(12) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT)
`
`(19) World Intellectual Property Organization
`International Bureau
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`25 January 2001 (25.01.2001) |IIIIIllllllll||lllllllllllllll||||l||||l||||||||||||||||l|||Illllllllllllllllll
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`(43) International Publication Date
`
`(10) International Publication Number
`WO 01/06699 A2
`
`
`(51) International Patent Classification7:
`
`H04L 9/00
`
`(21) International Application Number:
`
`PCT/USOO/19656
`
`(22) International Filing Date:
`
`19 July 2000 (19.07.2000)
`
`(25) Filing Language:
`
`(26) Publication Language:
`
`(30) Priority Data:
`09/356,600
`
`English
`
`English
`
`19 July 1999 (19.07.1999)
`
`US
`
`(71) Applicant: RSA SECURITY INC. [US/US]; 36 Crosby
`Drive, Bedford, MA 01730 (US).
`
`(81) Designated States (national): AE, AG, AL, AM, AT, AU,
`AZ, BA, BB, BG, BR, BY, BZ, CA, CH, CN, CR, CU, CZ,
`DE, DK, DM, DZ, EE, ES, FI, GB, GD, GE, GH, GM, HR,
`HU, ID, IL, IN, IS, JP, KE, KG, KP, KR, KZ, LC, LK, LR,
`LS, LT, LU, LV, MA, MD, MG, MK, MN, MW, MX, MZ,
`NO, NZ, PL, PT, RO, RU, SD, SE, SG, SI, SK, SL, TJ, TM,
`TR, TT, TZ, UA, UG, UZ, VN, YU, ZA, ZW.
`
`(84) Designated States (regional): ARIPO patent (GH, GM,
`KE, LS, MW, MZ, SD, SL, SZ, TZ, UG, ZW), Eurasian
`patent (AM, AZ, BY, KG, KZ, MD, RU, TJ, TM), European
`patent (AT, BE, CH, CY, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, IE,
`IT, LU, MC, NL, PT, SE), OAPI patent (BF, BJ, CF, CG,
`CI, CM, GA, GN, GW, ML, MR, NE, SN, TD, TG).
`
`(72) Inventors: DUANE, William; 4 Howard Road, Westford,
`MA 01886 (US). ROSTIN, Peter; Gardsmygvagen 6,
`8-135 68 Tyreso (SE).
`
`Without international search report and to be republished
`upon receipt of that report.
`
`Published:
`
`(74) Agent: LANZA, John, D.; Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault,
`LLP, High Street Tower, 125 High Street, Boston, MA
`02110 (US).
`
`For two-letter codes and other abbreviations, refer to the ”Guid-
`ance Notes on Codes andAbbreviations " appearing at the begin-
`ning ofeach regular issue ofthe PCT Gazette.
`
`WO01/06699A2
`
`(54) Title: SYSTEM AND METHODS FOR MAINTAINING AND DISTRIBUTING PERSONAL SECURITY DEVICES
`
`(57) Abstract: This invention relates to methods and apparatus for securely accessing and providing information including the use
`of a personal security device on a client where the client is subject to compromise.
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`SYSTEM AND METHODS FOR MAINTAINING AND DISTRIBUTING PERSONAL
`SECURITY DEVICES
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`BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
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`Field of the Invention
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`This invention relates to the field of cryptography, including user authentication,
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`document authentication, symmetric key cryptography, public key cryptography, secure
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`communications, secret sharing, and key distribution.
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`W C
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`ryptography has become increasingly important with the increased presence of the
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`Internet, an inherently insecure transmission medium. Cryptography enables methods of secure
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`user authentication, which is a prerequisite to performing secure electronic commerce on the
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`Internet.
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`Typical methods of user authentication are insecure and vulnerable to eavesdropping. For
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`example, suppose that a user Alice wishes to log into a computer over the Internet. A typical
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`authentication process requires Alice to enter her password. This password is typically entered
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`and transmitted in the clear and may be easily intercepted by an eavesdropper Eve as it travels
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`across the Internet, providing Eve with the information necessary to gain exactly the same access
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`privileges as Alice. Cryptography provides secure authentication protocols allowing Eve to
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`eavesdrop on the authentication information without providing her with the necessary
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`information to gain the same access privileges as Alice.
