patent
`aggregators that broadly acquire any high-risk patents. This is ideal for start-ups and
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`small companies that operate in a specific technology space, as their membership fees
`and resources are used to protect only what they care about.
`
`• Unified makes all decisions regarding whether and when to challenge a patent in inter
`partes review. While this means that members do not have say in these decisions, it
`should allow members to benefit from inter partes review of dubious patents without
`becoming the “real parties-in-interest” in the review. A “real party-in-interest” in an inter
`partes review of a patent cannot later defend a patent infringement lawsuit using any
`argument that could have been (but wasn’t) raised during the inter partes review.
`
`• Unified refuses to buy patents from trolls, so members can be comforted that their
`membership fees will never even indirectly support troll activities.
`
`• Members do not give up any of their own patent rights, nor are they required to license
`their own patents to other Zone members.
`
`Cons
`
`• The narrow, technology-specific Zone approach means that not all companies will fit
`within one of Unified’s Zones of protected technology.
`
`• Unified refuses to buy patents from trolls, so members won’t benefit from dangerous
`patents being taken directly out of trolls’ hands.
`
`• Compared to RPX, Unified currently has fewer patent assets and less patent-purchasing
`activity.
`
`Allied Security Trust (AST)
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`What It Is
`
`
`Allied Security Trust (AST) acquires patents on behalf of its member companies based on a
`bidding system that distributes the cost of each patent among only those companies that are
`interested in purchasing it.
`
`Principle members include Google, IBM, Intel, Oracle, Philips, and Sony.
`
`
`How It Works
`
`
`Companies pay an annual fee for AST membership. Though the amount of the fee is not publicly
`available, it appears that the cost is around $200,000 per year and is not adjusted based on
`company size. Members can then participate in a bidding process through which AST makes
`patent-purchasing decisions.
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`When making purchasing decisions, AST investigates each patent, then sends out an analysis of
`the patent to members that might be interested in the patented technology. After reviewing the
`patent analysis, an AST member may decide to bid on the patent through AST. Without
`divulging identifying information, AST communicates common interest to other members and
`figures out how the cost of the patent can be spread out between interested members. A typical
`AST purchase involves three or four member companies splitting the cost of the patent.
`Members thus share the cost of acquiring useful patents while controlling the amount they bid
`and maintaining anonymity under most circumstances.
`
`Once a patent or portfolio is acquired, the AST members that funded the purchase receive a
`perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive license that continues even if the companies leave AST. A
`member company that did not participate in the initial acquisition may obtain a subsequent
`license through a Subsequent License Option (SLO). The licensing fee for an SLO is always
`equal to the highest price paid by one of the initial funders. The proceeds from the SLO are then
`given to the original bidders, spread out proportionally based on the amount each bidder
`originally contributed. New members are allowed to take an SLO to any portfolio currently
`owned by AST.
`
`AST engages in a “catch, license, and release” model for patents rather than aggregating patents.
`AST purchases a patent, licenses it to members, and then sells the patent (with the licenses still
`remaining in effect under all future owners), and splits the proceeds among the members that
`funded the acquisition.
`
`
`
`Pros
`
`•
`
`• AST avoids the “one size fits all” aggregation model by allowing members to bid only on
`the patents they want rather than paying for licenses in technology areas irrelevant to
`their businesses.
`
`If a member leaves AST, the patents they have licensed go with them, which gives
`companies flexibility to leave.
`
`• AST purchasing decisions move quickly, and the “delivery date” of a patent is within a
`few days of an accepted offer, which can be an advantage for fast-paced companies.
`
`• Members include some of the world’s largest tech companies, which means smaller
`companies can benefit from their purchasing power.
`
`In addition to getting a license to the patent, early bidders get money back when other
`member companies later license the patent, and when AST ultimately sells the patent.
`
`• Members do not give up any of the rights to their own, non-AST patent portfolios, nor are
`they required to license their own inventions to other members.
