Case 1:15-cv-01170-GMS Document 241 Filed 07/11/17 Page 1 of 20 PageID #: 11595
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V. and
`U.S. PHILIPS CORPORATION,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC. and
`ASUS COMPUTER INTERNATIONAL,
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`Defendants.
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`KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V. and
`U.S. PHILIPS CORPORATION,
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`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
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`HTC CORP. and
`HTC AMERICA, INC.
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`Defendants.
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`KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V. and
`U.S. PHILIPS CORPORATION,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`V.
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`VISUAL LAND, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`U.S. PHILIPS CORPORATION,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`SOUTHERN TELECOM INC.,
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`C.A. No. 15-1125-GMS
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`C.A. No. 15-1126-GMS
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`C.A. No. 15-1127-GMS
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`C.A. No. 15-1128-GMS
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`Microsoft Ex. 1023
`Microsoft v. Philips - IPR2018-00026
`Page 1 of 7
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`Case 1:15-cv-01170-GMS Document 241 Filed 07/11/17 Page 2 of 20 PageID #: 11596
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`Defendant.
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`KONINKLIJKEPHILIPS N.V. and
`U.S. PHILIPS CORPORATION,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`DOUBLE POWER TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
`ZOWEE MARKETING CO., LTD., and
`SHENZEN ZOWEE TECH. CO., LTD.,
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`Defendants.
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`KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V. and
`U.S. PHILIPS CORPORATION,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`YIF ANG USA, INC., d/b/a
`E-FUN, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V. and
`U.S. PHILIPS CORPORATION,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`ACER INC. and
`ACER AMERICA CORPORATION,
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`Defendants.
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`C.A. No. 15-1130-GMS
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`C.A. No.15-1131-GMS
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`C.A. No. 15-1170-GMS
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`Microsoft Ex. 1023
`Microsoft v. Philips - IPR2018-00026
`Page 2 of 7
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`Case 1:15-cv-01170-GMS Document 241 Filed 07/11/17 Page 3 of 20 PageID #: 11597
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`ORDER CONSTRUING THE TERMS OF U.S. PATENT NOs. RE44,913, 6,690,387,
`7,184,064, 7,529,806, 5,910,797, 6,522,695, 8.;543,819, 9.436,809, 6,772,114, RE43,564 1
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`After having considered the submissions of the parties and hearing oral argument on the
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`matter, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that, as used in the asserted
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`claims ofU.S. Patent Nos. RE 44,913 ("the '913 patent"), 6,690,387 ("the '387 patent"), 7,184,064
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`("the '064 patent"); 7,529,806 ("the '806 patent"), 5,910,797 ("the 797 patent"), 6,522,695 ("the
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`'695 patent"), 8,543,819 ("the '819 patent"), 9,436,809 ("the '809 patent"), 6,772,114 ("the '114
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`patent"), & RE43,564 ("the '564 patent"):2
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`The '913 Patent
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`1.
`
`The court adopts the parties' proposed construction for the term "display area" to
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`mean "region of an electronic screen."3
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`2.
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`The term "keypad" is construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary
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`meaning.4
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`1 All docket citations refer to Civil Action NO. 15-1125-GMS. The abbreviation "Tr." refers to the transcript
`from the Markman Hearing on May 3, 2017, D.I. 143.
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`2 The court does not address indefiniteness contentions at this time.
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`3 The parties' agreed upon the construction of the term "display area" in the Joint Claim Chart. (D.I. 111-2.)
`In the absence of a genuine dispute, the court will not construe this term. See 02 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond
`Innovation Technology Co., Ltd., 521F.3d1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008); US. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d
`1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`4 Defendants propose a construction that limits the claimed "keypad" to "a plurality of keys arranged to
`resemble a numeric entry or phone dialing interface:" The Defendants' citations to the specification are not persuasive.
`(D.I. 118 at 11.) The patentee provided no definition of"keypad" in the specification and no disavowal of QWERTY
`or other non-numeric keypads.