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`Cryptographic methods of secure user authentication require the storage of sensitive
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`information, typically on a medium such as the hard disk drive of a general purpose computer or
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`the flash memory of a personal digital assistant. With the increasing portability and mobility of
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`such hardware comes the increasing ease of its theft. In one illustrative example, a user travels
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`with a laptop computer containing authentication information stored on its hard disk. This
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`authentication information can be used to make a secure network connection, to log in to a
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`remote host, and to sign email. If the laptop were to be stolen, the thief could then use this stolen
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`information to perform further mischief by masquerading as the user.
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`One type of sensitive authentication information is a user’s private key. A private key is
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`a component of public key cryptography, which enables methods of user authentication as well as
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`secure communications over unsecured channels. Public key cryptography employs a key pair
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`comprising a public key and a private key. One key is used to encrypt a file and the other key is
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`used to decrypt it. The key used to encrypt a file is not usefial for subsequently decrypting it. In
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`general, public key cryptography enables a user Alice to authenticate herself to another user Bob
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`by encrypting data provided by Bob with her private key, creating a digital signature. Alice then
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`sends the signature to Bob. Bob then uses Alice’s public key to decrypt the signature, which he
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`then compares to the plaintext. Alice is authenticated to Bob if the decrypted and plaintext data
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`match. Implementations of public key cryptography include RSA, Diffie-Helman, ElGamal, and
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`Elliptic Curve Cryptography (“ECC”).
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`Another type of sensitive information is the output of an authentication token. In one
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`implementation, an authentication token displays a number that changes periodically. The
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`numbers displayed are elements in a pseudorandom sequence. Before the token is used, it is
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`synchronized with a security server so that the security server subsequently knows what number
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`is displayed on the token at any given time. When a user seeks access to a resource administered
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`by the security server, the user sends the server the number currently displayed on the token. The
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`server then authenticates the user by comparing the sent number with the number that the server
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`expects the authentication token to currently display. If they match, the user is authenticated and
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`granted access to the resource. An authentication token can be implemented in hardware or
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`software. In one software implementation, an authentication token includes program code
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`running on the user’s laptop.
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`Another type of sensitive information is a key to a challenge—response protocol. In one
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`implementation of this protocol, the key comprises a number known by the user and an
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`authentication server. Instead of requesting the number directly, the authentication server sends
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`the user an operand. The user performs a mathematical function using the operand and the key
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`and sends the result back to the authentication server, which compares the user’s answer with the
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`expected answer. The mathematical function is designed so that it is impractical to discern the
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`key from the operand and the result. A challenge-response authentication protocol can be
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`implemented in software on the user’s a general purpose computer.
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`Sensitive information for secure user authentication can be stored on a variety of
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`hardware. For example, secure user authentication methods may be implemented on a
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`workstation, a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a personal digital assistant, a smartcard, a
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`universal serial bus (“USB”) key, or specialized hardware. This specialized hardware can be
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`small and portable, with form factors similar to a credit card, a gumdrop, or a school ring.
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`There is a need to protect sensitive information stored on a wide range hardware that is
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`subject to several forms of physical compromise.
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`BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
`
`The invention provides apparatus and methods for securely accessing and providing
`
`information. In one embodiment the invention relates to a method for securely providing
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`information including the steps of receiving information identifying an encrypted personal
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`security device, providing the encrypted personal security device, receiving authentication
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`information, and providing decryption information for the personal security device responsive to
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`the authentication information. In a further embodiment, the encrypted personal security device
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`includes an encrypted key. In another embodiment, the encrypted personal security device
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`includes information necessary to make a secure virtual private network connection. In another
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`embodiment. the method further includes the step of validating the authentication information.
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`In another embodiment, the step of providing the encrypted personal security device includes the
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`steps of retrieving and providing the personal security device. In a further embodiment, the
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`retrieval step includes retrieving the personal security device from an authentication server. In
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`another embodiment, the method further includes the step of storing the personal security device
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`on a smartcard. In another embodiment, the method further includes the step of storing the
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`personal security device in a volatile memory element.