`
`•
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`Cons
`
`• For privacy-sensitive companies, AST conducts most of its transactions completely
`anonymously. However, when AST sells patents on the open market, the name of the
`patent’s licensees can be disclosed to potential buyers against the member’s will (by a
`majority vote of other members).
`
`In order to speed up the “delivery date” of patent purchases to a few days after an
`accepted offer and to lower the transactions costs, AST seeks little in the way of
`warranties and representations when making patent purchasing decisions.
`
`•
`
`• AST buys and sells patents on the open market, which means that AST may be feeding
`patent trolls by buying patents from them, and that the patents AST owns may later fall
`into the hands of trolls. AST members have perpetual licenses to these patents and cannot
`be attacked with these patents, but members with strong anti-troll convictions may take
`exception to the idea of indirectly doing business with trolls.
`
`• While the amount of the annual membership fee is not publicly available, it appears that
`the fee is not adjusted based on the size of the member company.
`
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`RPX
`
`What It Is
`
`
`RPX is a membership-based patent risk management service that acquires patent rights to license
`to members for defensive purposes, provides patent intelligence, and offers insurance policies to
`cover the legal and settlement costs of being sued for patent infringement.
`
`RPX was founded in 2008 by John Amster and Geoffrey Barker, both former vice presidents of
`controversial patent assertion entity Intellectual Ventures. As of January 2014, 168 companies
`are members, including Google, Microsoft, Oracle, and Intel.
`
`
`How It Works
`
`
`Companies join RPX for an annual membership fee calculated based on the company’s size. As
`of 2014, annual fees range from $85,000 to around $7 million. Each member receives a license
`to all patent rights that RPX owns. These licenses last for as long as the company remains a
`member of RPX, with licenses becoming perpetual after a certain number of years of
`membership. Members also gain access to the RPX client portal—an online resource with
`detailed profiles of NPEs, overviews of the litigation history and chain of title of individual
`patents, and other market intelligence. Members do not give up any of their own patent rights,
`nor are they required to license their own patents to other members.
`
`To date, RPX has spent $750 million on acquiring patents and patent rights for its members.
`RPX purchases rights to high-value or high-risk patents on the open market—sometimes only
`
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`buying licenses for its members, and sometimes acquiring the entire patent, which preempts
`trolls from buying the patent. RPX also buys patent rights out of active litigation in which its
`members are defendants, claiming to have intervened to secure dismissals for clients more than
`430 times.
`
`RPX recently launched a litigation insurance offering for smaller companies that covers the legal
`and settlement costs of patent lawsuits. The policy is priced based on forward-looking risk for
`the company as determined by actuarial models—typically between $150,000 and $250,000 per
`policyholder. The policy includes a base level of RPX’s core subscription service. As of January
`2014, there are 25 policyholders.
`
`
`Pros
`
`• RPX takes into account company size when calculating annual membership fees. The
`amount of the membership fee is locked in at the time of sign-up, so joining early is
`advantageous for small, growing companies.
`
`• RPX not only purchases patents preemptively, but also intervenes in active litigation in
`which clients are defendants.
`
`• RPX’s size gives it massive purchasing power to buy patents and license them to
`members. RPX claims to represent 10% of transaction activity on the open market.
`
`• RPX’s new litigation insurance offering is designed with small companies in mind and
`comes with the benefits of general RPX membership.
`
`• Members do not give up any of their own patent rights, nor are they required to license
`their own patents to other members.
`
`
`Cons
`
`• While RPX’s membership prices reflect company size, the $85,000 minimum annual
`membership cost may still prove prohibitive for start-ups.
`
`• RPX appears to buy patents and patent rights from trolls, which members might find
`objectionable.
`
`• RPX sometimes sells patents (after licensing them to its members) and is willing to sell to
`trolls. While its members should be safe from these patents, all other companies—large
`and small—could be attacked by trolls armed with patents sold by RPX.
`
`• Licenses only last for as long as a company remains a member of RPX—though licenses
`become perpetual after a certain number of years of membership. Companies that choose
`not to renew membership before their licenses become perpetual may suffer some
`diminution of rights.