`(D.I. 117 at 2.) Accordingly, the court will not limit the term to a particular
`embodiment disclosed in the specification. Instead, the court construes the term consistent with its plain and, ordinary
`meaning.
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`Microsoft Ex. 1023
`Microsoft v. Philips - IPR2018-00026
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`Case 1:15-cv-01170-GMS Document 241 Filed 07/11/17 Page 5 of 20 PageID #: 11599
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`(1) a microprocessor in conjunction with a computer readable storage medium
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`running a computer program to perform the function, such as the algorithm
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`disclosed at 4:45-5:14, 5:48-67, Figure 5; or (2) dedicated logic circuits, PICmicro
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`chips, or application specific integrated circuits (ASIC) that work with or without
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`such a computer program to perform the function, such as the algorithm disclosed
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`at 4:45-5:15, 5:47-67, Figure 5."6
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`The '387 Patent
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`1.
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`The term "terminating said scrolling motion when one of the conditions
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`comprising the following group of conditions is sensed: (a) a substantially
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`stationary finger touch having a finite duration is sensed; (b) .an end-of-scroll
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`signal is sensed" is construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. 7
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`6 The parties agree that this phrase should be construed under 35 U.S.C § 112, ~ 6, and agree as to the claimed
`function. The only remaining dispute is what constitutes adequate corresponding structure. Plaintiffs propose "a
`touch a screen and either: (1) a microprocessor in conjunction with a computer readable storage medium running a
`computer program to perform the function, such as the algorithm disclosed at 4:45-5:14, 5:48-67, Figure 5; or (2)
`dedicated logic circuits, PICmicro chips, or application specific integrated circuits (ASIC) that works [sic] with or
`without such a computer program to perform the function, such as the algorithm disclosed at 4:45-5:15, 5:47-67,
`Figure 5" as the corresponding structure. The Plaintiffs' citations to the specification provide sufficient structure for
`this function. In contrast, Defendants' construction contains structure-related to displaying-that is not necessary
`for performing the function. (D.1. 131 at 4.) The court therefore adopts Plaintiffs' proposed corresponding structure.
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`7 The parties primarily dispute is whether this term requires "sensing" for both conditions (a) and (b) of the
`claims, or simply one. Markman Hr'g Tr. 42: 1-5; 63:3-5. Plaintiffs' proposed construction largely relies on claim 9,
`which discloses that the sensing is done for a "group of conditions" and that scrolling is terminated when of those
`conditions occurs. (D.I. 117 at 5.) Plaintiffs also rely on the language of dependent claim 10, which states "wherein
`said group of conditions to be sensed for terminating said scrolling motion." '3 87 patent, col. 8 11. 45-46. Defendants
`contend that the plain language of this claim requires performance of only one of these conditions: "terminating said
`scrolling motion when one of the conditions comprising the following group of conditions is sensed." (D .I. 118 at 7)
`(emphasis added). In light of the intrinsic evidence, the court sees no reason to unnecessarily modify the scope of the
`claim by adding the extra step of"sensing for." Thus, the court adopts Defendants' proposed construction.
`
`5
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`Microsoft Ex. 1023
`Microsoft v. Philips - IPR2018-00026
`Page 4 of 7
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`Case 1:15-cv-01170-GMS Document 241 Filed 07/11/17 Page 6 of 20 PageID #: 11600
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`The '064 Patent
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`1.
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`The
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`term "finger
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`touch program
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`instructions associated with said
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`microprocessor for sensing speed, direction, and time duration of a finger
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`touch contact with said display screen" is construed in accordance with its plain
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`and ordinarymeaning. 8
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`2.
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`The term "timer means associated with said microprocessor to provide timing
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`·capacity therefor" is construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary
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`meaning. 9
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`8 The parties dispute whether this term should be construed pursuant to § 35 U.S.C. 112, if 6. There is a
`presumption that a term falls outside § 112, ii 6 where the claim does not employ the word "means." Williamson v.
`Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). While this presumption may be overcome when the claim
`fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing
`that function, the court does not believe that is the case here. Id.
`Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Douglass Schmidt, has supported their assertion that the claim limitation recites
`"program instructions associated with said microprocessor," and a person of ordinary skill in the art ("POSA") would
`understand this language to connote the structure of a software program that is executed by a microprocessor. (D.I.
`117 at 6.) In his declaration, Dr. Schmidt explains: a POSA would understand that "finger touch" refers to a user's
`interaction with a touchscreen, and that "finger touch program instructions" are part of a software program· executed
`by the microprocessor that operates on the information provided from a touchscreen." Id. at 6-7 (citing D.I. 122 'lJ 29).
`Defendants offer no opposing evidence, either intrinsic or extrinsic. Rather, Defendants rely on arguments
`that the claim merely substitutes the word "instructions," that "could encompass any number of different software
`algorithms," for the word "means" and fail to disclose "how the software operates to achieve [the claimed] function."
`(D.I. 118 at 8.) Notably, Defendants seem to concede that the claim language connotes structure by indicating that
`"[t]his limitation describes a special-purpose software running on a microprocessor." (Id. at 8; D.I. 131 at 6.) Because
`Defendants failed to establish clear and convincing evidence that the claim limitation does not provide sufficient
`structure, they cannot overcome the presumption that the claim is not subject to§ 112 ii 6.
`·
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`9 As noted, the court is aware that a term presumptively falls within 35 U.S.C. § 112, ii 6 when the claim
`employs the word "means," Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., Inc., 194 F.3d 1250, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
`but that presumption may be overcome when the claim recites sufficient structure for performing the function. Id.
`The court believes that is the case here.
`Plaintiffs argue that the term connotes sufficient structure for a POSA to perform the claimed function of
`"providing timing capacity therefor," and therefore should be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning. (D.I. 117 at
`9.) The court is convinced that a POSA would interpret a "timer means associated with said microprocessor" to refer
`to specific, well known structure for providing timing capacity for a microprocessor. (Id.) Although Defendants argue
`that patentee "as master of the claim" made a "deliberate choice" to use "timer means" language, Markman Hr'g Tr.
`61:4-8, the court finds that the term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
`F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person
`of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more
`than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.").
`6
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`Microsoft Ex. 1023
`Microsoft v. Philips - IPR2018-00026
`Page 5 of 7
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`Case 1:15-cv-01170-GMS Document 241 Filed 07/11/17 Page 7 of 20 PageID #: 11601
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`3.
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`The term "stopping motion program instructions associated with said
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`microprocessor for terminating scrolling displacement of the image on said
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`screen upon first occurrence of any signal in the group of signals comprising:
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`(a) a substantially stationary finger touch on the screen enduring for a period
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`longer than a preset'minimum time, and (b) an end-of-scroll signal received
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`from said scroll format data source" is construed in accordance with its plain and
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`ordinary meaning. 10
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`The '806 Patent
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`1.
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`The court adopts the parties' proposed construction for the term "alternative flies"
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`to mean "alternative :files;"
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`2.
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`The court adopts the parties' proposed construction for the term ".give" to mean
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`"given.
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`3.
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`The term "media presentation" 1s construed to mean "data having multiple
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`segments." 11
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`10 Like the claim limitation above, supra note 8, this claim limitation does not employ the word "means."
`Again, there is a presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, iJ 6 does not apply. Plaintiffs, relying on the expert declaration of
`Dr. Schmidt, contend:
`the POSA would understand the term to connote structure by sufficiently describing how the claim
`limitation's operation (terminating scrolling displacement) is achieved in the context of the
`invention (through the execution of a software program by the microprocessor which stops the
`scrolling displacement of the images displayed on the screen in response to the first appropriate
`signal it receives from either the touchscreen or the scroll format data source).