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`In another aspect the invention relates to a method for accessing secure information
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`including the steps of receiving an encrypted personal security device, receiving decryption
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`information for the personal security device, and decrypting the personal security device. In one
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`embodiment the method further includes the step of using the decrypted personal security device
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`to access secure information. In another embodiment, the personal security device includes
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`information necessary to make a secure network connection between a network client and a
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`network server. In another embodiment, the personal security device includes information
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`necessary to make a secure virtual private network connection. In another embodiment, the
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`method further includes the steps of transmitting information identifying an encrypted personal
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`security device and transmitting authentication information. In another embodiment, the method
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`further includes the step of storing the personal security device on a smartcard. In another
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`embodiment, the method further includes the step of storing the personal security device in a
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`volatile memory element.
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`In another embodiment the invention relates to a method for allowing a network client
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`secure access to information including the steps of requesting, by the network client, a personal
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`security device from a network server, wherein the personal security device includes encrypted
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`information necessary to make a secure network connection, forwarding, by the network server,
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`the personal security device to the network client, and providing, by the network server,
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`decryption information for the personal security device. In another embodiment, the personal
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`security device includes information necessary to make a secure virtual private network
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`connection. In another embodiment, the method further includes the steps of forwarding, by the
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`network server, the request to an authentication server, querying, by the authentication server, a
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`user databse with the request, returning, by the user database, a personal security device to the
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`authentication server, and forwarding, by the authentication server, the personal security device
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`to the network server. In another embodiment, the method further includes the steps of
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`obtaining, by the client, authentication information from an authentication token, providing, by
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`the client, the authentication information to the authentication server, confirming, by the
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`authentication server, the validity of the authentication information, retrieving, by the network
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`server, decryption information for the personal security device from a database, and providing, by
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`the network server, decryption information for the personal security device to the client. In
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`another embodiment, the method firrther includes the step of decrypting, by the client, the
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`personal security device.
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`In another embodiment the invention relates to a device for providing secure access to
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`information including a first receiver receiving information identifying an encrypted personal
`
`security device, a first transmitter providing the personal security device, a second receiver
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`receiving authentication information, and a second transmitter providing decryption information
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`for the personal security device responsive to the authentication information. In a further
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`embodiment, the personal security device includes an encrypted key. In another embodiment, the
`
`personal security device includes information necessary to make a secure network connection
`
`between a network client and a network server. In another embodiment, the personal security
`
`device includes information necessary to make a secure virtual private network connection. In
`
`another embodiment, the device also includes an authenticator validating the authentication
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`information. In another embodiment, the first receiver is the same as the second receiver. In
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`another embodiment, the first transmitter is the same as the second transmitter.
`
`In another aspect the invention relates to a device for accessing secure information
`
`including a first receiver receiving an encrypted personal security device, a second receiver
`
`receiving decryption information for the personal security device, and a decryptor decrypting the
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`personal security device. In another embodiment, the personal security device includes
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`information necessary to make a secure network connection between a network client and a
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`network server. In another embodiment, the personal security device includes information
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`necessary to make a secure virtual private network connection. In another embodiment, the
`
`device further includes a first transmitter transmitting information identifying an encrypted
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`personal security device, and a second transmitter transmitting authentication information. In
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`another embodiment, the first transmitter is the same as the second transmitter. In another
`
`embodiment, the device also includes a smartcard storing the decryption information. In another
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`embodiment, the device also includes a volatile memory element storing the decryption
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`information. In another embodiment, the first receiver is the same as the second receiver.
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`In another embodiment the invention relates to a system for providing secure access to
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`information including a network client including a volatile memory element and a network server
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`storing an encrypted personal security device in a server memory element, the personal security
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`device including encrypted information. In another embodiment, the system further includes a
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`smartcard having a volatile memory element storing the personal security device. In another
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`embodiment, the system further includes decrypted information for forming a secure network
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`connection between the client and the server wherein the decrypted information is derived from
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`applying the decryption information to the personal security device. In a further embodiment, the
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`decryption information is stored in the volatile memory element. In a further embodiment, the
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`decrypted information is stored in the volatile memory element. In another embodiment, the
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`network is a virtual private network. In a further embodiment, the encrypted information
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`includes information necessary for forming a secure network connection the the client and the
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`server. In a further embodiment, the system further includes an authentication token, wherein the
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`token is capable of providing authentication information, and an authentication server, wherein
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`the authentication server includes a user database, wherein the user database includes decryption
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`information for the personal security device, and wherein the authentication server is capable of
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`providing the decryption information upon receipt of the authentication information.