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`• RPX’s business model is being challenged in court. A patent troll called Cascades
`Computer Innovation has sued RPX and some of its members alleging a conspiracy to
`“monopsonize” the market (that is, drive down the prices) for certain patents. These
`claims recently survived a motion to dismiss. However, the court later stayed the case for
`120 days, noting that the outcome of the underlying patent litigation (that is, the possible
`invalidity of the patent) “has the potential to narrow substantially, or moot entirely, the
`antitrust issues.”
`
`It is troubling for one entity to own so many patents. While RPX has promised never to
`assert or litigate the patents in its portfolio, its business model could change, and it might
`assert its patents through shell companies in a manner similar to Intellectual Ventures.
`
`•
`
`
`
`Patent Pledges
`
`Patent pledges are commitments that companies make to license their own patents in a particular
`way. Most of the pledges described in this paper are multilateral pledges through which
`companies opt into networks with other companies that have made the same pledge (for
`example, by promising not to offensively assert patents against any other member of the network
`that has made the same commitment). Pledges can also be made unilaterally, and any company
`can create its own pledge to license its own patents in a way that benefits open innovation—for
`example, by promising that the company will never assert its employees’ patents offensively
`without each inventor’s permission. Pledges offer a way for companies to continue to patent their
`inventions while assuring the public—and potential employees—that their patents will only be
`used for good.
`
`
`The Defensive Patent License (DPL)
`
`What It Is
`
`
`The Defensive Patent License (DPL) is like a non-aggression pact for patents: companies
`commit to never asserting any of their patents offensively against any other company that has
`also committed to the DPL.
`
`Berkeley Law Professor Jennifer Urban and New York University Law Professor Jason Schultz
`have been developing the DPL since 2010. The DPL will be officially launched at a conference
`at Berkeley on November 7, 2014.
`
`In the interest of full disclosure, representatives from Engine Advocacy, the Electronic Frontier
`Foundation, and the Open Invention Network who participated in preparing this paper also serve
`on the DPL Advisory Board.
`
`
`
`Any company can opt into the DPL network by pledging never to assert any of its patents against
`any other company in the DPL network, except defensively. By joining the DPL network, a
`
`How It Works
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`company commits to offering any other DPL user a royalty-free license to any of its patents.
`Companies must dedicate all of their patents to the DPL in order to avoid the problem of
`members only contributing low-value patents. In return for this commitment, every DPL user is
`eligible to receive a royalty-free license to any patent in any other DPL user’s portfolio.
`
`These commitments only apply to other DPL users. Companies that have opted into the DPL
`may still offensively sue (or seek paid licenses from) anyone outside of the DPL network.
`
`DPL commitments travel with the patent, so any future owners of a patent licensed under the
`DPL must continue to honor the DPL’s terms for that patent.
`
`Companies may choose to leave the DPL at any time. However, previous licensees still retain
`their royalty-free licenses to the patents of the former DPL member. Any royalty-free licenses
`that the departing company received under the DPL may be converted to paid licenses at fair,
`reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms at the discretion of the remaining licensors.
`
`Committing to the DPL requires two steps: first, e-mailing defensivepatent@gmail.com with a
`message declaring intent to license the company’s entire patent portfolio under the DPL, and
`second, posting the commitment on a publicly accessible, indexed website controlled by the
`company.
`
`
`Pros
`
`• The DPL’s requirement that licensees commit their entire patent portfolio makes it a
`serious, company-wide commitment to defensive patenting (unlike some patent pledges
`that have been limited to only a small subset of a company’s patents). Joining the DPL
`sends a clear message to the public that the company is committed to defensive patenting
`and open innovation and does not wish to abuse the current patent system. Such a
`statement can attract both talent and positive publicity.
`
`• Companies that join the DPL do not lose the ability to assert their patent portfolios
`against, or collect licensing fees from, non-DPL members.
`
`• The DPL’s structure is especially beneficial for members with small patent portfolios.
`However, large companies do still have an incentive to join the DPL network in order to
`avoid litigation from DPL members.