`(D.I. 117 at 7.) Defendants fail to effectively refute this contention. The court therefore adopts the plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`11 The court adopts, in part, Plaintiffs' proposed construction of this term. At oral argument, Plaintiffs
`identified two relevant questions: (1) must a "media presentation" have multiple segments and (2) is a "media
`presentation" video or audio data?
`As to the first issue, the court finds that the intrinsic record supports the assertion that media presentation has
`multiple segments. Plaintiffs correctly point out that independent claims 1 and 12 refer to "a given segment of the
`media presentation," suggesting that the invention requires multiple segments. (D.I. 117 at 10.) The Title, Abstract,
`and Summary of The Invention support Plaintiffs' construction. See, e.g., '806 patent, col. 111. 65-66 ("To this end
`7
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`Microsoft Ex. 1023
`Microsoft v. Philips - IPR2018-00026
`Page 6 of 7
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`Case 1:15-cv-01170-GMS Document 241 Filed 07/11/17 Page 8 of 20 PageID #: 11602
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`4.
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`The term "wherein if the determined filed is one of a plurality of files required
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`for the media presentation, the means for parsing comprises means for:
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`concurrent with the media presentation, retrieving a next :file; and using
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`content of the next file to continue the media presentation" is construed to mean
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`"the means for parsing has the capability to: (1) retrieve a next file corresponding
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`to a later segment of a media presentation while an earlier retrieved segment is
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`presented and (2) to use the content of the next file to continue the media
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`presentation." 12
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`5.
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`The term "parsing [the/a] control information file" is construed in accordance
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`with its plain and ordinary meaning. 13
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`the content file is split into multiple parts. Each part or segment requires a relatively short download time."); id. col.
`4 11. 15-16 ("The segmentation of the content file into separately downloadable segments . . . "). Plaintiffs'
`construction-"multiple segments"-aligns with the patent's description of the invention. See Reinshaw PLC
`Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`Second, the intrinsic record demonstrates that media presentation can be "video or audio data." Dependent
`claim 4 discloses "[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the media presentation comprises an audio presentation;"
`dependent claim 5 discloses "[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the media presentation comprises a video presentation."
`'806 patent, col. 6 IL 7-10. The specific dispute, however, is whether media presentation should be limited to just
`those two types of data. Because limitations stated in dependent claims are typically not to be read into the independent
`claim from which they depend, the dependent claims 4-5 do not establish thatthe '806 patent requires the term "media
`presentation" to be exclusively audio or video data. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1242 (Fed. Cir.
`2003) ("Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, dependent claims are presumed to be of narrower scope than the
`independent claims from which they depend."). There is a strong implication that media presentation is not limited to
`audio and video data. As a result, the court believes construing the claim term as "data having multiple segments"
`aligns with the scope of the patent and does not divorce the construction from its claim language.
`
`12 The court adopts Plaintiffs' proposed construction. The specification provides support for this limitation
`in step 110 of Figure 1, labeled "Download Next File Segment & Buffer While Preceding Segment is Being Played
`Out." '806 patent at Fig. l; id. col. 3 11. 14-16 ("In step 110, the next file segment is downloaded at the client and
`stored in a buffer while the previous file segment ... is played out.").
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`13 Plaintiffs argue that the term "parsing" is "a well-understood term in computer science ... relat[ing] to the
`analysis of a computer file," and therefore should be afforded its plain meaning. (D.I. 117 at 11.) Plaintiffs also argue
`that the term "control information file" should be construed in accordance with its plain meaning, because the term is
`not given any specialized meaning in the intrinsic record. (Id.)
`According to Defendants, the prosecution history establishes that the patentee intended "parsing [the/a]
`control information file" to have a specific meaning that distinguished the claimed invention from the prior art. (D.I.
`8
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`Microsoft Ex. 1023
`Microsoft v. Philips - IPR2018-00026
`Page 7 of 7
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