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`BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWINGS
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`The foregoing and other objects, features and advantages of the present invention, as well
`
`as the invention itself, will be more fully understood from the following description of preferred
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`embodiments, when read together with the accompanying drawings, in which:
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`FIG. 1 is a flowchart illustrating the interaction between a client and a server.
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`FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating steps a server undertakes to securely provide
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`information.
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`FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating steps a client undertakes performing a challenge-
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`response protocol for accessing information.
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`FIG. 4 is a schematic illustration of a security regime.
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`FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating steps a client undertakes to securely receive and access
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`information.
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`FIG. 6 is a schematic illustration of a hardware embodiment used to store and access a
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`personal security device.
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`FIG. 7 is a schematic illustration of a hardware embodiment used to store and access a
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`personal security device.
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`FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating steps to erase sensitive information after use.
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`FIG. 9 is a schematic illustration of a system for securely providing information.
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`FIG. 10 is a schematic illustration of a workstation storing and decrypting a personal
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`security device.
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`FIG. 11 is a schematic illustration of a system for securely providing a key in response to
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`authentication.
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`FIG. 12 is a schematic illustration of a smartcard and a smartcard reader.
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`FIG. 13 is a schematic illustration of a personal security device stored in an external non-
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`volatile medium.
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`DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
`
`For the purposes of this invention, the term “personal security device” refers to encrypted
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`sensitive information that may be stored on devices subject to physical compromise. “Personal
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`security device” may also be used as a synecdoche to refer to the hardware storing this encrypted
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`sensitive information. In one embodiment of the invention, the personal security device can only
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`be decrypted with decryption information, known as a key.
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`For the purposes of this invention, “non-volatile storage medium” refers to any medium
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`in which data persists when power is not supplied to the device on which the medium resides.
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`Examples of non-volatile storage media include disks, tapes, compact disc read—only memory
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`(“CD-ROM”), digital versatile disc (“DVD”), flash memory, erasable—programmable read-only
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`memory (“EPROM”) and read-only memory (“ROM”). For the purposes of this invention,
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`“volatile storage medium” refers to any medium in which data is stored in a transitory manner or
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`data is lost when power is removed from the medium. An example of a volatile storage medium
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`is random-access memory (“RAM”). In a typical embodiment, volatile storage media are less
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`susceptible to physical compromise than non-volatile storage media.
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`For the purposes of this invention, the term “physical compromise” encompasses any
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`means by which an adversary may gain access to information on a user’s system. For example, a
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`laptop computer can be stolen and its contents accessed. Physical compromise also encompasses
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`an adversary may gaining entrance to an office and copying sensitive contents of a target
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`computer onto a removable storage medium such as a floppy disk or removable cartridge.
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`Physical compromise also encompasses an adversary transmitting sensitive information from a
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`target computer to one of the adversary’s computers over a computer network such as the
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`Internet. Physical compromise also encompasses the use of cracking methods including viruses
`
`and trojan horses. For example, a desktop system can be infected with a virus that seeks out
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`sensitive information and transmits what it finds to an adversary over the Internet. Alternatively,
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`an adversary can exploit a security hole in an operating system to gain access to that system
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`directly. One example of a security hole exploit is known as Back Orifice, which provides
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`unauthorized access to systems running Microsoft’s Windows NT operating system.
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`For the purposes of this invention, the term “authentication token” refers to a device or
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`program providing authentication information to a user that is determined based on secret
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`information shared by the authentication token and an authentication server. In one embodiment,
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`the authentication token is implemented as code running on the user’s general purpose computer.
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`In an alternate embodiment, the authentication token is implemented on specialized hardware.