`
`• Once a DPL license is attached to a patent, trolls will never be able to assert that patent
`against DPL members who have a license to the patent.
`
`• There is no membership fee to join the DPL. To join, members simply need to pledge
`their own patent portfolio. (Of course, this is a different type of cost.)
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`Cons
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`• The DPL’s requirement that licensees commit their entire patent portfolio means that
`larger companies with big portfolios may be reluctant to join. Some companies,
`particularly large corporations, may not be in a position to dedicate their entire patent
`portfolios to the DPL. Members are not allowed to “pick and choose” which patents
`become part of the DPL network.
`
`• Patents bound by the DPL may be seen by investors or potential buyers as worth less than
`other patents since they cannot be wielded against any DPL member.
`
`• Although trolls cannot assert DPL-licensed patents against DPL members, the DPL does
`not prevent trolls from asserting DPL-licensed patents against non-DPL members, nor
`does it provide protection from trolls armed with non-DPL patents.
`
`•
`
`It is unclear whether courts will uphold the provision of the DPL that precludes future
`owners of the patent from asserting the patent against DPL members. It is possible
`that bankruptcy courts may be able to void DPL provisions on a patent that needs to be
`liquidated in order to satisfy creditors of the previous licensor, though DPL creators
`Urban and Schultz think this is unlikely.
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`Open Invention Network (OIN)
`
`What It Is
`
`
`The Open Invention Network (OIN) is a company that acquires patents and patent applications
`and makes them available royalty-free to any entity that agrees not to assert its patents against
`the Linux system, effectively creating a “patent no-fly zone” around essential Linux
`technologies.
`
`OIN was launched in 2005, and its members include Google, IBM, Philips, Sony, NEC, SUSE,
`and Red Hat.
`
`In the interest of full disclosure, OIN participated in preparing this paper along with the
`Electronic Frontier Foundation and Engine Advocacy.
`
`
`How It Works
`
`
`OIN acquires patents and patent applications in a multitude of technology areas and grants
`royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive, non-transferable licenses to any company that promises
`not to assert its own patents against the Linux system.
`
`OIN undertakes diverse activities to reduce patent risk for its more than 750 licensees. In
`addition to receiving licenses to OIN’s independent defensive patent portfolio, OIN licensees
`offer free patent licenses to one another on patents that relate to the Linux system. OIN adopted
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`this model in order to protect the Linux platform, thereby enabling companies to feel secure
`making significant investments in Linux technologies.
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`Pros
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`• Joining the network is free.
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`• Joining OIN provides companies with licenses to all patents owned by other OIN
`licensees that relate to the Linux system.
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`• Joining OIN provides companies with a license to OIN-owned patents and applications
`that relate to non-Linux system areas such as software, wireless, networking, biometrics,
`security, and other technologies.
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`• Joining OIN makes a public statement that the company supports Linux and open
`innovation. This can attract potential employees as well as positive publicity from the
`open source community.
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`Cons
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` OIN licensees are required to license their patents that relate to the Linux system to each
`other as part of a broad-based cross-license and a commitment to patent non-aggression
`within the defined scope of Linux.
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` •
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`• OIN’s focus is on providing a safe, open environment for the Linux system. Thus, it does
`not extend into other technology areas.
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`Twitter’s Innovator’s Patent Agreement (IPA)
`
`What It Is
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`The Innovator’s Patent Agreement (IPA) is a patent assignment method developed by Twitter to
`guarantee its employees that if they assign an invention to Twitter, the patent will not be used to
`sue anyone offensively without the inventor’s permission.
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`Twitter implemented the IPA in early 2013, applying it to all patents issued to its engineers in the
`past and present. Following Twitter’s lead, companies like Jelly, Lift, Stack Exchange, and
`TellApart are also using the IPA.
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`How It Works
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`The IPA is different from other pledges in that it is actually a standard employee agreement that
`covers inventions assigned by employees to the company. To adopt the IPA, companies need
`only put a provision in invention assignment contracts stating that the company and employee
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`agree that any invention assigned by the employee to the company will fall under