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`Referring to FIG. 1, and in brief overview, a system is provided
`
`One embodiment of the invention, as illustrated in FIG. 1, includes a client that interacts
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`with a server to gain access to sensitive information. The client first transmits a personal security
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`device query to the server (Step 100). In one embodiment, this query includes information
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`necessary to uniquely identify a specific personal security device. In an alternate embodiment,
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`the query includes a request to generate a new personal security device. In one embodiment, the
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`query is received via a computer network. In a further embodiment, the computer network is a
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`local area network. In an alternate embodiment, the computer network is a wide area network.
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`In a further embodiment, the wide area network is the Internet. In one embodiment, the query is
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`received Via an open or unsecured connection. In an alternate embodiment, the query is received
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`via a secured connection. In a further embodiment, the connection is secured by the SSL
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`protocol. In one embodiment, the query does not include any authentication information.
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`The server receives the personal security device query (Step 110), and provides the
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`personal security device to the client (Step 120). In one embodiment, the server provides the
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`personal security device by transmitting it over a computer network. In a further embodiment,
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`the computer network is a local area network. In an alternate embodiment, the computer network
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`is a wide area network. In a further embodiment, the wide area network is the Internet. In one
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`embodiment, the personal security device is transmitted over an open or unsecured connection.
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`In an alternate embodiment, the personal security device is transmitted over a secured
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`connection. In a further embodiment, the connection is secured by the SSL protocol.
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`The client then receives the transmitted personal security device (Step 130) and transmits
`a key query requesting the key to the personal security device (Step 140). The key query includes
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`an unique identifier for the personal security device to be decrypted. The key query also includes
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`authentication information. In one embodiment, the authentication information is the output of
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`an authentication token. In an alternate embodiment, the authentication information is a
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`digitally—signed document. In yet another alternate embodiment, the authentication information
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`is a passphrase. In yet another alternate embodiment, the authentication information is a
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`response to a challenge. In yet another alternate embodiment, the authentication information
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`includes biometric information. In one embodiment, the key query is transmitted via a computer
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`network. In a further embodiment, the computer network is a local area network. In an alternate
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`embodiment, the computer network is a wide area network. In a further embodiment, the wide
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`area network is the Internet. In one embodiment, the key query is transmitted via an open or
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`unsecured connection. In an alternate embodiment, the key query is transmitted via a secured
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`connection. In a further embodiment, the connection is secured by the SSL protocol.
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`The server then receives the key query (Step 150) and determines if the authentication
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`information is correct (Step 160). In one embodiment, the server determines if the authentication
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`information matches the information the server expects to be displayed on an authentication
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`token. In an alternate embodiment, the server verifies the authentication information’s digital
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`signature. In yet another alternate embodiment, the server determines if the authentication
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`information matches a passphrase. In yet another alternate embodiment, the server determines if
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`the authentication information is a correctly calculated response to a challenge. In yet another
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`alternate embodiment, the server determines if the authentication information matches a user’s
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`biometric information.
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`If the authentication information is correct, the server provides the key to the personal
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`security device (Step 170). Otherwise the server refuses to provide the key (Step 180). In one
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`embodiment, the server provides the key by transmitting it over a computer network. In a further
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`embodiment, the computer network is a local area network. In an alternate embodiment, the
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`computer network is a wide area network. In a further embodiment, the wide area network is the
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`Internet. In one embodiment, the key is transmitted over an open or unsecured connection. In an
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`alternate embodiment, the key is transmitted over a secured connection. In a further
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`embodiment, the connection is secured by the SSL protocol.
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`The client receives the key (Step 190) and uses it to decrypt the personal security device
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`(Step 195) thereby gaining access to its contents. In one embodiment, the key is a symmetric key
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`and decryption is performed using a symmetric cipher such as RC4, A4, DES, RC5, Blowfish, or
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`RC6. In an alternate embodiment, the key is a first asymmetric key of a key pair, the personal
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`security device was encrypted with a second key of a key pair, and the decryption is performed
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`using a public-key cryptographic cipher.
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`In one embodiment of this invention, the personal security device may be distributed
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`openly and without any requirement for authentication. In a further embodiment, the key to the
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`personal security device is not distributed openly, but only in response to proper authentication.
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`FIG. 2 illustrates steps taken by a server of this embodiment. The server receives a query for a
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`personal security device (Step 200). In one embodiment, this query includes information
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`necessary to uniquely identify a specific personal security device. In an alternate embodiment,
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`the query includes a request to generate a new personal security device. In one embodiment, the
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`query is received via a computer network. In a further embodiment, the computer network is a
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`local area network. In an alternate embodiment, the computer network is a wide area network.
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`In a further embodiment, the wide area network is the Internet. In one embodiment, the query is
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`received via an open or unsecured connection. In an alternate embodiment, the query is received
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`PCT/U800/19656
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`_ 10 _
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`via a secured connection. In a further embodiment, the connection is secured by the SSL
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`protocol. In one embodiment, the query does not include any authentication information.
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`The server then provides the personal security device (Step 210). In one embodiment, the
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`server provides the personal security device by transmitting it over a computer network. In a
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`fiirther embodiment, the computer network is a local area network. In an alternate embodiment,
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`the computer network is a wide area network. In a further embodiment, the wide area network is
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`the Internet. In one embodiment, the personal security device is transmitted over an open or
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`unsecured connection. In an alternate embodiment, the personal security device is transmitted
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`over a secured connection. In a further embodiment, the connection is secured by the SSL
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`10
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`protocol.
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`The server then receives a key query (Step 220). The key query includes an unique
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`identifier for the personal security device to be decrypted. The key query also includes
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`authentication information. In one embodiment, the authentication information is the output of
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`an authentication token. In an alternate embodiment, the authentication information is a
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`digitally-signed document. In yet another alternate embodiment, the authentication information
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`is a passphrase. In yet another alternate embodiment, the authentication information is a
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`response to a challenge. In yet another alternate embodiment, the authentication information
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`includes biometric information. In one embodiment, the key query is received via a computer
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`network. In a further embodiment, the computer network is a local area network. In an alternate
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`embodiment, the computer network is a wide area network. In a further embodiment, the wide
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`area network is the Internet. In one embodiment, the key query is received via an open or
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`unsecured connection. In an alternate embodiment, the key query is received via a secured
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`connection. In a further embodiment, the connection is secured by the SSL protocol.
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`The server then determines if the authentication information is correct (Step 230). In one
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`embodiment, the server determines if the authentication information matches the information the
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`server expects to be displayed on an authentication token. In an alternate embodiment, the server
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`verifies the authentication information’s digital signature. In yet another alternate embodiment,
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`the server determines if the authentication information matches a passphrase. In yet another
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`alternate embodiment, the server determines if the authentication information is a correctly
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`calculated response to a challenge. In yet another alternate embodiment, the server determines if
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`the authentication information matches a user’s biometric information.
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`|PR2018-00067
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`Unified EX1017 Page 11
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`IPR2018-00067
`Unified EX1017 Page 11
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`WO 01/06699
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`PCT/USOO/19656
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`If the authentication information is correct, the server provides the key to the personal
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`security device (Step 240). Otherwise the server refuses to provide the key (Step 250). In one
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`embodiment, the server provides the key by transmitting it over a computer network. In a further
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`embodiment, the computer network is a local area network. In an alternate embodiment, the
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`computer network is a wide area network. In a further embodiment, the wide area network is the
`
`Internet. In one embodiment, the key is transmitted over an open or unsecured connection. In an
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`alternate embodiment, the key is transmitted over a secured connection. In a further
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`embodiment, the connection is secured by the SSL protocol.
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`Methods of providing proper authentication include but are not limited to entering a
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`password, successfully completing a challenge—response protocol, entering data from an
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`authentication token, and biometric authentication. Characterisitics for biometric authentication
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`can include fingerprints, voice prints, retinal scan, facial features, or the measurement of any
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`physical characteristic associated with a user to be authenticated.
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`FIG. 3 illustrates an embodiment employing a challenge-response protocol. A client
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`requests a specific personal security device by sending a personal security device query (Step
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`300). In one embodiment, this query includes information necessary to uniquely identify a
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`specific personal security device. In an alternate embodiment, the query includes a request to
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`generate a new personal security device. In one embodiment, the query is received via a
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`computer network. In a further embodiment, the computer network is a local area network. In an
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`alternate embodiment, the computer network is a wide area network. In a further embodiment,
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`the wide area network is the Internet. In one embodiment, the query is received v